State of Iowa v. Donald Lavadis Dickerson III

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: November 13, 2025
• Docket: 25-0701
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0701 Filed November 13, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DONALD LAVADIS DICKERSON III, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Jeffrey C. McDaniel,

Judge.

A defendant appeals his sentence for possession of a controlled substance

with intent to deliver. AFFIRMED.

Nathan A. Olson of Branstad & Olson Law Office, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Chicchelly, P.J., and Buller and

Langholz, JJ. 2

LANGHOLZ, Judge.

Donald Dickerson III pleaded guilty to possessing fifty kilograms or less of

marijuana with intent to deliver it to another person in violation of Iowa Code

section 124.401(1)(d) (2023). At sentencing, he argued that the district court

should impose a deferred judgment. The State sought a five-year suspended

sentence and a two-year term of probation, arguing that a deferred judgment was

inappropriate based on the seriousness of the offense and because he previously

received a deferred judgment that was revoked. The district court agreed with the

State. And Dickerson now appeals, arguing that the court abused its discretion in

selecting a suspended sentence and probation rather than a deferred judgment.

Because the court did not abuse its considerable sentencing discretion, we affirm.

We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions, including the

exercise of its discretion whether to grant a deferred judgment, for an abuse of

discretion. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 2023). This

deferential standard of review recognizes that the court’s decision “to impose a

particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption

in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). And even when

the court would have been justified in imposing the sentence sought by the

defendant, “our task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the

district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable

grounds.” Id. at 725. So it is not enough that the defendant disagrees with the

court’s weighing of the sentencing factors and the sentence ultimately selected.

See Gordon, 998 N.W.2d at 863. 3

The district court did not abuse its discretion here. Dickerson does not point

to any unreasonable or untenable grounds of the court’s decision. Rather, he

argues that court failed “to weigh rehabilitative factors in balance with the nature

and timing of the charges” and contends that a proper weighing of all the factors

would have given him “a second chance” with a deferred judgment. But this is

essentially an improper request for us to reweigh the sentencing factors and decide

for ourselves what sentence we would impose. See Gordon, 998 N.W.2d at 863

(“The test for whether a sentencing court abused its discretion is not whether we

might have weighed the various factors differently.”).

The court explained all the factors that it considered and concluded

“probation is the best step for you” and “I am denying that request for a deferred

judgment.” The court noted that it had reviewed the presentence investigation

report—which showed six convictions over the past dozen years, including one in

which a deferred judgment had been revoked. And the court highlighted that

Dickerson had a second drug offense about a year after this offense—to which he

had pleaded guilty by the time of this sentencing. The court thus reasoned:

A deferred judgment is granted for somebody who deserves a second chance, who has had an unfortunate incident in their life that is considered to be an aberration, and this is not an aberration, this is a two-time offense, and plus [Dickerson] has an extensive criminal—clearly an extensive criminal history in this case, although those criminal charges are not all of great significance.

Seeing no abuse of discretion in this exercise of the district court’s

sentencing judgment, we affirm Dickerson’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.