IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-0945 Filed July 24, 2024
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DERONTA MICHAEL JAMISON JR., Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Joel W. Barrows,
Judge.
Defendant appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to second-degree
robbery. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Deronta Jamison Jr. appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to
second-degree robbery. We conclude Jamison was not entitled to an
individualized hearing to consider the factors associated with juvenile offenders
because no minimum sentence was imposed. We also determine the court did not
abuse its discretion in sentencing Jamison to a term of imprisonment. Accordingly,
we affirm Jamison’s sentence.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
In October 2022, when Jamison was seventeen years old, he and an
associate went into a store in Davenport wearing masks. One of the two produced
a handgun and demanded all the money from the cash register. They also took
several game consoles. Photographs of some of the stolen property were found
on Jamison’s phone, as well as evidence that he attempted to sell the game
consoles.
The State charged Jamison with robbery in the first degree. He entered into
a plea agreement where he agreed to plead guilty to the lesser-included offense
of second-degree robbery, in violation of Iowa Code section 711.3 (2022). This
was an open plea, and the parties were free to make any recommendation at
sentencing. Jamison admitted the minutes of testimony were true and correct.
The court accepted Jamison’s guilty plea.
The presentence investigation report (PSI) noted that Jamison was on
probation in Illinois at the time of the offense.1 About the current offense, Jamison
1 Jamison had a juvenile adjudication in Illinois and was placed on probation there. 3
stated, “I was feeling desperate for money. I went in GameStop and threatened
the cashier. I took the money and I ran.” The PSI recommended incarceration,
stating that on assessment, “[t]he defendant scored in the moderate category for
future violence and the moderate/high category for future victimization.”
At the sentencing hearing, held on May 31, 2023, the district court stated,
“Because of the fact that Mr. Jamison was seventeen at the time of this offense,
mandatory incarceration is not required, and in addition, the mandatory minimum
could not be imposed without an independent Miller[2] factors hearing.” The plea
agreement recited that the State would cap its minimum prison sentence request
at five years. But at the sentencing hearing, the State informed the court that it
was not intending to seek a mandatory minimum sentence and would forgo a Miller
factors hearing. Based on this concession, a separate Miller hearing was not
conducted.
The State recommended “a ten-year indeterminate sentence with no
mandatory minimum.” Defense counsel recommended a deferred judgment and
probation. The court sentenced Jamison to a term of imprisonment not to exceed
ten years. Jamison now appeals his sentence for the offense of second-degree
robbery.3
2 In Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court ruled the Eighth Amendment prohibited a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for children. 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). 3 Under Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3), a defendant who pleads guilty is
generally barred from appealing absent good cause. State v. Luke, 4 N.W.3d 450, 455 n.2 (Iowa 2024). “[T]he good-cause requirement is satisfied in this context when the defendant appeals a sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to in the plea bargain.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2020). Jamison is appealing his sentence and has therefore demonstrated good cause to appeal. 4
II. Sentencing
A. Jamison contends the district court should have held a hearing on
the Miller factors. A court must hold “an individualized sentencing hearing if it is
contemplating imposing a mandatory minimum sentence on a juvenile offender.”
State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 386 (Iowa 2020). He claims the court’s failure
to conduct such a hearing was unconstitutional. See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d
378, 402 (Iowa 2014) (finding it is unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile offender
to a mandatory prison sentence without the possibility of parole). We review
constitutional challenges to a sentence de novo. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d
107, 113 (Iowa 2013).
In State v. Propps, the Iowa Supreme Court held a juvenile defendant was
not entitled to a Miller hearing where the sentence for a criminal offense has no
mandatory minimum period of incarceration and the defendant is immediately
eligible for parole. 897 N.W.2d 91, 101 (Iowa 2017). The court stated:
Completely eliminating the mandatory imposition of a prison term, even when the term is indeterminate and the individual is immediately eligible for parole, would not serve the proportionality concept we have addressed in our previous juvenile sentencing cases. In those cases, we sought to eliminate the mandatory nature of mandatory minimums and sentences that were the functional equivalent of life without parole because those sentences did not offer juveniles a “meaningful opportunity” to demonstrate their rehabilitation before the parole board. See, e.g., Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 402–03; [State v.] Null, 836 N.W.2d [41,] 75 [(Iowa 2013)]; [State v.] Pearson, 836 N.W.2d [88,] 97 [(Iowa 2013)]; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 121. Our goal was not to excuse the behavior of juveniles, but rather to impose punishment in a way that was consistent with the lesser culpability and greater capacity for change of juvenile offenders. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 398, 402–03; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 75 (“[W]hile youth is a mitigating factor in sentencing, it is not an excuse.”). . . . This is in stark contrast to the situation presented here. In this case, Propps was immediately eligible for parole and able to 5
demonstrate by his own actions his maturation and rehabilitation. When a one-size-fits-all mandatory minimum is imposed, an arbitrary amount of time spent in prison dictates when a juvenile will be released. See, e.g., Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 122. In contrast, when an indeterminate sentence is given that contains no mandatory minimum sentence and allows a juvenile to be immediately eligible for parole, the juvenile defendant’s behavior in prison dictates when parole will be available—with the potential for immediate parole if rehabilitation, maturity, and reform have been demonstrated.
Id.
Jamison claims that the holding in Propps does not apply here because,
under section 901.5(3), the court could have imposed a prison sentence with a
mandatory minimum time of incarceration. He asserts that “unlike the juvenile
defendant in Propps, Jamison was subjected to a potential mandatory minimum
period of incarceration for the robbery in the second-degree charge when he
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-0945 Filed July 24, 2024
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DERONTA MICHAEL JAMISON JR., Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Joel W. Barrows,
Judge.
Defendant appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to second-degree
robbery. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Deronta Jamison Jr. appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to
second-degree robbery. We conclude Jamison was not entitled to an
individualized hearing to consider the factors associated with juvenile offenders
because no minimum sentence was imposed. We also determine the court did not
abuse its discretion in sentencing Jamison to a term of imprisonment. Accordingly,
we affirm Jamison’s sentence.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
In October 2022, when Jamison was seventeen years old, he and an
associate went into a store in Davenport wearing masks. One of the two produced
a handgun and demanded all the money from the cash register. They also took
several game consoles. Photographs of some of the stolen property were found
on Jamison’s phone, as well as evidence that he attempted to sell the game
consoles.
The State charged Jamison with robbery in the first degree. He entered into
a plea agreement where he agreed to plead guilty to the lesser-included offense
of second-degree robbery, in violation of Iowa Code section 711.3 (2022). This
was an open plea, and the parties were free to make any recommendation at
sentencing. Jamison admitted the minutes of testimony were true and correct.
The court accepted Jamison’s guilty plea.
The presentence investigation report (PSI) noted that Jamison was on
probation in Illinois at the time of the offense.1 About the current offense, Jamison
1 Jamison had a juvenile adjudication in Illinois and was placed on probation there. 3
stated, “I was feeling desperate for money. I went in GameStop and threatened
the cashier. I took the money and I ran.” The PSI recommended incarceration,
stating that on assessment, “[t]he defendant scored in the moderate category for
future violence and the moderate/high category for future victimization.”
At the sentencing hearing, held on May 31, 2023, the district court stated,
“Because of the fact that Mr. Jamison was seventeen at the time of this offense,
mandatory incarceration is not required, and in addition, the mandatory minimum
could not be imposed without an independent Miller[2] factors hearing.” The plea
agreement recited that the State would cap its minimum prison sentence request
at five years. But at the sentencing hearing, the State informed the court that it
was not intending to seek a mandatory minimum sentence and would forgo a Miller
factors hearing. Based on this concession, a separate Miller hearing was not
conducted.
The State recommended “a ten-year indeterminate sentence with no
mandatory minimum.” Defense counsel recommended a deferred judgment and
probation. The court sentenced Jamison to a term of imprisonment not to exceed
ten years. Jamison now appeals his sentence for the offense of second-degree
robbery.3
2 In Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court ruled the Eighth Amendment prohibited a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for children. 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). 3 Under Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3), a defendant who pleads guilty is
generally barred from appealing absent good cause. State v. Luke, 4 N.W.3d 450, 455 n.2 (Iowa 2024). “[T]he good-cause requirement is satisfied in this context when the defendant appeals a sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to in the plea bargain.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2020). Jamison is appealing his sentence and has therefore demonstrated good cause to appeal. 4
II. Sentencing
A. Jamison contends the district court should have held a hearing on
the Miller factors. A court must hold “an individualized sentencing hearing if it is
contemplating imposing a mandatory minimum sentence on a juvenile offender.”
State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 386 (Iowa 2020). He claims the court’s failure
to conduct such a hearing was unconstitutional. See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d
378, 402 (Iowa 2014) (finding it is unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile offender
to a mandatory prison sentence without the possibility of parole). We review
constitutional challenges to a sentence de novo. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d
107, 113 (Iowa 2013).
In State v. Propps, the Iowa Supreme Court held a juvenile defendant was
not entitled to a Miller hearing where the sentence for a criminal offense has no
mandatory minimum period of incarceration and the defendant is immediately
eligible for parole. 897 N.W.2d 91, 101 (Iowa 2017). The court stated:
Completely eliminating the mandatory imposition of a prison term, even when the term is indeterminate and the individual is immediately eligible for parole, would not serve the proportionality concept we have addressed in our previous juvenile sentencing cases. In those cases, we sought to eliminate the mandatory nature of mandatory minimums and sentences that were the functional equivalent of life without parole because those sentences did not offer juveniles a “meaningful opportunity” to demonstrate their rehabilitation before the parole board. See, e.g., Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 402–03; [State v.] Null, 836 N.W.2d [41,] 75 [(Iowa 2013)]; [State v.] Pearson, 836 N.W.2d [88,] 97 [(Iowa 2013)]; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 121. Our goal was not to excuse the behavior of juveniles, but rather to impose punishment in a way that was consistent with the lesser culpability and greater capacity for change of juvenile offenders. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 398, 402–03; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 75 (“[W]hile youth is a mitigating factor in sentencing, it is not an excuse.”). . . . This is in stark contrast to the situation presented here. In this case, Propps was immediately eligible for parole and able to 5
demonstrate by his own actions his maturation and rehabilitation. When a one-size-fits-all mandatory minimum is imposed, an arbitrary amount of time spent in prison dictates when a juvenile will be released. See, e.g., Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 122. In contrast, when an indeterminate sentence is given that contains no mandatory minimum sentence and allows a juvenile to be immediately eligible for parole, the juvenile defendant’s behavior in prison dictates when parole will be available—with the potential for immediate parole if rehabilitation, maturity, and reform have been demonstrated.
Id.
Jamison claims that the holding in Propps does not apply here because,
under section 901.5(3), the court could have imposed a prison sentence with a
mandatory minimum time of incarceration. He asserts that “unlike the juvenile
defendant in Propps, Jamison was subjected to a potential mandatory minimum
period of incarceration for the robbery in the second-degree charge when he
entered his plea of guilty pursuant to the plea agreement.” He contends that the
court should have held an individualized sentencing hearing to consider the factors
outlined in Miller and the relevant mitigating factors of youth.
We note first that while Jamison refers to the possibility of a mandatory
minimum sentence, the applicable code section provides the sentencing court
discretion as to whether to impose a determinate minimum period of incarceration.
Had the district court imposed a minimum period of incarceration, it would have
been a discretionary minimum, rather than a mandatory minimum sentence. See
State v. Howard, No. 14-1549, 2016 WL 4051322, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 27,
2015) (discussing and distinguishing Lyle from a “discretionary minimum”).
In State v. Crooks, the district court could have imposed a minimum
sentence, but it expressly declined to consider this possibility. 911 N.W.2d 153,
173 (Iowa 2018). The Iowa Supreme Court concluded, “Under Propps, no hearing 6
on the Miller/Lyle factors was required to sentence Crooks to prison with immediate
eligibility for parole.” Id.; accord State v. Shade, No. 17-1541, 2018 WL 3654856,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2018) (“More recently, the supreme court concluded
the district court was not required to conduct a Miller hearing where the juvenile
defendant could have been subject to a minimum sentence but where the district
court declined to impose a minimum sentence.” (citing Crooks, 911 N.W.2d at
173)). In Shade, “the district court declined to impose a minimum sentence and
instead made the defendant immediately eligible for parole.” 2018 WL 3654856,
at *2.
We conclude Jamison was not entitled to a hearing on the Miller factors. At
the start of the sentencing hearing, the State indicated it was not requesting that
the court impose a minimum term of incarceration. The court then determined,
“since the State is not putting on Miller factors evidence, that’s not an issue.” As
in Crooks and Shade, because the court declined to impose a minimum sentence,
no Miller hearing was required. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d at 173; Shade, 2018
WL 3654856, at *2.
B. Jamison also contends the district court abused its discretion by
sentencing him to a term of imprisonment. He claims the court should have
considered the Miller factors when determining an appropriate sentence.4 When
a sentence is within statutory limits, we review the court’s sentencing decision for
4 The Miller factors consists of the age of the offender and the features of youthful
behavior; the particular family and home environment that surround the youth; the circumstances relating to youth that may have played a role in the commission of the crime; the challenges for youthful offenders in navigating through the criminal process; and the possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change. 567 U.S. at 477–78. 7
an abuse of discretion. Majors, 940 N.W.2d at 385. “[O]ur task on appeal is not
to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to determine if it was
unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 387 (citation omitted).
Jamison has the burden to show the court abused its discretion. See Crooks, 911
N.W.2d at 171.
Although we have determined Jamison was not entitled to a hearing to
consider the Miller factors, “a sentencing court is to consider any mitigating
circumstances relating to a defendant,” including “the circumstances of youth and,
specifically, any applicable Miller/Lyle factors.” See id. at 173 (citations omitted).
Once the sentencing court declines to impose a minimum period of incarceration
without parole, the Miller/Lyle factors remain relevant in considering the remaining
sentencing options, along with all other mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Yet the court is not required to specifically examine and apply each factor on the
record at this point. It considers all relevant factors in exercising its discretion to
select the proper sentencing option. We may find an abuse of discretion “[i]f a
sentencing court fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received
significant weight.” Id. “[T]he failure to acknowledge a particular sentencing
circumstance does not necessarily mean it was not considered.” State v. Boltz,
542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
The PSI recited Jamison’s criminal history and facts concerning his
childhood. The PSI also noted that Jamison was placed on probation for an
offense only two months prior to the current offense.
At the sentencing hearing, the court stated: 8
The reasons for the sentence: I’m certainly cognizant of Mr. Jamison’s age, but this was an extremely serious offense. Because of—because of the nature of the offense, his criminal history, for purposes of protection of the community, and because of the recommendation of the PSI author, those are the reasons the Court is imposing the sentence in this case.
The court considered Jamison’s youth when imposing sentence along with
other relevant sentencing factors. We find the court’s decision was not
“unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” See Majors, 940 N.W.2d at 387.
Jamison participated in an armed robbery. “Robbery, especially armed robbery,
requires the use of force and is ‘so inherently dangerous’ that participating in it as
the principal or aider and abettor in the manner that [defendant] did carries with it
an undeniable prospect of grave harm to the life of others.” State v. Harrison, 914
N.W.2d 178, 196 (Iowa 2018) (citing Conner v. State, 362 N.W.2d 449, 456 (Iowa
1985)).
While the reasons stated by the district court are brief and do not specifically
address the Miller/Lyle factors other than Jamison’s age, the statement does not
prevent appellate review. “A terse and succinct statement is sufficient provided
that the brevity of the court’s statement does not prevent appellate review of the
exercise of the trial court's sentencing discretion.” State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d
402, 408 (Iowa 2015).
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Jamison to a term of imprisonment.
AFFIRMED.