State of Iowa v. Donna Lee Cox

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: July 2, 2025
• Docket: 23-1771
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1771 Filed July 2, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DONNA LEE COX, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Charles C. Sinnard,

Judge.

A defendant appeals the denial of her motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.

Jesse A. Macro, Jr. (argued) of Macro Law, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino (argued),

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Heard at oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ. 2

GREER, Presiding Judge.

Donna Cox was charged with possession of controlled substance

(methamphetamine) after officers discovered methamphetamine and drug

paraphernalia on her person and in her car. The drug investigation yielding

evidence of the possession of methamphetamine started as a traffic stop for a

broken taillight and crossing the center line while driving, but after a canine alerted

to the presence of an illicit substance, officers searched Cox’s vehicle. Cox argues

that officers impermissibly prolonged the traffic stop by implementing a “systematic

approach” where “the canine officer intentionally delays the issuance of tickets by

calling another officer to the scene of traffic violation to complete the writing or

paperwork required for a ticket, so the initial officer can unlawfully extend the stop

in an attempt to gain probable cause to search the vehicle.”

After review of the record, we find Officers Skyler Verros and Joseph

Weppler did not impermissibly extend the traffic stop. Thus, we affirm the denial

of the motion to suppress.

Background Facts and Proceedings.

Cox claims a drug investigation incident to a traffic stop, where probable

cause to search was established by a canine free air sniff, violated her state and

federal constitutional rights. The district court summarized the pertinent facts as

follows:

On June 16, 2022 Sergeant Skyler Verros (“Verros”) of the Knoxville Police Department was on routine patrol. In addition to being a Sergeant, Verros is also a K9 handler. Verros’ K9 partner is named Rosko. Rosko and Verros have been partners for approximately two (2) years. . . . Rosko is a passive alert K9. He indicates the detection of narcotics by sitting during a deployment. 3

On June 16th, . . . Verros was patrolling within the city limits of Knoxville, when he observed a silver minivan traveling in the opposite direction of him. As the vehicles drove past each other, Verros observed the driver of the minivan, who Verros knew to be Jason Vaughn. Verros then turned his vehicle around to follow the minivan and run an administrative check of the vehicle. Before Verros could run the check, he observed two motor vehicle violations, a defective third break light, and the driver operating the vehicle in the opposite lane of traffic. Upon viewing these violations, Verros activated the lights on his patrol car and initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle. During the suppression hearing, several questions were directed to Verros, by counsel for the defendants, about his reason for following the vehicle. Verros admitted that he had decided to follow the vehicle to see if he could develop either probable cause or reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop the vehicle. Verros had previously explained at a deposition, and subsequently confirmed at the suppression hearing, that he had developed a system to deploy his K9 following a traffic stop, to check for the presence of narcotics. Based on prior knowledge of Vaughn being associated with illegal narcotics, Verros made the determination upon observing Vaughn driving the minivan, that Verros would follow the vehicle and see if he could develop grounds to stop the vehicle and deploy K9 Rosko. After stopping the minivan and approaching the driver’s side of the vehicle, Verros confirmed Vaughn was driving. Verros also observed . . . Cox sitting in the passenger seat of the van. Verros requested the license of Vaughn and registration and proof of insurance for the vehicle. Vaughn was able to produce a valid driver’s license, but after approximately three (3) to four (4) minutes of searching, Cox could not come up with current proof of insurance for the vehicle. Verros then returned to his patrol car to issue a warning for one of the traffic violations and a citation for no insurance. Pursuant to Verros’ system, he had called [Weppler] to come to the scene, at the beginning of the traffic stop. Weppler arrived as Verros was finishing the warning but prior to completing the citation for no insurance. Weppler then took over issuing the no insurance citation while Verros deployed Rosko to sniff for the presence of narcotics around the exterior of the vehicle. Rosko made several passes around the vehicle before finally giving an indication for the presence of narcotics in the vehicle. Weppler was finishing the citation for no insurance at approximately the same time as Rosko indicated the presence of narcotics. The elapsed time from the stop of the minivan to the time Rosko established probabl[e] cause for the presence of a controlled substance, was approximately eleven (11) minutes. 4

After Rosko’s signal, Verros and Weppler asked Cox to step outside the vehicle so

the officers could search the vehicle for methamphetamine. Weppler found a pipe

with methamphetamine residue in Cox’s front pocket. During a search of the

vehicle, officers found methamphetamine and methamphetamine residue in the

vehicle. Both Cox and Vaughn were arrested and charged.

Cox filed a motion to suppress, arguing the search of her vehicle incident to

the traffic stop violated her rights under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution

and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The district court

denied her motion to suppress, finding the search did not violate Cox’s state or

federal constitutional rights.

Cox proceeded to an agreed-upon trial on the minutes where the district

court found her guilty of possession of controlled substance (methamphetamine),

first offense, a serious misdemeanor. Cox received a sentence of 120 days in jail,

with all 120 days suspended, and one year of probation as part of a global

judgment entry for this charge and five other unrelated offenses. She was also

required to pay fines and surcharges on each of her six criminal convictions.

Cox appeals the denial of her motion to suppress.

Standard of Review.

“When a defendant challenges a district court’s denial of a motion to

suppress based upon the deprivation of a state or federal constitutional right, our

standard of review is de novo.” State v. Coffman, 914 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Iowa

2018) (citation omitted). What constitutes the prolonging of a traffic stop must be

determined by “evaluat[ing] the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire

record.” State v. White, 887 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). In 5

fact, “[e]ach case must be evaluated in light of its unique circumstances.” Coffman,

914 N.W.2d at 244 (citation omitted).

Discussion.

Cox contends that both the Iowa and United States Constitutions support

her assertions, but she fails to delineate any difference between the standards in

state and federal jurisprudence. “Article I, section 8 guarantees the right to be

secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and it contains language

nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment counterpart.” State v. Salcedo, 935

N.W.2d 572, 577 (Iowa 2019). “We generally interpret the scope and purpose of

the Iowa Constitution’s search and seizure provisions to track with federal

interpretations of the Fourth Amendment because of their nearly identical

language.” State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 847 (Iowa 2019) (cleaned up). “When

both federal and state constitutional claims are raised, we may, in our discretion,

choose to consider either claim first in order to dispose of the case, or we may

consider both claims simultaneously.” Salcedo, 935 N.W.2d at 577 (citation

omitted). Because Cox does not make independent state and federal claims, we

consider her constitutional claims simultaneously.

Cox begins her challenge by asserting the stop of her vehicle was

“pretextual,” yet she acknowledges that the motivation of the officer stopping the

vehicle is not controlling in determining whether probable cause existed. See

Brown, 930 N.W.2d at 854 (“[W]e made clear that an officer’s ulterior motive for

making the arrest does not limit the right to conduct a search incident thereto under

the Iowa Constitution if probable cause exists for an arrest to be made.” (cleaned

up)). From that statement, Cox’s focus turns to the process Verros used to allow 6

for a drug dog sniff. Cox seems to recognize that the initial traffic stop was

permissible. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (“As a general

matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have

probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”); Salcedo, 935

N.W.2d at 577 (“It is well settled that a traffic violation, however minor, gives an

officer probable cause to stop a motorist and is therefore a reasonable seizure.”

(cleaned up)). And she does not contest that a free air dog sniff is allowed without

independent reasonable suspicion if the sniff does not prolong the traffic stop. See

generally Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); State v. Arrieta, 998 N.W.2d

617, 619 (Iowa 2023) (“Officers are allowed to use a drug dog to conduct a ‘free

air sniff’ around the outside of a vehicle during a valid traffic stop without any

suspicion that the vehicle contains drugs under the premise that the driver has no

expectation of privacy in the air outside the vehicle.”). From our review, the traffic

violation was observed on Verros’s car camera video, making the initial stop

justified. So we turn to Cox’s argument over the permissibility of a system she

characterized as the initial officer’s systematic approach.

This initial officer systematic approach, as described by Cox, involves a

canine officer purposefully stalling a traffic stop while writing citations and calling

for a second officer, who responds and takes over writing citations, thereby freeing

the initial canine officer to conduct a free-air sniff. As Cox notes, “[s]imply put, the

initial officer is attempting [to] extend a traffic stop without separate probable cause

other than the original traffic offenses by intentionally slowing down the ticket

issuing process to permit the dog sniff search.” Cox urges that this unconstitutional

system need to be “stopped by the courts.” The suppression court also expressed 7

reservations about the process used by Verros at the overall complexion of the

stop as it

would offer in speculation that the current state of the law [that the motivation of the officer is irrelevant with a valid traffic stop] may not always be the case. Given recent societal focus on profiling, and even some recent legislative efforts to prevent such conduct, it is not beyond this Court’s imagination that in the not-too-distant future there could be a shift of focus to an officer’s subjective reasons for singling out an individual for investigation. Lawmakers may come to recognize that an “ends justifies the means” approach to investigations may cause an otherwise well-intentioned investigation to be tainted by fixed, preconceived ideas that a person is guilty, before any proof is adduced. That shift in focus could be expedited by law enforcement’s systematic and routine use of relying on minor objective reasons for investigation, to support subjective hunches based on a profile. But that is a discussion for another time and in another arena.

Cox contends that the initial officer systematic approach violates the precept that

“when the reason for a traffic stop is resolved and there is no other basis for

reasonable suspicion” the officer must allow a motorist to leave. State v. Coleman,

890 N.W.2d 284, 301 (Iowa 2017). And, Cox argues, the process used here

delayed and extended the stop. We start with this last point.

The Initial Officer Systematic Approach.

We turn to Cox’s central focus that the scheme used by Verros results in a

constitutional problem that should trigger the exclusionary rule. See Herring v.

United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (“[T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter

deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent [police] conduct, or in some

circumstances . . . systemic negligence.”). As an issue of first impression, Cox

argues the system—which includes the exchange of Weppler for Verros when

writing a citation—constitutes the prolonging of a traffic stop. She contends, “The

sole purpose of calling a second officer to actually write the ticket is to circumvent 8

the limits placed on the officers by” article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution and

the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. But because the officer swap

did not cause an impermissible delay and is consistent with activities found in a

reasonable traffic investigation, we find no violation.

As for the pertinent facts, Verros and Weppler were efficient in swapping

places in the patrol vehicle. Weppler appeared alongside the vehicle; Verros

mentioned he had just completed the warning for the traffic offense but had not

completed the citation for no insurance. Verros then promptly left the vehicle and

Weppler picked up where Verros left off, inputting information on the patrol laptop

to complete the citation. Leaving the area around the patrol vehicle, Verros

completed a canine free air sniff with canine Rosko. Weppler finished scanning in

a signature to the citation, completing the citation, mere seconds after Rosko

finished.

An officer may not “earn bonus time to pursue an unrelated criminal

investigation” by completing traffic-related offenses expeditiously. Rodriguez v.

United States, 575 U.S. 348, 357 (2015). And “[a]uthority for the seizure . . . ends

when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—

completed.” Id. at 354. “If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries

expeditiously, then that is the amount of ‘time reasonably required to complete [the

stop’s] mission.’” In re Pardee, 872 N.W.2d 384, 393 (Iowa 2015) (alteration in

original) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356–57).

In this matter, as part of our de novo review, we reviewed both Verros’s and

Weppler’s bodycam footage for any signs of purposeful and impermissible

sluggishness. Both Verros and Weppler added information into a citation template 9

without obvious procrastination or delay. Weppler struggled to scan in a signature

to the citation, completing what appeared to be this final task seconds after canine

Rosko completed his effort. The district court noted that the entire stop took

approximately eleven minutes; on our review of the body camera footage,

Weppler’s completion of the ticket took just short of four minutes and canine

Rosko’s work took approximately two minutes during the time Weppler finished the

citation. Verros conducted the dog sniff during the time Weppler was still

completing the citation. We find no evidence that Weppler was stalling, as he

worked dutifully to complete the citation. We add, although the two officers worked

on the warning and citation successively, we cannot find the mere presence of two

officers delayed the “mission of the stop.” See id. at 396. Verros and Weppler, by

completing the warning and the citation as a team, did not impermissibly prolong

the traffic stop.

The law prohibits the unreasonably prolonging of a traffic stop “longer than

is necessary to effectuate that purpose.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 (cleaned up).

“Ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop” are permissible. See id. at 355

(cleaned up). Examples of permissible inquiries include “checking the driver’s

license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver,

and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. We also

allow officers to “take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to

complete [the] mission safely,” as officer safety remains a paramount concern. Id.

at 356. “Once lawfully stopped, inquiries reasonably related to the mission of

addressing the traffic infraction and attending to related safety concerns are

permissible.” Salcedo, 935 N.W.2d at 578. “[T]he Fourth Amendment will tolerate 10

certain unrelated investigations that do not extend the roadside stop, but the stop

will remain lawful only ‘so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend

the duration of the stop.’” Id. at 579 (second alteration in original) (quoting

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355).

Under these facts, we think the officer “swap” is a negligibly burdensome

act that falls under acts normally found during permissible investigations or

“incident to a traffic stop.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. Officers often work in pairs,

whether to train, expedite tasks, or ensure safety. To find that officers may not

swap tasks during a traffic stop would impinge the ability of officers to act in

accordance with what the situation demands. See id. at 356. The momentary

delay was not a violation of Cox’s constitutional rights.

Conclusion.

We affirm the denial of Cox’s motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.