IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0617 Filed April 27, 2016
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
J.D. WILBERT LOUIS TUECKE, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clayton County, John J.
Bauercamper, Judge.
A defendant convicted of two counts of second-degree sexual abuse as a
juvenile with an intellectual disability challenges the district court’s decision to
reimpose the “mandatory” minimum sentence term of service as part of his
sentence. AFFIRMED.
Scott J. Nelson, Dubuque, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler P. Buller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ. 2
DOYLE, Judge.
A defendant diagnosed with a mild intellectual disability was convicted of
two counts of second-degree sexual abuse for acts committed when he was a
juvenile. He filed a motion to correct his sentences in 2015, and following a
resentencing hearing, the district court elected to reimpose his prior sentences,
including the statutory requirement that he serve at least seventy percent of the
maximum term of his sentences. He now appeals the constitutionality of those
sentences, based upon his intellectual disability and age at the time the crimes
were committed. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
J.D. Tuecke was born in April 1990. In May 2008, he was charged by trial
information in district court with two counts of second-degree sexual abuse, in
violation of Iowa Code section 709.3(2) (2007), class “B” felonies. The trial
information alleged that during the summer of 2007, Tuecke sexually abused two
children under the age of twelve.
Tuecke was seventeen-years old when he committed the alleged acts,
and he requested jurisdiction be transferred to the juvenile court. Thereafter, a
juvenile-court officer filed a report to the district court, noting, among other things,
that Tuecke had a learning disability and had been provided special education
services via an individualized education plan. Additionally, the report stated:
During the investigation of the matter . . . , the Public Defender’s Office and Assistant County Attorney . . . provided information regarding a possible manner of handling this case. The proposal would allow for the Transfer of Jurisdiction of the case involving J.D. Tuecke, specifically, two counts of [second-degree sexual abuse], to the juvenile court. The juvenile court would then immediately recommend waiver of jurisdiction to the criminal 3
division of the district court. This proposal would allow the court many sentencing options which are not available in the current filing due to the mandatory sentencing.
The juvenile-court officer recommended the court proceed in the suggested
manner, and Tuecke, represented by counsel, agreed to the plan. Tuecke
subsequently pled guilty in district court to two counts of second-degree sexual
abuse; he received a deferred judgment and was placed on probation. See also
Iowa Code §§ 901.5(1) (permitting the sentencing court to defer judgment and
sentence if authorized by section 907.3), 907.3(1) (permitting the sentencing
court to defer judgment and sentence with the defendant’s consent unless certain
facts exist, not present here), 907.5 (requiring the sentencing court to first
determine which sentencing “option, if available, will provide maximum
opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant and protection of the
community from further offenses by the defendant and others” after considering
“the age of the defendant; the defendant’s prior record of convictions and prior
record of deferments of judgment if any; the defendant’s employment
circumstances; the defendant’s family circumstances; the nature of the offense
committed; and such other factors as are appropriate”); but see id. § 902.12(3)
(requiring a person serving a sentence for a conviction of second-degree sexual
abuse under section 709.3 to serve “at least seven-tenths of the maximum term
of the person’s sentence”).
In August 2009, Tuecke was now over the age of eighteen, and Tuecke’s
probation officer reported Tuecke had violated the terms of his probation.
Tuecke was also charged with second-degree burglary. Although Tuecke
admitted the violations, the court allowed him to remain on probation but modified 4
its terms to require that Tuecke (1) reside at a residential treatment facility for a
year or until he obtained maximum benefits from available programming, (2)
successfully complete the sex-offender-treatment program (SOTP), and (3) have
no contact with his victims. Tuecke also pled guilty to the second-degree-
burglary charge, and he received a ten-year suspended sentence with placement
at the residential treatment facility.
In August 2010, Tuecke’s probation officer filed another report of violation
alleging numerous probation violations. His probation officer noted that Tuecke’s
negative behaviors were escalating and that it appeared Tuecke was “a threat to
the community safety and a high risk to sexually re-offend.” Tuecke had
destroyed facility property, evidencing Tuecke was “capable of acting in a
physically aggressive manner,” and he seemed “either unwilling or unable to
curtail and control [his] defiant thinking and behavior that could ultimately lead to
another hands-on victim.” Tuecke had breached the terms of his SOTP contract
in numerous respects, such as possessing pornographic materials, performing
sex acts on another resident in the facility, and making sexually-inappropriate
comments.
A hearing on the alleged probation violations was subsequently held.
Ultimately, the court determined Tuecke’s deferred judgment should be revoked,
and it imposed the judgment it previously deferred, sentencing Tuecke to serve a
minimum term of confinement of seventeen-and-one-half years on the two
counts, to be served concurrently, and to be served consecutively with the term
imposed upon his second-degree burglary conviction. 5
In January 2015, following the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014), Tuecke filed a motion to correct his illegal
sentence. In Lyle, the court determined “all mandatory minimum sentences of
imprisonment for youthful offenders are unconstitutional under the cruel and
unusual punishment clause in article I, section 17 of [the Iowa] constitution.” 854
N.W.2d at 401. Because Tuecke was a youthful offender when he committed his
two acts of sexual abuse in 2007, Tuecke requested he be resentenced.
The State stipulated that under Lyle Tuecke must be resentenced, and the
court set the matter for hearing and directed that a new presentence investigation
report (PSI) be prepared. The “Psychological Report” section of the PSI,
completed in March 2015, noted Tuecke had three psychiatric diagnoses: mild
recurrent major depressive disorder, mild intellectual disability, and pedophilia.
His intellectual functioning was described as follows:
Mr. Tuecke was given the [Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale test] . . . and scored a 67. [The Iowa Department of Corrections (DOC)] is currently converting psychiatric diagnoses to the new DSM-5 codes from DSM-IV-TR. The DSM-5 criteria for Intellectual Disability now requires evidence of both intellectual and adaptive deficits. Mr. Tuecke no longer meets the criteria for this diagnosis as he lacks adaptive deficits. To further corroborate this conclusion, his [Test of Adult Basic Education] reading level improved from 3.8 (equivalent grade level) [in January 2011] to 6.3 [in August 2011], a span of six months. His reading was tested a third time [in January 2014] at 7.0. He is a high school graduate. The [Saint Louis University Mental Status Exam] administered [in June 2013] showed no evidence of dementia. This exam also revealed that [Tuecke] has a basic command of math, knowledge acquisition and recall, concrete reasoning, and auditory memory. These demonstrated skills, when considered together, also point towards the absence of an intellectual disability.
The PSI also provided details of the numerous disciplinary reports Tuecke had
received since incarcerated in 2010. 6
At the resentencing hearing, the court set aside Tuecke’s prior judgment
and prison sentence, and it adjudged him guilty of the two counts of second-
degree sexual abuse. The court resentenced Tuecke on each count to a term of
imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five years, to be served concurrently, and it
ordered those sentences to run consecutively to his second-degree-burglary
sentence. The court ordered Tuecke to “serve a minimum of [seventy percent] of
the sentence before coming eligible for parole,” and it imposed a special life
sentence requiring he be committed to the custody of the DOC for the rest of his
life, as provided by section 903B.1.1 Thereafter, the court filed a written order
consistent with its oral pronouncement at sentencing.
Tuecke now appeals.
II. Discussion.
On appeal, Tuecke argues the seventy-percent mandatory minimum
sentence imposed is disproportionate and constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the United States Constitution and the Iowa
Constitution.2 He also argues the district court abused its discretion in
1 Though Tuecke received two sentences for his second-degree-sexual-abuse convictions, the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, so we at times refer to his sentences in the singular. 2 Tuecke’s argument heading in his brief only references the Iowa Constitution. However, his argument and conclusion cite both the Iowa and United States Constitutions. He does not expressly suggest we interpret the Iowa Constitution differently than the Federal Constitution, but his argument centers upon Lyle, wherein the majority “follow[ed] the federal analytical framework in deciding [Lyle], but ultimately use[d its] judgment in giving meaning to [Iowa’s] prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in reaching [its] conclusion.” See 854 N.W.2d at 401-03. This is relevant because, as the dissenters in Lyle point out, the holding in Lyle under the Iowa Constitution goes beyond the United States Supreme Court’s holdings interpreting the similar Federal Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See id. at 405 (Waterman, J., dissenting) (“By holding Lyle’s seven-year mandatory minimum sentence for his violent felony is cruel and unusual punishment and unconstitutional under article I, section 17 of 7
sentencing him to the mandatory-minimum term. As a general rule, we review a
district court’s sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724-25 (Iowa 2002). However, when a defendant
challenges the constitutionality of a sentence, our review is de novo. See State
v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 553 (Iowa 2015).
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment.
1. Applicable Juvenile-Sentencing Jurisprudence.
Both the U.S. Constitution and the Iowa Constitution prohibit the infliction
of cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Iowa Const. art.
I, § 17 (“Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be
imposed, and cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted.”). Underlying
the constitutions’ prohibition is the venerable adage “that punishment should fit
the crime.” State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009). “[T]he right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment flows from the basic ‘precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
offense.’” State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 57 (Iowa 2013) (citation omitted).
However, the right’s meaning and interpretation is “not static” but rather ever
evolving. See Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 384. Thus, constitutional challenges alleging
cruel and unusual punishment must be considered under the current, prevailing
the Iowa Constitution, rather than under the Eighth Amendment, the majority evades review by the United States Supreme Court.”); id. at 408 (Zager, J., dissenting) (“The majority expands article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution to a point supported by neither our own caselaw nor by any caselaw of the United States Supreme Court. Neither does such an expansive interpretation find support in the caselaw of any other appellate court in the nation. Contrary to the majority’s reasoning, the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Constitution does not support this expansive interpretation.”). Because Tuecke asks that we follow the court’s reasoning in Lyle, we only address his claims under the Iowa Constitution. 8
“standards of whether a punishment is ‘excessive’ or ‘cruel and unusual,’”
drawing “meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.” Id.
“Until recently, there were two general classifications of cruel and unusual
sentences.” Id. at 385 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010)). The
first category of claims required a determination of whether a particular
defendant’s sentence, considering all of the circumstances of the case, is
unconstitutionally excessive or grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the
particular crime. See id. The second category of claims “contemplated
categorical bars to imposition of the death penalty irrespective of idiosyncratic
facts.” Id. However, the claims in this category generally fell under two separate
subsets: challenges based upon the nature of the crime by itself, and challenges
based upon “characteristics of the offender.” Id. The Iowa Supreme Court
differentiated the two subsets by way of example:
For instance, no offender can be sentenced to death—regardless of their personal characteristics—if only convicted of a nonhomicide offense and they did not intend to cause the death of another. [Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008)]. Additionally, a death penalty cannot be imposed, irrespective of the crime, on an intellectually disabled criminal offender, [Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 350 (2002)], or a juvenile offender, [Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005)].
Id.
The United States Supreme Court introduced a third category of
challenges in Graham, 560 U.S. at 70-74, “blend[ing] its two prior subsets of
categorical challenges—consideration of the nature of the crime and
consideration of the culpability of the offender.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 385. In that 9
case, the sentence at issue—life in prison without parole—followed a juvenile
offender’s conviction for committing a nonhomicide offense. See id. (discussing
Graham, 560 U.S. at 71). The Court concluded the sentence constituted cruel
and unusual punishment, given “the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide
offenders,” the severity of the sentence, and its determination that “penological
theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide
offenders.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 74-75. The Court noted states were not
“required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a
nonhomicide crime,” but it concluded the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment under the Federal Constitution did require states to “give defendants
like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” prohibiting the states “from making the
judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.”
Id. at 75. Stated another way, under the Eighth Amendment, juveniles convicted
of nonhomicide offenses must have the possibility to be released during their
lifetimes. See id. “[E]ven if [a defendant] spends the next half century attempting
to atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes,” the Eighth Amendment
mandates that that defendant be given a “chance to later demonstrate that he is
fit to rejoin society based solely on a nonhomicide crime that he committed while
he was a child in the eyes of the law.” Id. at 79.
Thereafter, “the Court in [Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012),]
held a statutory schema that mandates life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole cannot constitutionally be applied to a juvenile.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 381;
see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725, 734 (2016) (finding its 10
holding in Miller—“that a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense could not be
sentenced to life in prison without parole absent consideration of the juvenile’s
special circumstances in light of the principles and purposes of juvenile
sentencing”—applied retroactively). The Iowa Supreme Court subsequently
determined the Miller rule was retroactive, and it “applied the reasoning in Miller”
in several cases that followed. See Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 381 (discussing Null,
836 N.W.2d at 72; State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 96-97 (Iowa 2013); and
State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013)). Ultimately, the court held a
juvenile offender’s sentence that effectively deprived the offender “of a
meaningful opportunity for early release on parole during the offender’s lifetime
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” was cruel and unusual
punishment.3 Id. Summarizing its application of Miller to these cases, the court
noted it found “not just . . . a de facto life sentence or one ‘that is the practical
equivalent of a life sentence without parole’” to be cruel and unusual, it also
found a juvenile offender’s sentence of a “lengthy term-of-years” to be cruel and
unusual. Id. (citations omitted). Notably, in two of the cases, the sentences were
found unconstitutional under the Iowa Constitution. See Null, 836 N.W.2d at 76;
Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 96-98; but see Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 122 (finding
“sentence with parole [was] the practical equivalent of a life sentence without
parole” and amounted “to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa
Constitution”).
3 Lyle, Null, Pearson, Ragland, and State v. Seats, a more recent cruel-and-unusual punishment case, were each decided by a four-to-three vote. See Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 558. 11
A year after deciding Ragland, the court considered Lyle, premised upon a
juvenile offender’s cruel-and-unusual-punishment challenge to his sentence of
ten years in prison with a mandatory minimum term of seven years for a
nonhomicide offense. See 854 N.W.2d at 380-81. The court held:
In the end, we conclude all mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for youthful offenders are unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment clause in article I, section 17 of our constitution. Mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles are simply too punitive for what we know about juveniles. . . . Additionally, we think the jolt would be compounded once parents would further discover that their child must serve at least seventy percent of the term of the mandatory sentence before becoming eligible for parole. This shock would only intensify when it is remembered how some serious crimes can at times be committed by conduct that appears less serious when the result of juvenile behavior. This case could be an illustration. .... Ultimately, we hold a mandatory minimum sentencing schema, like the one contained in section 902.12, violates article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution when applied in cases involving conduct committed by youthful offenders. We agree categorical rules can be imperfect, “but one is necessary here.” [Graham, 560 U.S. at 75]. We must comply with the spirit of Miller, Null, and Pearson, and to do so requires us to conclude their reasoning applies to even a short sentence that deprives the district court of discretion in crafting a punishment that serves the best interests of the child and of society. The keystone of our reasoning is that youth and its attendant circumstances and attributes make a broad statutory declaration denying courts this very discretion categorically repugnant to article I, section 17 of our constitution.
Id. at 400-03 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Because the sentencing
court did not consider the newly established factors or requirements stated in
Miller or the court’s recent cases when it made its sentencing decision, the court
vacated Lyle’s sentence and remanded the case back to the sentencing court.
See id. at 401-02. The court directed that the sentencing court determine 12
whether “the minimum period of incarceration without parole is warranted under
the factors identified in Miller and further explained in Null.” Id. at 404 n.10.
Yet, the Lyle majority clarified that although it was vacating the sentence
and remanding, it was not holding “that juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced
to imprisonment for their criminal acts” or that “juvenile offenders cannot be
sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment.” Id. at 380-81. It qualified it was
“only hold[ing] juvenile offenders cannot be mandatorily sentenced under a
mandatory minimum sentencing scheme.” Id. at 381. The court also expressly
stated its holding did “not prohibit judges from sentencing juveniles to prison for
the length of time identified by the legislature for the crime committed” or “from
imposing a minimum time that youthful offenders must serve in prison before
being eligible for parole.” Id. at 403 (emphasis added). In a footnote, it further
explained:
Under article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution, the portion of the statutory sentencing schema requiring a juvenile to serve seventy percent of the period of incarceration before parole eligibility may not be imposed without a prior determination by the district court that the minimum period of incarceration without parole is warranted under the factors identified in Miller and further explained in Null. The factors to be used by the district court to make this determination on resentencing include: (1) the age of the offender and the features of youthful behavior, such as “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the particular “family and home environment” that surround the youth; (3) the circumstances of the particular crime and all circumstances relating to youth that may have played a role in the commission of the crime; (4) the challenges for youthful offenders in navigating through the criminal process; and (5) the possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change.
Id. at 404 n.10 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 13
This tributary of the law has not been as crystal clear as a northeast Iowa
trout stream, and the Iowa Supreme Court further muddied the waters in 2015.
In State v. Louisell, the court “consider[ed] the nature and extent of a court’s
discretion in resentencing a juvenile offender convicted of a murder committed in
1987.” 865 N.W.2d 590, 592 (Iowa 2015). In that case, Louisell was convicted
of first-degree murder, a crime committed when she was seventeen years and
five months old, following a jury trial in 1988. See id. at 592-94. “[S]he was
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, the only sentence authorized in
Iowa Code section 902.1 (1987) for that crime.” Id. at 593-94 (footnote omitted).
In 2011, after the Supreme Court decided Graham, Louisell filed a motion to
correct her sentence, asserting it was now illegal. See id. at 594. Following a
series of events, not relevant here, an individualized sentencing hearing was held
in district court to resentence Louisell. See id. The district court “carefully
considered the evidence in the record and thoroughly analyzed each of the Miller
factors.” See id. at 595. The court then determined Louisell should be
resentenced “to a definite term of twenty-five years with credit for time served,
thereby discharging her from prison immediately and releasing her to correctional
supervision, as if on parole, for no more than two years.” Id. However, in the
event it was determined the court lacked authority to impose this new, definite
term-of-years sentence, “the court imposed an alternative sentence of life in
prison with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.” Id. The State
appealed and requested a stay of the resentencing order, and the supreme court
“granted the stay and retained the appeal to clarify the district court’s sentencing
authority in this evolving area of law.” Id. 14
On review, the supreme court found the district court lacked authority to
impose its first sentence—a definite term of twenty-five years—because the Iowa
Code, at that time, did not authorize “a term-of-years sentence for a defendant
convicted of first-degree murder, even if that defendant committed the crime as a
juvenile,” and it vacated that part of the sentencing court’s order. Id. at 598. It
then discussed its and the Supreme Court’s recent juvenile-sentencing
jurisprudence. See id. at 598-600. Because the existing statutory punishment—
prohibiting all offenders from being released on parole if convicted of a class “A”
felony—was unconstitutional following Miller, Ragland, Null, and Pearson, the
court found the sentencing court correctly severed that portion of the sentence in
resentencing Louisell. See id. at 599. The severance left the following statutory
subsection intact, that, “[n]otwithstanding subsection 1 [from which the initial
language was severed], a person convicted of a class ‘A’ felony, and who was
under the age of eighteen at the time the offense was committed shall be eligible
for parole after serving a minimum term of confinement of twenty-five years.” Id.
(discussing Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(a)(2011)). However, the court also found,
under Lyle, the portion of the subsection that required serving a mandatory
minimum term of confinement violated the Iowa Constitution and also struck that
language from the statute. See id. at 600 (“Accordingly, Lyle requires that the
final clause of subsection 902.1(2)(a) providing for a mandatory minimum term of
confinement also be severed for purposes of sentencing Louisell.”). After
severing the statute’s unconstitutional parts, it found what remained was that the
sentencing “court had discretion to impose a life sentence with eligibility for
parole.” Id. It then vacated the sentencing court’s alternative sentence and 15
remanded “for entry of a sentence of life in prison with eligibility for parole.” Id. at
601. Once again, the court emphasized in a footnote that Louisell only
addressed “the scope of the district court’s discretion to impose an individualized
sentence after considering the Miller factors.” Id. at 601 n.9. It expressly stated
it was not deciding “whether the sentence of life in prison with eligibility for parole
is in [Louisell’s] case disproportionate, illegal, or cruel and unusual under either
the Eighth Amendment or article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.” Id.
The same day it handed down its opinion in Louisell, the court also
decided Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 556. In that case, Seats was convicted of first-
degree murder, among other things, for a crime he committed when he was a
juvenile, and he challenged his conviction of life without the possibility of parole
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham. Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 547-
49. After a series of events not relevant here, a sentencing hearing was held.
See id. at 550-51. Thereafter, the sentencing court, having considered the
applicable statutory factors and the factors set forth in Miller, determined a
sentence of life without parole was warranted for Seats. See id. at 551-52.
“Ultimately, the [sentencing] court granted Seats’s motion to correct the illegal
sentence ‘[t]o the extent the previous sentence was imposed without
individualized consideration of the circumstances’” and it “‘otherwise denied the
motion and upheld Seats’s sentence of life with parole eligibility after sixty years
as commuted by the governor.” Id. at 552 (second alteration in original). The
sentencing court “addressed Seats’s personal characteristics and potential for
reform, using his childhood circumstances, the negative family influences in his 16
life, and his lack of a stable support system as a factor against him” and the
nature of his crime. Id.
Seats appealed the sentence, and on further review, the supreme court
found the sentencing court “did not consider the factors a court must consider
before sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without the possibility of parole,” and
it vacated the sentence and remanded the case back to the district court. Id. at
557. In remanding, the court stated the “question the [sentencing] court must
answer at the time of sentencing is whether the juvenile is irreparably corrupt,
beyond rehabilitation, and thus unfit ever to reenter society, notwithstanding the
juvenile’s diminished responsibility and greater capacity for reform that ordinarily
distinguishes juveniles from adults.” Id. at 558.
2. Applicable Intellectual Disability-Sentencing Jurisprudence.
We add to the equation the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Atkins v.
Virginia, which explicitly considered “whether the death penalty should ever be
imposed on [an intellectually disabled] criminal.” 536 U.S. at 307. The Court
Those [intellectually disabled] persons who meet the law’s requirements for criminal responsibility should be tried and punished when they commit crimes. Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, however, they do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct. Moreover, their impairments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital proceedings against [so diagnosed] defendants.
Id. at 306-07. Comparing such offender’s “relative culpability” to the “penological
purposes served by the death penalty,” the court determined intellectually
disabled defendants “should be categorically excluded from execution.” Id. at 17
317-18. Concerning retribution, the Court found that because “severity of the
appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of the
offender . . . an exclusion for the [intellectually disabled] is appropriate.” Id. at
319. Additionally, culpability was again key to the Court’s determination that
execution of the intellectually disabled did not serve the penological purpose of
deterrence, because “it is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that
make these defendants less morally culpable.” Id. at 320. “Construing and
applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our ‘evolving standards of
decency,’ [the Court] therefore conclude[d] that such punishment is excessive
and that the Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to
take the life’ of an [intellectually disabled] offender.” Id. at 321 (citation omitted).
Atkins has not been extended to include borderline intellectually disabled
offenders. But see Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990, 1992 (2014) (finding
“Florida law requir[ing] that, as a threshold matter, [a defendant] show an IQ test
score of 70 or below” to establish an intellectual disability was unconstitutional
because it “create[d] an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability
will be executed”). Moreover, lower courts faced with Atkins-based challenges
by intellectually-disabled offenders have found Atkins only applies to those
offenders with death penalty sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Gibbs, 237
F. App’x 550, 568 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding Atkins was inapplicable in the context
of a sentence that did not involve the death penalty); Harris v. McAdory, 334 F.3d
665, 668 n.1 (7th Cir. 2003) (same); People v. Brown, 967 N.E.2d 1004, 1022 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2012) (same); Commonwealth v. Yasipour, 957 A.2d 734, 744 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2008) (same). 18
3. Application of Jurisprudence to Tuecke.
Tuecke argues that because he was a juvenile and diagnosed with an
intellectual disability at the time he committed the sexual offenses, the
“mandatory” minimum imposed as part of his new sentence is unconstitutional
under the logic and reasoning of Lyle. For the following reasons, we disagree.
First and foremost, unlike all of the cases cited above, including Lyle,
Tuecke’s judgment was initially deferred, and no sentence was imposed upon
him. See Iowa Code § 907.1(1). The purpose of deferred judgments “is to
provide an opportunity for rehabilitation and to spare the defendant, particularly a
first offender, the burden of a criminal record. Like probation, a deferred
judgment is a privilege, where the defendant is the primary beneficiary.” 22A
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 558 (footnote omitted). Additionally, the death penalty is
not at issue here, and thus, Atkins is inapplicable.
Tuecke was given an opportunity for rehabilitation from the get-go; had he
complied with the conditions set by the court, no sentence would have been
imposed upon him. See Iowa Code § 907.1(1). The crux of the cruel-and-
unusual-punishment cases where a juvenile’s sentence was deemed
unconstitutional is that the sentencing court had no discretion to consider
relevant mitigating factors, such as the offender’s age or possibility for
rehabilitation, in fashioning its sentence. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460
(holding mandatory life without parole for juveniles was cruel and unusual
punishment); Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (holding the United States “Constitution
prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender
who did not commit homicide”); Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 381 (“Pursuant to Iowa 19
statute, the sentence was mandatory, and [Lyle] was required to serve seventy
percent of the prison term before he could be eligible for parole.”); Null, 836
N.W.2d at 46 (“At Null’s sentencing hearing, the court stated that it had no
discretion in imposing the fifty-year sentence for second-degree murder or the
twenty-five-year sentence for first-degree robbery.”); Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 89
(“Because each first-degree robbery conviction carries a sentence of twenty-five
years imprisonment subject to a seventy percent mandatory minimum, Pearson
received a fifty-year sentence and will be ineligible for parole until she serves
thirty-five years.”); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 110 (“The district court then
sentenced Ragland to a term of life in prison without parole. The sentence was
mandatory under Iowa law.”).
Unlike the above-cited cases, the court in this case had discretion initially
when it granted Tuecke a deferred judgment, and it explained it elected to defer
judgment and sentence after it considered the plea agreement, Tuecke’s age,
and the nature of the offense. Instead of imposing judgment and sentence, it
directed that programming be provided to Tuecke for purposes of rehabilitation.
Then, after Tuecke—as an adult—violated his probation agreement in 2009, the
court again chose to defer Tuecke’s judgment and sentence, ordering Tuecke to
reside at a residential treatment facility. It did not revoke its deferred judgment
and impose a sentence until 2010, when Tuecke again violated his probation by
committing numerous rule infractions of the residential treatment facility and after
Tuecke had committed second-degree burglary. Clearly, the sentencing court
gave Tuecke several chances to establish his offenses were committed because
he lacked maturity and that he was rehabilitated. Tuecke chose not to abide by 20
the court’s reasonable terms. Consequently, we do not believe, under the facts
of this case, that Tuecke’s 2010 sentence constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the Iowa Constitution merely because the offenses were
committed when he was a juvenile.
In any event, following Tuecke’s motion requesting resentencing under
Lyle, the court resentenced Tuecke in 2015. In its colloquy at the sentencing
hearing, the judge noted his detailed experience as a juvenile-court judge, as
well as his familiarity with Tuecke’s sexual-abuse convictions, having served as
the judge in all of the prior relevant proceedings. The court further explained it
had considered the factors set forth in Lyle in determining whether to re-impose
the seventy-percent “mandatory” minimum requirement as part of Tuecke’s new
sentence, and it determined the requirement should be re-imposed, stating:
[S]ince day one, the court has imposed the least-restrictive criminal sanctions, the least-onerous criminal sanctions available to Mr. Tuecke with the hope that he would take advantage of those services. .... . . . The court used graduated sanctions and increased those sanctions only based upon his further violations and misconduct, that the court only imposed the sanction of prison and the mandatory minimum sentence as a last resort—after exhausting all of his other efforts and taking into account the services offered to him both by the justice system and his family during the interim. And by following that procedure of graduated sanctions, the court considered the difficulty youthful offenders have in these circumstances and their lack of maturity by not immediately imposing the most severe sanction available to the court and giving the defendant the benefit of those opportunities to change his behavior. For all of those reasons, the court believes the mandatory minimum seventy-percent requirement should be imposed and the consecutive sentence from the new later burglary charge are all appropriate. 21
Lyle explicitly does not prohibit judges “from imposing a minimum time that
youthful offenders must serve in prison before being eligible for parole.”4 854
N.W.2d at 403. It only requires the sentencing court first determine if “the
minimum period of incarceration without parole is warranted under the factors
identified in Miller and further explained in Null” before imposing the time. Id. at
404 n.10. There is no question the court did that here. Cf. State v. McLachlan,
No. 14-0257, 2015 WL 1332336, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2015). Thus,
though the word “mandatory” has been used, it is clear the court used its
discretion in considering and then imposing a minimum term of service, as
required under Lyle. Consequently, the district court’s sentences do not violate
the Iowa Constitution on its face.
After the district court applies the principles of Miller to a defendant’s
sentence, and we find the sentence is appropriate under Lyle, we consider
whether the sentence in this case would be cruel and unusual because of gross
disproportionality. See Null, 836 N.W.2d at 76; Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 883.
Though the basic principles for determining whether a sentence is
disproportionate under the Iowa Constitution are the same under the Federal
4 The court’s explanation in Louisell, 865 N.W.2d at 600,—that, under Lyle, “all mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles violate article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution,”—appears to be at odds with the following paragraph Lyle: It is important to be mindful that the holding in this case does not prohibit judges from sentencing juveniles to prison for the length of time identified by the legislature for the crime committed, nor does it prohibit the legislature from imposing a minimum time that youthful offenders must serve in prison before being eligible for parole. Article I, section 17 only prohibits the one-size-fits-all mandatory sentencing for juveniles. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 403. However, the court noted in Louisell that the only issue before it was “the scope of the district court’s discretion to impose an individualized sentence after considering the Miller factors.” Louisell, 865 N.W.2d at 601 n.10 (emphasis added). Tuecke does not challenge the district court’s authority or the scope of its discretion here, and we consequently do not address it further. 22
Constitution, our review under our own constitution is more stringent than review
under the Federal Constitutional counterpart; our review must not be “toothless.”
See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 883. Nevertheless, it is “rare that a sentence will
be so grossly disproportionate to the crime as to satisfy the threshold inquiry and
warrant further review.” State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 650 (Iowa 2012).
Additionally, “[i]f the sentence does not create an inference of gross
disproportionality, then ‘no further analysis is necessary.’” Id. (citation omitted).
When reviewing a defendant’s sentence to determine whether it is “grossly
disproportionate” to the offense, we give substantial deference to the legislature
and its discretion to enact penalties for certain crimes. See id. Generally, the
punishments established by the legislature are “regarded as the most reliable
objective indicators of community standards for purposes of determining whether
a punishment is cruel and unusual.” Id. We also consider whether there is a
high risk of potential gross proportionality based upon the “unique features” of a
case. See id. at 651.
Here, there is no doubt Tuecke’s age and intellect created a risk of
potential gross proportionality. Nevertheless, under the case’s unique facts, we
do not find the imposition of a minimum term of service to be grossly
disproportionate to Tuecke’s crimes. First, it is questionable whether Tuecke has
an intellectual disability, and if so, whether the “mild” disability would fall into the
Atkins classification of categorically-barred defendants. Additionally, though
Tuecke was a juvenile, he was eighteen when he was charged with sexually
abusing two children under the age of twelve. He and his parents agreed to have
the case moved to district court because it provided the best possible options for 23
Tuecke’s rehabilitation. Tuecke chose to enter into a plea agreement allowing
him to be granted a deferred judgment, wherein no sentence would have been
entered against him if he complied with the terms of his probation. After he
turned eighteen, he violated his probation. The court gave Tuecke another
chance; yet, he again violated his probation. In fact, while in the residential
treatment facility, his behaviors seemed to escalate, and he has since incurred
numerous infractions in prison. Ultimately, the reasoning behind Lyle is that “our
collective sense of humanity preserved in our constitutional prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment and stirred by what we all know about child
development demands some assurance that imprisonment is actually appropriate
and necessary.” 854 N.W.2d at 401. His probation violations and subsequent
infractions before the initial sentences were imposed evidence that imprisonment
is actually appropriate and necessary. Moreover, Tuecke does not have a life
sentence. While a seventeen-and-one-half-year sentence is lengthy, it is what
the legislature has determined to be appropriate. After reviewing Tuecke’s case
and comparing the gravity of his crime to the penalty mandated by the statute,
we do not find the minimum term of service imposed by the district court in
resentencing Tuecke leads to an inference of gross disproportionality. Since the
penalty does not lead to an inference of gross disproportionality, the sentence is
not cruel or unusual punishment, and we need not continue the analysis.
B. Abuse of Discretion.
Tuecke next argues the court abused its discretion when it determined the
seventy-percent time-served requirement be imposed as part of his sentences.
He argues the requirement is unreasonable, given the facts of the case. “An 24
abuse of discretion will only be found when a court acts on grounds clearly
untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d
550, 553 (Iowa 2015). “When a sentence imposed by a district court falls within
the statutory parameters, we presume it is valid and only overturn for an abuse of
discretion or reliance on inappropriate factors.” Id. at 554. Importantly, “we do
not decide the sentence we would have imposed, but whether the sentence
imposed was unreasonable.” Id. In exercising its discretion, the court should
“consider all pertinent matters in determining [the] proper sentence, including the
nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, defendant’s age, character
and propensities and chances of his reform.” Null, 836 N.W.2d at 87. Again, the
“punishment should fit both the crime and the individual,” though the court owes
a duty to the public as much as it owes to the offender in determining the
sentence. See id.
Here, the district court considered all of the pertinent factors in
determining Tuecke’s sentences, including its decision to impose the minimum-
term-of-service requirement. It carefully weighed the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in Tuecke’s case, including Tuecke’s failure to follow the terms of
his probation twice. Tuecke’s behaviors evidenced he was a threat to the
community. Upon our review, we find the imposition of a minimum term of
service as part of Tuecke’s corrected sentences was reasonable under all of
facts and circumstances of the case. Consequently, we conclude the sentencing
court did not abuse its discretion. 25
III. Conclusion.
The district court’s decision to impose the minimum term of service
requirement as part of Tuecke’s corrected sentences did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment under the Iowa Constitution. Additionally, the imposition of
a minimum term of service as part of Tuecke’s corrected sentences was
reasonable under all of the facts and circumstances of the case and not an
abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm Tuecke’s sentences.
AFFIRMED.