IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0459 Filed May 3, 2017
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KIERRA BENTLEY, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joseph M.
Moothart, District Associate Judge.
Kierra Bentley appeals following her convictions for disorderly conduct,
interference with official acts, and assault on a peace officer. AFFIRMED.
Michael H. Johnson of Johnson Law Firm, Spirit Lake, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ. 2
BOWER, Judge.
Kierra Bentley appeals following her convictions for disorderly conduct,
interference with official acts, and assault on a peace officer. Bentley claims the
district court improperly allowed the State to introduce a video recording of her
post-arrest behavior into evidence and improperly denied her motion for new trial.
We hold the video recording was properly allowed into evidence and the district
court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a new trial. We affirm the
district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On January 27, 2015, Bentley drove to West High School in Waterloo to
pick up her brother. She found him and his cousin fighting with a group who
were not students. A group of more than twenty people had gathered with some
involved in the fight, some attempting to stop the fight, and some watching. An
off-duty Waterloo police officer, Kyle Jurgensen, drove by West High School,
noticed the fight, called 911 to request help, and ran to stop the fight.
As he arrived at the scene, Jurgensen saw Bentley spit on a man
attempting to break up the fight. Jurgensen testified he showed her his badge,
identified himself as a police officer, and directed her to leave the crowd as she
was under arrest. Bentley did not respond to his direction, cursed at him, and
attempted to leave the scene. Jurgensen “took control of her” and moved her out
of the crowd and toward the curb.
Jurgensen forced Bentley into a sitting position once they were outside the
perimeter of the group. He testified he stood over her, keeping her down and 3
holding his badge. At some point, Jurgensen was distracted, and Bentley was
able to get up and began walking away. Jurgensen again attempted to restrain
her, and Bentley kicked him twice. Other officers arrived on the scene, and
Bentley was arrested. Bentley maintains she did not hear Jurgensen identify
himself and was not aware he was a police officer.
Shortly before the case was scheduled for trial, the prosecution notified
Bentley a video recording had been located that had not previously been
included in discovery. Trial was continued for a short period of time to allow the
prosecution to amend the minutes of evidence and for Bentley to review the
recording. After some confusion, Bentley and her trial counsel were able to see
the video. In the recording, Bentley uses profanity and derogatory language
while deriding the Waterloo Police Department. Over Bentley’s objections, the
recording was admitted into evidence.
On December 8, 2015, the case proceeded to trial. On December 10,
Bentley was found guilty on all three charges. Bentley filed a motion for new trial
and in arrest of judgment, which were denied. She was sentenced February 26,
2016, and filed a notice of appeal March 8. On May 13, the Iowa Supreme Court
granted Bentley’s application for discretionary review of her simple misdemeanor
convictions and consolidated the appeals under the current case number.
II. Standard of Review
District courts’ evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 476 (Iowa 2013). “Ordinarily the grant or
denial of a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, 4
reviewable on appeal only for abuse of that discretion.” State v. Belt, 505
N.W.2d 182, 184 (Iowa 1993).
III. Objection to Evidence
Bentley claims the recording was erroneously admitted into evidence.
She claims the recording violated the Iowa rules of criminal procedure, was
irrelevant, and was unfairly prejudicial.
a. Violation of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure
Bentley first claims the State violated the Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure
2.14(5), rendering the video recording inadmissible. Bentley made discovery
requests in March 2015, at which time the State turned over evidence, including
a video recording that was not offered at trial. However, shortly before trial was
scheduled to begin, the State notified Bentley a second video recording had been
discovered. The district court granted a continuance to allow Bentley time to
view the video and allow the State to amend the minutes of evidence. Bentley’s
counsel believed a copy of the video would be made available; however, the
State had offered to allow Bentley and her counsel to view the recording at the
prosecutor’s office or request a copy from the Waterloo Police Department. This
confusion resulted in less time to view the video.
Bentley does not claim she had insufficient time to review the evidence or
she was unduly and unfairly surprised by the introduction of the recording.
Bentley’s only claim is the State failed to sufficiently comply with the rules of
criminal procedure. However, the “reasons for failure to provide timely discovery
may properly be considered by the court.” State v. Leto, 305 N.W.2d 482, 489 5
(Iowa 1981). Additionally, our supreme court has afforded “considerable
discretion to the trial court in enforcing the discovery rules.” Id. The State
described the cause of the delay in locating the video to the trial court, and the
trial court, after due consideration, found a continuance to be an adequate
remedy. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
b. Relevancy
Bentley next claims the recording should not have been admitted because
it was irrelevant to the issues at trial. Evidence is relevant when it has “any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence” and “[t]he fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Iowa R.
Evid. 5.401. The test to determine admissibility is “whether a reasonable
[person] might believe the probability of the truth of the consequential fact to be
different if he knew of the proffered evidence.” State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226,
229 (Iowa 1988) (citations omitted)).
The State was required to prove Bentley had the specific intent to assault
Jurgensen. The jury instructions stated “‘[s]pecific intent’ means not only being
aware of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it with a
specific purpose in mind.” In the recording, Bentley made statements regarding
her opinions on the Waterloo Police Department, her perception of the fight, and
her state of mind at the time she kicked Jurgenson. We hold the district court did
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0459 Filed May 3, 2017
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KIERRA BENTLEY, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joseph M.
Moothart, District Associate Judge.
Kierra Bentley appeals following her convictions for disorderly conduct,
interference with official acts, and assault on a peace officer. AFFIRMED.
Michael H. Johnson of Johnson Law Firm, Spirit Lake, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ. 2
BOWER, Judge.
Kierra Bentley appeals following her convictions for disorderly conduct,
interference with official acts, and assault on a peace officer. Bentley claims the
district court improperly allowed the State to introduce a video recording of her
post-arrest behavior into evidence and improperly denied her motion for new trial.
We hold the video recording was properly allowed into evidence and the district
court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a new trial. We affirm the
district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On January 27, 2015, Bentley drove to West High School in Waterloo to
pick up her brother. She found him and his cousin fighting with a group who
were not students. A group of more than twenty people had gathered with some
involved in the fight, some attempting to stop the fight, and some watching. An
off-duty Waterloo police officer, Kyle Jurgensen, drove by West High School,
noticed the fight, called 911 to request help, and ran to stop the fight.
As he arrived at the scene, Jurgensen saw Bentley spit on a man
attempting to break up the fight. Jurgensen testified he showed her his badge,
identified himself as a police officer, and directed her to leave the crowd as she
was under arrest. Bentley did not respond to his direction, cursed at him, and
attempted to leave the scene. Jurgensen “took control of her” and moved her out
of the crowd and toward the curb.
Jurgensen forced Bentley into a sitting position once they were outside the
perimeter of the group. He testified he stood over her, keeping her down and 3
holding his badge. At some point, Jurgensen was distracted, and Bentley was
able to get up and began walking away. Jurgensen again attempted to restrain
her, and Bentley kicked him twice. Other officers arrived on the scene, and
Bentley was arrested. Bentley maintains she did not hear Jurgensen identify
himself and was not aware he was a police officer.
Shortly before the case was scheduled for trial, the prosecution notified
Bentley a video recording had been located that had not previously been
included in discovery. Trial was continued for a short period of time to allow the
prosecution to amend the minutes of evidence and for Bentley to review the
recording. After some confusion, Bentley and her trial counsel were able to see
the video. In the recording, Bentley uses profanity and derogatory language
while deriding the Waterloo Police Department. Over Bentley’s objections, the
recording was admitted into evidence.
On December 8, 2015, the case proceeded to trial. On December 10,
Bentley was found guilty on all three charges. Bentley filed a motion for new trial
and in arrest of judgment, which were denied. She was sentenced February 26,
2016, and filed a notice of appeal March 8. On May 13, the Iowa Supreme Court
granted Bentley’s application for discretionary review of her simple misdemeanor
convictions and consolidated the appeals under the current case number.
II. Standard of Review
District courts’ evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 476 (Iowa 2013). “Ordinarily the grant or
denial of a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, 4
reviewable on appeal only for abuse of that discretion.” State v. Belt, 505
N.W.2d 182, 184 (Iowa 1993).
III. Objection to Evidence
Bentley claims the recording was erroneously admitted into evidence.
She claims the recording violated the Iowa rules of criminal procedure, was
irrelevant, and was unfairly prejudicial.
a. Violation of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure
Bentley first claims the State violated the Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure
2.14(5), rendering the video recording inadmissible. Bentley made discovery
requests in March 2015, at which time the State turned over evidence, including
a video recording that was not offered at trial. However, shortly before trial was
scheduled to begin, the State notified Bentley a second video recording had been
discovered. The district court granted a continuance to allow Bentley time to
view the video and allow the State to amend the minutes of evidence. Bentley’s
counsel believed a copy of the video would be made available; however, the
State had offered to allow Bentley and her counsel to view the recording at the
prosecutor’s office or request a copy from the Waterloo Police Department. This
confusion resulted in less time to view the video.
Bentley does not claim she had insufficient time to review the evidence or
she was unduly and unfairly surprised by the introduction of the recording.
Bentley’s only claim is the State failed to sufficiently comply with the rules of
criminal procedure. However, the “reasons for failure to provide timely discovery
may properly be considered by the court.” State v. Leto, 305 N.W.2d 482, 489 5
(Iowa 1981). Additionally, our supreme court has afforded “considerable
discretion to the trial court in enforcing the discovery rules.” Id. The State
described the cause of the delay in locating the video to the trial court, and the
trial court, after due consideration, found a continuance to be an adequate
remedy. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
b. Relevancy
Bentley next claims the recording should not have been admitted because
it was irrelevant to the issues at trial. Evidence is relevant when it has “any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence” and “[t]he fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Iowa R.
Evid. 5.401. The test to determine admissibility is “whether a reasonable
[person] might believe the probability of the truth of the consequential fact to be
different if he knew of the proffered evidence.” State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226,
229 (Iowa 1988) (citations omitted)).
The State was required to prove Bentley had the specific intent to assault
Jurgensen. The jury instructions stated “‘[s]pecific intent’ means not only being
aware of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it with a
specific purpose in mind.” In the recording, Bentley made statements regarding
her opinions on the Waterloo Police Department, her perception of the fight, and
her state of mind at the time she kicked Jurgenson. We hold the district court did
not abuse its discretion by finding the recording was relevant. 6
c. Unfair Prejudice
Bentley also claims the recording should not have been admitted as any
probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice. The district court “may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. To determine if evidence is more
probative than prejudicial “we consider the probative value of the evidence” and
then “balance the probative value against the danger of its prejudicial or wrongful
effect upon the triers of fact.” State v. Huston, 825 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Iowa 2013)
(internal quotations marks and citations omitted). “Evidence that appeals to a
jury’s sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or
triggers other mainsprings of human actions what may cause a jury to base its
decision on something other than the established propositions in the case is
evidence that is unfairly prejudicial.” Plaster, 424 N.W. 2d at 231.
The video depicts Bentley in an agitated state, using profanity, and making
derogatory comments against police officers and the Waterloo Police
Department. Bentley claims any slight probative value the video has is
outweighed by the unfair prejudice it creates. The State contends the recording
provided the jury with evidence of Bentley’s mental state near the time of the
incident and provided evidence Bentley had specific intent. The State also notes
Bentley was able to testify she was agitated at the time of the recording due to
the circumstances preceding her arrest. The jury was free to believe Bentley’s 7
statements were made in the aftermath of an adrenaline-fueled situation where
she was defending her brother.
At the hearing to determine the admissibility of the recording, the district
court stated “it appears that the contents of that videotape would be relevant with
respect, at least, to the issue of intent. . . . I am also finding that the probative
value of that evidence, particularly on the issue of intent, is not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” The evidence had probative
value which the district court weighed against the possibility of prejudice. The
district court did not abuse its discretion.
IV. Motion for New Trial
Bentley finally claims the district court improperly applied the weight of the
evidence standard. The proper question before the district court is whether the
verdict is “contrary to the weight of the evidence.” State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d
199, 201 (Iowa 2003). We are limited to a review of the district court’s exercise
of discretion. Id. at 203. “The motion [for new trial] is addressed to the discretion
of the court, which should be exercised with caution, and the power to grant a
new trial on this ground should be invoked only in exceptional cases in which the
evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” See State v. Ellis, 578
N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 1998) (citation omitted).
While Bentley correctly points to many pieces of evidence which tend to
exonerate her, including the fact Jurgensen was in plain clothes and conditions
were described as riot-like, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Evidence was presented showing Bentley had the specific intent to assault a 8
peace officer, including statements from Jurgensen and Bentley herself. The
verdict was not contrary to the weight of the evidence.
AFFIRMED.