State of Iowa v. Ezekiel Larson

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 16, 2024
• Docket: 24-0148
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0148 Filed October 16, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

EZEKIEL LARSON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, DeDra Schroeder,

Judge.

A defendant appeals his sentence following a guilty plea. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ella M. Newell, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., Buller, J., and Danilson, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024). 2

DANILSON, Senior Judge.

Ezekiel Larson pled guilty to one count of child endangerment resulting in

bodily injury. As part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed to jointly

recommend imposition of a suspended five-year prison term accompanied by three

years of probation.1 The subsequent presentence investigation report

recommended Larson be sentenced to prison. At sentencing, the district court

declined to accept the parties’ joint recommendation and instead sentenced

Larson to a five-year term of incarceration. Larson appeals, claiming the district

court abused its discretion when sentencing him to a prison term.2

I. Standard of Review

“Our review of a sentence imposed in a criminal case is for correction of

errors at law.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “We will not

reverse the decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some

defect in the sentencing procedure.” Id. “A sentencing court’s decision to impose

a specific sentence that falls within the statutory limits ‘is cloaked with a strong

presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or

the consideration of inappropriate matters.’” State v. Boldon, 954 N.W.2d 62, 73

(Iowa 2021) (citation omitted).

1 The plea agreement was not conditioned on the district court’s acceptance of the

joint sentencing recommendation. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(3). 2 Because Larson challenges his discretionary sentence, he has good cause to

appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2023) (requiring defendants who plead guilty to offenses other than class “A” felonies to establish good cause to appeal); State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2020) (“We hold that the good-cause requirement is satisfied in this context when the defendant appeals a sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to in the plea bargain.”). 3

II. Discussion

Larson claims that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by

failing to adequately consider mitigating factors such as his remorse, employment,

family supports, and cooperation with the Iowa Department of Health and Human

Services in a separate juvenile court case. He also argues the district court should

not have considered his criminal history to conclude that he was not an appropriate

candidate for probation.

The purpose of sentencing is “to provide maximum opportunity to

rehabilitate the defendant and to protect the community.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d

at 106. When fashioning an individualized sentence to achieve that purpose, the

sentencing court considers several sentencing factors including: the nature of the

offense; the attending circumstances; the age, character, and propensity of the

defendant; the defendant’s employment status, family circumstances, potential for

reform, and prior record of convictions or deferred judgments; and any other

relevant factors. Id. Additionally, “[a] defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for

the offense, and a sincere demonstration of remorse, are proper considerations in

sentencing.” State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022) (citation

omitted). It is up to the district court to balance these individual factors given the

circumstances of each defendant. See State v. Hightower, 8 N.W.3d 527, 543

(Iowa 2024). And “while the district court ha[s] the obligation to consider relevant

factors, it [is] not required to specifically acknowledge each mitigating factor

claimed by” the defendant. State v. Phillips, 996 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Iowa Ct. App.

2023). 4

Following our review of the record, we conclude that the district court did

not abuse its discretion when it weighed permissible sentencing factors to reach a

sentencing determination. At the sentencing hearing and within the written

sentencing order, the district court noted Larson’s age, attitude, criminal history,

employment status, and familial support; the nature of the offense; the parties’ joint

recommendation; and the presentence investigation report recommendation as

factors it considered when making its sentencing determination. These are all

permissible factors for the court to consider.

While Larson contends that the court should have placed greater

significance on certain mitigating factors like his remorse, the court had no duty to

specifically discuss each mitigating factor or to weigh them as significantly as

Larson desired. See id. To the extent that Larson argues the district court

improperly considered his criminal history to conclude that he was a poor

candidate for probation, he is incorrect. The district court was free to consider

Larson’s criminal history, which spanned a decade and included multiple instances

of Larson violating probation.3 See id. at 421.

Larson cannot establish that the district court abused its discretion when it

sentenced him to prison. See Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106 (collecting cases

3 At the sentencing hearing, Larson’s counsel noted that the presentence investigation report required no additions or corrections and conceded that the court could rely upon it for sentencing purposes. The report detailed Larson’s criminal history. It showed that when Larson was previously placed on probation, he violated probation multiple times. 5

recognizing a defendant bears the burden on appeal to “overcome the presumption

in favor of the sentence”). As a result, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.