State of Iowa v. Esai Reno Filomeno Castillo

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: September 4, 2024
• Docket: 23-2044
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-2044 Filed September 4, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ESAI RENO FILOMENO CASTILLO, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County,

Karen Kaufman Salic, Judge.

Esai Reno Filomeno Castillo appeals the sentence imposed after pleading

guilty. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Katherine Wenman, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ. 2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Esai Reno Filomeno Castillo appeals the sentence imposed by the district

court after pleading guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor.1 He contends the court

abused its discretion when sentencing him by failing to consider certain mitigating

factors and improperly relying on others. Because we find no abuse of discretion,

we affirm the sentence.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In April 2022, Castillo was hired as a campus life associate at Youth For

Christ (YFC). Before being hired, he served as a volunteer for the program. While

working there, he developed a relationship with B.J., a fifteen-year-old girl in his

youth group.

In August, a parent reported concerns to YFC’s ministry director about

Castillo’s boundaries with church youth. This allegation prompted YFC to

investigate Castillo’s behavior and ultimately terminated Castillo’s employment.

The ministry director later discovered that Castillo and his wife were in a

“polygamous relationship” with two teenaged girls in Castillo’s youth group. She

notified the Mason City Police Department, which conducted its own investigation.

The investigation revealed that Castillo possessed a photo on his cell phone of

B.J. engaged in a sex act. The State charged Castillo with: Count I, sexual

exploitation of a minor and Count II, telephone dissemination of a depiction of a

minor.

1 Because Castillo only appeals his sentence and does not challenge his underlying plea, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.6 (2022); State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020). 3

As a result of a plea negotiation, Castillo pled guilty to count I; the court

accepted his guilty plea and dismissed count II. At the sentencing hearing, the

State recommended incarceration based on the severity of the offense and the

nature of the relationship. In turn, Castillo requested a deferred judgment or, in

the alternative, a suspended sentence. The court sentenced Castillo to an

indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed two years. He appeals.

II. Review.

We review sentences for correction of errors at law. State v. Damme,

944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020). “[T]he decision of the district court to impose a

particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption

in its favor,” and we will only reverse for an abuse of discretion. State v. Formaro,

638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs when “the

decision was exercised on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or

unreasonable.” Id.

III. Discussion.

Castillo makes two central claims regarding sentencing: he contends the

court (1) failed to consider mitigating factors and (2) improperly relied on unproven

offenses. We consider each argument in turn.

Castillo first argues that the court failed to consider mitigating factors, such

as his age, lack of criminal history, the positive reviews from character witnesses

at sentencing, his remorse, and his willingness to seek counseling. But this is

incorrect. While the court was not “required to specifically acknowledge each claim

of mitigation urged by a defendant,” State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct.

App. 1995), it expressly noted nearly all of these factors. The court stated that it 4

was considering Castillo’s “age, prior criminal history—or in your case, lack of” in

exercising its discretion. But it also voiced its concerns about the witnesses’

accounts and Castillo’s showing of remorse, finding that “some of [the witnesses’]

comments are rather minimizing of your behavior and victim blaming” despite

Castillo “being the adult in this situation.” The court also expressed its frustration

with Castillo’s diminishment of his own actions, finding that Castillo had not “taken

full accountability” because “[he is] still trying to downplay this and minimize.”

Further, while Castillo apologized during his statement at sentencing, he also

interrupted proceedings to justify the relationship, claiming it occurred “after I was

at YFC.” The court then went on to explain its reasoning for imposing

incarceration. Accordingly, we find Castillo’s argument that such factors were not

considered to be wholly without merit.

Next, Castillo contends that the court incorrectly punished him under

section 709.15 rather than section 728.12 because it penalized him “for having a

relationship with the minor even though it was not illegal.”2 Compare Iowa

Code § 709.15 (involving sexual exploitation of a minor by a “counselor or

therapist”), with id. § 728.12 (involving sexual exploitation of a minor without

2 Castillo further alleges that the court abused its discretion because it punished

him for an “unproven offense.” While “[i]t is a well-established rule that a sentencing court may not rely upon additional, unproven, and unprosecuted charges,” it is permitted when “the defendant admits to the charges or there are facts presented to show the defendant committed the offenses.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. Castillo both admitted to his relationship with B.J. and pled guilty to possession of the photo. Even so, for the reasons stated below, we find that the court did not consider any uncharged or unproven acts when sentencing Castillo. 5

requiring the individual to be working in a specific professional capacity). There

are two problems with this argument.

First, while the court noted Castillo’s “position of control and influence” over

the victim, this does not mean it sentenced him under the wrong statutory

provision. The court did not impose punishment under section 709.15. It neither

alleged that Castillo ever acted as a “counselor or therapist” nor stated that Castillo

engaged in any physical relationship with B.J. In fact, the court acknowledged that

Castillo’s relationship with B.J. was “arguably legal” and never made any reference

to section 709.15 at all.

Second, we require sentencing courts to consider “the nature of the offense

[and] the attending circumstances” when exercising discretion. See Damme,

944 N.W.2d at 106 (quoting Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725). The court’s

consideration of Castillo’s abuse of power over B.J., and his subsequent lack of

accountability for his actions, are part of such circumstances. See, e.g., State v.

Cooper, No. 21-0378, 2022 WL 3067970, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2022)

(permitting the court to consider grooming behaviors as part of sentencing); see

also State v. Jacobs, No. 18-0160, 2019 WL 156638, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.

Jan. 9, 2019) (“[T]he court can consider a defendant’s acceptance of

responsibility—or lack thereof—in deciding what sentence to impose.”). In

exercising its discretion, the court explained to Castillo, “You met this girl—this

young, underage girl while you were part of a church program, and then whether

it was during your employment or after, you began a relationship with her that,

while arguably legal, ended up with you having child porn on your phone.” We can

find no reason why the court’s consideration of the facts of the case constitutes an 6

abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm Castillo’s sentence for sexual

exploitation of a minor.

IV. Disposition.

Because we find no abuse of discretion by the sentencing court, we affirm

Castillo’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.