State of Iowa v. Kami Marie Lillibridge

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: February 22, 2023
• Docket: 21-1628
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-1628 Filed February 22, 2023

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

KAMI MARIE LILLIBRIDGE, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert Hanson, Judge.

The district court prohibited the defendant from carrying a firearm following

her conviction for possession of a controlled substance, first offense (marijuana),

which the defendant challenges. VACATED AND REMANDED.

Fred Stiefel, Victor, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., Badding, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023). 2

POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.

In August 2021, Kami Lillibridge was charged by trial information with

possession of a controlled substance, first offense (marijuana). Lillibridge later

filed a written guilty plea; she waived her right to be present at plea proceedings

and sentencing.

On September 30, the district court accepted the guilty plea, adjudged

Lillibridge guilty, and sentenced her to forty-eight hours in jail. The sentencing-

order form contained the following, which the district court left blank:

Yet, also on September 30, the court entered an order notifying Lillibridge it “issued

an order or judgment by which [she] lost firearm rights because [she] met one or

more of the following criteria . . . : Unlawful drug user or addict.”

Lillibridge appeals, arguing the district court cannot prohibit her from

acquiring or carrying a firearm without first making a finding that she meets the

criteria of an “unlawful user or addict” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The State, in 3

response, urges us to find we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.1 It maintains

that, after pleading guilty to a crime other than a class “A” felony, Lillibridge has

not shown good cause to raise this issue on appeal. See Iowa Code

§ 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2021).

Good Cause. As we must, we start with the question of good cause. See

State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 149 (Iowa 2021) (“It is our duty to reject an

appeal not authorized by statute.” (citation omitted)). Lillibridge characterizes the

firearm prohibition as part of a sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed

upon and, relying on State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020), asserts

she has good cause for this appeal. The State, on the other hand, argues the

firearm prohibition is a collateral consequence of Lillibridge’s conviction, not a part

of the sentence. But whether the firearm prohibition is part of Lillibridge’s sentence

does not necessarily answer whether she has good cause—good cause for a

direct appeal is not limited to sentencing issues. Cf. State v. Newman, 970 N.W.2d

866, 870 (Iowa 2022) (finding good cause to consider defendant’s claim about lack

of competency). “[W]hat constitutes good cause is context-specific . . . .” Damme,

944 N.W.2d at 104. “Generally speaking, a defendant asserts a legally sufficient

reason and establishes good cause to appeal as a matter of right by asserting a

claim on appeal for which an appellate court potentially could provide relief.”

Newman, 970 N.W.2d at 869. We conclude Lillibridge has good cause to

challenge whether the district court made the appropriate findings before stripping

her of her firearm rights.

1The State filed two motions to dismiss, and our supreme court ordered each to be considered as part of the appeal before transferring the case to us. 4

Firearm Prohibition. Lillibridge argues that the district court cannot issue

a notice of firearm prohibition without first making a finding that she meets the

criteria under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)2 and the applicable federal regulations. There

was no hearing on this issue—Lillibridge’s entire case was dealt with “on paper”—

and the district court made no pertinent findings. And here, the State concedes it

“cannot defend the substance of the notice of firearms prohibition on the existing

record.”

Both Lillibridge and the State contend that the appropriate remedy is to send

the issue back for the district court to consider whether a factual basis exists to

support the ordered prohibition. As it is possible a factual basis could be shown,

we conclude the best course is to vacate the prohibition and remand for further

proceedings to give the State an opportunity to establish a factual basis. Cf. State

v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 792 (Iowa 1999).

VACATED AND REMANDED.

2 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) states: It shall be unlawful for any person— .... (3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)); .... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.