IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1208 Filed January 11, 2023
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOSHUA JAMES PENDLETON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Gina C. Badding,
Judge.
The defendant appeals his convictions for first-degree murder and first-
degree robbery. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Heard by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ. Badding, J.,
takes no part. 2
TABOR, Presiding Judge.
Joshua Pendleton killed Pastor Allen Henderson outside St. Paul’s
Lutheran Church in Fort Dodge. Pendleton also took the pastor’s cell phone. For
those acts, a jury convicted Pendleton of first-degree murder and first-degree
robbery. On appeal, Pendleton contends his statements to law enforcement that
day should have been suppressed. He also challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence for robbery and for one of two alternative theories marshalled for first-
degree murder. In doing so, he contests the constitutionality of Iowa Code
section 814.28 (2019) on general verdicts.
Because Pendleton’s statements to police were neither involuntary nor
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, the district court properly allowed
them into evidence. And because the proof was sufficient to support both theories
of first-degree murder, we affirm the convictions without reaching the
constitutionality of the statute.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
Parishioner Erika, and her son, H.K., arrived early for his confirmation class
at St. Paul’s. When they arrived around 5:20 p.m., all the entrances were locked.
But using her church key, Erika and H.K. entered through the main doors and
settled into the parish office. Pastor Henderson shut off his computer in the office
and headed into the fellowship hall. As Erika and H.K. conversed in the office,
they heard a sound. Erika recognized the pastor’s voice, saying: “What are you
doing here? Why are you here? You don’t belong here.” Soon she and H.K.
moved to the fellowship hall. 3
After finishing some homework, H.K. went to look for the pastor. The boy
took a hallway by the kitchen toward the back door. Erika testified, “Next thing I
know, he comes running back telling me, ‘Mom, Pastor’s on the ground with blood
coming out of his head.’” Looking out the back door, Ericka saw Henderson on the
ground. She called 911.
When paramedics arrived, they first noted the pastor’s head injury. They
then checked for vital signs, finding no pulse and no respirations. Their efforts to
resuscitate him did not succeed. An autopsy recorded a ligature mark on the
pastor’s neck, as well as bleeding inside his brain. The medical examiner identified
the cause of death as “blunt force injury of the head with strangulation.”
Back at the crime scene, investigators found evidence of a struggle. Drywall
was damaged in the hallway just inside the church door. The pastor’s glasses
were on the floor. And the pastor’s gun was under his body. On the sidewalk just
outside the back door, investigators found a rope with a metal clasp.
Church surveillance cameras captured some of the action. The video
showed a man wearing a dark jacket, jeans, and red shoes walking beside the
church carrying a rope. The man turned a corner and did not re-emerge for nearly
ten minutes. When he appeared on camera again, his right sleeve was rolled up
and the rope was gone. But now he was glancing at a cellphone in his right hand.
It didn’t take investigating officers long to recognize the man in the video as
Pendleton. They knew Pendleton from previous encounters involving his unstable
mental health. After identifying Pendleton from the surveillance footage, officers
walked to his apartment, just two blocks from the church. The apartment was
empty. But officers spotted Pendleton in the front yard walking toward them. He 4
spoke to them in a stilted manner,1 claiming he heard a girl screaming at the
church. “He was molesting little girl. I got his phone right here. . . . He wouldn’t
give it up.” Officers placed Pendleton in handcuffs.
At the police station, Detective Larry Hedlund interviewed Pendleton. He
gave Pendleton Miranda warnings2 and obtained a written waiver. Pendleton
started with this narrative:
That man was very strong. I had to bite him in head. . . . He tried to claw my eyes out. . . . I can’t believe how strong he was. And I was struggling because the last thing I wanted was for him to shut the door and get back in to little girl. ‘Cause I thought he might get rid of her.
Hedlund next asked about the rope on the ground. Pendleton responded:
“That’s my hemp belt . . . I brought it there. I heard little girl screaming. . . . I ring
bell. And he sees me in door.” Pendleton claimed that he held up his hemp belt
and told Henderson, “I got present for little girl,” as a ruse to get the pastor to open
the door. Pendleton admitted that when Henderson opened the door, he wrapped
the rope around the pastor’s neck.
When Hedlund asked about the hole in the drywall, Pendleton answered: “I
made it.” Pendleton then described the pastor pushing the rope off his neck while
Pendleton held the back door open with his foot. Pendleton also said he bit
Henderson on the head “because he was overpowering me.”
1 Throughout the evening, Pendleton slipped in and out of a Russian accent, featuring grammar lapses. 2 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 5
As for the pastor’s cellphone, Pendleton explained: “I said give me phone
because he . . . had it in pocket. I said I’m taking phone because I thought he was
recording it. . . . I thought he was trying to record his sex acts with the little girl.”
Pendleton then decided he would end the interview: “I’m not gonna talk
anymore, can I leave?” And he asked for an attorney. Hearing those invocations,
Hedlund stopped the interview and arrested Pendleton.
In October 2019, the State charged Pendleton with first-degree robbery for
taking Henderson’s cellphone and first-degree murder, alleging both premeditation
and participation in the forcible felony of robbery. The court halted proceedings in
February 2020, finding that Pendleton was not competent to stand trial. After he
received treatment for his schizophrenia, Pendleton’s prosecution resumed in
June 2020. That fall, he gave notice of his intent to raise an insanity defense.
Pendleton also moved to suppress statements he made to police on the day
of his arrest. In considering suppression, the district court divided his statements
into four phases: (1) when he was handcuffed outside his apartment; (2) when he
was at the police station but before the Miranda waiver; (3) after he signed the
written waiver of his Miranda rights; and (4) after he invoked his Miranda rights to
remain silent and counsel. The court suppressed statements Pendleton made
during the second and fourth phases but allowed all other statements.
At trial, the court instructed the jury to find Pendleton guilty of first-degree
murder if it found that he either “acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and
with a specific intent to kill” or “was participating in the offense of robbery in the
first or second degree.” On general verdict forms, the jury found Pendleton guilty
of first-degree murder and first-degree robbery. Pendleton appeals. 6
II. Analysis
Pendleton makes two arguments. First, he contends that the district court
should have suppressed all statements he made to police on the day of his arrest.
Second, he insists the State presented insufficient proof of felony murder. And
from there, he challenges the constitutionality of Iowa Code section 814.28, which
allows courts to uphold a general verdict if substantial evidence supports at least
one alternative theory.
A. Suppression of Statements
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article 1, section 9 of the
Iowa Constitution protect a criminal defendant from compulsory self-incrimination.
See U.S. Const. amend V; Iowa Const. art. 1, § 9; State v. Gibbs, 941 N.W.2d 888,
894 (Iowa 2020). “When a defendant challenges the denial of a motion to suppress
based on an asserted constitutional violation, we review the district court ruling de
novo.” State v. Sallis, 981 N.W.2d 336, 344981 (Iowa 2022). “We examine the
entire record to independently evaluate the totality of the circumstances based on
each case’s unique situation.” State v. Price-Williams, 973 N.W.2d 556, 531 (Iowa
2022). We defer to the district court’s fact findings, especially on witness
credibility, but we are not bound by them. Id. “We consider both the evidence
introduced at the suppression hearing as well as the evidence introduced at trial.”
State v. Hunter, 947 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (quoting State v.
Palmer, 791 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Iowa 2010)).
Pendleton’s suppression argument is threefold. First, he seeks to exclude
his replies to police questions after he was handcuffed but before he was
Mirandized. Second, he claims his Miranda waiver was not knowing and voluntary. 7
And third, he contends all his statements were involuntary because he was
suffering from unmedicated schizophrenia.
1. Volunteered Statements
A failure to provide a Miranda advisory warrants suppression of a suspect’s
statements made during a custodial interrogation. State v. Countryman, 572
N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1997). Custody means police have limited a suspect’s
freedom to act on the scale of a formal arrest. State v. Bogan, 774 N.W.2d 676,
680 (Iowa 2009). Interrogation includes both express questioning, as well as
words or actions that an officer would know were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
We consider the police encounter with Pendleton outside his apartment. As
captured on their body cameras, Pendleton approached the officers claiming to
have heard a girl screaming. Officer Evan Thompson replied “okay” and then
directed Pendleton to “show me your hands real quick.” Thompson then
handcuffed Pendleton, saying: “I just want to detain you at this point.” Pendleton
responded, “That’s fine.” And before officers asked any questions, Pendleton
made a muffled statement that ended with “had taser in pocket.” Asking for
clarification, Thompson responded “okay who’s that?” Pendleton answered “that’s
a bad man down there.” Thompson asked, “down by the church there?” And
Pendleton responded yes.
Thompson then introduced Detective Hedlund and asked Pendleton
whether he would speak to Hedlund at the station. Pendleton looked at the
detective and volunteered: “Yes, he was molesting little girl.” Pendleton continued,
telling officers that he had taken Henderson’s phone. Officers asked Pendleton if 8
he had any weapons, patted him down, and prepared to transport him to the
station. During the pat down, the officer said, “this is just for our safety.” Pendleton
responded “I wouldn’t hurt nobody innocent” and recalled asking Henderson “what
are you doing to that little girl?”3
Pendleton argues that he was in custody and subjected to interrogation as
soon as he encountered the officers. Like the district court, we agree he was in
custody but not interrogated. “Statements made after a person is taken into
custody are not automatically considered the product of interrogation.” State v.
Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Iowa 2001). For instance, “statements that are
volunteered, spontaneous and freely made by an arrested person do not come
within the scope of Miranda.” Id.
Pendleton points to two exchanges when officers knew they would elicit an
incriminating response. First, Officer Thompson asked “who’s that?” after
Pendleton mentioned someone having a taser. Because that question focused on
a safety matter related to Pendleton’s detention, we do not find a Miranda violation.
See State v. Sallis, 574 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 1998) (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at
301); see also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (recognizing
Miranda exception in situation imperiling public safety).
Second, Thompson asked Pendleton if he would speak to Detective
Hedlund. In a non-responsive reply, Pendleton asserted he would not harm an
innocent person. Contrasting that assertion with his distorted belief about the
pastor, Pendleton said he caught Henderson “in the act” of molesting a girl.
3Pendleton said Henderson at one point told him it was not a little girl but a little boy, in apparent reference to H.K. 9
Contrary to Pendleton’s argument, Thompson had no reason to know that his
benign inquiry would encourage Pendleton to incriminate himself on the spot.
Pendleton’s volunteered statement was not the product of interrogation. See State
v. Brown, 176 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Iowa 1970).
Pendleton’s statements at his apartment were admissible.
2. Miranda Waiver
Next, Pendleton lobbies for the suppression of his statements made after
the Miranda waiver. At the police station, Detective Hedlund joined Pendleton in
an interview room. About five minutes in, Hedlund showed Pendleton a Miranda
rights form. Pendleton read his rights out loud and then signed the waiver.4 To be
valid, a Miranda waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Tyler,
867 N.W.2d 136, 174 (Iowa 2015). A waiver is voluntary when it is “the product of
the suspect’s free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception” by the police. Id. (citation omitted). We look at the totality of the
circumstances and these factors:
Defendant’s age; whether defendant had prior experience in the criminal justice system; whether defendant was under the influence of drugs; . . . whether defendant was mentally “subnormal”; whether deception was used; whether defendant showed an ability to understand the questions and respond; the length of time defendant was detained and interrogated; defendant’s physical and emotional reaction to interrogation; whether physical punishment, including deprivation of food and sleep, was used.
4 While not alone sufficient, a written waiver provides “strong proof” of voluntariness. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 559. 10
Id. at 175 (citation omitted). Among these factors, Pendleton focuses on his mental
condition: untreated schizophrenia. He contends his Miranda waiver was
involuntary because he was “under the influence of schizophrenic hallucinations.”
It’s true that Pendleton had struggled with schizophrenia for at least fifteen
years. His mother testified that two weeks before the killing, he had been
experiencing auditory and visual hallucinations because he was not taking his
medication. She tried to get her son help, but he was unwilling to accept treatment
from the mental-health center.
What’s not as clear cut is the effect of Pendleton’s schizophrenia on his
ability to waive Miranda and answer the detective’s questions. Experts at trial gave
conflicting opinions on Pendleton’s mental state.5 The State offered testimony
from Pendleton’s treating physician. Dr. Gary Keller diagnosed Pendleton with
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and amphetamine use disorder. But
because the doctor did not treat Pendleton until months after the interrogation, he
could not distinguish if Pendleton’s behaviors stemmed from prolonged drug use
or his mental illness.
The defense countered with testimony from neuropsychologist Daniel
Tranel, who evaluated Pendleton over one year after the incident. Dr. Tranel
believed Pendleton was acting under “a diseased or deranged condition of the
mind” on the day of the killing. But on cross-examination, Dr. Tranel acknowledged
that he did not review the videos from that day. Another defense expert witness,
psychiatrist Arnold Andersen, examined Pendleton for competency in January
5At oral argument, the parties agreed that trial evidence supporting and opposing Pendleton’s insanity defense was relevant to this suppression question. 11
2020, about four months after the killing. Dr. Andersen observed that Pendleton
was “behaving very abnormally” and his statements were “nonsensical.” But Dr.
Anderson also did not review video from the day of the killing.
In contrast, the State’s rebuttal expert, psychiatrist James Dennert,
examined all the video evidence before forming his opinion. He considered that
footage as “[t]he best evidence for [Pendleton’s] state of mind at the time of the
incident.” In Dr. Dennert‘s opinion, Pendleton “did not suffer any mental
impairment or derangement” that day. Not at the time of the killing. And not at the
time of the interrogation. Dr. Dennert noted that Pendleton highlighted “a logical
inconsistency” in the Miranda warning for Detective Hedlund. Dr. Dennert also
testified about Pendleton’s ability to understand the interrogation process:
Throughout the interview, he responded appropriately. He asked pertinent questions. His comments were pertinent and appropriate. He seemed to understand the situation and he said things and did things that reasonably interpreted as indicating that he is trying to present himself in the light that he wishes to present himself.
While the evidence on Pendleton’s psychiatric condition was mixed, we are
persuaded by Dr. Dennert’s assessment that his “mental subnormality” did not
prevent Pendleton from knowingly and voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights. See
State v. Davidson, 340 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Iowa 1983) (stating that “mental
subnormality does not itself deprive a waiver or confession of voluntariness”).
Furthermore, when we turn to the totality of the circumstances, most of the
factors weigh on the side of a knowing and voluntary waiver. For instance,
Pendleton was thirty-six years old and had previous encounters with police, having
been arrested for minor offenses. The record does not suggest Pendleton was
under the influence of drugs. Nor did the detective use deception. To the contrary, 12
Hedlund’s approach was clear and straightforward. He did not intimidate, coerce,
or trick Pendleton into waiving his rights. See Tyler, 867 N.W.2d at 174. The
interview format was not coercive. The questioning took place the evening of the
killing, but not late into the night. It lasted less than thirty minutes. Pendleton was
offered a drink and received a can of diet Mountain Dew.
And Pendleton was not daunted by the setting. One example: in the middle
of his Miranda warning, Pendleton declared, “I don’t need legal representation, I
have the truth.” Hedlund said “okay” and asked Pendleton to keep reading. When
Hedlund confronted Pendleton about his Russian accent, the suspect explained—
in a self-deprecating manner—that he picked it up from a phone app and he fakes
an accent because it is “appealing to women.”
In deciding whether his mental condition prevented a voluntary waiver or
confession, we look to Pendleton’s “comportment and demeanor.” See Davidson,
340 N.W.2d at 773. Pendleton remained calm and cooperative until the end when
Hedlund arrested him for murder. Even if he were experiencing symptoms of
schizophrenia, Pendleton’s demeanor and discussion showed he understood his
Miranda rights and made a voluntary waiver.
That understanding was on display when Pendleton invoked his right to
silence and right to counsel. Pendleton asked if the interview was being recorded;
Hedlund responded, “of course,” and pointed at a camera in the corner. When
Hedlund posed another question, Pendleton declared, “I’m not gonna speak
anymore. Can I go?” Hedlund replied: “I need to check on something.” Pendleton
then insisted, “I want lawyer.” Hedlund ended the interview but asked to
photograph Pendleton’s hands. At first, Pendleton agreed but then changed his 13
mind: “no, I don’t want pictures of hands here until lawyer comes.” This exchange
shows Pendleton understood his rights and knew how to invoke them, bolstering
the inference that he knowingly and voluntarily waived them earlier. From our de
novo review, we find Pendleton’s post-Miranda statements were admissible.
3. Due Process Violation
Pendleton closes with an argument that all of his statements to police were
involuntary and therefore admitting them into evidence violated his right to due
process. The test for voluntariness is the same under Miranda as it is for due
process. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d at 176. So for the reasons recited in the previous
section, we find Pendleton voluntarily made his statements to police.6
B. Substantial Evidence
“We review sufficiency of the evidence claims for correction of errors at law.”
State v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Iowa 2022). We consider whether, when
taken in the light most favorable to the State, the verdicts are supported by
substantial evidence. Id. Evidence is substantial if it would convince a rational
trier of fact that Pendleton is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Pendleton argues we should vacate his robbery conviction because the
State offered insufficient evidence of his intent to commit a theft. What’s more, if
the State did not prove robbery, according to Pendleton, it did not prove the forcible
6The State contends that because Pendleton confessed to killing Henderson and advanced an insanity defense, admitting his statements was harmless error. Because we reject his suppression arguments, we need not address this alternative contention. 14
felony alternative of first-degree murder, requiring that conviction to be overturned
as well.7
Granted, the jury returned general verdicts on the two murder alternatives.8
Under prior law, if the evidence was insufficient under one alternative, we would
not try to divine which alternative the jury embraced and instead would reverse for
retrial. See, e.g., State v. Tyler, 873 N.W.2d 741, 754 (Iowa 2016). But Iowa Code
section 814.28, enacted in 2019, now prohibits reversing a general verdict “on the
basis of a defective or insufficient theory if one or more of the theories presented
and described . . . is sufficient to sustain the verdict on at least one count.”
Pendleton challenges section 814.28 on constitutional grounds, arguing it violates
the separation of powers, due process, and equal protection.9 But we need not
reach those arguments because both alternatives are supported by the record.
We start with the robbery instructions. To convict Pendleton of first-degree
robbery, the jury had to find:
7 Pendleton does not challenge the State’s proof of premediated murder. 8 To convict Pendleton of first-degree murder, the jury had to find: 1. On or about the 2nd day of October 2019, Mr. Pendleton struck and/or strangled Allen Henderson 2. Allen Henderson died as a result of being struck and/or strangled. 3. Mr. Pendleton acted with malice aforethought. 4. Mr. Pendleton either: (a) acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with a specific intent to kill Allen Henderson; or (b) was participating in the offense of [r]obbery in the [f]irst or [s]econd [d]egree. 9 Given the timing of his briefing, Pendleton’s routing statement recommended the
supreme court transfer this appeal to our court because another case pending before the supreme court would resolve those constitutional issues. But that decision, State v. West Vangen, filed in June 2022, did not resolve the constitutionality of section 814.28. 975 N.W.2d 344, 348–51 (Iowa 2022). 15
1. On or about the 2nd day of October 2019, Mr. Pendleton had the specific intent to commit a theft; 2. To carry out that intention or to assist him in escaping from the scene, with or without stolen property, Mr. Pendleton either: a. Committed an assault as defined in Instruction No. 37 on Allen Henderson; or b. Threatened Allen Henderson with, or purposely put Allen Henderson in fear of, immediate serious injury; and 3. While perpetrating the robbery, Mr. Pendleton: a. Purposely inflicted or attempted to inflict a serous injury on Allen Henderson; or b. Was armed with a dangerous weapon
Or the jury could find second-degree robbery if:
1. On or about the 2nd day of October 2019, Mr. Pendleton had the specific intent to commit a theft. 2. In carrying out his intention or to assist him in escaping from the scene, with or without the stolen property, Mr. Pendleton: a. Committed an assault on Allen Henderson as defined in Instruction No. 37; or b. Threatened Allen Henderson with, or purposely put Allen Henderson in fear of, immediate serious injury.
Pendleton claims the State offered insufficient proof that he intended to commit a
theft. The jury did not receive a theft instruction, but our code provides “[a] person
commits theft when the person . . . [t]akes possession or control of the property of
another . . . with the intent to deprive the other thereof.” Iowa Code § 714.1(1).
The property at issue is the pastor’s cell phone. Pendleton claims he did
not have a specific intent to take the phone because he “was acting in response to
a delusion that Henderson was sexually abusing a child in church and was using
the phone to record the abuse.” In other words, Pendleton “took the phone
because he believed it was evidence of the crime.”
But even if Pendleton believed he was acting for righteous reasons, the jury
could reasonably find he “[took] possession or control” of the phone “with the intent 16
to deprive” the pastor of the property.10 Pendleton told Hedlund how he used the
hemp belt to lure Henderson out of the building before attacking him. In his
interview, Pendleton claimed that he seized the phone because he believed that
Henderson was using it to record sex acts. Pendleton also told officers that when
he tried to take the phone, Henderson “wouldn’t give it up.” Considering
Pendleton’s dubious motive, the jury could reasonably conclude his intent was to
permanently deprive Henderson of his phone.
Pendleton also submits that if his “intent were to rob Henderson, certainly
he would have taken . . . other valuables,” including the pastor’s gun, his wallet,
and his cash—all of which were found on or near the body. But the State did not
have to explain why Pendleton did not steal all items in Henderson’s possession.
It was enough that the State offered proof that Pendleton had the specific intent to
deprive Henderson of the phone. The State proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that Pendleton committed robbery and thus was “participating in” a forcible felony
when he killed Henderson. Because both murder alternatives are supported, we
need not delve into Pendleton’s constitutional challenges to section 814.28. See
West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d at 351.
III. Conclusion
We find no grounds to suppress the challenged statements. And substantial
evidence supports both the robbery verdict and the felony-murder theory for first-
degree murder. Thus, we affirm Pendleton’s convictions.
AFFIRMED.
10Section 714.1(1) “requires more than a temporary dispossessing of another’s property.” State v. Berger, 438 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989).