State of Iowa v. Dennis Keith Yeager

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

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No. 25-1307

Filed August 19, 2026

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State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

Dennis Keith Yeager, Defendant–Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Brendan Greiner, Judge.

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AFFIRMED

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John J. Bishop, Cedar Rapids, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.

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Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.

Opinion by Greer, P.J.

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GREER, Presiding Judge.

The district court rejected a joint recommendation for probation and sentenced Dennis Yeager to three one-year prison terms to run consecutively. Yeager now appeals, arguing that the sentencing court abused its discretion by failing to consider his rehabilitation during the pendency of these proceedings or his potential for future rehabilitation. After our review, which reveals no abuse of discretion by the sentencing court, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Yeager entered written Alford pleas to three counts of assault causing bodily injury, a serious misdemeanor. Under the plea agreement, the parties jointly recommended that all jail time be suspended, that Yeager be placed on one year of probation, and that two no-contact orders remain in effect. At the time of sentencing, Yeager was serving time in jail for violating those same no-contact orders. The court was not bound by the parties’ sentencing recommendation.

The district court held a combined plea and sentencing hearing.

Yeager urged probation, arguing that jail had made him reflect on his actions and probation would provide needed services, help him reintegrate as a productive member of society, and allow him to be present as a grandfather. Yeager’s counsel argued that Yeager had “been sitting in jail for about four months” and the hope was that he could be rehabilitated on probation. In response to Yeager’s urgings, the court stated, “[t]he prior court found that [Yeager’s] actions were so egregious while these cases were pending that 300 days incarceration was appropriate. Why on earth should this Court give him probation if another court believed that he should have a lengthy jail term because he couldn’t follow court orders?” The district court then asked the

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State to summarize Yeager’s criminal history, which was long and contained recent convictions.

The district court rejected the joint sentencing recommendation and sentenced Yeager to three one-year terms of incarceration, to be served consecutively. This sentence was within statutory limits. On the record, the court explained it imposed the sentence “based on the extensive criminal history and the facts and circumstances of this case. And the fact that [Yeager] did not comply with the court orders regarding the no contact orders. I don’t see that he will follow any orders if I were to place him on probation.” The district court made no mention of rehabilitation as a sentencing factor.

The district court thereafter entered a written sentencing order, which listed the following factors considered in this sentence:

Among the factors selected in the written order was Yeager’s “[m]aximum opportunity for rehabilitation.”

Yeager now appeals, arguing that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the district court abused its discretion when it “gave no consideration to [his] rehabilitation” and “failed to fairly or accurately consider the possibilities for [his] rehabilitation.”

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II. Standard of Review.

“A sentencing court’s decision to impose a specific sentence that falls within the statutory limits ʻis cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate matters.’” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105–06 (Iowa 2020) (quoting State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002)). We reverse only for an abuse of discretion, such as when the decision was made on grounds “clearly untenable or unreasonable.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724.

III. Analysis.

Rehabilitation is embedded as a core sentencing goal. To advance this goal, our courts are required to select the sentence that provides the maximum opportunity for a defendant’s rehabilitation while also protecting the community from further offenses. See Iowa Code §§ 901.5, 907.5 (2025).

But alongside our system’s interest in a defendant’s reform, there is also a “strong presumption” in favor of a court’s decision to impose a specific sentence. Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105–06. We afford district courts wide latitude in sentencing because they are uniquely positioned to evaluate important considerations as they arise on the ground. Yeager must overcome the presumption in favor of his sentence by making some affirmative showing that the court’s decision was untenable or unreasonable. See State v. Gartin, 271 N.W.2d 902, 911 (Iowa 1978); State v. Johnson, 513 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa 1994). He has not made that showing.

Yeager contends the district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider his rehabilitation after his offense or his prospects for rehabilitation on the probation recommended by his plea agreement. He

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argues that, in explaining the sentence, the court focused only on his criminal history, the seriousness of the current offense, and his prior violations of no- contact orders—without addressing rehabilitation. While Iowa Code section 901.5 requires courts to consider rehabilitation when selecting a sentence, and Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(2) requires courts to state the basis for the sentence, neither provision compels a judge to explicitly recite rehabilitation as part of their explanation at sentencing. No single sentencing factor—including rehabilitation—is controlling; the district court has broad discretion to weigh the relevant factors and explain its sentencing decision. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724–25. As such, the failure to specifically mention rehabilitation at sentencing does not, standing alone, constitute an abuse of discretion.

Such was our holding in State v. Stanley. 344 N.W.2d 564, 569 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). There, like here, the defendant argued that the sentencing court had improperly failed to consider his opportunity for his rehabilitation. Id. We held that a failure on the part of the sentencing court to specifically recite its consideration of the defendant’s rehabilitation was not an abuse of discretion and that the defendant bears the burden to overcome the presumption that a district court properly exercised discretion by making some other “affirmative showing of abuse, together with resulting prejudice.” Id.

Finally, Yeager faces other obstacles to his challenge. A district court may make a proper sentencing record by either orally stating the reasons on the record or placing the reasons in a written sentencing order. See State v. Luke, 4 N.W.3d 450, 457–58 (Iowa 2024). In this case, the district court entered the standard written sentencing order listing general sentencing factors. By checking the applicable boxes, the court can indicate which

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factors it considered in its sentence. On Yeager’s sentencing order, the district court checked the box indicating that its sentence was imposed to provide the “[m]aximum opportunity for rehabilitation.” Because the order was completed in a manner specific to Yeager, it shows that the court considered rehabilitation when imposing his sentence. See id.; see also State v. Clemons, No. 23-1605, 2024 WL 5153537, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2024); State v. Profit, No. 23-0225, 2024 WL 3291093, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 3, 2024).

To the extent that Yeager argues the district court improperly weighed his aggravating sentencing factors against the mitigating factor of rehabilitation, he has not shown how the court’s weighing was so “untenable or unreasonable” as to amount to an abuse of discretion. The abuse-ofdiscretion inquiry is not whether an appellate court might assign different weight to the various factors, but whether the defendant shows the sentence was based on grounds that were unreasonable or untenable. State v. Rasmussen, 7 N.W.3d 357, 363–65 (Iowa 2024); State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862–63 (Iowa 2023).

Likewise, Yeager’s sentence fell within the statutory limits. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724 (noting a sentence within the statutory limits receives a strong presumption in its favor). Although the court did not elaborate on its reasoning to the extent that Yeager would prefer, its explanation was sufficient. See State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015) (noting that a “terse and succinct” sentencing rationale is sufficient when the reasons for the exercise of discretion are obvious from the record). And while imposition of three one-year consecutive terms of imprisonment is substantially more severe than the probation contemplated

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by the plea agreement, the court was not bound by that recommendation, and such sentence was soundly within the district court’s discretion.

IV. Conclusion.

Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm Yeager’s sentences.

AFFIRMED.