State of Iowa v. Jason David Hocking

CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
DecidedNovember 13, 2025
Docket24-0663
StatusPublished

This text of State of Iowa v. Jason David Hocking (State of Iowa v. Jason David Hocking) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Iowa v. Jason David Hocking, (iowactapp 2025).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0663 Filed November 13, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JASON DAVID HOCKING, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,

Linda M. Fangman, Judge.

A defendant appeals his conviction for robbery in the first degree.

AFFIRMED.

Colin McCormack of Van Cleaf & McCormack Law Firm, LLP, Des Moines,

for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., Langholz, J., and

Telleen, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025). 2

TELLEEN, Senior Judge.

Jason Hocking appeals his conviction for robbery in the first degree, arguing

insufficient evidence supported his conviction.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In September 2023, Joshua Harris and his wife were driving past the

Waterloo mechanic shop he owned. The shop was closed, but Harris noticed the

doors of a customer’s car were open and a man was looking under the vehicle’s

hood. He observed that the individual was not Justin Wentz, the shop’s co-owner,

so Harris called Wentz and had his wife turn their car around so that he could

watch the individual from the next street over. Harris watched the individual “for

less than a minute,” then got out of his car, ran up to the customer’s vehicle, “took

[his] shirt off” and “took everything out of [his] pockets,” prepared “to defend [his]

property if [he] had to.”

Harris confronted the man, later confirmed to be Hocking, at the customer’s

vehicle. Hocking provided contradictory explanations for why he was at the

vehicle, claiming both that “it was his car” and that he wanted to purchase it, but

was carrying tools that “would not go with a car . . . that you owned”—specifically,

a “brake lock,” often used for hot wiring cars, which permits the user to start a

vehicle without the user being behind the steering wheel. Harris was still on the

phone with Wentz at this time, and Wentz told Harris to “keep him there.” Harris

then chased Hocking around the vehicle and told Hocking he would “pull [his] pistol

out,” though Harris testified that he was bluffing and had not brought a firearm with

him. According to Harris, Hocking “acted like he wanted to rush me” and “had 3

something in his hand that was behind him”—“a pointed object.” Harris confirmed

that he “had no sense of time,” “everything was quick,” and cited that his health

problems made his memory “a little cloudy.”

During this scuffle Wentz showed up on the scene. Wentz “flies across the

parking lot” and engaged in a melee against the driver’s door of the vehicle. At

some point during the fight, Hocking “lifted up” the screwdriver while Wentz was

“rushing him.” Around this time, Harris and Wentz forced Hocking into the vehicle.

Harris called 911 to report an attempted assault and vehicle theft by Hocking, and

he and Wentz worked to keep Hocking inside the vehicle. Harris testified to have

seen Wentz’s firearm while they were forcing Hocking into the vehicle and reported

to 911 that they both had permits to carry and were carrying at the time of the

attempted theft.

When officers arrived at the scene, Harris reported that Hocking attempted

to steal a customer’s vehicle. Hocking denied that he was attempting to steal the

vehicle but admitted to using the brake lock, which Harris and Wentz confirmed

they did not own. Harris opined to a responding officer that Hocking must have

been experienced in car theft because the vehicle he was attempting to steal, a

Chrysler 300, is “not hard to hotwire.” Officers observed that Hocking appeared to

be under the influence of methamphetamine and placed him in a squad car where

he began quietly talking to himself. The responding officers then searched for the

screwdriver with which Harris and Wentz claimed Hocking had threatened them.

Officers found the screwdriver in Hocking’s pocket, Hocking confirmed the

screwdriver belonged to him, and Harris reported that it was the screwdriver he

earlier saw Hocking holding. 4

Hocking was charged with robbery in the first degree (count I) and

possession of burglar’s tools (count II), and a jury convicted him as charged. The

district court sentenced Hocking to twenty-five years on count I and two years on

count II, to be served concurrently. Hocking now appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence for correction of legal

error. State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012). We consider the record

evidence “in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable

inferences that may be fairly drawn from [that] evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). If

the evidence could convince a rational fact finder of the defendant’s guilt beyond

reasonable doubt, we will uphold the verdict. Id.

III. Discussion

Hocking challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction

for robbery in the first degree. The jury instructions informed the jury that the State

was required to prove:

1. On or about the 19th day of September, 2023, [Hocking] had the specific intent to commit a theft as defined in Instruction 17.[1] 2. To carry out his intention or to assist him in escaping from the scene, with or without the stolen property, [Hocking]: (a) Committed an assault on Joshua Harris or Justin Wentz . . . OR (b) Threatened Joshua Harris or Justin Wentz with, or purposely put Joshua Harris or Justin Wentz in fear of immediate serious injury, OR (c) Threatened to immediately commit Willful Injury . . . . 3. [Hocking] was armed with a dangerous weapon.

1 Instruction 17 defined “theft” as “taking possession or control of property with the

intent to deprive the owner.” 5

The term “assault” included acts which “place another person in fear of immediate

physical contact which will be painful, injurious, or offensive to another person,

when coupled with the apparent ability to do the act; or intentionally displays a

dangerous weapon in a threatening manner towards another.”

We can quickly dispose of Hocking’s claim based on his argument on the

second possible element: whether he put Harris or Wentz in fear of immediate

serious injury. On this element, Hocking only argues that “even if the jury were to

assume that [Hocking’s] alleged movement towards Mr. Harris was sufficient to

constitute a threat, there was no evidence offered by the State that being stabbed

with a screwdriver would constitute a serious injury as defined by the Iowa Code.”

But our supreme court has directly addressed this argument, stating:

It is manifest there are many articles and instruments other than those specifically named in the section which might properly come within the scope of an ‘offensive or dangerous weapon’ if they were used or carried for use as weapons, [e.g.], pocket knives, razors, hammers, screwdrivers, ice picks, hatpins, chains, and many others, which are manufactured and generally used for peaceful and proper purposes.

State v. Hill, 140 N.W.2d 731

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Related

State v. Hill
140 N.W.2d 731 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1966)
State of Iowa v. Dontay Dakwon Sanford
814 N.W.2d 611 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2012)

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State of Iowa v. Jason David Hocking, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-iowa-v-jason-david-hocking-iowactapp-2025.