IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1602 Filed January 10, 2024
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JACOB LEE ANTHONY DENNISTON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, James D. Coil,
Judge.
Jacob Denniston appeals after a jury found him guilty of indecent exposure.
AFFIRMED.
Jane M. White of Gribble Boles Stewart & Witosky, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Schumacher, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Doyle, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2024). 2
DOYLE, Senior Judge.
Jacob Denniston appeals after a jury found him guilty of indecent exposure.
He challenges both the sufficiency and weight of the evidence showing his guilt.
Because substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Denniston was
masturbating in a public place and Denniston failed to preserve error on his
challenge to the weight of the evidence, we affirm.
In March 2022, Denniston entered the women’s restroom at a Kwik Star in
Waterloo and locked the door. He remained inside the restroom for three hours,
preventing employees from performing restroom checks every half hour as
directed. An employee knocked on the door and called out to see if someone was
inside, but Denniston did not answer. Believing that someone accidentally locked
the door with the bathroom unoccupied, the store manager gave an employee the
universal key to unlock the door. When the employee opened the door, he saw
Denniston lying on the floor under the sink, naked from the waist down. The
employee testified that Denniston’s “[p]rivate areas were out,” Denniston’s hand
was moving over “his private area,” and “he also had a porn magazine between
his legs.” The employee quickly left the restroom, and the manager called the
police. An officer arrived and found the restroom door locked, and Denniston again
failed to respond to attempts at contact. After the manager unlocked the door, the
officer found Denniston lying naked on the floor with one hand covering his
testicles and the other hand covering his penis.
The State charged Denniston with indecent exposure under Iowa Code
section 709.9(2)(a) (2022). At trial, the court instructed the jury Denniston was
guilty if the State proved: 3
1. On or about the 25th day of March 2022, the defendant masturbated. 2. The defendant did so in a public place. 3. The defendant did so in the presence of another.
Denniston challenges the sufficiency of the evidence showing that (1) he was in
public and (2) he was masturbating.
We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of errors at law.
See State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 800 (Iowa 2021). We view the evidence and
all reasonable inferences that we can draw from it in the light most favorable to the
State. Id. We are “highly deferential to the jury’s verdict” and “affirm the jury’s
verdict when the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. Substantial
evidence is evidence that may convince a rational person of the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We are not concerned with whether the evidence
would support a different finding; our concern is whether the evidence supports the
finding the jury made. Id.
The focus of Denniston’s appeal is whether he was in “public.” He argues
that after locking the door, a person has an expectation of privacy in a public
restroom. But as the State notes, the “expectation of privacy” analysis applies in
determining whether the government has infringed on a person’s constitutional
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. That analysis does not
bear on whether one is in a public place. See State v. Booth, 670 N.W.2d 209,
216 (Iowa 2003) (Carter, J., dissenting) (stating that the expectation-of-privacy
analysis “is in no way determinative of a right to admission on the part of the
general public”). 4
Substantial evidence shows that Denniston was in a public place. The trial
court instructed the jury, “The phrase ‘public place’ is defined as any place,
building, or conveyance to which the public has or is permitted access.”1 Because
Denniston did not object to the jury instruction defining “public place,” “he cannot
complain that the evidence was insufficient to support a legal proposition contrary
to the one instructed to the jury.” State v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 521 (Iowa
2022). The Kwik Star store manager testified that the public has access to the
store’s restrooms twenty-four hours per day. The ability to lock the door
temporarily does not change the public nature of the restrooms. The keys to unlock
the door were not in Denniston’s possession2; they were in the possession of Kwik
Star’s manager. By staying in the restroom for three hours and ignoring
employees’ attempts to determine whether someone was inside, the jury could
infer that Denniston anticipated someone would eventually enter. See State v.
Sullivan, No. 18-0559, 2019 WL 21144636, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 15, 1999)
(concluding that “a jury could reasonably infer that Sullivan’s action of leaving the
water running in the hotel restroom with the door unlocked would bring someone
to the room to investigate,” and a reasonable person would understand that an
investigator would enter the room when no one responded to knocking or made
their presence known).
1 The same definition of “public place” is used in the statute prohibiting public
intoxication. See Iowa Code § 123.3(43) (defining “public place” as used in chapter 123, the “Iowa Alcoholic Beverage Control Act”). The Iowa Supreme Court has noted, “Business premises are commonly considered public places for purposes of public intoxication statutes.” State v. Paye, 865 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2015). 2 The employee who opened the restroom door testified, “We don’t provide a key
for our customers to use the restroom.” 5
Denniston also contends there is insufficient evidence showing he was
engaged in masturbation when the employee entered the restroom. He argues
that the employee failed to provide a specific description of what he viewed when
he opened the restroom door. We disagree. The employee testified that he saw
Denniston lying on the floor under the sink, naked from the waist down, “doing
what he was doing.” The prosecutor then asked questions to clarify:
Q. And what you said was, “He was doing what he was doing.” Was what he was doing masturbating? A. Yes. Q. How do you know that? A. I saw it. Private areas were out, hands was on his private area, and he also had a porn magazine between his legs. . . . Q. And was the defendant stroking himself when you were in there? A. Yes. Q. So he was moving his hand? A. Yep. Q. He wasn’t just holding or covering himself? A. No.
Denniston also argues that the employee testified he was in the restroom a “very
brief moment” that lasted about two seconds is incompatible with his testimony that
he saw Denniston masturbating and “stroking” his privates.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1602 Filed January 10, 2024
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JACOB LEE ANTHONY DENNISTON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, James D. Coil,
Judge.
Jacob Denniston appeals after a jury found him guilty of indecent exposure.
AFFIRMED.
Jane M. White of Gribble Boles Stewart & Witosky, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Schumacher, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Doyle, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2024). 2
DOYLE, Senior Judge.
Jacob Denniston appeals after a jury found him guilty of indecent exposure.
He challenges both the sufficiency and weight of the evidence showing his guilt.
Because substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Denniston was
masturbating in a public place and Denniston failed to preserve error on his
challenge to the weight of the evidence, we affirm.
In March 2022, Denniston entered the women’s restroom at a Kwik Star in
Waterloo and locked the door. He remained inside the restroom for three hours,
preventing employees from performing restroom checks every half hour as
directed. An employee knocked on the door and called out to see if someone was
inside, but Denniston did not answer. Believing that someone accidentally locked
the door with the bathroom unoccupied, the store manager gave an employee the
universal key to unlock the door. When the employee opened the door, he saw
Denniston lying on the floor under the sink, naked from the waist down. The
employee testified that Denniston’s “[p]rivate areas were out,” Denniston’s hand
was moving over “his private area,” and “he also had a porn magazine between
his legs.” The employee quickly left the restroom, and the manager called the
police. An officer arrived and found the restroom door locked, and Denniston again
failed to respond to attempts at contact. After the manager unlocked the door, the
officer found Denniston lying naked on the floor with one hand covering his
testicles and the other hand covering his penis.
The State charged Denniston with indecent exposure under Iowa Code
section 709.9(2)(a) (2022). At trial, the court instructed the jury Denniston was
guilty if the State proved: 3
1. On or about the 25th day of March 2022, the defendant masturbated. 2. The defendant did so in a public place. 3. The defendant did so in the presence of another.
Denniston challenges the sufficiency of the evidence showing that (1) he was in
public and (2) he was masturbating.
We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of errors at law.
See State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 800 (Iowa 2021). We view the evidence and
all reasonable inferences that we can draw from it in the light most favorable to the
State. Id. We are “highly deferential to the jury’s verdict” and “affirm the jury’s
verdict when the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. Substantial
evidence is evidence that may convince a rational person of the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We are not concerned with whether the evidence
would support a different finding; our concern is whether the evidence supports the
finding the jury made. Id.
The focus of Denniston’s appeal is whether he was in “public.” He argues
that after locking the door, a person has an expectation of privacy in a public
restroom. But as the State notes, the “expectation of privacy” analysis applies in
determining whether the government has infringed on a person’s constitutional
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. That analysis does not
bear on whether one is in a public place. See State v. Booth, 670 N.W.2d 209,
216 (Iowa 2003) (Carter, J., dissenting) (stating that the expectation-of-privacy
analysis “is in no way determinative of a right to admission on the part of the
general public”). 4
Substantial evidence shows that Denniston was in a public place. The trial
court instructed the jury, “The phrase ‘public place’ is defined as any place,
building, or conveyance to which the public has or is permitted access.”1 Because
Denniston did not object to the jury instruction defining “public place,” “he cannot
complain that the evidence was insufficient to support a legal proposition contrary
to the one instructed to the jury.” State v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 521 (Iowa
2022). The Kwik Star store manager testified that the public has access to the
store’s restrooms twenty-four hours per day. The ability to lock the door
temporarily does not change the public nature of the restrooms. The keys to unlock
the door were not in Denniston’s possession2; they were in the possession of Kwik
Star’s manager. By staying in the restroom for three hours and ignoring
employees’ attempts to determine whether someone was inside, the jury could
infer that Denniston anticipated someone would eventually enter. See State v.
Sullivan, No. 18-0559, 2019 WL 21144636, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 15, 1999)
(concluding that “a jury could reasonably infer that Sullivan’s action of leaving the
water running in the hotel restroom with the door unlocked would bring someone
to the room to investigate,” and a reasonable person would understand that an
investigator would enter the room when no one responded to knocking or made
their presence known).
1 The same definition of “public place” is used in the statute prohibiting public
intoxication. See Iowa Code § 123.3(43) (defining “public place” as used in chapter 123, the “Iowa Alcoholic Beverage Control Act”). The Iowa Supreme Court has noted, “Business premises are commonly considered public places for purposes of public intoxication statutes.” State v. Paye, 865 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2015). 2 The employee who opened the restroom door testified, “We don’t provide a key
for our customers to use the restroom.” 5
Denniston also contends there is insufficient evidence showing he was
engaged in masturbation when the employee entered the restroom. He argues
that the employee failed to provide a specific description of what he viewed when
he opened the restroom door. We disagree. The employee testified that he saw
Denniston lying on the floor under the sink, naked from the waist down, “doing
what he was doing.” The prosecutor then asked questions to clarify:
Q. And what you said was, “He was doing what he was doing.” Was what he was doing masturbating? A. Yes. Q. How do you know that? A. I saw it. Private areas were out, hands was on his private area, and he also had a porn magazine between his legs. . . . Q. And was the defendant stroking himself when you were in there? A. Yes. Q. So he was moving his hand? A. Yep. Q. He wasn’t just holding or covering himself? A. No.
Denniston also argues that the employee testified he was in the restroom a “very
brief moment” that lasted about two seconds is incompatible with his testimony that
he saw Denniston masturbating and “stroking” his privates. But the reason for the
employee’s quick departure was that the nature of Denniston’s act was
immediately obvious to him.3 Because the employee’s testimony provides an
ample basis for finding that Denniston was masturbating, substantial evidence
supports the jury’s verdict.
Denniston also contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for new
trial, reiterating the same claims addressed above under a weight-of-the-evidence
3 The employee testified, “So it was like two seconds of, okay, I’m doing—and then,
you know, I saw enough. I saw enough.” The prosecutor stated, “I understand that you weren’t just going to stand there and watch what was going on,” to which the employee responded, “No.” 6
standard. The State challenges error preservation, noting that Denniston never
raised a weight-of-the-evidence claim before the trial court.
We agree that Denniston failed to preserve error on any claim that the
verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. Although Denniston’s motion for
new trial outlines several grounds for new trial, only paragraphs seven and eight
of his motion are at issue on appeal:
7. The issue of whether or not a single public bathroom for one individual with a door that locks from the inside provides a right of privacy to an individual was crucial to the defense and was overruled . . . and a privacy instruction was not given to the jury. 8. The evidence was insufficient for as jury to find that the defendant masturbated in public.
The motion does not state that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the
evidence, and it does not cite Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(7)
[formerly numbered 2.24(2)(b)(6)] or State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658–59 (Iowa
1998). At the hearing on the motion, Denniston’s counsel argued that there was
insufficient evidence showing Denniston was in a public place and masturbating.
And in denying the motion, the trial court found “there was sufficient evidence that
the defendant did masturbate in public.”
Sufficiency-of-the-evidence and weight-of-the-evidence challenges are not
synonymous. See State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706–07 (Iowa 2016). Raising
only a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim does not preserve error on a weight-of-
the-evidence claim. See State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 491 (Iowa
2013) (“On appeal, Thompson relies on Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(6) and State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 1998).
However, Thompson’s counsel never cited that rule or Ellis in his posttrial motion 7
or during the hearing on that motion in district court.”). As Denniston did not raise
a weight-of-the-evidence challenge or receive a ruling on such a challenge,
Denniston has not preserved any such challenge for our review. State v. Crawford,
972 N.W.2d 189, 198 (Iowa 2022) (“[A] party has an obligation to raise an issue in
the district court and obtain a decision on the issue so that an appellate court can
review the merits of the decision actually rendered.”); Meier v. Senecaut, 641
N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that
issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we
will decide them on appeal.”). Because Denniston failed to preserve error, we do
not address his weight-of-the-evidence claims on appeal.