State of Iowa v. Jesus Hernandez Jr.
This text of State of Iowa v. Jesus Hernandez Jr. (State of Iowa v. Jesus Hernandez Jr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1276 Filed October 29, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JESUS HERNANDEZ JR., Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wright County, Christopher Foy,
Judge.
A defendant appeals his conviction for attempted murder. AFFIRMED.
Christopher A. Kragnes Sr. of Kragnes & Associates, PC, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ. 2
TABOR, Chief Judge.
During a dispute over the house where he was living, Jesus Hernandez
stabbed the property owner, Leo, in the neck. For that act, a jury convicted
Hernandez of attempted murder. On appeal, Hernandez argues the district court
should have suppressed his admission to law enforcement. Because Hernadez’s
statement to the officer was not a result of interrogation, the district court properly
allowed it into evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
Leo owned a small rental house in Galt, Iowa, where Hernandez was
residing. But Leo planned to repair the house for his own family to move in. So
Leo and his friend Chris set out to evict Hernandez from the property.
Upon their arrival, they encountered Hernandez and another man at the
property. The foursome gathered around a firepit to share beers. During their
discussion, Hernandez tried to give Leo a jacket as a gift. But Leo refused to wear
the jacket because it was a very warm day in May. This rejection upset Hernandez
so much that he threw the jacket in the firepit and lit it. The ensuing argument led
Leo to command Hernandez to move out of the house. Hernandez retaliated by
saying he was going to kill Chris and telling Leo that he would “show [them] death.”
While issuing those threats, Hernandez told Leo that they were sharing their last
beer, took out a pocketknife, and cut him across the neck.
Chris called 911. When Deputy Ray Zeien arrived on scene, Chris identified
Hernandez as the suspect. Deputy Zeien approached Hernandez with his weapon
drawn and told him to show his hands. Deputy Zeien then placed him in handcuffs
and asked him to sit on the ground. But when Hernandez said he had bad knees, 3
Deputy Zeien ushered him towards the police car so he could sit down. On the
way to the police car, Hernandez admitted to Deputy Zeien that he stabbed Leo.
Before trial, Hernandez moved to suppress this statement, contending that
it was inadmissible because Deputy Zeien did not read him a Miranda warning.
The district court denied this motion, finding admission of the statement did not
violate Hernandez’s right against self-incrimination. Later at trial, the jury found
Hernandez guilty of attempted murder. Hernandez appeals.
II. Analysis
The Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution protects a criminal
defendant from compulsory self-incrimination. See U.S. Const. amend V; State v.
Gibbs, 941 N.W.2d 888, 894 (Iowa 2020). “When a defendant challenges a district
court’s denial of a motion to suppress based upon the deprivation of a state or
federal constitutional right, our standard of review is de novo.” State v. Park, 985
N.W.2d 154, 168 (Iowa 2023) (quoting State v. Hauge, 973 N.W.2d 453, 458 (Iowa
2022)). “We examine the entire record to independently evaluate the totality of the
circumstances based on each case’s unique situation.” State v. Price-Williams,
973 N.W.2d 556, 531 (Iowa 2022). We defer to the district court’s fact findings,
especially on witness credibility, but we are not bound by them. Id. “We consider
both the evidence introduced at the suppression hearing as well as the evidence
introduced at trial.” State v. Hunter, 947 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020)
(quoting State v. Palmer, 791 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Iowa 2010)).
As his sole argument on appeal, Hernandez contends the district court
should have suppressed the inculpatory statement he made to Deputy Zeien while
heading to the police car. Law enforcement officers are required to issue Miranda 4
warnings to individuals who are subject to custodial interrogation. State v.
Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1997). Failing to do so warrants
suppression of statements made during the custodial interrogation. Id. For the
purposes of this analysis, interrogation means express questioning, as well as
other words or actions that an officer should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
In addressing Hernandez’s contention, we consider his encounter with
Deputy Zeien on their walk to the police car. As depicted in body camera footage,
Deputy Zeien held Hernandez’s shoulder and arm while walking. Hernandez then
turned to Deputy Zeien and said, “I won’t run. Don’t worry.” Deputy Zeien
responded, “Well I don’t know what’s going on, okay,” to which Hernandez replied,
“I stabbed the fucker.” The deputy continued escorting Hernandez to the car.
Hernandez insists Deputy Zeien initiated this exchange to elicit an
incriminating response. But the body camera footage shows Hernandez started
the conversation leading to the admission. In this context, the deputy’s statement
explained why he was holding Hernandez.
Our courts have not found benign statements by officers to be interrogation,
even when the officer initiated the contact. See State v. Brown, 176 N.W.2d 180,
182−83 (Iowa 1970) (finding no interrogation when an officer showed a gun
discovered at the scene to Brown and said, “Let’s go down to the station and try to
get this situation straightened out”); State v. Pendleton, No. 21-1208, 2023 WL
152526, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2023) (finding no interrogation when an
officer asked whether the defendant would speak to a detective); see also
Commonwealth v. Koumaris, 799 N.E.2d 89, 93−94 (Mass. 2003) (deciding that 5
when a defendant initiated the conversation, the officer’s statement “go ahead, tell
me what you have to say” was a passive response rather than interrogation).
Here, Deputy Zeien’s statement was a neutral response to explain why he
was holding onto Hernandez; the deputy had no reason to know that his
explanation would elicit such a damning admission from Hernandez. See Brown,
176 N.W.2d at 183. Hernandez’s volunteered statement was not the product of
interrogation.1 Thus, his confession was admissible.
III. Conclusion
We find no basis for suppressing the challenged statement. Thus, we affirm
Hernadez’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
1 Because we find no interrogation, we need not address the custody question.
State v. Pitman, No. 12-1743, 2014 WL 251899, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2014).
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