State of Iowa v. Donta Rapheal Hale

CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
DecidedJuly 24, 2024
Docket23-0547
StatusPublished

This text of State of Iowa v. Donta Rapheal Hale (State of Iowa v. Donta Rapheal Hale) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Iowa v. Donta Rapheal Hale, (iowactapp 2024).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0547 Filed July 24, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DONTA RAPHEAL HALE, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert,

Judge.

The defendant maintains the district court should have allowed him to

withdraw his guilty plea. APPEAL DISMISSED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Travis M. Visser-Armbrust

(until withdrawal), Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Badding, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024). 2

POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.

While represented by counsel, Donta Hale filed petitions to plead guilty to

possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (lorazepam), an

aggravated misdemeanor, and failure to possess a tax stamp, a class “D” felony.

The district court accepted the guilty pleas on the same day—January 19, 2023.

On February 6 and 21, Hale filed a pro se “motion to dismiss” and “motion in arrest

of [judgment, . . .] to withdraw plea, su[p]press and dismiss,” respectively. In

response to each, the district court filed an order stating that it took “no action on

the motion” because Hale was currently represented by counsel. See Iowa Code

§ 814.6A (2023) (providing “[t]he court shall not consider” the pro se filings of a

defendant who is represented by counsel other than for a few exceptions not at

issue here).

Hale appeared with counsel at the sentencing hearing. At the beginning of

the hearing, he asked the court, “I am told that I can’t take back the guilty plea. Is

that true?” The court explained that the time to do so had passed and then asked

Hale’s counsel to weigh in. Counsel explained that, after receiving copies of Hale’s

pro se motions, she met with him and talked about his concerns. Based on their

discussion at those meetings, she concluded there was not a legal basis to file a

motion in arrest of judgment. Then Hale handed his attorney a motion that asked

the court to remove counsel on the grounds of ineffective assistance and lack of

representation. The court reviewed the motion and—after back-and-forth

discussion involving Hale, Hale’s counsel, the prosecutor, and the court—Hale told

the court he wanted to withdraw his request for the removal of counsel and proceed 3

with sentencing. He was sentenced to prison terms of two years and five years

and ordered to serve them concurrently.

Here on appeal, Hale maintains the district court should have allowed him

to withdraw his guilty pleas. But Hale does not have a right to appeal from his

guilty pleas, so he must establish good cause before we may consider the merits

of his complaint. See State v. Rutherford, 997 N.W.2d 142, 145 (Iowa 2023) (“[W]e

generally lack jurisdiction over direct appeals from guilty pleas” except for “a guilty

plea for a class ‘A’ felony or in a case where the defendant establishes good

cause.” (quoting Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3)). Hale ignores the issue of good

cause in his appellate brief. See State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 153 (Iowa

2021) (providing it is the defendant who bears the burden of establishing good

cause to pursue an appeal following his guilty plea). And, regardless, our case

law prevents us from finding he has good cause. See State v. Damme, 944

N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2020) (concluding “‘good cause’ means a ‘legally sufficient

reason’”); Tucker, 959 N.W.2d at 149 (“A legally sufficient reason is a ground that

potentially would afford the defendant relief.”); accord Tucker, 959 N.W.2d at 153

(recognizing the defendant’s failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment precludes

appellate relief, so the defendant does not have good cause to challenge his guilty

plea (citing Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a))).

Because Hale has not established good cause to invoke this court’s

jurisdiction, we dismiss his appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

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Related

§ 814
Iowa § 814
§ 814.6
Iowa § 814.6(1)(a)(3)

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State of Iowa v. Donta Rapheal Hale, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-iowa-v-donta-rapheal-hale-iowactapp-2024.