State of Iowa v. Jon Robert Harris

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: December 17, 2025
• Docket: 24-1690
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1690 Filed December 17, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JON ROBERT HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, Justin Lightfoot,

Judge.

A criminal defendant appeals the district court’s lack of good cause finding

as to an untimely motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.

Webb L. Wassmer of Wassmer Law Office, PLC, Marion, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua Henry, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and

Ahlers, JJ. 2

SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Jon Robert Harris appeals his conviction for possession of

methamphetamine, third offense, as a habitual offender, claiming the district court

abused its discretion in finding a lack of good cause as to an untimely motion to

suppress evidence. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

After Harris was arrested and charged with crimes unrelated to this appeal, he

obtained a bail bond from Liberty Bail Bonds (Liberty) for release from jail. About

a week later, Liberty decided to revoke Harris’s bond and surrender him to the

Tama County Jail. Around the time Liberty made that decision, and prior to

apprehending Harris, Liberty called the Tama County Sheriff’s Office and spoke to

Chief Deputy Joseph Quandt to notify the office of the bond revocation and the

intention to return Harris to jail after locating him. Quandt then informed the county

attorney of the situation and emailed the jailers.

About four weeks later, Liberty apprehended Harris and surrendered him to

the jail, where Harris was searched according to jail booking procedures. During

booking, an officer discovered “a white tube that contained a crystal-like substance

that was consistent with methamphetamine” in Harris’s pocket. The officer advised

Harris of his Miranda rights and asked Harris about the tube. Harris stated it did

not belong to him and he was unaware of what the substance was in the tube. The

officer asked Harris if the substance would test positive for crystal

methamphetamine. Harris responded “probably.” The substance in the tube

tested positive for methamphetamine. 3

Harris was charged with possession of a controlled substance, third or

subsequent offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2024), on

May 1, 2024. He pled not guilty and waived his right to court-appointed counsel at

his arraignment, where the district court conducted a colloquy with Harris about his

decision to proceed as a self-represented litigant, including the fact that he would

be held to the same standard as an attorney. Harris demanded speedy trial, and

trial was scheduled for July 15, 2024, with his forty-day deadline to move to

suppress expiring on July 2. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(6). The last day to begin

trial under Harris’s demand for speedy trial was August 7, 2024.

On June 13, Harris filed a motion which the court interpreted as a motion to

dismiss for lack of probable cause. The motion asserted that Harris was wrongly

brought to jail by Liberty due to lack of a warrant on the separate criminal matters.

The district court denied this motion four days later based on Iowa Code

section 811.8, finding Liberty had authority under the statute to surrender Harris to

jail. On June 20, Harris applied for court-appointed counsel; his application was

approved the same day.

Two motions to suppress appear in the appellate record, one filed on

Saturday, July 13, and one filed on Sunday, July 14. The motions assert that good

cause existed for the late filing because the district court did not hold a hearing on

Harris’s prior pro se motion. The motion also argued Liberty had no authority to

bring Harris to jail, rendering his arrest unlawful, so the evidence found on Harris’s

person should be suppressed. Counsel lastly argued that Liberty failed to comply 4

with section 811.12 because it never notified “the chief law enforcement officer of

the local government subdivision” as required by section 80A.3A(1).1

The district court addressed the motion on the morning of the first day of

trial, July 15. Harris’s counsel again argued that Liberty’s seizure of Harris was

unlawful because of noncompliance with the notice requirement of

section 80A.3A(1). The State responded that they had not had an opportunity to

review what defense counsel was arguing and stated that it would not be possible

to fully address the motion on the morning of trial. As to the untimeliness of the

motion, defense counsel stated there was good cause for the delay in filing the

motion because he “did not have the time to look through all the discovery until

shortly before trial.” The State responded that there was no way to litigate the

motion because of its proximity to the start of trial and it had no witnesses or

evidence prepared.

The district court found a lack of good cause to allow the untimely motion to

suppress. The court reasoned that although Harris was unrepresented during the

time in which a motion to suppress should have been filed, he made the decision

to proceed pro se and was accordingly “obligated to follow all rules and deadlines

to the same extent as the party who has an attorney.” The court also determined

there was inadequate time for the State to respond to the motion to suppress as it

“was filed on the eve of trial.” As to the pro se motion filed by Harris before

representation, the court found the motion to dismiss did not raise the issue

identified in the subsequent motion to suppress.

1 New versions of sections 811.8 and 811.12 became effective on July 1, 2024,

but the portions of the statutes relevant here remain unchanged. 5

In addition to ruling that the motion was untimely, the district court also

determined that the exclusionary rule would not apply to the notice requirement

under section 80A.3A. The court concluded that Liberty was not a State actor and

that section 80A.3A does not provide rights to Harris, determining that the statute

is not one in “which a violation triggers [the] exclusionary rule.” The court lastly

found that the arrest was lawful, “even if that notice provision was not complied

with.”

Following a jury trial, Harris was convicted of possession of

methamphetamine, third offense, as a habitual offender, in violation of

sections 124.401(5), 902.8, and 902.9. Harris filed a combined motion for arrest

of judgment and new trial, arguing the court’s denial of the motion to suppress was

in error. The district court confirmed the previous denial of the motion at the

sentencing hearing. Harris was sentenced to a term of incarceration not to exceed

fifteen years. Harris appeals.

II. Standard of Review

“We review the district court’s good cause determination regarding the

timeliness of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Courts,

No. 19-0074, 2020 WL 1548496, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2020) (citation

omitted). “We will not find an abuse of discretion unless the trial court’s action was

clearly untenable or unreasonable.” State v. Eldridge, 590 N.W.2d 734, 736 (Iowa

Ct. App. 1999).

Harris asserts the standard of review for the denial on the merits of his

motion to suppress should be de novo, alleging a deprivation of a constitutional

right. See State v. Coffman, 914 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Iowa 2018) (“When a defendant 6

challenges a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress based upon the

deprivation of a . . . constitutional right, our standard of review is de novo.” (citation

omitted)). But because the basis of the motion related to allegations of statutory

violations of sections 80A.3A(1) and 811.12(1)(a), we review the district court’s

ruling for correction of errors at law. See State v. Starr, 4 N.W.3d 686, 691–92

(Iowa 2024) (citation omitted). “If the district court applied the law correctly and

substantial evidence supports the court’s findings . . . , we will affirm the district

court’s ruling on a motion to suppress.” Id. at 692 (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

Harris argues that the district court abused its discretion in finding no good

cause existed to support his untimely motion to suppress. We disagree. Pretrial

motions, including motions to suppress “shall be filed . . . no later than 40 days

after arraignment.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(6). If a motion is not filed within the

statutory timeline it “constitutes[s] waiver thereof, but the court, for good cause

shown, may grant relief from such waiver.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(5). Here, Harris

was arraigned on May 23, 2024, so the deadline for filing pretrial motions was

July 2. The motion to suppress was filed on July 13.

District courts have broad discretion to determine whether there is good

cause to accept an untimely motion to suppress. State v. Mundy, No. 13-1370,

2014 WL 2885037, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 25, 2014). “Factors considered . . .

include the adequacy of the defendant’s reasons for failure to comply with

applicable rules of procedure and whether the State was prejudiced as a result.”

Id. (citation omitted). The court “must weigh the defendant’s interest in a full and 7

fair trial against the State’s interest in avoiding unfair surprise and unnecessary

delay while also recognizing the sanctions . . . should not be imposed lightly.” Id.

The motion to suppress was filed the weekend before trial. And although

the district court allowed the defense an offer of proof about the alleged statutory

violation, the State was disadvantaged by its inability to fully review the motion or

prepare evidence and witnesses. The record shows that the State would be

prejudiced by the untimely motion. See id.

As for Harris’s justifications for the late filing, we find them unconvincing.

Harris argues his pro se motion to dismiss should have been construed as a motion

to suppress, so there was good cause to file the untimely suppression motion

because the court denied the first motion. But this assertion does not support good

cause for the late filing, as his pro se status does not excuse Harris or his eventual

counsel from timely moving. Kubik v. Burk, 540 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Iowa Ct. App.

1995) (“The law does not judge by two standards, one for lawyers and another for

lay persons. Rather, all are expected to act with equal competence. If lay persons

choose to proceed pro se, they do so at their own risk.” (internal citations omitted)).

Further, the pro se motion did not address the issue brought up in the later motion

to suppress. It is not the role of the courts to “rewrite a pro se pleading” or “act as

the advocate for a pro se litigant.” Goodwin v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 936 N.W.2d 634, 643

n.2 (Iowa 2019). The fact that Harris filed an alternative motion when he was self-

represented does not support good cause for the untimely motion to suppress.

And when counsel was appointed for Harris on June 20, time remained to

timely move before the deadline. At trial, defense counsel argued that such time

was not enough to review discovery to find grounds for a timely motion to suppress. 8

We disagree. When there is time left to file a pretrial motion, even when an

attorney is newly appointed, and the motion is not filed on time, a district court may

find that fact dispositive to a good cause analysis. See State v. Jones,

No. 05-0316, 2006 WL 133009, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2006).

Harris, when self-represented, had almost the full forty days to file a

suppression motion, and although his appointed counsel had a shorter window to

file a motion, “‘[m]erely not getting around to it’ cannot be considered adequate

grounds to violate a specific time limitation.” State v. Hollie, 854 N.W.2d 695, 697

(Iowa 2013) (affirming the district court’s finding of absence of good cause). We

find Harris’s reasons for the late filing inadequate, and that the State would be

unnecessarily surprised and prejudiced. See Eldridge, 590 N.W.2d at 736–37.

Accordingly, we find there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s

good cause determination for the untimely motion to suppress. Because we find

there was no good cause, we need not reach the merits of the motion. State v.

Ball, 600 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Iowa 1999) (declining to address the merits of an

untimely motion to suppress after finding a lack of good cause).

IV. Conclusion

For the above reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s

determination of a lack of good cause as to the filing of Harris’s motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.