State of Iowa v. Kenneth Edwin Barnes

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: December 18, 2024
• Docket: 23-2042
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-2042 Filed December 18, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

KENNETH EDWIN BARNES, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, John J. Sullivan,

Judge.

Kenneth Edwin Barnes appeals his sentences after pleading guilty to

possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine and possession of marijuana,

third or subsequent offense. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ. 2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Kenneth Edwin Barnes appeals his sentences after pleading guilty to

possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine and possession of marijuana,

third or subsequent offense. Barnes contends the sentencing court abused its

discretion by considering a plea agreement that Barnes claims was no longer in

effect at the time of sentencing. Because the district court accepted Barnes’s guilty

pleas and denied his motion in arrest of judgment, the sentencing court did not

abuse its discretion by considering the plea agreement in sentencing Barnes.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Barnes was facing three criminal charges when his attorney negotiated a

plea agreement with the State. Barnes agreed to plead guilty to one charge and

a lesser included offense of another in exchange for the State dismissing the third

charge and two simple misdemeanor cases. The agreement called for consecutive

ten-year and five-year sentences and was conditioned on the district court’s

concurrence.

The district court held the plea hearing the same day that Barnes signed the

written plea agreement. During the plea colloquy, Barnes agreed that his attorney

did not threaten or coerce him into pleading guilty. Finding that Barnes’s plea was

knowing and voluntary and supported by a factual basis, the court agreed it would

“not sentence [Barnes] to anything worse than what [he] bargained for” and set a

date for sentencing.

Within one month of the plea hearing, Barnes asked the court to appoint

him new counsel and moved in arrest of judgment, alleging his first attorney

coerced his guilty plea. The court appointed Barnes a new attorney but denied his 3

request to withdraw his pleas. At the sentencing hearing, Barnes again cited

alleged deficiencies in his first attorney’s performance and asked the court to

deviate from the plea agreement and suspend his sentences. The court noted that

Barnes signed a written plea agreement that fully explained the terms, and it

sentenced Barnes according to the agreement.

II. Discussion.

On appeal, Barnes challenges his sentences. Although we review

sentencing decisions for correction of errors at law, we only reverse for “an abuse

of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.” State v. Damme, 944

N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted). Barnes contends that the district

court abused its sentencing discretion by relying on the written plea agreement.

He claims that the plea agreement is an improper factor because the parties were

no longer in agreement as to the sentence, as shown by Barnes moving in arrest

of judgment.

Before we can reach the merits of his claim, Barnes must show good cause

to appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3). Good cause means a “legally

sufficient reason.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 104 (quoting Good Cause, Black’s Law

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)). Good cause exists when a defendant challenges the

sentence imposed after pleading guilty rather than the plea itself. Id. at 105. A

defendant has good cause to appeal “a discretionary sentence that was neither

mandatory nor agreed to as part of [a] plea bargain.” Id. The State argues that

Barnes cannot show good cause because the district court followed the written

plea agreement in imposing sentence. In other words, the State claims that Barnes

got exactly what he bargained for. We have dismissed appeals from guilty pleas 4

in similar circumstances. See State v. Swington, No. 23-0383, 2023 WL 8448499,

at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023) (collecting cases). But Barnes alleges the plea

agreement was no longer in effect at the time of sentencing. Thus, whether Barnes

received the benefit of what he bargained for is at issue. Regardless of the merits

of Barnes’s claim, he has established good cause to appeal. See id. (holding that

defendant established good cause to appeal by complaining that he did not get

what he bargained for despite the court rejecting his claim).

Turning to the merits, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

considering and following the sentences agreed on in the written plea agreement.

If a defendant withdraws a guilty plea, “the content of any plea discussions and

any resulting plea agreement, plea, or judgment shall be inadmissible in any

proceeding.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(4). Barnes tried to withdraw his plea by moving

in arrest of judgment, but the district court denied the motion. Barnes did not apply

for discretionary review of that denial, see Iowa Code § 814.6(2)(f) (allowing

discretionary review of an order denying a motion in arrest of judgment on grounds

other than ineffective assistance of counsel), and he does not challenge it now,

see e.g., State v. Scott, No. 20-1453, 2022 WL 610570, at *3–5 (Iowa Ct. App.

Mar. 2, 2022) (granting defendant’s request to consider notice of appeal as an

application for discretionary review of district court’s denial of his motion in arrest

of judgment in appeal challenging knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty pleas).

The ruling stands, as do the pleas. Because Barnes never withdrew his guilty

pleas, the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering the written plea

agreement at the sentencing hearing. We therefore affirm his sentences.

AFFIRMED.