State of Iowa v. Laura Margaret Mangrich

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: July 23, 2025
• Docket: 24-1660
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1660 Filed July 23, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

LAURA MARGARET MANGRICH, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Elizabeth Dupuich,

Judge.

A defendant appeals her sentences for second-degree theft and

unauthorized use of a credit card. AFFIRMED.

Raya D. Dimitrova of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and

Langholz, JJ. 2

LANGHOLZ, Judge.

While serving as treasurer of the Iowa City Girls Softball Association for

three years, Laura Mangrich stole money from the association. She pleaded guilty

to second-degree theft, a class “D” felony, and unauthorized use of a credit card,

an aggravated misdemeanor. See Iowa Code §§ 714.1, 714.2(2), 715A.6(1),

715A.6(2)(c) (2020). In her plea, Mangrich admitted that she took between $1000

and $10,000 of funds from the association and obtained funds of less than $1500

through the credit card. And before her sentencing, she repaid the association

almost $30,000—the full amount the association claimed as pecuniary damages.

At sentencing, she asked the district court to impose deferred judgments. But the

court disagreed, sentencing Mangrich to concurrent suspended sentences—a five-

year suspended sentence on the felony and a two-year suspended sentence on

the misdemeanor. Mangrich now appeals, arguing that the district court abused

its discretion in selecting suspended sentences rather than a deferred judgment.

Seeing no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing decision, we affirm.

We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions, including the

exercise of its discretion whether to grant a deferred judgment, for an abuse of

discretion. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 2023). This

deferential standard of review recognizes that the court’s decision “to impose a

particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption

in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). And even when

the court would have been justified in imposing the sentence sought by the

defendant, “our task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the

district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable 3

grounds.” Id. at 725. So it is not enough that the defendant disagrees with the

court’s weighing of the sentencing factors and the sentence ultimately selected.

See Gordon, 998 N.W.2d at 863 (“The test for whether a sentencing court abused

its discretion is not whether we might have weighed the various factors

differently.”); Iowa Code § 901.5.

The district court did not abuse its discretion here. Mangrich does not point

to any unreasonable or untenable grounds of the court’s decision. Rather, she

argues that the court should have weighed the sentencing factors differently to

reach the conclusion that a deferred judgment was appropriate. She contends it

should have put more weight on—among other things—her substance-use and

mental-health issues, her engagement with treatment for those issues, her

performance on pretrial release, and her efforts to strengthen her relationships with

supportive family.

But the court’s reasoning expressed at the sentencing hearing and the

written sentencing order shows that it considered these factors. It also carefully

explained why it disagreed with her request for deferred judgments:

It does appear the Defendant has made significant gains in repairing the damage she has caused and in improving her circumstances. This is with the unwavering support of her family. This is why she’s not spending any time in jail. This is the break she’s getting, and I’m sure she appreciates it very much. But the Court can’t ignore the fact that her scheme spanned approximately three and a half years throughout which she repeatedly breached her position of trust in executing countless decisions and demonstrating relatively sophisticated deception to deprave a nonprofit which supports female athletes. A large part of my job in protecting the community is keeping people from committing crimes of this nature. While I sincerely appreciate the request for a deferred judgment and the excellent arguments advanced by [Mangrich’s trial counsel] with a very impressive presentation, I don’t believe the goals can be met with a 4

deferred judgment. I’m going to deny the request for a deferred judgment based on all of the information that I was just provided.

And the court summed up its judgment “that the sentences and convictions

imposed will offer Defendant the maximum opportunity for rehabilitation balanced

against the need to protect the community from future offenses by Defendant and

others.” Seeing no abuse of discretion in this exercise of the district court’s

sentencing judgment, we affirm Mangrich’s sentences.

AFFIRMED.