State of Iowa v. Joseph David Parker
This text of State of Iowa v. Joseph David Parker (State of Iowa v. Joseph David Parker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1541 Filed June 21, 2017
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOSEPH DAVID PARKER, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A. Price,
District Associate Judge.
Defendant appeals, challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea.
SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
Karmen R. Anderson of The Law Office of Karmen Anderson, Des
Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ. 2
MULLINS, Judge.
Joseph Parker was charged by trial information with knowingly carrying a
dangerous weapon, to wit: brass knuckles, in violation of Iowa Code section
724.4(1) (2016). He filed a written petition to plead guilty in which he admitted
“having brass knuckles in the vehicle.” The order accepting plea and setting
sentencing recited Parker appeared with counsel and pled guilty. On the
weapons charge, the court sentenced Parker to two years’ incarceration and
suspended the fine. Parker appeals, claiming counsel was ineffective. Our
review is de novo. See State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Iowa 2012).
Parker did not file a motion in arrest of judgment but claims he should be
allowed to proceed with this appeal because his plea counsel was ineffective for
allowing him to plead when there was no factual basis for his plea. See Rhoades
v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 29 (Iowa 2014) (“If trial counsel permits a defendant to
plead guilty and waives the defendant’s right to file a motion in arrest of judgment
when there is no factual basis to support the defendant’s guilty plea, trial counsel
breaches an essential duty. It is well-settled law that under these circumstances,
we presume prejudice.” (citation omitted)). Specifically, he claims having brass
knuckles in a vehicle is not a crime under Iowa Code section 724.4(1) and there
was no evidence the knuckles were a dangerous weapon.
Upon our review of the record and the minutes of evidence,1 and following
the reasoning of State v. Tusing, 344 N.W.2d 253, 254 (Iowa 1984), and an
1 “Normally, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are considered in postconviction relief proceedings.” State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 785 (Iowa 2010). When, as here, “the record is sufficient to address a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,” we address the claim on direct appeal. Id. 3
unpublished opinion of our court, State v. Eaton, No. 14-1309, 2015 WL
3884354, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 24, 2015), we find the record does not at this
time show evidence sufficient to satisfy the elements of a violation of section
724.4(1). Accordingly, counsel provided ineffective assistance.
Pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 21.26(e), we vacate Parker’s sentence and
remand to allow the State an opportunity to supplement the record. If a factual
basis cannot be shown, Parker’s plea must be set aside.
SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.
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