IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1432
Filed August 19, 2026
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State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Jordan Nicholas Dee, Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, The Honorable Jeffrey A. Neary, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Rachel C. Regenold, Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Katherine Wenman, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., Langholz, J., and Doyle, S.J.
Opinion by Greer, P.J.
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GREER, Presiding Judge.
Following his guilty plea to one count of first-degree theft, a felony,1 and one count of third-degree theft, an aggravated misdemeanor, 2 Jordan Dee argues the sentencing court erred by considering improper factors, which included a fixed sentencing policy, and thus, we should remand for resentencing before a different judge. Further, he asserts the sentencing court did not provide sufficient reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. The State argues that the district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion and that Dee was properly advised of the reasons for the consecutive sentences, both at the hearing and later in the sentencing order.
We affirm because we find the district court properly exercised its discretion and did not apply a fixed sentencing policy. And, based on the guidance of our case law, the sentencing court properly advised of its reasons for consecutive sentences.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Establishing the factual basis for the theft charges, Dee admitted he sold cattle belonging to two other cattle producers, Logan Patterson and Brian Rohlk, without their permission and kept the proceeds to pay his own business bills. At his guilty plea hearing, Dee stated that he “handled the
1 “[G]ood cause exists to appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020). And because this matter involves a guilty plea to a class “A” felony, the prohibition found in Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2023), which prohibits a direct appeal as a matter of right from “[a] conviction where the defendant has pled guilty,” does not apply.
2 The State agreed to dismiss a charge of ongoing criminal conduct and another theft charge as a part of the plea agreement.
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situation way wrong” and that he thought he could pay them back later, but it just never happened. After an investigation, Dee was charged with four separate counts but ended up agreeing to plead guilty to two counts: first- degree theft and third-degree theft. The court accepted the guilty plea after a hearing and then set the matter for sentencing on a different date. A presentence investigation (PSI) was completed, which recommended incarceration.
The sentencing court heard from Dee and both victims, Patterson and Rohlk, by way of testimony. Dee advocated for a deferred judgment, emphasizing his lack of criminal history. The court summarized its thoughts and announced its sentencing decision on the record stating:
Well, a couple things. I—I—I’m moved by—I obviously had read Mr. Patterson’s statement, but his additional comments were, clearly, additionally impactful, and I—I think I heard, for the first time—I don’t think it was filed in writing—Mr. Rohlk’s victim comments.
But clearly you are eligible for a deferred. I don’t think a deferred’s appropriate here, given the circumstances at this time. This went on in such a way that it—and I don’t—this doesn’t really matter whether there’s—it’s true or not true about vacations and things like that, but this is an ongoing process, where you were, essentially, committing a regular process of thefts and taking advantage of the trust that people put in you by putting cattle on your property and asking you to take care of them.
And I suspect there were other things that impact this, but, nevertheless, you know, from what I can gather from the file and what’s been said here, you—you’ve agreed that you committed theft in the first degree, which is in excess of $10,000, the restitution is agreed upon, it’s $85,000, and that’s a significant amount.
And there’s not, necessarily, in my mind, a threshold where I say yeah, a deferred’s okay here and a deferred’s okay here—or not okay here. I—there’s really not a threshold. It’s a lot of different circumstances.
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I—Mr. Dee, I’m sad to say this, but I’m not really convinced that you’re remorseful today. You—you—you don’t do a very good job of convincing me of that today.
It’s almost like this is an inconvenience, and it—and it interrupted your life, and it messed things up for you, not for the other folks that are in the room. And I’m—and I’m—I’m compelled to think that it’s—it’s time that you understand that this had a huge impact on people.
And I know it’s going to have a huge impact on your—your family, but at least, today, I—I’m going to sentence you to prison, and I think you need to understand this stuff was never acceptable, and the continuing lies and deception that took place appear to be—to me, to be significant.
So I—I am going to impose the prison sentence that the Court can impose. I’m going to impose a 10-year sentence and a 2-year sentence, run them consecutive, so you have a 12-year sentence, a period of incarceration not to exceed 12 years, and I’ll pronounce the sentence more specifically.
I would be inclined to give you a time to report so you can get your affairs in order. You’re not risky in that respect, and I want your family to be as well taken care and prepared for your time away as—as—as much as they can be, given the circumstances. And I know that will be a—be a huge impact on them, and undeservedly so, for them.
But nevertheless, on Count 2 you are sentenced to a period of incarceration not to exceed ten years. On Count 3, which is the theft in the third degree, you’re sentenced to a period of incarceration not to exceed two years. The sentences will be imposed to run consecutively.
I’m imposing the minimum fines but suspending them. It’s unrealistic to expect that any day—any day soon you’ll be able to pay a fine on either one or both of those matters.
I am denying your request for probation and deferred judgment, and we’ll talk in a moment about mittimus. The sentences imposed [are] permitted by law. I’ve considered all sentencing options and know what my options are, given the circumstances, and believe this sentence will provide the maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of this defendant, deter him from committing further offenses, and send an appropriate message to those who might commit similar offenses in the future.
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Then the court confirmed its decision in a written order. After imposing consecutive terms of incarceration not to exceed ten years for the first-degree theft and two years for the third-degree theft, the sentencing court noted that the sentences ran consecutively because of the separate and serious nature of the offenses.
Dee appeals this sentencing decision.
II. Standard of Review.
We will reverse the sentencing decision of the district court when an abuse of discretion occurs or there is some defect in the sentencing procedure. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “When the district court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable, an abuse of discretion occurs.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa 2014). And, “[i]f a court in determining a sentence uses any improper consideration, resentencing of the defendant is required” even if it was only a “secondary consideration.” State v. Grandberry, 619 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 2000). The district court abuses its discretion when it applies a fixed sentencing policy. State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979).
III. Analysis.
A. Improper Considerations. Dee’s list of improper considerations includes: (1) unproven conduct, and (2) use of a fixed sentencing policy. We address these issues separately.
1. Unproven conduct. The unproven conduct relates to several statements made during the sentencing hearing. “[W]hen a challenge is made to a criminal sentence on the basis that the court improperly considered
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unproven criminal activity, the issue presented is simply one of the sufficiency of the record to establish the matters relied on.” State v. Longo, 608 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Iowa 2000). Here the sentencing court sentenced Dee within the bounds of the statutes related to each offense; he just finds it too harsh.
At the sentencing hearing, Patterson and Rohlk offered victim impact statements in person. Patterson detailed the deception Dee utilized to hide his crime, including text messages where Dee posed as his own father, to assure Patterson his money was coming. Patterson testified that his loss was closer to $367,000, rather than the $7,000 admitted by Dee. Patterson told the sentencing court the financial burden was far less than the emotional impact as he was forced to sell his family’s century farm. He asked the court to impose prison time for Dee.
Then Rohlk presented his victim impact statement. Rohlk described social media postings by Dee that showed photos of numerous vacations Dee had taken while failing to pay back the lost money from the stolen cattle. Believing that Dee had shown no remorse and had a “history of betraying people,” Rohlk opined that Dee deserved the maximum punishment. The State pointed to the PSI recommendation for incarceration, along with the victims’ testimony, and requested the court impose the ten-year sentence on the first-degree felony, along with the two-year sentence on the aggravated misdemeanor, consecutively.
Dee emphasized he had no history of criminal conduct and thus should have been granted a deferred judgment, which would allow him the opportunity to repay the victims and to support his wife and three small children. The sentencing court did consider the option, but after reviewing
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the extent of the crimes, the lack of remorse observed at the sentencing hearing, and the impact on the victims, rejected it.
One of the dismissed criminal counts alleged ongoing criminal conduct. Dee asserts the sentencing court used factors that were inserted by the victims during the hearing that were more appropriately a factual basis for the ongoing criminal conduct charge as unproven conduct against him at sentencing. Dee points to a statement of the court when it said:
This went on in such a way that it—and I don’t—this doesn’t really matter whether there’s—it’s true or not true about vacations and things like that, but this is an ongoing process, where you were, essentially, committing a regular process of thefts and taking advantage of the trust that people put in you by putting cattle on your property and asking you to take care of them.
Instead, Dee contends the sentencing court could only rely upon the admitted conduct, which was that “[h]e admitted to misappropriating property and retaining the proceeds, as well as overcharging for yardage.” Here, the sentencing court focused its rationale on the two thefts Dee committed against people who trusted him to care for their valuable livestock. And even though the victims discussed that Dee has a “history of betraying people,” it certainly was proved by the overall pattern of conduct Dee admitted as to the two of them. As for the allegation about taking vacations rather than repaying what he owed, the sentencing court said it really “doesn’t really matter” if it were true or not. We do not think Dee established that the sentencing court based its decision on unproven conduct related to the vacation assertions.
Further, as to the ongoing criminal conduct count, Dee was charged under Iowa Code section 706A.1 based upon an allegation that between November 2023 and April 2024, Dee committed “unlawful activity including
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any preparatory or completed offense, that was committed for financial gain on a continuing basis, that is punishable as an indictable offense under the laws of this state, to wit: committed theft of money or property belonging to other persons on two or more occasions.” The factual allegations between this count and the theft counts involved the similar facts that Dee admitted to under oath at the sentencing hearing. “There is no general prohibition against considering other criminal activities by a defendant as factors that bear on the sentence to be imposed.” Longo, 608 N.W.2d at 474. Thus, we do not find in any of the sentencing court’s statements about Dee’s behavior a reliance on other conduct that was not properly considered under the theft charges. These theft charges were repeated actions by Dee to take property of another for his own benefit.
Dee also alleges the sentencing court considered other negative behaviors as characterized by the victims. On this point the sentencing court said, “I’m going to sentence you to prison, and I think you need to understand this stuff was never acceptable, and the continuing lies and deception that took place appear to be—to me, to be significant.” (Emphasis added). All told, a theft can involve lies and deception, but even so, there must be an affirmative showing the district court relied on improper evidence to overcome the presumption the district court properly exercised its discretion. State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 762 (Iowa 1998). Yet at the end of the testimony, the sentencing court clarified that although it suspected “there were other things that impact this, but, nevertheless, you know, from what I can gather from the file and what’s been said here, you—you’ve agreed that you committed theft in the first degree, which is in excess of $10,000, the restitution is agreed upon, it’s $85,000, and that’s a significant amount.” (Emphasis added). In our view, this suggests that the sentencing court only based its decision on appropriate considerations and not suspected behavior.
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See State v. Witham, 583 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998) (per curiam) (finding a sentencing “court may not consider an unproven or unprosecuted offense when sentencing a defendant unless (1) the facts before the court show the accused committed the offense, or (2) the defendant admits it”).
Finally, Dee makes a brief argument that the sentencing court relied upon a PSI report that was inaccurate because it referred to all four charges rather than the two to which Dee plead. Yet he points to nothing in the record to suggest that the court considered any charge other than the two thefts that were involved in the sentencing decision. Dee did not object to the PSI report, but the record shows that the sentencing court corrected the record and pointed out on its own that the PSI report was not correct. “Even if improper material is presented at sentencing, it is reversible error only if the district court relied on it.” State v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608, 619 (Iowa 2024). From that record, and with nothing more from Dee, it is hard to understand how he has shown that the sentencing court did not weigh the PSI recommendation in an appropriate lens.
Because the sentence ordered by the sentencing court was within the statutory limits, there is a strong presumption in favor of the sentence that can only be overcome by an affirmative showing that the district court relied on improper evidence. See Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105–06. In the end, the sentencing court’s decision “is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor,” requiring Dee to overcome the presumption of regularity on appeal. See State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 67 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). As noted in our case law, “[t]his is a heavy burden.” See Schooley, 13 N.W.3d at 619.
Our appellate courts “trust that our district courts . . . will filter out improper or irrelevant evidence” while considering a victim impact
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statement in sentencing. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 764. “We generally rely on district courts to know what they can and cannot consider from a victimimpact statement.” See Schooley, 13 N.W.3d at 619. On this record, we find that the sentencing court properly considered appropriate sentencing factors, ordered a sentence within the appropriate parameters of the statutes, and did not rely upon improper conduct beyond what was included in the factual basis for the plea. We reject Dee’s challenge on this ground.
2. Fixed sentencing policy. To prove the sentencing court relied upon a fixed sentencing policy, Dee argues:
after commenting on the high amount of restitution involved, the court stated, “And there’s not, necessarily, in my mind, a threshold where I say yeah, a deferred’s okay here and a deferred’s okay here—or not okay here. I—there’s really not a threshold. It’s a lot of different circumstances.”
Dee contends that the sentencing court’s use of the words: “not necessarily” and “not really” “demonstrated a fixed-sentencing policy requiring restitution fall below a certain threshold before granting a deferred judgment.” Contrary to Dee’s position, we read the sentencing court’s statement that there was not “a threshold” suggests that there was no set policy that it would apply. As the State argued: “When sentencing Dee, after recognizing that Dee deprived his victims of a ‘significant amount’ of money, the court explicitly stated it did not have a threshold amount for when a deferred judgment was and was not appropriate.” Plus, the sentencing court offered other appropriate reasons for its sentences. See State v. Alexander, No. 15-0615, 2016 WL 3003415, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2016) (rejecting a claim of a fixed sentencing policy when the record shows consideration of a variety of factors).
“To establish reversible error based on an improper sentencing factor, the defendant is required to show that the court was not just merely aware of
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the factor, but that it relied on the factor in determining its sentence.” State v. McCollaugh, 5 N.W.3d 620, 627 (Iowa 2024). On this challenge, Dee fails in his proof. See State v. Voshell, 12 N.W.3d 1, 4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (“Voshell also claims the judge had a fixed sentencing policy. But we see nothing in the court’s statements to suggest a fixed sentencing policy for cases involving sexual assault, and we have no reason to believe the court would not impose a sentence of probation in a case where pertinent factors warranted it.”); see also Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d at 396 (noting that “instead of considering the minimal essential [sentencing] factors we consistently have identified, [the sentencing court] impermissibly selected only one . . . attending circumstance which triggered the court’s previously-fixed sentencing policy.”). Such is not the case here as there was no reliance shown and thus we find there was no fixed sentencing policy imposed. We reject this challenge.
B. Reasons for Consecutive Sentences. Dee asserts that the sentencing court violated the amended rule of criminal procedure and our case law that requires the court to “state on the record the basis for the sentence imposed and shall particularly state the reason for imposition of any consecutive sentence.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g); see State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 275 (Iowa 2016) (“Sentencing courts should also explicitly state the reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence . . . .”). The State counters by pointing to the sentencing order that set out reasons for the sentence decision, including that the court considered: Dee’s rehabilitation, the protection to the community, the PSI report, comments from the victims and more specifically that the sentences would be consecutive because of the separate and serious nature of the offenses. And while the sentencing court did not detail at the sentencing hearing the specific reasons for deciding to
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run the sentences consecutively, it did describe the reasons for the sentence overall.3
We consider both the court’s statements at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing order that follows in assessing a claim that the district court abused its discretion by failing to state the reasons for ordering consecutive sentences. Luke, 4 N.W.3d at 458. “[T]he oral colloquy and the written sentencing order may be combined to determine whether sufficient reasons have been given.” Id. The rule is helpful for two reasons: (1) “it ensures defendants are well aware of the consequences of their criminal actions,” and (2) “it affords our appellate courts the opportunity to review the discretion of the sentencing court.” Id. at 456 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, the sentencing court detailed its reasons at the sentencing hearing by discussing the multiple thefts that in its view were “significant.” The court provided its observation that Dee was not remorseful. Further it noted that “this sentence will provide the maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of this defendant, deter him from committing further offenses, and send an appropriate message to those who might commit similar offenses in the future.” Then, the court explained in its written order that it imposed consecutive sentences because of “the separate and serious nature of the
3 We note that the best practice is to set out in detail at the sentencing hearing the reasons for running sentences consecutively and to follow that up with an order confirming those reasons so that the defendant would know, without any question, the reasons the sentencing court found compelling. As our supreme court has emphasized, we “encourage sentencing courts to give more detailed reasons for a sentence specific to the individual defendant and crimes and to explicitly state the reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence.” State v. Luke, 4 N.W.3d 450, 458 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up).
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offenses.” The sentencing order also contained a form with check-the-box options and the sentencing court checked several of the boxes. “[I]f properly filled out, such a check-the-box form would be an acceptable way to express the reasons for a sentence.” Id. at 457.
In sum, similar to the situation in Luke, the sentencing court provided an on-the-record explanation that addressed appropriate factors, tailored to the facts and circumstances involved in Dee’s case. And while it did not specifically give reasons at the hearing for consecutive sentences, that omission was cured in the written sentencing order. See id. at 458.
We find the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion as it provided adequate reasoning for imposing consecutive sentences.
IV. Conclusion.
We affirm Dee’s sentences as we conclude the sentencing court properly exercised its discretion entering a sentence within the parameters of the applicable statutes, it did not apply a fixed sentence, and it outlined the reasons for the imposition of consecutive sentences.
AFFIRMED.