IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0352 Filed July 23, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
GATKEK DUAL LIETH, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Patrick H. Tott,
Judge.
A defendant appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and
Buller, JJ. 2
BADDING, Judge.
On appeal from his conviction for a drug offense, Gatkek Lieth challenges
the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop for
a cracked windshield. Expanding on the argument he made in district court, Lieth
contends the officer did not have probable cause to stop the vehicle because the
officer made a mistake of law and fact. We affirm the court’s ruling.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
After midnight on September 4, 2023, Trooper Conner Roos was working
the overnight shift on routine patrol. While parked at an abandoned gas station,
the trooper overheard radio traffic about a suspicious vehicle with four occupants
in it. Trooper Roos spotted the vehicle—a red 2013 Mercedes Benz that was
known to local law enforcement from past drug and firearm investigations—at a
nearby gas station. He followed the vehicle as it left the gas station, looking for
probable cause to pull it over.
Trooper Roos pulled up directly behind the Mercedes while it was stopped
at a red traffic light. Looking through the rear window of the vehicle, he observed
a cracked windshield that appeared to obstruct the clear vision of the driver. The
trooper radioed other units in the area and initiated a traffic stop.
Lieth was in the rear passenger seat of the Mercedes. After obtaining
consent to search the vehicle, officers found a “rolled-up foil” with burnt residue
and “a bag of white powder” where Lieth had been sitting. The powder field-tested
positive for cocaine. Lieth was arrested and charged with possession of a
controlled substance, third offense, as a habitual offender. 3
Lieth moved to suppress evidence seized from the stop under the federal
and state constitutions, arguing “[n]o justification was ever given nor was there any
probable cause for the stop.” In its resistance, the State contended Trooper Roos
had probable cause to stop the vehicle because the cracked windshield violated
Iowa Code section 321.438(1) (2023). The district court agreed with the State and
denied the motion to suppress.
Under a plea agreement with the State, Lieth entered a conditional guilty
plea to possession of a controlled substance, third offense, without the habitual
offender enhancement. The agreement, which was signed by both parties, stated:
“The Defendant anticipates appealing the Court’s adverse ruling to his motion to
suppress.” The district court accepted the guilty plea and imposed a suspended
sentence with probation. Lieth now appeals the denial of his suppression motion.1
II. Standard of Review
“The standard of review for a constitutional search and seizure challenge is
de novo.” State v. McClain, 20 N.W.3d 488, 494 (Iowa 2025) (citation omitted).
We make an “independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances” as shown
by the entire record. Id. (citation omitted). “We give deference to the district court’s
fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, but we
are not bound by those findings.” Id. (citation omitted).
1 We conclude that we have jurisdiction over Lieth’s preserved challenge to the
suppression ruling. See Iowa Code § 814.6(3); State v. McClain, 20 N.W.3d 488, 495 (Iowa 2025) (discussing the jurisdictional statute and the interest-of-justice standard). 4
III. Analysis
Lieth claims the traffic stop was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and article 1, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, both
of which prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. See
State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Iowa 2013). “A traffic stop is a ‘seizure’ under
both Constitutions.” State v. Griffin, 997 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Iowa 2023). “So if a
traffic stop is unreasonable, the stop is unconstitutional.” Id. at 419. “[A] traffic
stop is reasonable—and therefore constitutional—when there is probable cause to
believe that the motorist violated a traffic law.” Id. (cleaned up).
Iowa Code section 321.438(1) prohibits a person from driving “a motor
vehicle equipped with a windshield . . . which do[es] not permit clear vision.” The
district court found that because Trooper Roos observed a violation of
section 321.438(1), he had probable cause to stop the vehicle. Lieth contends the
district court erred in reaching that conclusion for two reasons.
First, Lieth argues the “clear vision” requirement in section 321.438(1)
should be interpreted to prohibit “cracks that would impair a driver’s vision to the
extent operation of the vehicle would be unsafe.” From that definitional premise,
Lieth argues that Trooper Roos made a mistake of law because he “erroneously
believed that any visible crack, which might potentially obstruct the driver’s clear
vision, constitutes a violation of the statute.” And under the Iowa Constitution, “a
mistake of law is not sufficient to justify a stop.”2 Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 294.
2 Under the Fourth Amendment, however, a reasonable mistake of law can support
a traffic stop. See Heien v. N. Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57 (2014); see also State v. Scheffert, 910 N.W.2d 577, 585 n.2 (Iowa 2018) (noting the “mistake-of-law 5
Second, Lieth argues that Trooper Roos made a mistake of fact when conducting
the traffic stop. Unlike a mistake of law, if an officer “makes an objectively
reasonable mistake about the facts underlying [a] violation, Iowa courts may
uphold the stop.” State v. Lansman, No. 19-0537, 2020 WL 1054571, at *2 (Iowa
Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2020) (citing State v. Lloyd, 701 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 2005)).
Lieth contends that the “challenging conditions under which the Trooper Roos
made his observation leads to a conclusion that Trooper Roos’[s] belief about the
windshield crack was not objectively reasonable.”
The State argues that neither of these arguments were raised by Lieth in
the suppression proceedings or decided by the district court. Instead, the State
contends “the questions defense counsel posed at the hearing on his motion
appear to have been designed to suggest the State Trooper’s testimony was not
credible by implying that he never actually saw the cracked windshield before
initiating the traffic stop.” We agree that was the focus of the suppression
proceeding and the issue decided by the district court.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0352 Filed July 23, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
GATKEK DUAL LIETH, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Patrick H. Tott,
Judge.
A defendant appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and
Buller, JJ. 2
BADDING, Judge.
On appeal from his conviction for a drug offense, Gatkek Lieth challenges
the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop for
a cracked windshield. Expanding on the argument he made in district court, Lieth
contends the officer did not have probable cause to stop the vehicle because the
officer made a mistake of law and fact. We affirm the court’s ruling.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
After midnight on September 4, 2023, Trooper Conner Roos was working
the overnight shift on routine patrol. While parked at an abandoned gas station,
the trooper overheard radio traffic about a suspicious vehicle with four occupants
in it. Trooper Roos spotted the vehicle—a red 2013 Mercedes Benz that was
known to local law enforcement from past drug and firearm investigations—at a
nearby gas station. He followed the vehicle as it left the gas station, looking for
probable cause to pull it over.
Trooper Roos pulled up directly behind the Mercedes while it was stopped
at a red traffic light. Looking through the rear window of the vehicle, he observed
a cracked windshield that appeared to obstruct the clear vision of the driver. The
trooper radioed other units in the area and initiated a traffic stop.
Lieth was in the rear passenger seat of the Mercedes. After obtaining
consent to search the vehicle, officers found a “rolled-up foil” with burnt residue
and “a bag of white powder” where Lieth had been sitting. The powder field-tested
positive for cocaine. Lieth was arrested and charged with possession of a
controlled substance, third offense, as a habitual offender. 3
Lieth moved to suppress evidence seized from the stop under the federal
and state constitutions, arguing “[n]o justification was ever given nor was there any
probable cause for the stop.” In its resistance, the State contended Trooper Roos
had probable cause to stop the vehicle because the cracked windshield violated
Iowa Code section 321.438(1) (2023). The district court agreed with the State and
denied the motion to suppress.
Under a plea agreement with the State, Lieth entered a conditional guilty
plea to possession of a controlled substance, third offense, without the habitual
offender enhancement. The agreement, which was signed by both parties, stated:
“The Defendant anticipates appealing the Court’s adverse ruling to his motion to
suppress.” The district court accepted the guilty plea and imposed a suspended
sentence with probation. Lieth now appeals the denial of his suppression motion.1
II. Standard of Review
“The standard of review for a constitutional search and seizure challenge is
de novo.” State v. McClain, 20 N.W.3d 488, 494 (Iowa 2025) (citation omitted).
We make an “independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances” as shown
by the entire record. Id. (citation omitted). “We give deference to the district court’s
fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, but we
are not bound by those findings.” Id. (citation omitted).
1 We conclude that we have jurisdiction over Lieth’s preserved challenge to the
suppression ruling. See Iowa Code § 814.6(3); State v. McClain, 20 N.W.3d 488, 495 (Iowa 2025) (discussing the jurisdictional statute and the interest-of-justice standard). 4
III. Analysis
Lieth claims the traffic stop was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and article 1, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, both
of which prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. See
State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Iowa 2013). “A traffic stop is a ‘seizure’ under
both Constitutions.” State v. Griffin, 997 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Iowa 2023). “So if a
traffic stop is unreasonable, the stop is unconstitutional.” Id. at 419. “[A] traffic
stop is reasonable—and therefore constitutional—when there is probable cause to
believe that the motorist violated a traffic law.” Id. (cleaned up).
Iowa Code section 321.438(1) prohibits a person from driving “a motor
vehicle equipped with a windshield . . . which do[es] not permit clear vision.” The
district court found that because Trooper Roos observed a violation of
section 321.438(1), he had probable cause to stop the vehicle. Lieth contends the
district court erred in reaching that conclusion for two reasons.
First, Lieth argues the “clear vision” requirement in section 321.438(1)
should be interpreted to prohibit “cracks that would impair a driver’s vision to the
extent operation of the vehicle would be unsafe.” From that definitional premise,
Lieth argues that Trooper Roos made a mistake of law because he “erroneously
believed that any visible crack, which might potentially obstruct the driver’s clear
vision, constitutes a violation of the statute.” And under the Iowa Constitution, “a
mistake of law is not sufficient to justify a stop.”2 Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 294.
2 Under the Fourth Amendment, however, a reasonable mistake of law can support
a traffic stop. See Heien v. N. Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57 (2014); see also State v. Scheffert, 910 N.W.2d 577, 585 n.2 (Iowa 2018) (noting the “mistake-of-law 5
Second, Lieth argues that Trooper Roos made a mistake of fact when conducting
the traffic stop. Unlike a mistake of law, if an officer “makes an objectively
reasonable mistake about the facts underlying [a] violation, Iowa courts may
uphold the stop.” State v. Lansman, No. 19-0537, 2020 WL 1054571, at *2 (Iowa
Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2020) (citing State v. Lloyd, 701 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 2005)).
Lieth contends that the “challenging conditions under which the Trooper Roos
made his observation leads to a conclusion that Trooper Roos’[s] belief about the
windshield crack was not objectively reasonable.”
The State argues that neither of these arguments were raised by Lieth in
the suppression proceedings or decided by the district court. Instead, the State
contends “the questions defense counsel posed at the hearing on his motion
appear to have been designed to suggest the State Trooper’s testimony was not
credible by implying that he never actually saw the cracked windshield before
initiating the traffic stop.” We agree that was the focus of the suppression
proceeding and the issue decided by the district court. So error was not preserved
on Lieth’s newly minted mistake-of-law and mistake-of-fact arguments. See
McClain, 20 N.W.3d at 495 (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that
issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we
will decide them on appeal.” (citation omitted)).
To the extent that Lieth’s appeal also challenges whether the trooper was
able to see the cracked windshield before stopping the vehicle, we give
“considerable deference” to the district court’s implicit credibility finding that the
doctrine is broader under the United States Constitution than it is under the Iowa Constitution”). 6
trooper observed a traffic violation. State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa
2004); cf. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 296–97 (finding an officer was not credible based
on internal inconsistencies in his testimony and contradictory extrinsic evidence).
At the suppression hearing, Trooper Roos testified that he “observed a cracked
windshield, particularly in front of the driver view,” along with a “cracked windshield
on the passenger towards the bottom.” The trooper believed that the driver’s clear
vision would be obstructed by the cracked windshield. While Trooper Roos’s
dashcam did not record his view from behind the vehicle at the traffic light, a picture
of the vehicle’s front windshield that was admitted at the hearing showed the two
cracks the trooper described in his testimony. We agree with the district court that
because the trooper observed a violation of section 321.438(1), he had probable
cause to stop the vehicle. See, e.g., State v. Williams, No. 00-942, 2001
WL 984710, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2001) (finding officers’ testimony about
a cracked windshield that may have obstructed the driver’s view in violation of
section 321.438(1) provided reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop); see also State
v. Jones, No. 05-0316, 2006 WL 133009, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2006); State
v. Kissee, No. 14-0219, 2015 WL 407957, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2015).3
For these reasons, we uphold the district court’s suppression ruling and
affirm Lieth’s conviction.
3 While these cases were considering cracked windshields under a reasonable
suspicion analysis—which was not argued by the State here—we agree with both parties that they are still probative under the probable cause analysis. See State v. Steffens, 889 N.W.2d 691, 697 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (finding the State did not preserve a reasonable-suspicion argument where it was not raised before or addressed by the district court as a justification for a traffic stop).