State of Iowa v. Jason Lee Tyer

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: January 9, 2025
• Docket: 24-0472
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0472 Filed January 9, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JASON LEE TYER, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County,

Karen Kaufman Salic, Judge.

Jason Tyer appeals his sentence for domestic abuse assault, third offense.

AFFIRMED.

Michael J. Jacobsma of Jacobsma Law Firm, P.C., Orange City, for

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ. 2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Jason Tyer appeals his sentence for domestic abuse assault, third offense.

He contends the court imposed an illegal sentence by ordering him to a

determinate term of incarceration. Because the sentence imposed by the district

court complies with the law, we affirm.

We review Tyer’s claim that the district court imposed an illegal sentence

for correction of errors at law. See State v. Lee, 6 N.W.3d 703, 706 (Iowa 2024).

A sentence is illegal if it is not permitted by statute. Id. The court imposes an

illegal sentence when it sentences a defendant to a term that is outside the

statutory bounds. State v. Wade, 7 N.W.3d 511, 514 (Iowa 2024).

Tyer pled guilty to one count of domestic abuse assault, third offense, a

class “D” felony.1 The district court sentenced Tyer to an indeterminate term of no

more than five years, and it ordered Tyer to serve all five years before being eligible

for parole or work release. Iowa Code section 902.3 states that for felony

convictions other than a class “A” felony, the court must impose a sentence of

confinement “for an indeterminate term.”2 Tyer contends that because the court

ordered him to serve a minimum sentence that is identical to the maximum term

allowed by law, the court imposed a determinate sentence in violation of Iowa

Code section 902.3.3

1 A defendant who pleads guilty must show “good cause” to appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2023). Because Tyer is challenging the sentence imposed on his conviction rather than the plea itself, he has good cause to appeal. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020). 2 The maximum sentence for a conviction of a class “D” felony is “no more than

five years.” Iowa Code § 902.9(1)(e). 3 No Iowa cases have addressed whether the court may impose a minimum

sentence that is equal to the statutory maximum. Some jurisdictions require “an 3

Iowa’s indeterminate sentence law requires the court to impose the

maximum sentence established by statute. State v. Wilson, 314 N.W.2d 408, 409

(Iowa 1982).

A determinate sentence imposes a specific number of years of imprisonment on a defendant, while an indeterminate sentence is one in which the legislature has set a range of the minimum and maximum amount of years deemed appropriate for the crime. Indeterminate sentences are parole eligible, while determinate sentences are not.

State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 2017) (internal citation omitted). In

absence of a statute setting a minimum sentence, the duration of the sentence is

appreciable amount of difference between the minimum and the maximum terms” of an indeterminate sentence. Arthur W. Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 4:2 Indeterminate sentencing (Oct. 2023 Update); accord G. Van Ingen, Annotation, Validity, Under Indeterminate Sentence Law, of Sentence Fixing Identical Minimum and Maximum Terms of Imprisonment, 29 A.L.R.2d 1344 (1953) (citing cases supporting “the principle that, under an indeterminate sentence law, the sentence cannot be for a definite term of imprisonment, but must be for not less than a specified period of time and for not more than a specified period, and there must be a difference between such periods, so that a sentence under such a law fixing identical minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment is invalid”). Many jurisdictions that require a differential in minimum and maximum sentences cite sentencing statutes that require it. See, e.g., State v. Sutton, 498 A.2d 65, 67–68 (Conn. 1985) (requiring that “the minimum sentence imposed could not exceed one-half the maximum”); State v. Wheeler, 499 A.2d 1005, 1007 (N.H. 1985) (requiring “that the minimum term may not exceed one-half the maximum”); People v. Edwards, 503 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (App. Div. 1986) (requiring a minimum sentence of one-half the maximum for class B armed felony offenses and one-third the maximum for all others). Some jurisdictions allow indeterminate sentences imposing identical minimum and maximum sentences based on the absence of statutory language requiring a differential. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hogan, 456 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (noting that, unlike in other jurisdictions, sentencing statute does not include “a specified differential between the minimum and maximum terms imposed” and refusing to imply one in the absence of such language); State ex rel. Brinkley v. Wright, 241 S.W.2d 859, 860– 61 (Tenn. 1951) (finding, “in the absence of statutory prohibition,” that indeterminate sentence fixing the same term for maximum and minimum sentence was not illegal). Iowa’s sentencing laws are silent on the question of imposing different minimum and maximum sentences. 4

determined by the parole board. Wilson, 314 N.W.2d at 409. If a statute prescribes

a minimum sentence, the court must determine whether it applies to the defendant.

Id.

The sentencing court determined that the provisions of section 902.13 apply

to Tyer, and Tyer does not dispute that determination. Instead, he argues that the

plain statutory language does not allow the court to impose a five-year minimum

sentence. His argument hinges on the words “between” and “within” as used in

Iowa Code section 902.13.

1. A person who has been convicted of a third or subsequent offense of domestic abuse assault under section 708.2A, subsection 4, shall be denied parole or work release until the person has served between one-fifth of the maximum term and the maximum term of the person’s sentence as provided in subsection 2. 2. The sentencing court shall determine, after receiving and examining all pertinent information referred to in section 901.5, the minimum term of confinement, within the parameters set forth in subsection 1, required to be served before a person may be paroled or placed on work release.

Iowa Code § 902.13 (emphasis added).

Our first step in interpreting a statute is determining whether it is ambiguous.

State v. McCollaugh, 5 N.W.3d 620, 623 (Iowa 2024). If its language is plain and

meaning clear, there is no ambiguity and our inquiry ends. Id. “It is our job to

interpret that language as written.” Id. at 624.

Tyer argues that under the ordinary and commonly understood meaning of

section 902.13, the court had no power to impose a minimum sentence identical

to the maximum. He claims that “within” is “a preposition used as a function word

to indicate in the limits or compass of something” and “between” means “something

is in intermediate relation to at least two other things.” Applying those definitions, 5

he claims that “the court can only impose a minimum term of confinement that is

less than five years and more than one year, but not a sentence that is for the

maximum term of confinement, five years.” In other words, Tyer views

subsection (1) as setting two endpoints for the minimum sentence: a low endpoint

of one-fifth of the maximum sentence (one year), and a high endpoint of the

maximum sentence (five years). He argues that subsection (2) directs the court to

choose a minimum sentence that falls along the range between those endpoints

but excludes the endpoints.

In Jensen v. Nelson, 19 N.W.2d 596, 598 (Iowa 1945), the supreme court

cited two definitions of “within” and recognized its use “is fairly susceptible of

different meanings” relating to time. The first definition “fix[es] both the beginning

and end of the period of time in which a specified act must be done. In this sense

‘within’ means ‘during.’” Jensen, 19 N.W.2d at 598. The second definition of within

means “not beyond, not later than, any time before, before the expiration of. In

this sense ‘within’ fixes the end but not the beginning of the period of time.” Id.

(cleaned up). The court noted the second definition “is neither unusual nor strained

and is well recognized in law.” Id. Under either definition, the endpoint is fixed

and cannot be exceeded. See In re Sw. Aircraft Servs., Inc., 831 F.2d 848, 854

n.1 (9th Cir. 1987) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“There are numerous cases in state

and federal courts dealing with the use of the word ‘within’ in a variety of statutory

situations. Most, if not all, hold that the word ‘within’ connotes the limit beyond

which action may not be taken.” (emphasis added) (collecting cases, including

Jensen, 19 N.W.2d at 598)). 6

Construing section 902.13(2) to allow the court to impose a minimum five-

year sentence before eligibility for parole or work release provides a less strained

reading and logical result. It complies with the general rules of statutory

construction set by the legislature. See Iowa Code § 4.1(34) (stating that “the first

day shall be excluded and the last included” when time is referenced in statutes

“unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the

general assembly, or repugnant to the context of the statute”). It also fits with Iowa

caselaw. See State v. Bird, 220 N.W. 110, 113 (Iowa 1928) (stating that an

indeterminate sentence is excessive if it exceeds the maximum provided by

statute).

Tyer also argues that the court’s judgment violates his right to due process

because it conflicts with section 903A.2(1)(b), which identifies sentences imposed

under section 902.13 as sentences for which an inmate “is eligible for a reduction

of sentence equal to fifteen eighty-fifths of a day for each day of good conduct by

the inmate.” See Maghee v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 712 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Iowa 2006)

(“When a state has created a right to good conduct time, that right is embraced

within the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.”). Tyer’s argument rests on the assumption that by ordering him to

serve “all five years” of his sentence without the possibility of parole, he will not

accumulate credit for earned time. The State disagrees with Tyer’s literal view of

the sentencing order and assumes the right to credit for earned time is implicit even

though it is not mentioned in the sentencing order.

Iowa Code section 903A.2(1)(a) states that “[e]ach inmate committed to the

custody of the director of the department of corrections is eligible to earn a 7

reduction of sentence.” Section 903A.2(1)(b) provides that those sentences

imposed under section 902.13 “are subject to a maximum accumulation of earned

time of fifteen percent of the total sentence of confinement,” and those serving

such sentences are “eligible for a reduction of sentence equal to fifteen eighty-

fifths of a day for each day of good conduct.” Ultimately, an administrative law

judge determines the amount of earned time credit to which an inmate is entitled.

See Iowa Code §§ 903A.1 (providing for appointment of an administrative law

judge to review of the conduct of inmates as provided in section 903A.3),

903A.3(1) (allowing the administrative law judge to “order forfeiture of any or all

earned time accrued” based on an inmate’s conduct). Without an order denying

Tyer credit for earned time, there is no error to correct. See, e.g., State v. Wade,

757 N.W.2d 618, 627 (Iowa 2008) (“A case is ripe for adjudication when it presents

an actual, present controversy, as opposed to one that is merely hypothetical or

speculative.”); cf. State v. Adams, No. 23-0651, 2023 WL 7014210, at *1 (Iowa Ct.

App. Oct. 25, 2023) (holding that without a court order denying the defendant credit

for time served, there was no error of law to correct).