IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1034 Filed August 1, 2018
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ELIJAH JAVON WILSON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David P.
Odekirk, Judge.
Elijah Javon Wilson appeals his conviction for first-degree robbery.
AFFIRMED.
John L. Dirks of Dirks Law Firm, Ames, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ. 2
BOWER, Judge.
Elijah Wilson appeals his conviction for first-degree robbery, in violation of
Iowa Code section 711.2 (2016). Wilson claims the district court abused its
discretion by sentencing him to prison instead of placing him on probation. Wilson
also claims he received ineffective assistance because defense counsel permitted
him to plead guilty, thereby waiving his claim the matter should be transferred to
juvenile court. We affirm the district court, but determine Wilson’s claim of
ineffective assistance should be preserved for possible postconviction
proceedings.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
On July 28, 2016, Wilson, age sixteen, and a friend, Kemonte Todd, age
eighteen, robbed Muhammid Madni. Todd was carrying a pellet gun and Wilson
was carrying a stun gun. Todd struck Madni and struggled to take his wallet.
Wilson shocked Madni approximately twenty times during the course of the
robbery. After taking Madni’s money, Wilson and Todd ran in opposite directions.
Todd was apprehended approximately one block south. He admitted to the
robbery and implicated Wilson as an accomplice. After questioning, Wilson also
admitted to the robbery.
Wilson was charged with first-degree robbery. On August 5, 2017, Wilson
filed a motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. The district court denied
Wilson’s motion, citing a lack of time and resources, Wilson’s culpability, the
severity of the offense, and the effect on the victim. 3
On April 7, Wilson pled guilty to first-degree robbery, in violation of section
711.2, a class “B” felony. The State agreed not to recommend the imposition of a
mandatory minimum sentence. The presentence investigation report
recommended a prison sentence over probation. At sentencing, the State argued
for a term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five years and Wilson argued for
a deferred judgment. The district court specifically noted,
The Court has reviewed the exhibits provided by the defense at today’s hearing, including the Reverse Waiver Report and I have also reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report completed by the Department of Correctional Services and considered the arguments of counsel. I also am familiar with the decision cited by the defense, State v. Lyle and State v. Roby and have considered the factors that the defense brought to the Court’s attention in those matters as well. And in reviewing the case, the Court determines that at this point in time, the request for a deferred judgment should be denied. And I am going to pronounce judgment and sentence today based on the factors that I already mentioned and the factors set out in Iowa Code Section 907.5 and, again, I have considered the factors set forth in the case law, including but not limited to, you know, age, prior record, family circumstances, etcetera, of the defendant and I do believe that the recommendations of the First Judicial District Department of Correctional Services in this case are appropriate and I do not believe that those recommendations are mutually exclusive of rehabilitation. I do believe Mr. Wilson is capable of rehabilitation and I believe that can happen under the order the Court is imposing today. And so I will sentence Mr. Wilson to a term of imprisonment not to exceed 25 years. No mandatory minimum will apply to that.
Wilson now appeals.
II. Sentencing
Wilson claims the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him to
twenty-five years in prison with no mandatory minimum. Wilson claims the district
court should have applied the five-factor tests of State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378
(Iowa 2014), and State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 135 (Iowa 2017). Wilson 4
believes the factors lead “to the conclusion that prison is counterproductive in his
case” and, therefore, an abuse of discretion.
If a sentence is within the statutory limits, we review a district court’s
sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545,
552 (Iowa 2015). “Thus, our task on appeal is not to second-guess the decision
made by the district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on
untenable grounds.” Id. at 553. “In other words, the district court did not abuse its
discretion if the evidence supports the sentence.” Id. However, “the special
considerations involved in sentencing a juvenile offender to an adult sentence
similarly mean that, ‘even under this deferential standard, an appellate court
should view such a sentence as inherently suspect,’ and ‘cannot merely rubber-
stamp the trial court’s sentencing decision.’” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 138 (citation
omitted).
Our supreme court has declined to extend the Lyle factors to cases without
a mandatory minimum. State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 101 (Iowa 2017). Even
though it was not required, the district court did consider the Lyle factors. In
combination with the presentence investigation, Wilson’s age, prior criminal
record, and family circumstances, the district court determined a deferred
judgment was inappropriate and a prison sentence offered a better opportunity to
promote rehabilitation. The presentence investigation report showed Wilson
incurred several juvenile offenses leading to juvenile probation, from which he was
unsuccessfully discharged. The report also noted Wilson took no personal 5
responsibility for the robbery and instead attempted to blame Todd for pressuring
him to commit the crime.
We find the district court properly evaluated a number of factors, including
the Lyle factors. We note the district court specially considered Wilson’s ability for
rehabilitation and tailored the sentence to promote that outcome. Because the
sentence is indeterminate with no minimum, Wilson is immediately eligible for
parole and “able to demonstrate by his own actions his maturation and
rehabilitation.” See Propps, 897 N.W.2d at 101.
III. Ineffective Assistance
Wilson claims he received ineffective assistance because defense counsel
permitted him to plead guilty to first-degree robbery. Wilson’s guilty plea waived
any objection to his claim the case should be transferred to juvenile court. See
State v. Emery, 636 N.W.2d 116, 121 (Iowa 2001) (citing State v. Yodprasit, 564
N.W.2d 383, 384-85 (Iowa 1997)). “A defendant can, however, challenge the
validity of his guilty plea by proving the advice he received from counsel in
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1034 Filed August 1, 2018
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ELIJAH JAVON WILSON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David P.
Odekirk, Judge.
Elijah Javon Wilson appeals his conviction for first-degree robbery.
AFFIRMED.
John L. Dirks of Dirks Law Firm, Ames, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ. 2
BOWER, Judge.
Elijah Wilson appeals his conviction for first-degree robbery, in violation of
Iowa Code section 711.2 (2016). Wilson claims the district court abused its
discretion by sentencing him to prison instead of placing him on probation. Wilson
also claims he received ineffective assistance because defense counsel permitted
him to plead guilty, thereby waiving his claim the matter should be transferred to
juvenile court. We affirm the district court, but determine Wilson’s claim of
ineffective assistance should be preserved for possible postconviction
proceedings.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
On July 28, 2016, Wilson, age sixteen, and a friend, Kemonte Todd, age
eighteen, robbed Muhammid Madni. Todd was carrying a pellet gun and Wilson
was carrying a stun gun. Todd struck Madni and struggled to take his wallet.
Wilson shocked Madni approximately twenty times during the course of the
robbery. After taking Madni’s money, Wilson and Todd ran in opposite directions.
Todd was apprehended approximately one block south. He admitted to the
robbery and implicated Wilson as an accomplice. After questioning, Wilson also
admitted to the robbery.
Wilson was charged with first-degree robbery. On August 5, 2017, Wilson
filed a motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. The district court denied
Wilson’s motion, citing a lack of time and resources, Wilson’s culpability, the
severity of the offense, and the effect on the victim. 3
On April 7, Wilson pled guilty to first-degree robbery, in violation of section
711.2, a class “B” felony. The State agreed not to recommend the imposition of a
mandatory minimum sentence. The presentence investigation report
recommended a prison sentence over probation. At sentencing, the State argued
for a term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five years and Wilson argued for
a deferred judgment. The district court specifically noted,
The Court has reviewed the exhibits provided by the defense at today’s hearing, including the Reverse Waiver Report and I have also reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report completed by the Department of Correctional Services and considered the arguments of counsel. I also am familiar with the decision cited by the defense, State v. Lyle and State v. Roby and have considered the factors that the defense brought to the Court’s attention in those matters as well. And in reviewing the case, the Court determines that at this point in time, the request for a deferred judgment should be denied. And I am going to pronounce judgment and sentence today based on the factors that I already mentioned and the factors set out in Iowa Code Section 907.5 and, again, I have considered the factors set forth in the case law, including but not limited to, you know, age, prior record, family circumstances, etcetera, of the defendant and I do believe that the recommendations of the First Judicial District Department of Correctional Services in this case are appropriate and I do not believe that those recommendations are mutually exclusive of rehabilitation. I do believe Mr. Wilson is capable of rehabilitation and I believe that can happen under the order the Court is imposing today. And so I will sentence Mr. Wilson to a term of imprisonment not to exceed 25 years. No mandatory minimum will apply to that.
Wilson now appeals.
II. Sentencing
Wilson claims the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him to
twenty-five years in prison with no mandatory minimum. Wilson claims the district
court should have applied the five-factor tests of State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378
(Iowa 2014), and State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 135 (Iowa 2017). Wilson 4
believes the factors lead “to the conclusion that prison is counterproductive in his
case” and, therefore, an abuse of discretion.
If a sentence is within the statutory limits, we review a district court’s
sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545,
552 (Iowa 2015). “Thus, our task on appeal is not to second-guess the decision
made by the district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on
untenable grounds.” Id. at 553. “In other words, the district court did not abuse its
discretion if the evidence supports the sentence.” Id. However, “the special
considerations involved in sentencing a juvenile offender to an adult sentence
similarly mean that, ‘even under this deferential standard, an appellate court
should view such a sentence as inherently suspect,’ and ‘cannot merely rubber-
stamp the trial court’s sentencing decision.’” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 138 (citation
omitted).
Our supreme court has declined to extend the Lyle factors to cases without
a mandatory minimum. State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 101 (Iowa 2017). Even
though it was not required, the district court did consider the Lyle factors. In
combination with the presentence investigation, Wilson’s age, prior criminal
record, and family circumstances, the district court determined a deferred
judgment was inappropriate and a prison sentence offered a better opportunity to
promote rehabilitation. The presentence investigation report showed Wilson
incurred several juvenile offenses leading to juvenile probation, from which he was
unsuccessfully discharged. The report also noted Wilson took no personal 5
responsibility for the robbery and instead attempted to blame Todd for pressuring
him to commit the crime.
We find the district court properly evaluated a number of factors, including
the Lyle factors. We note the district court specially considered Wilson’s ability for
rehabilitation and tailored the sentence to promote that outcome. Because the
sentence is indeterminate with no minimum, Wilson is immediately eligible for
parole and “able to demonstrate by his own actions his maturation and
rehabilitation.” See Propps, 897 N.W.2d at 101.
III. Ineffective Assistance
Wilson claims he received ineffective assistance because defense counsel
permitted him to plead guilty to first-degree robbery. Wilson’s guilty plea waived
any objection to his claim the case should be transferred to juvenile court. See
State v. Emery, 636 N.W.2d 116, 121 (Iowa 2001) (citing State v. Yodprasit, 564
N.W.2d 383, 384-85 (Iowa 1997)). “A defendant can, however, challenge the
validity of his guilty plea by proving the advice he received from counsel in
connection with the plea was not within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases.” State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 642 (Iowa 2009).
Wilson claims his case should have been transferred to juvenile court, and he
states he received ineffective assistance based on defense counsel’s advice to
plead guilty.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed de novo. Ledezma
v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). In order to prove ineffective assistance 6
of counsel, a defendant must prove (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty
and (2) prejudice resulted. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d at 641.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are an exception to the normal
rules of error preservation. State v. Clark, 814 N.W.2d 551, 567 (Iowa 2012).
“Although we ordinarily preserve ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for
postconviction relief actions where a proper record can be developed, ‘we will
address such claims on direct appeal when the record is sufficient to permit a
ruling.’” State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 48 (Iowa 2013) (citation omitted). We will
address a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if the
record is adequate. Clark, 814 N.W.2d at 567.
We find the present record is not adequate to address Wilson’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. We determine Wilson’s claim of ineffective
assistance should be preserved for possible postconviction proceedings.
We affirm Wilson’s conviction and sentence.