State of Iowa v. Debra Lynn Eccleston

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: February 22, 2023
• Docket: 22-1064
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1064 Filed February 22, 2023

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DEBRA LYNN ECCLESTON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wayne County, Dustria A. Relph,

Judge.

A defendant appeals her prison sentence for forgery. AFFIRMED.

Daniel M. Northfield, Urbandale, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ. 2

TABOR, Presiding Judge.

“$56,000 in a town the size of Promise City is a big deal.” That’s what the

district court told Debra Eccleston when sentencing her to prison for forgery.

During her eight years as city clerk for a town of eighty-eight residents, Eccleston

wrote unauthorized checks to herself and forged the mayor’s signature. She

pleaded guilty to first-degree theft and forgery. Then she asked for a deferred

judgment. The court rejected that request, instead imposing an indeterminate five-

year term for the forgery. The court suspended the ten-year term for theft. On

appeal, Eccleston insists her sentence was too harsh. Because the court properly

exercised its discretion, we will not disturb the sentence.

In her own words, as the city clerk, Eccleston “was responsible for all

financial obligations and record-keeping” for Promise City. She maintained its

checkbooks and bank statements. But she exploited that access for her own

economic gain. It started small, paying her personal utility bill. But she admitted

“the theft spiraled out of control” as time went on. She told the presentence

investigator (PSI) that “the only way to stop stealing was to resign the position.”

And she did so in 2020. But she left it to the new city clerk to discover the

discrepencies.

When the city found those discrepencies, it enlisted the state auditor’s office

to review its accounts. The missing funds totalled $56,549. On top of that, the

auditor’s bill was nearly $30,000. And the mayor revealed that Eccleston had

forged her signature over seventy times. 3

After the audit, the State charged Eccleston with forgery, a class “D” felony

in violation of Iowa Code section 715A.2(2)(a) (2012),1 and theft in the first degree,

a class “C” felony in violation of Iowa Code sections 714.1(1) and 714.2(1).

Without an agreement with the State, she pleaded guilty to both charges. At

sentencing, her counsel asked the court to grant a deferred judgment or to follow

the PSI recommendation and place her on probation. Counsel emphasized that

Eccleston had no criminal history and no alcohol or substance-abuse issues. But

he did link her “poor decision to steal monies” from the city to her “depression and

some other mental health conditions.” In her allocution, Eccleston expressed

regret for her actions and urged the court to “show leniency” in sentencing.

By contrast, the prosecution sought concurrent prison terms. The mayor

gave a victim impact statement, saying that Eccleston’s crimes had “caused a lack

of trust in our town.” The impact, according to the mayor, was significant: “We’re

going to have to delay many things for our city for a while. We need streets done.

There are things that need to be done.”

After hearing both sides, the court first recognized its range of options:

“[A]nything from a deferred judgment to prison.” The court next listed the key

factors it weighed when performing its “uneviable job of trying to figure out what

the most appropriate punishment is in this case.”

I’ve considered your age, that you are a fifty-four-year-old adult woman. I’ve considered your employment circumstances, your lack of prior criminal history, your family and home circumstances, your

1 The trial information alleged Eccleston commited her offenses between January 2012 and July 2020. The relevant Code sections pertaining to her convictions for forgery and theft were amended during that time period. However, those amendments do not impact Eccleston’s convictions. For simplicity, we cite to the 2012 Code. 4

need and potential for rehabilitation, whether the community needs protection from further offenses, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the victim impact statement.

The court noted its decision was difficult because this was not a case “where you

messed up a couple of times.” Rather, the crimes spanned eight years. The court

also underscored the outsized impact these financial crimes had on a town as

small as Promise City. From there, the court found that granting probation would

“unduly depreciate the seriousness of the multitude of offenses that have been

committed here.” Landing on a more lenient sentence than recommended by the

State, the district court imposed the indeterminate five-year prison term for forgery.

But the court suspended the indeterminate ten-year term for theft. The court also

ordered Eccleston to pay restitution of $56,549 for the stolen funds, plus

$29,963.65 for the state audit.

In this appeal, Eccleston argues that the prison sentence was “overly

harsh.” She reasons that because she committed financial and not violent crimes,

the community would be better served by placing her on probation. She claims

this would let her earn money and pay her restitution as soon as possible. She

also suggests that the court abused its discretion because it did not consider her

mental health when rejecting probation.

We review Eccleston’s sentence for the correction of legal error. See State

v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020). To warrant reversal, the sentencing

record must show an abuse of discretion or a procedural defect. State v. Patten,

981 N.W.2d 126, 130 (Iowa 2022). When the imposed sentence is within the

statutory limits, we will set it aside only for an abuse of discretion. State v. 5

Willbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Iowa 2022). We find such an abuse when the

sentencing court exercises its discretion on untenable grounds. Id.

Under this deferential standard, if the sentencing court relied on reasonable

grounds to reach its decision, we will not “second guess” the result. State v.

Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002). The question is not whether we as

appellate judges think the sentence was too harsh but whether the sentence

served the goals of rehabilitation and community protection and was anchored on

a sound rationale. Id. No question, Eccleston’s sentence met those goals and the

court weighed the proper factors.

The sentencing court was not compelled to follow the PSI recommendation.

See State v. Headley, 926 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2019). And it had the leeway

to place more weight on the duration of Eccleston’s offenses and the effect they

had on her community. “The right of an individual judge to balance the relevant

factors in determining an appropriate sentence inheres in the discretionary

standard.” State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 1983). As for Eccleston’s

mental health, we believe it was a consideration in the sentencing. After imposing

a prison term, the court ordered: “While in custody Ms. Eccleston shall receive a

mental health evaluation and follow any recommendations for treatment.”

Because the district court acted within its discretion, we affirm Eccleston’s

prison sentence.

AFFIRMED.