IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0843 Filed March 25, 2015
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ETHAN JOSEPH WALZTONI, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, David F. Staudt,
Judge.
An eighteen-year-old convicted of second-degree robbery challenges his
sentence as cruel and unusual. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, and Shawn Harden, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ. 2
TABOR, J.
Noting he is only “slightly above the age of majority,” Ethan Walztoni
challenges the mandatory minimum aspect of his sentence for second-degree
robbery as cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution and article 1, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. Because we
conclude the statutory requirement that he serve seven years of his ten-year
sentence is not grossly disproportionate to his role in an armed home invasion,
we affirm.
Eighteen-year-old Walztoni and two accomplices entered the
Independence home of Adam Yarlott late in the night of February 2, 2014.
Wearing a mask, Walztoni found a rifle inside the home and pointed it at the
victim. Meanwhile, his accomplices held the victim down and struck the victim in
the head with a hammer. Walztoni participated in the crime because he needed
money for his rent and believed they could steal “weed” from the residents. The
State originally charged Walztoni with six felony offenses: (1) robbery in the first
degree, a class “B” felony; (2) burglary in the first degree, also a class “B” felony;
(3) intimidation with a dangerous weapon, a class “C” felony; (4) and (5) two
counts of going armed with intent, class “D” felonies, and (6) assault while
participating in a felony, a class “D” felony. He reached a plea agreement,
reducing the charges to three lesser counts: (1) robbery in the second degree, a
class “C” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 711.3 (2013), which carried a
mandatory minimum term of seven years under Iowa Code sections 902.9(d) and
902.12(5); (2) attempted burglary, a class “C” felony, in violation of Iowa Code 3
section 713.4; and (3) assault while participating in a felony, a class “D” felony
under Iowa Code section 708.3, which carried a five-year mandatory minimum
based on the use of a dangerous weapon under Iowa Code section 902.7.
Under the agreement, the parties jointly recommended concurrent sentences.
At a combined plea and sentencing hearing, the district court accepted the
plea agreement and imposed concurrent indeterminate terms of ten years, ten
years, and five years. The sentencing order noted the mandatory minimums of
seven years and five years. Walztoni filed a notice of appeal. In his appellate
brief, Walztoni challenges only the mandatory seventy-percent sentence for the
second-degree robbery conviction.
Because Walztoni questions the constitutionality of his sentence, our
review is de novo. State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 869 (Iowa 2009). He
may raise this illegal sentence challenge at any time. Id. at 871–72.
Both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I,
section 17 of the Iowa Constitution prohibit the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment. U.S. Const. amend VIII; Iowa Const. art. I, § 17. (“Excessive bail
shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed, and cruel and
unusual punishment shall not be inflicted.”). Cruel-and-unusual-punishment
claims come in two varieties: a categorical approach, seeking to invalidate a
general sentencing practice, and a gross disproportionality comparison of a
particular defendant’s sentence with the seriousness of the particular crime. See
State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Iowa 2012) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 60 (2010)). Walztoni raises the second kind of challenge, arguing the 4
seven-year mandatory minimum is cruel and unusual as applied to his specific
case.1 Because Walztoni invokes the Iowa Constitution, “we will apply our more
stringent gross-disproportionality review to the facts of his case.” See id. at 650.
To determine whether Walztoni’s sentence is grossly disproportionate to
his crime we turn to the three-step test developed in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 290–92 (1983) (outlining the objective criteria as (1) the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the penalty, (2) sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (3) sentences imposed for the same crime
in other jurisdictions). The first factor poses a high burden for Walztoni. See
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 873 (noting “it is a rare case in which a threshold
comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an
inference of gross disproportionality”). Only if a challenge survives this threshold
test do we progress to the second and third Solem prongs. Id.
During our proportionality review, we are mindful of four principles. Oliver,
812 N.W.2d at 650. First, we defer to legislative determinations of punishment
and realize a sentence need not adhere to strict proportionality to be
constitutional. See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 872 (opining that “a reviewing court
is not authorized to generally blue pencil criminal sentences to advance judicial
perceptions of fairness”); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003)
1 Walztoni does not raise a categorical challenge to the mandatory minimum provision. Because he was an adult when he committed his offense, his situation is not controlled by State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 403 (Iowa 2014) (“[O]ur holding today has no application to sentencing laws affecting adult offenders. Lines are drawn in our law by necessity and are incorporated into the jurisprudence we have developed to usher the Iowa Constitution through time. This case does not move any of the lines that currently exist in the sentencing of adult offenders.”). 5
(emphasizing a reviewing court does not “sit as a ‘superlegislature’ to second-
guess policy choices”). Second, although we impose a more rigorous review
under our state constitution than under its federal counterpart, it remains rare that
a sentence is so grossly disproportionate to the offense that it satisfies the
threshold inquiry under Solem. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 650 (citing Iowa cases in
which defendants failed to meet this preliminary standard). Third, we regard a
recidivist offender as more culpable and, therefore, more deserving of a longer
sentence than a first-time offender. Id. Fourth, the unique features of a case
may “‘converge to generate a high risk of potential gross disproportionality.’” Id.
at 651 (quoting Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 884).
Keeping these principles in mind, we turn to the instant facts and consider
whether Walztoni’s seven-year mandatory minimum sentence was grossly
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0843 Filed March 25, 2015
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ETHAN JOSEPH WALZTONI, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, David F. Staudt,
Judge.
An eighteen-year-old convicted of second-degree robbery challenges his
sentence as cruel and unusual. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, and Shawn Harden, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ. 2
TABOR, J.
Noting he is only “slightly above the age of majority,” Ethan Walztoni
challenges the mandatory minimum aspect of his sentence for second-degree
robbery as cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution and article 1, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. Because we
conclude the statutory requirement that he serve seven years of his ten-year
sentence is not grossly disproportionate to his role in an armed home invasion,
we affirm.
Eighteen-year-old Walztoni and two accomplices entered the
Independence home of Adam Yarlott late in the night of February 2, 2014.
Wearing a mask, Walztoni found a rifle inside the home and pointed it at the
victim. Meanwhile, his accomplices held the victim down and struck the victim in
the head with a hammer. Walztoni participated in the crime because he needed
money for his rent and believed they could steal “weed” from the residents. The
State originally charged Walztoni with six felony offenses: (1) robbery in the first
degree, a class “B” felony; (2) burglary in the first degree, also a class “B” felony;
(3) intimidation with a dangerous weapon, a class “C” felony; (4) and (5) two
counts of going armed with intent, class “D” felonies, and (6) assault while
participating in a felony, a class “D” felony. He reached a plea agreement,
reducing the charges to three lesser counts: (1) robbery in the second degree, a
class “C” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 711.3 (2013), which carried a
mandatory minimum term of seven years under Iowa Code sections 902.9(d) and
902.12(5); (2) attempted burglary, a class “C” felony, in violation of Iowa Code 3
section 713.4; and (3) assault while participating in a felony, a class “D” felony
under Iowa Code section 708.3, which carried a five-year mandatory minimum
based on the use of a dangerous weapon under Iowa Code section 902.7.
Under the agreement, the parties jointly recommended concurrent sentences.
At a combined plea and sentencing hearing, the district court accepted the
plea agreement and imposed concurrent indeterminate terms of ten years, ten
years, and five years. The sentencing order noted the mandatory minimums of
seven years and five years. Walztoni filed a notice of appeal. In his appellate
brief, Walztoni challenges only the mandatory seventy-percent sentence for the
second-degree robbery conviction.
Because Walztoni questions the constitutionality of his sentence, our
review is de novo. State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 869 (Iowa 2009). He
may raise this illegal sentence challenge at any time. Id. at 871–72.
Both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I,
section 17 of the Iowa Constitution prohibit the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment. U.S. Const. amend VIII; Iowa Const. art. I, § 17. (“Excessive bail
shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed, and cruel and
unusual punishment shall not be inflicted.”). Cruel-and-unusual-punishment
claims come in two varieties: a categorical approach, seeking to invalidate a
general sentencing practice, and a gross disproportionality comparison of a
particular defendant’s sentence with the seriousness of the particular crime. See
State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Iowa 2012) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 60 (2010)). Walztoni raises the second kind of challenge, arguing the 4
seven-year mandatory minimum is cruel and unusual as applied to his specific
case.1 Because Walztoni invokes the Iowa Constitution, “we will apply our more
stringent gross-disproportionality review to the facts of his case.” See id. at 650.
To determine whether Walztoni’s sentence is grossly disproportionate to
his crime we turn to the three-step test developed in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 290–92 (1983) (outlining the objective criteria as (1) the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the penalty, (2) sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (3) sentences imposed for the same crime
in other jurisdictions). The first factor poses a high burden for Walztoni. See
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 873 (noting “it is a rare case in which a threshold
comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an
inference of gross disproportionality”). Only if a challenge survives this threshold
test do we progress to the second and third Solem prongs. Id.
During our proportionality review, we are mindful of four principles. Oliver,
812 N.W.2d at 650. First, we defer to legislative determinations of punishment
and realize a sentence need not adhere to strict proportionality to be
constitutional. See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 872 (opining that “a reviewing court
is not authorized to generally blue pencil criminal sentences to advance judicial
perceptions of fairness”); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003)
1 Walztoni does not raise a categorical challenge to the mandatory minimum provision. Because he was an adult when he committed his offense, his situation is not controlled by State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 403 (Iowa 2014) (“[O]ur holding today has no application to sentencing laws affecting adult offenders. Lines are drawn in our law by necessity and are incorporated into the jurisprudence we have developed to usher the Iowa Constitution through time. This case does not move any of the lines that currently exist in the sentencing of adult offenders.”). 5
(emphasizing a reviewing court does not “sit as a ‘superlegislature’ to second-
guess policy choices”). Second, although we impose a more rigorous review
under our state constitution than under its federal counterpart, it remains rare that
a sentence is so grossly disproportionate to the offense that it satisfies the
threshold inquiry under Solem. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 650 (citing Iowa cases in
which defendants failed to meet this preliminary standard). Third, we regard a
recidivist offender as more culpable and, therefore, more deserving of a longer
sentence than a first-time offender. Id. Fourth, the unique features of a case
may “‘converge to generate a high risk of potential gross disproportionality.’” Id.
at 651 (quoting Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 884).
Keeping these principles in mind, we turn to the instant facts and consider
whether Walztoni’s seven-year mandatory minimum sentence was grossly
disproportionate to his robbery offense under article 1, section 17 of the Iowa
Constitution. In support of his gross disproportionality claim, Walztoni points out
he “did not personally wield the hammer,” which could have seriously injured the
victim. He also underscores the fact that the gun he procured in the victim’s
home and pointed at the victim was not loaded. In addition, he asserts he has no
prior criminal history and took full responsibility for his offense during sentencing.
Walztoni’s circumstances are not so unique as to “converge to form a high
risk of disproportionality.” See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 884. Unlike the
situation in Bruegger, Walztoni’s actions were not “inadvertently caught by a
broadly written statute.” See Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 651. Walztoni’s conduct—
entering into a home without permission for the purpose of committing theft, 6
aiding and abetting an assault, and threatening an occupant with fear of
immediate serious injury—falls squarely within the elements of second-degree
robbery.
To fully address the proportionality question, we consider the totality of
circumstances, including the mitigating factors identified by Walztoni, as well as
other “potential factors that tend to aggravate the gravity of the offense and
magnify the consequences on [the victim].” See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 886.
The sentencing court captured the gravity of the offense in its remarks
concerning the impact on the victim:
[Y]ou put this man in great fear. I can’t imagine the horror that he went through to wake up in the middle of the night, have people inside his home, someone attacking him, hitting him with a hammer, someone point a gun at him; he didn’t know if it was loaded or not.
After considering the features of Walztoni’s case, we do not find the
mandatory minimum sentence of seven years to be grossly disproportionate to
the offense of robbery in the second degree. Because the punishment does not
create an inference of gross disproportionality, we do not need to analyze the
second and third factors of Solem. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 653.
AFFIRMED.