IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0110 Filed June 30, 2021
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EDWARD MILLER JR., Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeffrey Farrell, Judge.
Edward Miller Jr. appeals his convictions for attempted murder, willful injury
causing bodily injury, assault while participating in a felony, going armed with
intent, felon in possession of a firearm, and conspiracy to obstruct prosecution.
AFFIRMED.
Britt Gagne of Gagne Law Office, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Edward Miller Jr. appeals his convictions for attempted murder, willful injury
causing bodily injury, assault while participating in a felony, going armed with
intent, felon in possession of a firearm, and conspiracy to obstruct prosecution.
Miller claims substantial evidence does not support the jury’s guilty verdicts. He
also argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial and erred in
evidentiary rulings, including improperly allowing prior bad acts evidence. We find
the verdicts supported by substantial evidence. We also determine the district
court did not err in the evidentiary rulings or in denying Miller’s motion for a new
trial. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Background and Proceedings.
A rational jury could find the following facts based on the evidence admitted
at trial. On November 30, 2018, Ryan Stout drove his car to see his ex-wife, who
had a valid no-contact order against him. Stout parked near an apartment complex
some distance from his ex-wife’s house. While he was near the apartment
complex, a truck driven by Miller approached, and Miller warned Stout to move
away from the apartment complex because Stout did not belong in the area. Stout
did not know Miller.
Approximately fifteen minutes after their initial interaction, Stout again
encountered Miller outside the apartment complex. During this second encounter,
Miller was wielding a sawed-off shotgun. After exchanging words, Miller raised the
gun in the direction of Stout and fired at him, shooting Stout in the abdomen and
his face. Stout fled to his ex-wife’s house. Stout sustained injuries to his ribcage, 3
bicep, and face. One bullet fragment went between Stout’s orbital bone and
eyeball.
Police arrived on the scene of the shooting. A live Winchester .12-gauge
shotgun shell, commonly referred to as “birdshot,” was located outside the
apartment complex near the backdoor. Stout provided officers with a description
of Miller. Officers sought to interview the residents of the five-unit apartment
complex. Officers were able to speak with the residents of four of the units;
however, none of the residents matched Miller’s description. Miller’s brother
leased the remaining unaccounted-for apartment. Although officers repeatedly
knocked on the door of the fifth unit, no one answered.
On December 3, police detectives interviewed Stout. During the interview,
Stout was asked to review a photo line-up. A photo of Miller was not included.
Stout reviewed the photos and identified a potential suspect; however, he was
uncertain the identified individual was the perpetrator. Days later, the police
produced another photo line-up, which now included a photo of Miller. Stout
identified Miller as his assailant.
Investigators interviewed Miller concerning his whereabouts on the night in
question. Miller stated at the time of the shooting, he was living with his ex-wife,
K.T. He reported he was not at the apartment complex in question on the night of
the shooting and initially claimed to have been out with a girlfriend. When
investigators informed Miller they planned to speak to the female Miller used as an
alibi, Miller changed his story and said that he was actually with his other
girlfriends. When asked to provide contact information for the people he was 4
allegedly with, Miller could not provide last names or physical addresses for
verification. When investigators then offered a random name as someone Miller
may have been with on the night of the shooting, Miller responded that he could
have been with that person.
In late December, while incarcerated, Miller instructed K.T. to remove his
property from his brother’s apartment. Miller’s possessions were later recovered
from K.T.’s residence after investigating officers obtained a search warrant for her
home. Included in the property seized were Miller’s camera equipment and
shotgun ammunition.
While serving time for violating his no-contact order in late December, Stout
encountered Miller in the Polk County jail. The encounter resulted in Miller pointing
his hands at Stout to feign firing a gun at him. Stout reported the incident to jail
security and again identified Miller as the man who previously shot him.
On February 8, 2019, the State filed a trial information charging Miller with
attempted murder, willful injury causing bodily injury, assault while participating in
a felony, going armed with intent, felon in possession of a firearm, and conspiracy
to obstruct prosecution. Miller demanded speedy trial. Trial commenced on
May 6, 2019. Kenneth Hardy, an acquaintance of Miller, testified. At trial, Hardy
testified that Miller had been living at Miller’s brother’s apartment when the
shooting took place. Hardy testified that on the night of the shooting, he observed
police investigating the apartment complex. The next day, Hardy asked Miller why
the police were at his apartment the night before. Hardy testified Miller said it was
because he shot somebody who refused to leave the apartment complex. Miller 5
described the man as “lucky” because the gun was loaded with birdshot and not
slugs. Hardy later relayed these statements to law enforcement. Hardy testified
he believed Miller’s description of the events was plausible because, in the days
leading up to the shooting, Miller had grown increasingly paranoid, resulting in
Miller putting up cameras and purchasing a shotgun. Hardy testified that when he
was in Miller’s apartment a few days before the shooting, he observed a shotgun
as well as red shotgun shells underneath Miller’s couch and in his bedroom.
The jury found Miller guilty of all charges. Miller’s felony convictions were
enhanced by the habitual offender status pursuant to Iowa Code section 902.8
(2018). On June 24, Miller filed a motion for a new trial, citing newly discovered
evidence and arguing the jury verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.
Following an evidentiary hearing held on December 23, the district court denied
the motion. On January 2, 2020, the district court imposed an indeterminate forty-
year period of incarceration with a mandatory minimum term of twenty-and-a-half
years. Miller now appeals.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Miller challenges the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the charges of
attempted murder, going armed with intent, and conspiracy to obstruct
prosecution.1 Miller also conflates his sufficiency of the evidence arguments with
1 To the extent Miller argues sufficiency of the evidence as to the other three convictions, we find such arguments waived by lack of citation to the record. “When a party, in an appellate brief, fails to state, argue, or cite to authority in support of an issue, the issue may be deemed waived.” State v. Adney, 639 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001); see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (stating the argument section shall include “[a]n argument containing the appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them with citations to the authorities 6
a “weight of the evidence” standard. We address his sufficiency of the evidence
arguments immediately below and address the weight of the evidence challenge
in conjunction with Miller’s motion for a new trial argument.
A. Standard of Review
“Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed for errors at
law.” State v. Hansen, 750 N.W.2d 111, 112 (Iowa 2008). The jury’s verdict is
binding upon the reviewing court unless there is an absence of substantial
evidence to sustain it. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(a); State v. Schrier, 300
N.W.2d 305, 306 (Iowa 1981). “Evidence is substantial if it would convince a
rational fact finder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State
v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Iowa 2005). We review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, and all reasonable inferences are drawn to uphold the
verdict. State v. Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208, 212–13 (Iowa 2006). Direct and
circumstantial evidence are equally probative. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(p).
relied on and references to the pertinent parts of the record . . . [and f]ailure to cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue”); State v. McCright, 569 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Iowa 1997); Metro. Jacobson Dev. Venture v. Bd. of Rev., 476 N.W.2d 726, 729 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). As noted above, random mention of an issue, without elaboration or supportive authority, is not sufficient to raise an issue for review. Schreiber v. State, 666 N.W.2d 127, 128 (Iowa 2003). We do not consider conclusory statements not supported by legal argument. See, e.g., Baker v. City of Iowa City, 750 N.W.2d 93, 103 (Iowa 2008) (holding that a party’s “conclusory contention” was waived where the party failed to support it with an argument and legal authorities); State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 913–14 (Iowa 2003), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545, 551 (Iowa 2010) (concluding the defendant waived consideration of the merits of his claims on appeal, which were presented as one-sentence conclusions without analysis); McCleeary v. Wirtz, 222 N.W.2d 409, 417 (Iowa 1974) (holding that a “subject will not be considered” where a “random discussion” is not supported by a legal argument and citation to authority). 7
B. Attempted Murder
First, Miller asserts the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support
his attempted murder conviction. For the jury to convict Miller of attempted murder,
the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Miller shot
Stout; (2) he expected that his actions would set in motion a force or chain of
events that would cause or result in Stout’s death; and (3) his specific intention
was to cause Stout’s death.
The State proved the identity of the shooter through Stout’s eyewitness
testimony, Hardy’s testimony, and other circumstantial evidence. Miller challenges
the reliability of Stout’s eyewitness identification and argues that without it, there is
insufficient evidence to prove he was the shooter. He points to Stout’s initial
incorrect photo lineup identification and offers other factors that may affect
eyewitness identification, including distance and visibility, the presence of a
dangerous weapon, intoxication levels of the witness, and cross-racial
identification.
However, “[g]enerally, direct eyewitness testimony establishing the elements
of the crime are sufficient to generate a jury question.” State v. Keys, No. 15-1991,
2017 WL 1735617, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. May 3, 2017). Although we recognize that
eyewitness testimony is not without fault, our supreme court has stated, “[t]he
fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint of improper state
conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a trial court to screen such evidence
for reliability before allowing the jury to assess its creditworthiness.” State v. 8
Doolin, 942 N.W.2d 500, 509 (Iowa 2020) (citing Perry v. New Hampshire, 565
U.S. 228, 245 (2012)).
“[T]he jury, not the judge, traditionally determines the reliability of evidence.”
Id. “[I]t suffices to test reliability through the rights and opportunities generally
designed for that purpose, notably, . . . vigorous cross-examination, protective
rules of evidence, and jury instructions on both the fallibility of eyewitness
identification and the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. at 509–510.
The potential shortcomings of Stout’s eyewitness testimony were presented
to the trier of fact. The jury was aware of Stout’s identification in the initial photo
lineup, which did not include Miller. They heard Stout describe the distance and
condition under which he observed Miller. Additional circumstantial evidence
identifying Miller as the shooter was also presented. Miller and Stout encountered
each other while incarcerated and Stout reported to jail security that Miller stared
at him and made a shooting motion with his hands. Additionally, Hardy’s testimony
that Miller lived at the apartment building, had recently become increasingly
paranoid and purchased a shotgun, and admitted to shooting Stout offers support
for the jury verdict. We find sufficient evidence establishing Miller as the shooter.
Miller challenges the remaining intent-related elements of his attempted
murder conviction. He argues the probability of the shooter’s actions causing
death was so low, such cannot sufficiently prove the shooter acted with the
necessary intent. Miller argues because Stout was shot with birdshot from a
distance, the shooter could not have expected the shooter’s actions to result in 9
Stout’s death and, therefore, the shooter lacked the specific intent to cause Stout’s
death. However, intent is not dependent on the probability of a certain outcome; it
is the action and its expected consequences from which intent is inferred. See
State v. Young, 686 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 2004) (finding that factual possibility
is unnecessary to find an act was in furtherance of the required specific intent
necessary to support a conviction for attempted murder).
“The general rule is that one who arms himself with the express purpose of
shooting another cannot ordinarily claim the elements of first degree murder are
lacking.” State v. Smith, 240 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Iowa 1976). Miller pointed a loaded
shotgun at Stout, pulled the trigger, and Stout sustained injuries. That Stout did
not sustain more serious injuries as a result of the shooting does not negate the
action itself and the intent derived therefrom. Further, the jury heard Miller’s
statement that Miller believed the gun was loaded with slugs rather than birdshot.
The jury also heard testimony that birdshot fired at a certain distance could still be
lethal. We find the record contains sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Miller
of attempted murder.
C. Going Armed with Intent
Next, Miller argues that the State failed to sufficiently prove the identity and
“going” elements of the conviction for going armed with intent. As the charged
offense arises from the same underlying factual scenario, our analysis regarding
the identity element as discussed above is applicable here. The “going” element
requires the State to prove that while armed with a firearm, Miller moved from one 10
place to another. Miller argues the State failed to meet its burden because no
testimony was offered to show he went somewhere to obtain the shotgun.
The evidence presented to the jury established that no weapon was
observed during Miller and Stout’s initial confrontation. When Stout returned and
the two men met again, Miller was armed with a shotgun. From the evidence
presented, a jury could reasonably infer Miller left the initial scene, obtained the
shotgun, and returned—carrying the firearm from one place to another. See State
v. Harris, 891 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Iowa 2017) (finding sufficient circumstantial
evidence for the jury to infer defendant carried a knife from inside the bar where
an initial verbal confrontation occurred to the street where the stabbing later took
place). When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find
sufficient evidence to support Miller’s conviction of going armed with intent.
D. Conspiracy to Obstruct Prosecution.
Finally, Miller challenges his conviction for conspiracy to obstruct
prosecution. Miller attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support the first two
elements the jury was required to find: (1) that he agreed with K.T. that one of them
would commit the offense of obstruction of prosecution and (2) he entered into the
agreement with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense.
While incarcerated, Miller called K.T. and requested she remove his
property from his brother’s apartment. The phone calls in the jail were monitored.
Included in the items K.T. removed and which were subsequently seized at her
apartment were Miller’s camera equipment and shotgun ammunition. At trial, the
State argued the removed property could be admissible, and the circumstances 11
surrounding the call indicate Miller intended for K.T. to remove the property in order
to conceal it from the prosecution. K.T. testified that Miller had asked her to
remove the property for safekeeping but that Miller never asked her to remove a
gun or ammunition, only to remove a washer and dryer, his camera equipment,
and a vehicle.
A reasonable jury could infer from the surrounding circumstances that
Miller’s intent was to remove potentially incriminating evidence from his brother’s
apartment. Miller specifically asked K.T. to remove his camera and camera
equipment. The cameras and equipment could potentially contain evidence
relevant to the night of the shooting, and Miller’s request for K.T. to remove it from
the apartment would prevent investigators from finding it. Intent is usually proven
“by circumstantial evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the conduct of
the defendant and all the attendant circumstances in light of human behavior and
experience.” State v. Casaday, 491 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Iowa 1992). We find the
record contains sufficient evidence to support Miller’s conviction for conspiracy to
obstruct prosecution.
III. Motion for New Trial
Following trial, Miller filed a motion for a new trial arguing newly discovered
evidence and that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.
When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence, we review for an abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 573
N.W.2d 14, 17 (Iowa 1997). An abuse of discretion occurs when the “district court
exercised its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent 12
clearly unreasonable.” State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 207 (Iowa 2003). When
a defendant claims the district court should have granted a motion for new trial on
a claim the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, review is for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 559 (Iowa 2006).
As noted by the trial court, in order to receive a new trial for newly
discovered evidence, the defendant has the burden of showing that (1) the
evidence was discovered after the verdict, (2) could not have been discovered
earlier in the exercise of due diligence, (3) is material to the issues in the case and
not merely cumulative, and (4) probably would have changed the result of the trial.
See Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003); see also Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.24(2)(b)(8).
The district court held an evidentiary hearing to consider the new evidence.
At the hearing, Miller called Marshall Wilkerson as a witness. Wilkerson testified
that in late November or early December 2018, his friend, Luke Swann,2 asked
him to hide a sawed-off shotgun and Swann stated that he shot Stout. He further
testified he did not report such to the police because he “was not even sure it was
true or not.” However, on redirect, Wilkerson, for the first time, stated that he was
an eyewitness to the shooting.
The district court found it questionable as to whether Miller met the
discoverability element. However, the court determined that even given the benefit
of the doubt on the discoverability element, Miller had not proven that the newly
2 Swann died on March 4, 2019, which was prior to Miller’s trial. 13
discovered evidence was likely to change the outcome of the trial. The court noted
that the State had presented “a strong case” with “evidence [that] was rationally
connected and made logical sense,” whereas the testimony offered by Wilkerson
lacked credibility and would not change the outcome of a new trial. The court noted
that Wilkerson never reported Swann’s involvement to law enforcement and stated
that he actually witnessed the shooting for the first time on redirect at the hearing.
Additionally, while Miller asserted that he did not know Wilkerson and they did not
discuss the shooting, the two men were housed on the same unit while
incarcerated. Finally, the court reasoned that if a new trial were granted, previously
excluded incriminating evidence of Miller’s attempts to fabricate an alibi through
another inmate while incarcerated would likely be introduced, undermining any of
Wilkerson’s testimony and further incriminating Miller.
Motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are “not favored
and should be closely scrutinized and granted sparingly.” State v. Kramer, 231
N.W.2d 874, 881 (Iowa 1975). “The standard for whether the evidence probably
would have changed the result of the trial is a high one because of the interest in
bringing finality to criminal litigation.” More v. State, 880 N.W.2d 487, 499 (Iowa
2016). The record supports the district court’s determination. There are issues of
reliability surrounding Wilkerson’s explanation of the shooting. Evidence of Miller’s
previous attempts to fabricate an alibi further discredit Wilkerson’s testimony and,
if introduced at a new trial would incriminate Miller. “The trial court is generally in
a better position than we to determine whether evidence, newly discovered, would
probably lead to a different verdict upon retrial, and we have often said we will not 14
interfere with its ruling unless it is reasonably clear that such discretion was
abused.” State v. Compiano, 154 N.W.2d 845, 849 (1967). We affirm the district
court’s denial of Miller’s motion for a new trial, finding no abuse of discretion by the
trial court.
Finally, Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(6) allows the district
court to grant a new trial when the verdict is contrary to law of evidence. “Contrary
to the evidence” means contrary to the weight of the evidence. State v. Ellis, 578
N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 1998). “The ‘weight of the evidence’ refers to ‘a
determination [by] the trier of fact that a greater amount of credible evidence
supports one side of an issue or cause than the other.’” Id. at 658 (quoting Tibbs
v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 37–38 (1982)). “This is a more stringent standard than the
sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard.” Nguyen v. State, 707 N.W.2d 317, 327
(Iowa 2005). “[The court] may weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of
witnesses. If the court reaches the conclusion that the verdict is contrary to the
weight of the evidence and that a miscarriage of justice may have resulted, the
verdict may be set aside and a new trial granted.” Ellis, 578 N.W.2d at 658–59.
The district court’s discretion should be exercised with caution and invoked “only
in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the
verdict.” Id. at 659. “[A]ppellate review is limited to a review of the exercise of
discretion by the trial court, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence.” Reeves, 670 N.W.2d at 203.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding:
The weight of the evidence supports defendant’s convictions. The victim identified defendant as the shooter. While 15
he picked out a different person in the first photo lineup, he had stated he was not sure and did not definitively identify him. He immediately recognized defendant from the second lineup. Further, he encountered defendant at the jail and recognized him from that event. Mr. Stout testified that defendant even made a shooting motion when they saw each other. Mr. Stout reported the incident to the jail and again identified defendant as the shooter from a jail video. Mr. Hardy testified that defendant admitted to and described the shooting. That description is consistent to the actual shooting. Mr. Hardy testified that he had seen a shotgun at defendant’s apartment previously. Law enforcement located a shotgun shell outside the apartment building. Defendant resided in that building, so he was tied to the location. There was no history between defendant and Mr. Stout, but defendant was dealing drugs and the jury heard testimony that he was becoming increasingly paranoid. Mr. Stout did not live at the building and was walking through the parking lot late at night, which may have fed into defendant’s paranoia. Defendant’s testimony was not clear and lacked credibility. The jury’s decision was reasonably based on credible evidence presented at trial.
We find the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Miller’s motion for
a new trial based on the weight-of-the-evidence standard as the verdict is not
contrary to the weight of the evidence.
IV. Evidentiary Objections
Evidentiary rulings are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v.
Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Iowa 2018). An abuse of discretion occurs when
“discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an
extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Long, 814 N.W.2d 572, 576 (Iowa 2012).
The standard of review for hearsay, however, is for errors at law. State v. Huser,
894 N.W.2d 472, 495 (Iowa 2017). When hearsay is improperly admitted, the
district court’s error is presumed to be prejudicial unless the State demonstrates
the error was harmless. Id. 16
Miller begins by pointing to the sustained hearsay objection following an
exchange between defense counsel and witness Hardy during cross-examination.
The exchange involved a question of whether Hardy remembers ever being told
by Miller if the cameras were put up in part to keep an eye on his brother. Without
deciding whether the district court erred in its ruling, the excluded testimony of
Hardy did not prevent Miller from offering his explanation for installing security
cameras or otherwise limit his defense. During his testimony at trial, Miller’s
counsel specifically asked him his reasoning for installing security cameras. The
jury heard Miller’s explanation, including that he did so in part to protect his brother.
We find the sustained objection was harmless to Miller.
Additionally, Miller challenges the overruled objection raised by defense
counsel following the prosecution’s inquiry into the observations an officer made
while watching Stout study the photo lineup. Defense counsel objected to the
question and potential answer on the grounds of speculation. Here, the question
presented to the officer regarded the officer’s observation of Stout while he was
looking over the photo lineup.
An answer to the question posed requires nothing more than the officer’s
observations that Stout studied the lineup carefully and intently and appeared
uncertain when identifying the potential defendant. These are the officer’s
observations and they are personal to him. Additionally, this was not new evidence
for the jury as the testimony that Stout was uncertain and improperly identified the
defendant had already been provided to the jury, and therefore any alleged error
is harmless. We affirm the district court’s rulings on the objections. 17
V. Prior Bad Acts Evidence
Finally, Miller challenges the district court’s admittance of certain prior bad
acts evidence. Prior to trial, Miller filed a motion in limine concerning proposed
testimony of Hardy suggesting Miller had purchased a shotgun because he sold
drugs and was concerned about being robbed. Miller asserted the evidence was
inadmissible character evidence, irrelevant, and its probative value was
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The State responded that
the evidence was being introduced to prove motive and offered to explain why
Miller would shoot Stout, whom he did not know. The court preliminarily accepted
the evidence could be used to prove motive but reserved ruling until proper
foundation had been laid at trial. The State made an offer of proof prior to Hardy
testifying, and the court ruled the testimony admissible.
A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Rodriguez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2001). The party
challenging the evidentiary ruling must prove the trial court abused this discretion.
State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 232 (Iowa 1988). Abuse occurs when the trial
court exercises its discretion “on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an
extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Helmers, 753 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Iowa 2008).
When an appellate court weighs the probative value of the evidence against its
prejudicial effect, it gives significant leeway to the trial judge’s determination. State
v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 20–21 (Iowa 2006).
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity 18
therewith.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b). It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. State v. Castaneda, 621
N.W.2d 435, 439–40 (Iowa 2001). In order for the district court to properly admit
prior bad acts evidence, it must first find that the evidence is relevant to some fact
in issue other than the defendant’s criminal disposition, that there is “clear proof”
the defendant committed the act, and that the evidence’s probative value is not
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. State v. Sullivan, 679
N.W.2d 19, 25 (Iowa 2004).
We have found evidence is “prima facie admissible” if it is offered for a
legitimate purpose other than to prove propensity. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d at
439–40. Miller did not know Stout, and thus the State needed to establish a motive
for Miller shooting Stout. Hardy’s testimony was used to explain Miller had grown
increasingly paranoid of being robbed and Miller did not like that Stout kept
“creeping back” after warning him to leave the area. This testimony could establish
a motive for the shooting and serves a legitimate purpose. See State v. Nelson,
791 N.W.2d 414, 425–26 (Iowa 2010) (finding evidence of drug dealing was
relevant to motive because a drug dealer would be more inclined to shoot a person
seeking to buy drugs if they believed the person was an undercover police officer).
Regarding clear proof, Miller argues Hardy lacks credibility and, therefore,
his testimony could not be used as evidence Miller sold drugs.
In assessing whether there is clear proof of prior misconduct, it is not required that the prior act be established beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is corroboration necessary. There simply needs to be sufficient 19
proof to prevent the jury from engaging in speculation or drawing inferences based on mere suspicion.
Newell, 710 N.W.2d at 23 (quotations and citations omitted). Hardy’s trial
testimony concerning Miller’s admissions, which were subject to cross-
examination, is sufficient to satisfy the clear proof requirement.
Finally, we turn to whether the probative value of the evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Evidence is unfairly
prejudicial it “appeals to the jury’s sympathies, arouses its sense of horror,
provokes its instinct to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of human action.”
Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d at 440. The probative value of evidence is substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect when it could lead a jury to base its decision on
unrelated or un-established factors in the case. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 231.
In State v. Larsen, 512 N.W.2d 803, 808 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993), we
concluded that prior bad acts evidence that was no more sensational or disturbing
than the crime charged did not meet this standard. Miller was charged with
attempted murder and other violent offenses—conduct more alarming than dealing
drugs. Additionally, evidence of Miller’s drug dealing was not overreaching but
briefly mentioned to establish motive. We find it unlikely the jury convicted Miller
based on Hardy’s testimony that Miller sold drugs. “Because the weighing of
probative value against probable prejudice is not an exact science, we give a great
deal of leeway to the trial judge who must make this judgment call.” Newell, 710
N.W.2d at 20–21. We affirm the court’s ruling. 20
VI. Conclusion
We find the jury’s verdict supported by substantial evidence. We also
determine the district court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or by denying Miller’s
motion for a new trial. Accordingly, we affirm Miller’s convictions.