IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1797 Filed November 13, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
GARRETT MICHAEL CONDON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Stuart P. Werling,
Judge.
A criminal defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion by
considering an improper factor in its imposition of a prison sentence. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and
Sandy, JJ. 2
SANDY, Judge.
Garrett Michael Condon alleges that the district court abused its discretion
by considering an improper factor in its imposition of a prison sentence. Because
the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing, we affirm.
I. Statement of Facts & Procedural Background.
Condon was charged in Scott County, Iowa, following a series of incidents
in April 2024 involving property damage and arson connected to his former
romantic partner, C.M.
Condon and C.M. had been in a relationship for approximately four years
before ending their relationship in November 2023. After the breakup, Condon
continued to contact C.M. by phone and text. In February 2024, the two
encountered one another while driving, during which Condon pursued C.M. and
struck her vehicle. Following that incident, C.M. relocated to another residence
without disclosing her location to Condon.
In the early morning hours of April 7, 2024, a fire occurred at the Davenport
home of C.M.’s mother. Two of her pets were rescued from the second-floor
balcony; a third pet died due to smoke inhalation. Evidence showed that Condon
used an incendiary device to start the fire with the intent to damage the property.
During the same time frame, Condon caused additional damage to the property by
cutting the side of an above-ground swimming pool and spray-painting several
vehicles parked at the residence.
Later that evening, C.M. encountered Condon at a local skate park. He
approached her vehicle, jumped onto the hood, and kicked the windshield until it
cracked. That night, she received a phone call from an unidentified number and 3
recognized Condon’s voice. According to the minutes of testimony, he threatened
to “finish the job” if she did not meet him.
At approximately 9:30 p.m. that same day, Condon went to the Davenport
residence of C.M.’s friend where he broke a window, damaged a television by
throwing bricks, and spray-painted both the home and a detached garage. He was
arrested in Moline, Illinois later that month.
The State initially charged Condon with five counts, including first-degree
arson, first-degree criminal mischief, and stalking while in possession of a
dangerous weapon. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Condon pleaded guilty to four
lesser-included offenses: second-degree arson, two counts of second-degree
criminal mischief, and stalking as an aggravated misdemeanor. The State agreed
to dismiss the remaining count at his cost, and the parties were free to make
separate sentencing recommendations while agreeing that any term of
incarceration would run concurrently.
A presentence investigation report (PSI) was prepared. The report
recommended a suspended sentence with placement at a residential correctional
facility, noting Condon’s prior successful completion of probation, his employment
history, and documented struggles with mental health and substance abuse. The
PSI concluded that structured supervision and treatment would address these
issues while allowing him to maintain employment and pay restitution.
At sentencing, the State urged the district court to impose imprisonment on
all counts, citing the seriousness of the offenses and their impact on the victims.
The defense sought a deferred judgment or suspended sentences consistent with 4
the PSI recommendation. Condon addressed the court, expressing remorse for
his conduct and attributing his actions to a period of mental health instability.
The district court denied the request for deferred judgment or probation and
imposed concurrent sentences of ten years for second-degree arson, five years
on each count of second-degree criminal mischief, and two years for stalking,
along with corresponding fines. The court stated that it had considered the PSI,
the nature and gravity of the offenses, and the impact on the victims, emphasizing
that the arson of an occupied structure was “extremely troubling.” The court
observed that Condon appeared to have done better in a “controlled environment”
than in a less controlled one and concluded that incarceration was appropriate
both to protect the public and to provide rehabilitative programming within the Iowa
Department of Corrections.
Condon filed a timely notice of appeal challenging only the sentence and
asserting that the district court abused its discretion when it relied on an improper
factor. He argues the court’s remarks that Condon appeared to do better in a
“controlled environment” than in a less controlled environment were improper.
II. Standard of Review.
A sentencing court’s decision to impose a specific sentence that falls within
the statutory limits “is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only
be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate
matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).
We afford sentencing judges a significant amount of latitude because of the
“discretionary nature of judging and the source of the respect afforded by the
appellate process.” Id. at 725. The defendant must overcome the presumption of 5
regularity when challenging a court’s sentence. See State v. Pappas, 337 N.W.2d
490, 494 (Iowa 1983).
III. Analysis.
A sentencing court cannot rely on an improper factor when imposing its
sentence, “even if it was merely a ‘secondary consideration.’” State v. Schooley,
13 N.W.3d 608, 618 (Iowa 2024) (citation omitted).
Condon’s challenge is based on the court’s statement that it appeared
Condon did better in a controlled environment as opposed to a less controlled one.
Condon contends that what the court meant by a “less-controlled environment”
was probation, and what it meant by “controlled environment” was prison. And
Condon argues this conclusion is contrary to the information in the PSI because
Condon had not served time in jail or prison on his prior offenses.
In State v. Formaro, the supreme court explained why the sentencing court
is afforded discretion in crafting a defendant's sentence to further goals, including
rehabilitation of the offender and protection of the community:
In applying the abuse of discretion standard to sentencing decisions, it is important to consider the societal goals of sentencing criminal offenders, which focus on rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the community from further offenses.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1797 Filed November 13, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
GARRETT MICHAEL CONDON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Stuart P. Werling,
Judge.
A criminal defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion by
considering an improper factor in its imposition of a prison sentence. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and
Sandy, JJ. 2
SANDY, Judge.
Garrett Michael Condon alleges that the district court abused its discretion
by considering an improper factor in its imposition of a prison sentence. Because
the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing, we affirm.
I. Statement of Facts & Procedural Background.
Condon was charged in Scott County, Iowa, following a series of incidents
in April 2024 involving property damage and arson connected to his former
romantic partner, C.M.
Condon and C.M. had been in a relationship for approximately four years
before ending their relationship in November 2023. After the breakup, Condon
continued to contact C.M. by phone and text. In February 2024, the two
encountered one another while driving, during which Condon pursued C.M. and
struck her vehicle. Following that incident, C.M. relocated to another residence
without disclosing her location to Condon.
In the early morning hours of April 7, 2024, a fire occurred at the Davenport
home of C.M.’s mother. Two of her pets were rescued from the second-floor
balcony; a third pet died due to smoke inhalation. Evidence showed that Condon
used an incendiary device to start the fire with the intent to damage the property.
During the same time frame, Condon caused additional damage to the property by
cutting the side of an above-ground swimming pool and spray-painting several
vehicles parked at the residence.
Later that evening, C.M. encountered Condon at a local skate park. He
approached her vehicle, jumped onto the hood, and kicked the windshield until it
cracked. That night, she received a phone call from an unidentified number and 3
recognized Condon’s voice. According to the minutes of testimony, he threatened
to “finish the job” if she did not meet him.
At approximately 9:30 p.m. that same day, Condon went to the Davenport
residence of C.M.’s friend where he broke a window, damaged a television by
throwing bricks, and spray-painted both the home and a detached garage. He was
arrested in Moline, Illinois later that month.
The State initially charged Condon with five counts, including first-degree
arson, first-degree criminal mischief, and stalking while in possession of a
dangerous weapon. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Condon pleaded guilty to four
lesser-included offenses: second-degree arson, two counts of second-degree
criminal mischief, and stalking as an aggravated misdemeanor. The State agreed
to dismiss the remaining count at his cost, and the parties were free to make
separate sentencing recommendations while agreeing that any term of
incarceration would run concurrently.
A presentence investigation report (PSI) was prepared. The report
recommended a suspended sentence with placement at a residential correctional
facility, noting Condon’s prior successful completion of probation, his employment
history, and documented struggles with mental health and substance abuse. The
PSI concluded that structured supervision and treatment would address these
issues while allowing him to maintain employment and pay restitution.
At sentencing, the State urged the district court to impose imprisonment on
all counts, citing the seriousness of the offenses and their impact on the victims.
The defense sought a deferred judgment or suspended sentences consistent with 4
the PSI recommendation. Condon addressed the court, expressing remorse for
his conduct and attributing his actions to a period of mental health instability.
The district court denied the request for deferred judgment or probation and
imposed concurrent sentences of ten years for second-degree arson, five years
on each count of second-degree criminal mischief, and two years for stalking,
along with corresponding fines. The court stated that it had considered the PSI,
the nature and gravity of the offenses, and the impact on the victims, emphasizing
that the arson of an occupied structure was “extremely troubling.” The court
observed that Condon appeared to have done better in a “controlled environment”
than in a less controlled one and concluded that incarceration was appropriate
both to protect the public and to provide rehabilitative programming within the Iowa
Department of Corrections.
Condon filed a timely notice of appeal challenging only the sentence and
asserting that the district court abused its discretion when it relied on an improper
factor. He argues the court’s remarks that Condon appeared to do better in a
“controlled environment” than in a less controlled environment were improper.
II. Standard of Review.
A sentencing court’s decision to impose a specific sentence that falls within
the statutory limits “is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only
be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate
matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).
We afford sentencing judges a significant amount of latitude because of the
“discretionary nature of judging and the source of the respect afforded by the
appellate process.” Id. at 725. The defendant must overcome the presumption of 5
regularity when challenging a court’s sentence. See State v. Pappas, 337 N.W.2d
490, 494 (Iowa 1983).
III. Analysis.
A sentencing court cannot rely on an improper factor when imposing its
sentence, “even if it was merely a ‘secondary consideration.’” State v. Schooley,
13 N.W.3d 608, 618 (Iowa 2024) (citation omitted).
Condon’s challenge is based on the court’s statement that it appeared
Condon did better in a controlled environment as opposed to a less controlled one.
Condon contends that what the court meant by a “less-controlled environment”
was probation, and what it meant by “controlled environment” was prison. And
Condon argues this conclusion is contrary to the information in the PSI because
Condon had not served time in jail or prison on his prior offenses.
In State v. Formaro, the supreme court explained why the sentencing court
is afforded discretion in crafting a defendant's sentence to further goals, including
rehabilitation of the offender and protection of the community:
In applying the abuse of discretion standard to sentencing decisions, it is important to consider the societal goals of sentencing criminal offenders, which focus on rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the community from further offenses. It is equally important to consider the host of factors that weigh in on the often- arduous task of sentencing a criminal offender, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform. Furthermore, before deferring judgment or suspending sentence, the court must additionally consider the defendant's prior record of convictions or deferred judgments, employment status, family circumstances, and any other relevant factors, as well as which of the sentencing options would satisfy the societal goals of sentencing. The application of these goals and factors to an individual case, of course, will not always lead to the same sentence. Yet, this does not mean the choice of one particular sentencing option over another constitutes 6
error. Instead, it explains the discretionary nature of judging and the source of the respect afforded by the appellate process.
638 N.W.2d at 724–25 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
Here the district court gave valid reasons for declining to suspend Condon’s
prison sentence and did not rely on an improper factor by mentioning a controlled
environment as one in which Condon will better be rehabilitated. Considering
Condon’s behavior and failure to manage his mental health and substance abuse
issues on his own, prior to his arrest and jailing, it was reasonable for the court to
determine that Condon did better in a “controlled environment” such as jail or
prison. These were proper considerations by the court that speak to the
sentencing goals of protecting the public and providing for Condon’s rehabilitation.
See Iowa Code § 901.5 (2024).
Condon had to “overcome the presumption in favor of the sentence by
affirmatively demonstrating the court relied on an improper factor.” State v. Goble,
4 N.W.3d 700, 704 (Iowa 2024) (quoting State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106
(Iowa 2020)). He has failed at doing so. We find the district court properly
exercised its discretion in making its sentencing decision and did not rely on an
improper factor. We therefore affirm the sentence imposed.
AFFIRMED.