State of Iowa v. Lance Emanuel Battiste

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: July 2, 2025
• Docket: 24-1800
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1800 Filed July 2, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

LANCE EMANUEL BATTISTE, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Thomas P. Murphy,

Judge.

A defendant appeals his sentence for second-degree theft. SENTENCE

VACATED AND CASE REMANDED.

Austin Jungblut of Parrish Kruidenier L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and

Langholz, JJ. 2

LANGHOLZ, Judge.

In selecting Lance Battiste’s suspended prison sentence—rather than the

deferred judgment Battiste wanted or the incarceration urged by the State—the

district court relied on the nature of his “sophisticated crime.” Battiste argues that

this was error because while the minutes of testimony described a sophisticated

scheme of stealing the victim’s identity to wire $88,641.29 from the victim’s line of

credit to a bank account held by Battiste—constituting identify theft and first-degree

theft—he did not admit to this conduct when pleading guilty to second-degree theft

nor did the State otherwise prove it. We agree. So we must vacate the sentence

and remand for resentencing by the district court without consideration of this

unproven conduct.

I.

Battiste pleaded guilty to second-degree theft in violation of Iowa Code

sections 714.1(1) and 714.2(2) (2021) as a part of a plea deal resolving his charges

for identity theft and first-degree theft. In his written guilty plea, he admitted:

I received and exercised control over property (money) that was stolen and I had reasonable cause to believe that the money had been stolen. I had the intent to permanently deprive its owner of it and did not take any steps to return the property to him and instead spent it on goods for myself. The money I spent was $8,641.29.

His plea also agreed “that a jury could find me guilty on each charge for which I

am pleading guilty if the witnesses testified as set forth in the minutes of testimony”

and that “[t]he court may rely on the minutes of testimony for a further factual basis

for my guilty plea.” The plea did not include any other admission that the minutes

of testimony are true. 3

Those minutes describe that a victim living in Dallas County discovered that

his credit union had extended him $88,641.29 on a $90,000 line of credit that he

had opened for emergencies but never used. On further investigation, the credit

union’s fraud department said that someone had called in and changed his phone

number and email associated with the accounts, correctly giving proper pass

codes and answers to security questions. And then, a transaction was made

drawing down from the line of credit to the victim’s savings account. “An electronic

document was sent to the [newly updated] email address to gather an electronic

signature,” and the credit union received back a signature and completed the

transaction. Then, the money was transferred from the savings account by wire

transfer to a bank account at another institution.

The minutes also describe that the wire-transfer request was initiated from

an IP address for a hotel in Houston, Texas. Battiste was not on the list of guests

checked into the hotel at the time of the request. But Battiste was the holder of the

bank account receiving the funds. And he lived near Dallas, Texas. The bank

account’s statements showed that over the week after the funds were wired to the

account, they were withdrawn in various ways. That included a debit-card

transaction at a Dallas-area store buying a $2100 luxury bag, which was seen

being held by Battiste’s wife in multiple social media posts.

The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) did not include a full description

of the official version or the victim’s version of the offense. Rather, it just said “See

Trial Information and Minutes of Testimony” for the official version and “See

Minutes of Testimony” for the victim’s version. But Battiste gave a statement of

his version of the offense that was included in the PSI in full: “I met a guy who said 4

he would invest in a trucking company I wanted to start. He said he could help me

get a truck under my LLC. So I gave him my account information and he said he

would put money in the account.”

At sentencing, the prosecutor argued for a five-year prison sentence. She

urged the court to look to the minutes of testimony, emphasizing that they showed

that Battiste “called” the victim’s credit union, “changed a number of questions,”

and “used the [victim’s] information to access that line of credit.” And she argued

that these facts showing “how this crime was committed” were “particularly

concerning” because Battiste had worked at “a finance establishment” and for an

insurance company since “[t]hose are places where the defendant would have

access to a lot of personal information of people who hold accounts in those

establishments, things like: social security numbers, addresses, bank account

numbers, routing numbers.”

Battiste did not acquiesce to this reliance on the minutes of testimony. In

arguing for a deferred judgment, his attorney reiterated that he “pled guilty to a

theft in the second degree, not to everything that he has been charged with.” She

emphasized that Battiste “will acknowledge his part of this crime,” but “there is a

reason why you’re not getting any of that evidence that is alleged . . . in the

Minutes.” And she urged the need “to be very clear to what he pled guilty to versus

what has been laid out in the State’s argument today.”

In his allocution too, Battiste reaffirmed his statement in the PSI, rejecting

the State’s version of the facts:

I came across a guy who was willing to invest in a company for me. And it turned out to be—to not be what—what he said [it] was. . . . I guess you can kind of say I’ve been very sheltered because . . . I 5

have, you know, a small type of community that . . . I usually, you know, hang around with. . . . [S]o once meeting other people and kind of—I kind of just take people at what they say.

...

The honest truth was I honestly thought that someone was going to be investing. But of course I—the reason why I took the plea is because when I looked at it I’m like, okay. Once [my attorney] explained to me the law as far as theft and your part in theft, I kind of looked at, like, okay, well, receiving funds that are stolen that I might be iffy about is wrong. And I feel like, you know, I definitely need to be—need to take responsibility for that.

Ultimately, the district court rejected both parties’ sentencing

recommendations and imposed a suspended five-year prison sentence. As part

of its explanation for the decision, the court reasoned, “I can’t undermine the nature

of this offense. It’s a sophisticated crime. You should have known better at your

age. And you’re obviously an intelligent guy. So I’m somewhat concerned about

that.” And the court reiterated again when explaining its decision not to grant a

deferred judgment, “The reason I’m not ordering a deferred is because of the

nature of the crime. Okay? It’s fairly sophisticated. It will prohibit you from

working—the conviction will prohibit you from working in the financial or insurance

industries under the federal Crime Control Act of 1994.”

Battiste now appeals his suspended sentence, arguing that the district court

improperly relied on unproven criminal activity described in the minutes of

testimony in considering the nature of offense. He also argues that the court

improperly considered only the nature of the offense in selecting the sentence. But

we address only the first argument because it fully resolves this appeal. 6

II.

We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions for an abuse

of discretion. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 2023). This

deferential standard of review recognizes that the court’s decision “to impose a

particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption

in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). And “our task

on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to

determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 725.

Even so, a court “cannot consider unproven or unprosecuted offenses in

fashioning a defendant’s sentence unless the defendant admits them or facts are

presented to prove them.” State v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608, 616 (Iowa 2024)

(cleaned up). This includes “[i]nformation contained in the minutes of testimony”

unless the facts “are admitted to or otherwise established as true.” State v. Lovell,

857 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Iowa 2014) (cleaned up). “[W]here portions of the minutes

are not necessary to establish a factual basis for the guilty plea, they are denied

by the defendant, and they are otherwise unproved, we find no basis to allow the

sentencing court to consider and rely on these portions.” State v. Black, 324

N.W.2d 313, 316 (Iowa 1982). Indeed, relying on such an improper consideration

in sentencing is an abuse of discretion that requires resentencing, “even if it was

merely a secondary consideration.” Schooley, 13 N.W.3d at 618 (cleaned up). But

a defendant has the burden to “show that the sentencing court relied on improper

evidence.” State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554, 572 (Iowa 2018).

Here, the district court twice discussed its reliance on the “sophisticated”

nature of Battiste’s criminal conduct. First, when discussing all the factors it 7

considered when selecting the sentence. And then again when reasoning that a

deferred judgment was not appropriate because an actual conviction would

prohibit him “from working in the financial or insurance industries under the federal

Crime Control Act of 1994.” Problem is, there is nothing “sophisticated” about the

factual circumstances that Battiste admitted to in his guilty plea, during the

presentence investigation, or at the sentencing hearing. He only admitted that he

received stolen money—by giving his account information to “a guy who said he

would invest in a trucking company [he] wanted to start”—with reasonable cause

to believe that it had been stolen and then spent nearly $9000 on goods for himself.

The “sophisticated crime” is described only in the minutes of testimony.

There, we see information suggesting that Battiste took control of another person’s

credit-union accounts by using the victim’s personal information to change the

email and phone numbers associated with the accounts. It also suggests Battiste

then drew down nearly $90,000 from the victim’s line-of-credit account at the credit

union and wired the money to a bank account held by Battiste. And it alleges he

withdrew all the money in various ways from the bank account over the next

several days before closing it. Based on these allegations, Battiste had originally

been charged with identity theft and first-degree theft. See Iowa Code §§ 715A.8,

714.1(1), 714.2(1). But he did not plead guilty to those offenses. He did not admit

that he engaged in any of that conduct. And no evidence was submitted to prove

the conduct. So the court could not consider it. See Black, 324 N.W.2d at 316.

In arguing otherwise, the State points out that Battiste agreed in his guilty

plea “[t]he court may rely on the minutes of testimony for a further factual basis for

my guilty plea” and agreed at sentencing that district court could use the PSI— 8

which referred to the minutes of testimony rather than describing the official version

or victim’s version of the offense. But those are not admissions from Battiste to

the unproven criminal conduct alleged in the minutes. The parts of the minutes

referring to how Battiste allegedly gained control of the victim’s accounts and wired

money were not necessary to establish a factual basis for his guilty plea to

receiving and spending the stolen money in his account. See State v. Gonzalez,

582 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Iowa 1998). And even assuming that the cross-references

to the minutes in PSI would be enough to let the court rely on the minutes if left

unchallenged, see State v. Chawech, 15 N.W.3d 78, 85 (Iowa 2024), Battiste did

challenge that version of the facts. The PSI included Battiste’s statement refuting

that version of the offense. And Battiste and his attorney both highlighted to the

court at sentencing that he had not admitted to the conduct described in the

minutes that the State was urging the court to consider.

Yet the district court still accepted the State’s invitation and considered the

unproven conduct in the minutes of testimony. We see no other possible basis for

the court’s repeated reasoning about the “sophisticated” nature of Battiste’s

offense. And so, Battiste has met his burden to show that the court relied on an

improper consideration. We must thus vacate the sentence and remand for

resentencing.

SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED.

Tabor, C.J., concurs; Ahlers, J., dissents. 9

AHLERS, Judge (dissenting).

I don’t see the problem the majority sees that results in vacation of Lance

Battiste’s sentence. Part of the reason I do not see the problem is because I do

not take as expansive a view of the district court’s use of the word “sophisticated”

in describing Battiste’s crime.

Battiste pleaded guilty to an amended charge of theft in the second degree

for possessing stolen property. One of the elements of that offense is that Battiste

had to know or have reasonable cause to believe that the property over which he

exercised control was stolen. See Iowa Code § 714.1(4) (2021); Iowa Crim. Jury

Instructions 1400.3. To establish the factual basis for that and other elements of

his crime, in his written guilty plea, Battiste consented to the court “rely[ing] on the

minutes of testimony for a further factual basis for [his] guilty plea.”

So what do the minutes tell us about the factual basis and, in particular,

about the element of the crime that the money over which Battiste exercised

control was stolen? They tell us that someone stole money from the victim by

changing the victim’s email address and phone number linked to the victim’s line

of credit at a financial institution, initiating an unauthorized transaction drawing on

the line of credit, and transferring the misappropriated funds to an account in Texas

held by Battiste. Battiste admitted these facts by consenting to the court relying

on the minutes to establish a factual basis. While Battiste did not admit to being

the person who stole the money, he admitted he exercised control over the money

stolen via the described scheme. With that admission, Battiste was a party to a

crime that can be reasonably described as “sophisticated.” Unlike the majority, I

do not view mere reference to Battiste’s crime as “sophisticated” to somehow 10

indicate that the district court reached a conclusion that Battiste is the one who

stole the money. And its Battiste’s burden to affirmatively show that the court relied

on improper evidence. See State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554, 572 (Iowa 2018).

Battiste failed to make this showing. The court never said Battiste stole the money.

All the court said was that the crime was sophisticated. And, in comparison to

many of the crimes we see, it was. I see nothing about that word choice that leads

to the conclusion that the court was viewing Battiste as the person who stole the

money as opposed to being the person who received it.

As I see no affirmative showing that the district court considered unproved

charges or improper factors and find no merit in Battiste’s other arguments, I find

no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing decision. As such, I would

affirm, and I respectfully dissent from the decision to vacate Battiste’s sentence.