State of Iowa v. Joshua Allen Hooker

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: June 18, 2025
• Docket: 24-1921
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1921 Filed June 18, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JOSHUA ALLEN HOOKER, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County,

Gary P. Strausser, Judge.

Joshua Hooker appeals following his guilty plea to driving while barred as a

habitual offender. AFFIRMED.

Audra F. Saunders, West Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and

Sandy, JJ. 2

SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

Joshua Hooker appeals following his guilty plea to driving while barred as a

habitual offender. Hooker contends his counsel was ineffective. Hooker also

asserts the district court abused its discretion in imposing a ninety-day sentence.

Hooker cannot raise his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal.

And as we determine there was no abuse of discretion by the district court, we

affirm Hooker’s sentence.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

A Muscatine police officer recognized Hooker to be driving with a barred

license and initiated a traffic stop. Hooker was later charged by trial information

with driving while barred, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code

section 321.561 (2023).

Hooker later pled guilty to driving while barred, as charged, and to a

probation violation under Iowa Code section 908.11.1 The district court accepted

Hooker’s guilty plea and sentenced him to ninety days in jail. Hooker appeals.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Hooker claims his plea counsel was ineffective “in allowing a plea where the

evidence did not establish a factual basis.” We are prohibited from deciding his

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal. Iowa Code § 814.7;

State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 109 (Iowa 2021) (“[Iowa’s appellate courts are]

without authority to decide ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct

1 A memorandum of a global plea agreement was filed on December 12, 2023, but

was later retracted by Hooker as an “inadvertent filing.” But Hooker confirmed through counsel that the plea of guilty to the driving while barred charge filed on December 12, 2023, which called for an open sentencing, remained valid. 3

appeal.”). Hooker can pursue this claim through an action for postconviction relief

pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 822, if he chooses. We do not consider his

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim further in this opinion.

III. Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

Hooker also challenges the sentence imposed by the court.2 “We will not

reverse the decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some

defect in the sentencing procedure.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa

2002). An abuse of discretion will not be found unless the sentencing decision

was “exercised on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or

unreasonable.” Id. When the sentence imposed is within the statutory limits, the

district court’s sentencing decision “is cloaked with a strong presumption in its

favor.” Id. Hooker must “overcome the presumption in favor of the sentence.”

Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106.

Hooker contends the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him

to ninety days in jail. Hooker does not dispute that his sentence is within the

statutory limits. See Iowa Code §§ 321.561 (providing that driving while barred

constitutes an aggravated misdemeanor), 903.1(2) (imposing a statutory

maximum two-year term of imprisonment for an aggravated misdemeanor).

Statutorily provided sentencing goals are to deliver the maximum

opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant and to protect the community

from further offenses by the defendant and others. See id. § 901.5. Determining

2 We have jurisdiction to hear Hooker’s appeal because Hooker has established

good cause by challenging the sentence imposed, which was neither mandatory nor an agreed term of the plea deal. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2020). 4

what sentence will best achieve this balance is within the discretion of the district

court. See id. When deciding whether to defer or suspend a sentence, a court

shall consider the age of the defendant, the defendant’s prior record, and such

other factors as are appropriate. See id. § 907.5(1).

Our appellate record does not include a transcript of the sentencing hearing.

Without a transcript, all information from the sentencing hearing must be gleaned

from the sentencing order. Hooker argues that his history, age, maturity level, and

criminal history do not warrant the ninety-day sentence imposed. Hooker further

argues that his sentence is unwarranted because he took responsibility for his

actions by pleading guilty to the allegation as charged. The district court

determined a ninety-day sentence would advance the sentencing goals of

rehabilitation and community protection as well as provide for specific and general

deterrence. The district court relied on appropriate sentencing factors, including

the plea agreement of the parties,3 the nature and circumstances of the offense,

Hooker’s criminal history, and statutory sentencing requirements.

The district court’s sentencing decision was not untenable or unreasonable.

The sentence imposed was within the statutory limits, and Hooker has not

overcome the presumption in favor of his sentence. See State v. Pedersen,

No. 23-0724, 2025 WL 1066248, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2025) (“[I]t is not

enough that the defendant merely disagrees with the court’s weighing of the

3 There is not a written plea agreement filed in this proceeding, but the corrected

sentencing order references two other cases, AGCR064211 and AGCR070361. In any event, Hooker does not raise a challenge to the consideration of a plea agreement in his sentencing claim. 5

sentencing factors and the particular sentence selected.”). As the district court did

not abuse its discretion, we affirm the sentence imposed.

AFFIRMED.