State of Iowa v. Jamodd Amaul Sallis

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 29, 2025
• Docket: 24-1132
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1132 Filed October 29, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JAMODD AMAUL SALLIS, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David P.

Odekirk, Judge.

A criminal defendant appeals his conviction of sexual abuse in the third

degree, enhanced as a habitual offender. AFFIRMED.

Christopher Kragnes Sr., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua Henry, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., Greer, J., and Doyle, S.J.*

Buller, J., takes no part.

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025). 2

GREER, Judge.

Jamodd Sallis appeals his conviction of sexual abuse in the third degree,

enhanced as a habitual offender. Pointing to a breakdown in the middle of trial

between him and trial counsel, Sallis claims the district court erred by denying him

the right to counsel by failing to appoint him new counsel or inquire into the details

of the breakdown in his attorney-client relationship. But we find the district court

dedicated significant time inquiring into the relationship breakdown and Sallis

never requested substitute counsel, so we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In October 2021, the State charged Sallis with sexual abuse in the third

degree. The State alleged that Sallis, then forty years old and married, had sex

with the fifteen-year-old victim—his “distant cousin”—on at least three different

occasions and had impregnated her. The victim testified that she occasionally

babysat for the Sallis family, including on trips the family took outside of their

hometown of Waterloo. Sallis had sex with the victim in the Sallis family home in

Waterloo on two occasions and outside of the home on three other occasions. She

testified that Sallis is the father of her child born in 2021, which an Iowa Division of

Criminal Investigation criminalist confirmed with 99.9999% certainty. Upon

learning that Sallis was the father of the child, the victim’s mother reported Sallis

to local authorities.

After being charged and arrested, Sallis was provided court-appointed

counsel. Over the course of the next eight months, the district court appointed and

allowed withdrawal of attorneys representing Sallis on eight separate occasions.

Upon his own motion, Sallis was finally permitted to represent himself in June 3

2022, and standby counsel was appointed. Yet, in September, after Sallis filed a

financial affidavit and applied for counsel, an attorney from the Waterloo Public

Defender’s Office was appointed and appeared on behalf of Sallis. Sallis did not

raise any concerns with his newly appointed counsel until day two of the jury trial,

which began in January 2024.

On the second day of trial, the State first called the victim as a witness.

Following his counsel’s cross-examination of the victim, Sallis requested a sidebar

outside the presence of the jury. His counsel informed the court,

I’m not sure the nature of what Mr. Sallis wanted a sidebar for. I assume it’s based on my cross-examination of [the victim]. I think we have a[n] extreme difference in opinion on how to approach this case and what questions to ask. I am unwilling to do it the way he wants it done, and so I don’t really know what to do from here.

The district court asked what Sallis “would like to say.” Sallis maintained that

nothing happened in Waterloo that was of a “sexual nature” and that sexual

intercourse only happened in Davenport, so his counsel’s cross-examination of the

victim did not further his theory of defense. He further stated that “there could have

been questions asked” by his counsel “to be able to get to that point and to ask

[the victim] different questions where [the victim] could be able to really say what

actually happened.” Counsel responded that she did not support the line of

questioning urged by Sallis, which he claimed would “pull [the victim’s] lies out.”

She further reiterated that she did not believe Sallis’s line of questioning would

impeach the victim because the victim’s testimony was consistent with her

previous statements and child-protection-center (CPC) interview. As counsel put

it: “I know what he wants me to ask. I do not think it is impeachment, and I am not

going to ask the questions that he wants me to ask. And that is where we are—I 4

don’t know—am I a puppet.” The district court inquired whether Sallis or his

counsel wanted to make an offer of proof. At this point, the court confirmed that

strategic decisions are counsel’s to make, but permitted calling the victim back to

the witness stand for an offer of proof by Sallis. But the district court, defense

counsel, and the State all expressed confusion over how the offer of proof could

impeach the victim since she had always maintained that Sallis had sex with her

in Waterloo:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I mean, there’s no strategy involved in it. I just simply don’t think that it’s—that the girl made an inconsistent statement about [sex occurring in Waterloo]. THE COURT: And I guess let’s . . . make a record, though, on what the inconsistency is alleged to be. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. So Mr. Sallis’s position is that [the victim] said to CPC originally that no sex occurred in Waterloo. I have watched the video. He has watched the video too. We have a difference of opinion on what she’s saying. I believe she’s saying that sex happened in Waterloo and he touched her bottom. He believes that she only said that her bottom was touched. So I don't know if we can submit the CPC video as a court exhibit or something for future reviewing courts. But the point is she told CPC that sex happened in Waterloo. She testified at a deposition that sex happened in Waterloo. I’m not going to impeach her and pretend that she didn’t say that that happened when she did. I can’t do that. THE COURT: And, [assistant county attorney], does the State have any position on all of this? Does it disagree with anything [defense counsel] has said as far as what’s in the CPC interview tape? COUNTY ATTORNEY: No, the State doesn’t believe that [the victim] has made an inconsistent statement when we’re talking about the sex acts that occurred in Waterloo. And the State would absolutely object to the defendant being afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the victim in this case.

Both sides then agreed that a copy of the CPC interview and an Iowa

Department of Health and Human Services report would be submitted as exhibits

for purposes of creating a record on the issue. Following the offer of proof,

subsequent testimony of the victim’s mother, and a break, defense counsel 5

explained to the court that the attorney-client relationship had degraded

completely:

At some point during the break Mr. Sallis asked that he speak with me and my [supervisor], in a different room, and so we spent some time there. I was there for about half of the time. Essentially where I see it is that Mr. Sallis and I have a complete difference in opinion on how this case should be run. [My supervisor] explained to him how that works is that I choose this and if he disagrees then I don’t—then I’m not his lawyer. And Mr. Sallis wishes that I would meet with him longer or hear him longer or listen to his questions, and it is my position I have listened to all his questions and I have answered all the questions that matter. I’m not—I have spent countless hours talking to Mr. Sallis. There’s nothing else to talk about. We have had a complete breakdown of communication. Our attorney-client relationship is toast. I don’t know what to do. He’s completely dissatisfied with all the questions I’m asking. I can’t sit here and keep asking questions and keep defending this man as every single thing I do I’m being questioned on. So I don’t know where to go from here. And I know that [my supervisor] basically told him, listen, you either proceed forward with [me] or you ask to fire and ask for a mistrial or something. I don’t know what Mr. Sallis’s choice is or what he wants to do. But that’s where I’m at. I’m done.

In response, Sallis voiced disagreement with the characterizations of

counsel. He advised the court that he and defense counsel had “spent time on the

telephone where I would start asking questions and honestly never get to be able

to get my questions out before getting cut off and not really able to get the question

through” and that “there’s no getting through” to his counsel. Sallis additionally

alleged that defense counsel had not given his case sufficient time:

Your Honor, she’s told me herself that she has not—I had to ask her to look at certain videos that she had not looked at. I had to ask her—because she sent the investigator over so I can watch the videos because she hadn’t watched them. I had to tell her what was in those videos so that she can understand the other part of the case. I have evidence that she doesn’t have, and I’m trying to show her that and she’s not looking at it. .... 6

So she’s told me herself out of her mouth that, oh, I’m on the way and I like to do it last minute, I’m a last-minute type of girl. Those are her lang—that’s her language. So there’s not been hours spent on my case. I have to disagree with that. And I wanted that to be on the record.

The district court then framed the question to Sallis as “at this time . . .,

Mr. Sallis, are you prepared to go forward with [defense counsel] as your attorney

or not.” The district court observed that there had been plenty of time to prepare,

witnesses had been established for “about . . . a couple years practically,” and “the

question really is straightforward. You certainly have the right to assist in your

defense, but [defense counsel] is the attorney[,] and she’s the one to determine

which questions should be ultimately asked the witness and decide how to proceed

with that.”

Sallis then asked the court if he had a right to understand his counsel’s trial

strategy, to which the court clarified, “You have a right to consult with your attorney

and understand from her whatever—ask whatever questions you want to of her.”

Defense counsel responded that “it’s going to change nothing. We can go into

another room and talk again. We are not going to communicate with each other.

We’ll come back in ten minutes and have the same thing.”

The district court then decided,

So here’s what we’re going to do. I’m going to—and I understand, [defense counsel], your position. I do. I’m hearing you. And I’m hearing you, Mr. Sallis. But I’m going to give us twenty-five minutes to talk about what questions may be asked with regard to the next two witnesses we’re going to have before lunch. We’ll come back at 11:30 and finish those two witnesses up before lunch hopefully. Does that sound realistic?

Trial then proceeded without further issues relating to defense counsel’s

representation of Sallis. The jury convicted Sallis as charged. Following trial, 7

defense counsel moved to withdraw, citing Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct

32:1.16(b)(4), which states “a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if . . .

the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with

which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement,” and Iowa Rule of Professional

Conduct 32:1.16(a)(2), which states that an attorney “shall withdraw from the

representation of a client if . . . the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially

impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client.” That motion was granted, new

counsel was appointed, and deadline for post-trial motions was extended.

Sallis now appeals, arguing the district court erred by denying him the right

to counsel by failing to appoint him new counsel or thoroughly inquire into the

breakdown in his attorney-client relationship.

II. Error Preservation

The State contests error preservation, arguing that State v. Tejeda requires

the defendant to explicitly request substitute counsel before any sua sponte duty

of inquiry into a communication breakdown is placed on the district court. 677

N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 2004). The State emphasizes the Tejeda court’s holding that,

“we therefore now explicitly recognize that there is a duty of inquiry once a

defendant requests substitute counsel on account of an alleged breakdown in

communication.” See id. at 750 (emphasis added). At first blush, the Tejeda

court’s holding may appear to have imposed a hard-and-fast requirement for the

defendant to request substitute counsel. But the supreme court further clarified

that the question is whether the trial court was “apprised of a potential breakdown

in communication” that constituted “a complete breakdown in communication

between the attorney and the defendant.” Id. at 750–51 (citation omitted). 8

Although Sallis never directly requested substitute counsel, both he and defense

counsel extensively described the alleged breakdown in communication and

provided the district court with “a colorable complaint” alerting the district court of

the need for an inquiry. Id. at 751. Error is preserved.

III. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s decision not to appoint substitute counsel for

an abuse of discretion. Id. at 749; accord State v. Martin, 608 N.W.2d 445, 449

(Iowa 2000). By contrast, a claim that the district court failed to inquire into a

communication breakdown presents a constitutional question, which we would

typically review de novo. See Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d at 749. Here, the district court

did inquire into Sallis’s concerns, and so we proceed to review the court’s course

of action for an abuse of discretion.

IV. Discussion

Sallis claims the district court erred in not appointing substitute counsel and

not thoroughly inquiring into the attorney-client relationship breakdown. Sallis

highlights his defense counsel’s statements that there had been “a complete

breakdown of communication,” the “attorney-client privilege is toast,” “I am done,”

and she could not “keep defending [Sallis] as every single thing I do I’m being

questioned on.”

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have

the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. And the Iowa

Constitution also enshrines the right to counsel, stating: “In all criminal

prosecutions . . . the accused shall have a right to . . . have the assistance of

counsel.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. But these rights do not guarantee a “meaningful 9

relationship” between client and counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983).

A defendant requesting substitute court-appointed counsel bears the burden to

show “a conflict of interest, irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in

communication between the attorney and the defendant.” State v. Lopez, 633

N.W.2d 774, 779 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted). And “[l]ast-minute requests for

substitute counsel, insofar as they constitute a delay tactic, are disfavored.”

Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 750.

An adequate inquiry into a communication breakdown or conflict can include

when the presiding judge “personally ask[s] the defendant at a hearing to explain

the nature of the communication problem.” Id. at 751. The judge should seek to

determine if the defendant’s claims are related to defense counsel’s

representation. See id. “[T]o prove a total breakdown in communication, a

defendant must put forth evidence of a severe and pervasive conflict with his

attorney or evidence that he had such minimal contact with the attorney that

meaningful communication was not possible.” Id. at 752 (quoting United States v.

Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1249 (10th Cir. 2002)).

The district court dedicated significant time to inquiry into the difference in

opinions Sallis and his counsel held relating to questioning the victim. And the

court agreed with Sallis’s counsel that the dispute was over a strategic question,

stating “these differences [are] strategic in nature and ones that counsel is typically

afforded the latitude to make decisions on how to cross-examine and impeach

witnesses.” The district court was similarly unpersuaded by Sallis’s allegation that

defense counsel had not reviewed all the evidence and had not dedicated sufficient

time to his case, explaining that “[t]here’s undoubtedly been hours and hours and 10

hours and hours of time spent” on his case. Nonetheless, the court still asked if

Sallis would like substitute counsel. Sallis did not request substitute counsel.

While Sallis’s complaints in relation to his defense counsel were sufficient

to preserve his claim on appeal, his failure to directly request substitute counsel is

informative to the court’s exercise of discretion. Indeed, the district court directly

asked Sallis, “are you prepared to go forward with [defense counsel] as your

attorney or not[?]” Sallis did not respond by requesting new counsel, only

requesting clarification on whether he has “a right as a client to understand what

the strategy is between myself and . . . my attorney?” And after being given a

break to further consult with his attorney, Sallis never requested substitute counsel.

The court extensively entertained Sallis’s complaints about his defense counsel,

and after hearing those complaints, requested definitive clarification from Sallis on

whether he was requesting new counsel.

Based upon the court’s careful exploration of Sallis’s concerns regarding

his counsel and the record before us, we find the district court exercised

appropriate discretion in not granting relief Sallis did not request from it. We affirm.

AFFIRMED.