State of Iowa v. Kevin Charles Lind

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: June 19, 2026
• Docket: 25-0821
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 25–0821

Submitted April 21, 2026—Filed June 19, 2026

State of Iowa,

Appellant,

vs.

Kevin Charles Lind,

Appellee.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Paul D. Scott, judge.

The State appeals the dismissal of a human trafficking charge under Iowa

Code section 710A.2 (2024). Affirmed.

Per curiam.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven (argued), Assistant

Attorney General, for appellant.

Jonathan M. Causey (argued) of Causey & Ye Law, P.L.L.C., Des Moines,

and Paul J. Statler of Babich Sarcone, P.L.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee. 2

This is a companion case to State v. Lind (Lind I), ___ N.W.3d ___, ___ (Iowa

2026). In this case, as in Lind I, Kevin Lind is charged with human trafficking in

violation of Iowa Code section 710A.2(1) (2024). In this case, as in Lind I, the

State accuses Lind of violating that statute by “knowingly . . . attempting to

purchase services involving commercial sexual activity from a victim or another

person engaged in human trafficking.” Id. § 710A.1(4)(b). In this case, as in Lind

I, it is undisputed that Lind did not negotiate to purchase services involving

commercial sexual activity from any actual “victim,” a term that the statute

defines as a “person subjected to human trafficking.” Id. § 710A.1(13). Also, it is

undisputed that Lind did not negotiate to purchase services involving

commercial sexual activity from any other “person” who was actually “engaged

in human trafficking.” Id. § 710A.1(4)(b). Accordingly, the district court

dismissed the human trafficking charge.

As the State points out, though, the trial information and minutes of

testimony allege that Lind negotiated with a prostitute who had represented to

Lind that she would provide a minor for sexual activity in exchange for money.

Yet, after the prostitute was deposed, the State conceded that she had actually

been lying to Lind.1 She was never really going to provide the minor, the State

conceded. Even so, the State alleges, Lind believed the prostitute’s

representations and intended to act on them. And if those alleged facts were

proven, the State argues, they would be enough to show that Lind engaged in

1Ordinarily, a motion to dismiss a charge in a trial information would rise or fall on the

facts alleged in the minutes and trial information, which we would accept as true. See State v. Gonzalez, 718 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Iowa 2006) (“We accept the facts alleged by the State in the trial information and attached minutes as true.”). We would accept those alleged facts as true regardless of what witnesses might say in their depositions. This situation is special, however, because the State conceded in the district court that the prostitute was never actually going to provide a minor to Lind. 3

human trafficking under the “attempting to purchase” definition. Id. This is true,

the State says, even though the prostitute was not actually “engaged in human

trafficking” and the minor was not actually a “victim,” that is, a person “subjected

to human trafficking.” Id. § 710A.1(4)(b), (13).

We rejected this approach in Lind I, ___ N.W.3d at ___. Instead, we

concluded that the 2024 version of the statute—under which Lind was charged

in both cases—was violated only if a defendant attempted to purchase sex

services from an actual victim or another person actually engaged in human

trafficking. Id. at ___. Here, it is undisputed that Lind did neither. Therefore, Lind

did not violate Iowa Code section 710A.2(1), and the district court was correct to

grant Lind’s motion to dismiss. We affirm.

Affirmed.

This opinion shall not be published.