IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-0521 Filed November 21, 2023
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JISSEL MAGALI GOMEZ-TORRES, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van Marel,
District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals her conviction for operating while intoxicated following
the denial of her motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.
Agnes G. Warutere of Warutere Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Ankeny, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Greer, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Carr, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2023). 2
GREER, Presiding Judge.
Jissel Gomez-Torres appeals her conviction for operating while intoxicated
(OWI), arguing that the court should have granted her motion to suppress.
Because we find that there was reasonable suspicion that Gomez-Torres was
operating her vehicle while intoxicated based on her driving, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
At approximately 2:34 a.m. on September 22, 2022, Story County Sheriff’s
Deputy Matthew Massaro observed a vehicle drive over the dashed white center
line on the westbound Highway 30 exit ramp (the flyover or overpass) coming off
of Interstate 35 and noted the driver continued driving in the middle of the two lanes
on the second portion of that flyover. As he continued behind the vehicle, he also
saw it weave within its lane and vary its speed from sixty-five miles per hour (mph)
on the flyover to forty-five and back up to fifty-five mph on Highway 30, even though
the speed limit was sixty-five mph. After the driver activated the turn signal late,
the deputy noted the driver appeared to almost miss the turn onto the University
Boulevard exit ramp off of Highway 30, and the vehicle drove over the exit ramp’s
solid white lines and the gore1 in the process. It was at that point that Deputy
Massaro initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle. Once stopped, Deputy Massaro
identified the driver of the vehicle from her driver’s license and insurance
information as Gomez-Torres.
The State charged Gomez-Torres via trial information with OWI, first
offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(A) (2022), a serious
1 The gore is the triangular part of a highway in between the highway’s lanes and
an exit ramp. See Gore, Merriam-Webster (3rd ed. 2002). 3
misdemeanor, in October 2022. Gomez-Torres moved to suppress the evidence
obtained following the stop of her vehicle, arguing that Deputy Massaro stopped
her vehicle without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress in February 2023, Deputy Massaro
testified that he did not observe Gomez-Torres exceed the speed limit of sixty-five
mph or fall below the minimum speed limit. He also confirmed he did not begin
following her vehicle based on any observation of a traffic violation. In fact, he
stated he was not “entirely sure” what caused him to begin following the vehicle.
In all, he opined that his observations encompassed four or five minutes of
following her vehicle for a distance of about three or four miles. As additional
evidence, the State offered and the district court admitted Deputy Massaro’s
dashboard camera footage. The dash cam footage begins after Deputy Massaro
observed the vehicle drive in the middle of the two lanes on the flyover from
Interstate 35 to Highway 30 westbound. Beginning at 2:34 a.m. and ending at 2:38
a.m. when Deputy Massaro initiates a traffic stop, the footage shows the driving
maneuvers of Gomez-Torres. Because Deputy Massaro was pacing the vehicle,
the footage also demonstrates—based on the patrol vehicle’s speed—that
Gomez-Torres’s vehicle varied its speed from sixty-five mph down to forty-five mph
and back up to fifty-five. Deputy Massaro testified to observing the same driving
behaviors depicted in his dash camera video.
Gomez-Torres argued at the suppression hearing that the deputy’s video
“captured what happened here.” Then, Gomez-Torres emphasized there was no
traffic violation that led the deputy to start following her. In her view, a person 4
viewing the footage would find a driver who was not speeding, was driving
smoothly and mostly straight with only one or two occasions where she may have
crossed a line, but certainly not in any manner to raise a reasonable suspicion of
impairment. The district court disagreed.
At the hearing, the district court orally denied the suppression motion,
finding that Deputy Massaro had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that
Gomez-Torres was operating her vehicle while intoxicated based on Gomez-
Torres driving down the middle of two lanes over the dashed line dividing them,
weaving in her lane, varying her speed, almost missing her exit, and driving over
the gore area while crossing the solid white line. Ultimately, the district court
concluded,
[W]hen this court looks at the totality of the circumstances, that the officer did have reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Maybe while none of these things individually would cause the court to make that determination, the court doesn’t look at each of these as an individual event.
Gomez-Torres agreed to the OWI charge being submitted to the court for a
bench trial on the minutes of testimony.2 The district court found Gomez-Torres
guilty as charged and sentenced her to two days in jail and a fine of $1250.
Gomez-Torres now appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
We review constitutional claims like this challenge to the denial of the
suppression motion de novo. State v. Montgomery, 966 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Iowa
2 The minutes of testimony reflected Gomez-Torres provided a chemical breath
sample that tested at .185 blood alcohol level, which is over the legal limit. See Iowa Code § 321J.2 (2022). 5
2021); see U.S. Const. amend. IV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. In doing so, we conduct
an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. State v. McIver,
858 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Iowa 2015) (“[W]e do not evaluate reasonable suspicion
based on each circumstance individually, but determine the existence of
reasonable suspicion by considering all the circumstances together.”).
III. Analysis.
“A traffic stop is unquestionably a seizure . . . .” State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d
288, 292 (Iowa 2013). Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for a
seizure. See State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002). To make a
warrantless traffic stop of a vehicle, police must have probable cause or
reasonable suspicion based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the stop. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-0521 Filed November 21, 2023
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JISSEL MAGALI GOMEZ-TORRES, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van Marel,
District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals her conviction for operating while intoxicated following
the denial of her motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.
Agnes G. Warutere of Warutere Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Ankeny, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Greer, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Carr, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2023). 2
GREER, Presiding Judge.
Jissel Gomez-Torres appeals her conviction for operating while intoxicated
(OWI), arguing that the court should have granted her motion to suppress.
Because we find that there was reasonable suspicion that Gomez-Torres was
operating her vehicle while intoxicated based on her driving, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
At approximately 2:34 a.m. on September 22, 2022, Story County Sheriff’s
Deputy Matthew Massaro observed a vehicle drive over the dashed white center
line on the westbound Highway 30 exit ramp (the flyover or overpass) coming off
of Interstate 35 and noted the driver continued driving in the middle of the two lanes
on the second portion of that flyover. As he continued behind the vehicle, he also
saw it weave within its lane and vary its speed from sixty-five miles per hour (mph)
on the flyover to forty-five and back up to fifty-five mph on Highway 30, even though
the speed limit was sixty-five mph. After the driver activated the turn signal late,
the deputy noted the driver appeared to almost miss the turn onto the University
Boulevard exit ramp off of Highway 30, and the vehicle drove over the exit ramp’s
solid white lines and the gore1 in the process. It was at that point that Deputy
Massaro initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle. Once stopped, Deputy Massaro
identified the driver of the vehicle from her driver’s license and insurance
information as Gomez-Torres.
The State charged Gomez-Torres via trial information with OWI, first
offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(A) (2022), a serious
1 The gore is the triangular part of a highway in between the highway’s lanes and
an exit ramp. See Gore, Merriam-Webster (3rd ed. 2002). 3
misdemeanor, in October 2022. Gomez-Torres moved to suppress the evidence
obtained following the stop of her vehicle, arguing that Deputy Massaro stopped
her vehicle without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress in February 2023, Deputy Massaro
testified that he did not observe Gomez-Torres exceed the speed limit of sixty-five
mph or fall below the minimum speed limit. He also confirmed he did not begin
following her vehicle based on any observation of a traffic violation. In fact, he
stated he was not “entirely sure” what caused him to begin following the vehicle.
In all, he opined that his observations encompassed four or five minutes of
following her vehicle for a distance of about three or four miles. As additional
evidence, the State offered and the district court admitted Deputy Massaro’s
dashboard camera footage. The dash cam footage begins after Deputy Massaro
observed the vehicle drive in the middle of the two lanes on the flyover from
Interstate 35 to Highway 30 westbound. Beginning at 2:34 a.m. and ending at 2:38
a.m. when Deputy Massaro initiates a traffic stop, the footage shows the driving
maneuvers of Gomez-Torres. Because Deputy Massaro was pacing the vehicle,
the footage also demonstrates—based on the patrol vehicle’s speed—that
Gomez-Torres’s vehicle varied its speed from sixty-five mph down to forty-five mph
and back up to fifty-five. Deputy Massaro testified to observing the same driving
behaviors depicted in his dash camera video.
Gomez-Torres argued at the suppression hearing that the deputy’s video
“captured what happened here.” Then, Gomez-Torres emphasized there was no
traffic violation that led the deputy to start following her. In her view, a person 4
viewing the footage would find a driver who was not speeding, was driving
smoothly and mostly straight with only one or two occasions where she may have
crossed a line, but certainly not in any manner to raise a reasonable suspicion of
impairment. The district court disagreed.
At the hearing, the district court orally denied the suppression motion,
finding that Deputy Massaro had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that
Gomez-Torres was operating her vehicle while intoxicated based on Gomez-
Torres driving down the middle of two lanes over the dashed line dividing them,
weaving in her lane, varying her speed, almost missing her exit, and driving over
the gore area while crossing the solid white line. Ultimately, the district court
concluded,
[W]hen this court looks at the totality of the circumstances, that the officer did have reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Maybe while none of these things individually would cause the court to make that determination, the court doesn’t look at each of these as an individual event.
Gomez-Torres agreed to the OWI charge being submitted to the court for a
bench trial on the minutes of testimony.2 The district court found Gomez-Torres
guilty as charged and sentenced her to two days in jail and a fine of $1250.
Gomez-Torres now appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
We review constitutional claims like this challenge to the denial of the
suppression motion de novo. State v. Montgomery, 966 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Iowa
2 The minutes of testimony reflected Gomez-Torres provided a chemical breath
sample that tested at .185 blood alcohol level, which is over the legal limit. See Iowa Code § 321J.2 (2022). 5
2021); see U.S. Const. amend. IV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. In doing so, we conduct
an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. State v. McIver,
858 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Iowa 2015) (“[W]e do not evaluate reasonable suspicion
based on each circumstance individually, but determine the existence of
reasonable suspicion by considering all the circumstances together.”).
III. Analysis.
“A traffic stop is unquestionably a seizure . . . .” State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d
288, 292 (Iowa 2013). Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for a
seizure. See State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002). To make a
warrantless traffic stop of a vehicle, police must have probable cause or
reasonable suspicion based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the stop. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). “When a peace officer observes any type of traffic
offense, the violation establishes both probable cause to stop the vehicle and
reasonable suspicion to investigate.” State v. Pennington, 881 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2016); see also McIver, 858 N.W.2d at 702. Furthermore, “[r]easonable
suspicion to stop a vehicle for investigative purposes exists when articulable facts
and all the circumstances confronting the officer at the time give rise to a
reasonable belief that criminal activity may be afoot.” State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d
197, 204 (Iowa 2004). On the other hand, “[m]ere suspicion, curiosity, or hunch of
criminal activity is not enough.” Id. Because Gomez-Torres is only challenging
the reasonable suspicion supporting the stop of her vehicle, we only address
reasonable suspicion in our analysis. 6
Our supreme court established the bright-line rule that a single incident of
briefly crossing the edge line of a divided highway, absent more, is not enough to
raise reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 205–06; see also State v.
Murphy, No. 21-0938, 2022 WL 1100904, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2022)
(applying Tague and stating, “we do not believe Murphy's one-time act of crossing
the fog line with his truck’s passenger side tires gave rise to a reasonable suspicion
that he was driving while intoxicated”).
However, in interpreting Tague, we have repeatedly found that a vehicle
that does more than cross the edge line once for a couple of seconds may raise
reasonable suspicion that the driver is intoxicated. See State v. Lobo, No. 17-
1768, 2019 WL 762192, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2019) (collecting cases
finding reasonable suspicion based on crossing of center and edge lines along
with time of night); see State v. Keith, No. 17-1044, 2018 WL 2174089, at *2 (Iowa
Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018) (collecting cases finding reasonable suspicion based on
swerving, weaving, and crossing of center and edge lines). In fact, when
considering a set of similar circumstances, we determined that the stopping officer
had reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop. See State v. Sorenson,
No. 14-1101, 2016 WL 718984, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016) (finding
reasonable suspicion when a vehicle made a wide turn on a corner, crossed “the
center line on occasion,” and weaved over the fog line before “crossing a rumble
strip, leaving the travel portion of the highway and driving on the shoulder until”
coming to a stop sign). Even more, our supreme court has clarified the Tague
standard to add that “[w]eaving within one’s own lane and changing speeds without
exceeding the speed limit do not violate any statute, but they do provide evidence 7
of impairment.” State v. Struve, 956 N.W.2d 90, 104 (Iowa 2021). And we consider
the totality of all observed driving behaviors in determining whether reasonable
suspicion of impaired driving existed. McIver, 858 N.W.2d at 702.
Here, Deputy Massaro observed more than a single crossing of the white
edge line of the highway. Instead, he testified to—and the dash camera footage
supported—“something more”: Gomez-Torres driving down the middle of two
lanes over the dashed line dividing the lanes, weaving in her lane and touching the
dashed center line and solid edge line in the process, varying her speed to twenty
miles below the speed limit, almost missing her exit and activating her turn signal
only after doing so, and driving over the gore area next to the exit while crossing
the solid white line separating the exit from the highway lanes. Taken together,
these actions rise above the level of a single isolated incident of briefly touching
the edge line. Therefore, Deputy Massaro had sufficient evidence of impairment
to raise a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, namely, that
Gomez-Torres was driving while intoxicated, and the warrantless traffic stop was
not a violation of her constitutional rights.
IV. Conclusion.
Because Deputy Massaro’s stop of Gomez-Torres’s vehicle was supported
by reasonable suspicion based on more than a single, isolated incident of touching
the edge line of the road, we find, like the district court, that Gomez-Torres’s motion
to suppress should be denied, and we affirm her conviction for OWI, first offense.
AFFIRMED.