State of Iowa v. David Hering

918 N.W.2d 503
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
DecidedApril 18, 2018
Docket17-0724
StatusPublished

This text of 918 N.W.2d 503 (State of Iowa v. David Hering) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Iowa v. David Hering, 918 N.W.2d 503 (iowactapp 2018).

Opinion

DANILSON, Chief Judge.

David Hering appeals from the denial of his April 4, 2017 motion for a restitution hearing. Our review is for correction of errors at law. State v. Klawonn , 688 N.W.2d 271 , 274 (Iowa 2004).

In 2004, Hering was convicted of one count of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder. See State v. Hering , No. 14-1343, 2016 WL 3271910 , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 15, 2016). "An order of restitution was filed on July 9, 2004, which ordered Hering to pay restitution of $150,000 to the estate of [the decedent] and $27,409.84 to the Crime Victim Compensation Program." Id. Hering challenged the restitution order, and this court affirmed the part of the district court's ruling finding the restitution order requiring Hering to pay $150,000 to the victim's estate had been satisfied through the payment of the judgment in a separate civil action. Id. But we reversed in part, eliminating the requirement Hering reimburse the Crime Victim Compensation Program $27,409.84. Id.

On January 10, 2017, the district court issued the following ruling:

On 12/20/2016, [Hering] filed a request for a restitution hearing. His attached Restitution Account activity shows the Department of Corrections [ (IDOC) ] has withheld $2350.31 from his account. Hering claims his restitution obligation has been satisfied and no such funds should have been withdrawn from his account.
The State does not resist the application.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall first use the funds to pay any unpaid court costs, attorney fees or other assessed sums due and unpaid and the balance shall refun[d] to Hering's prisoner account, the sum of $2350.31.

On January 24, Hering filed a "Motion to Produce Supplemental Restitution Orders and Itemized Bill," which the district court considered to be a motion for discovery. The district court denied the motion "because the docket in the matter is available to [Hering]" and "there is no pending litigation and [Hering] cannot request discovery of a non-party when no litigation is pending."

On April 4, Hering filed another petition for restitution hearing, asserting the clerk of court had not refunded any money to his prison account and "it is unclear why" there had been no refund. He asserted he "has satisfied his court ordered plan of restitution in full and the record confirms that the money IDOC withheld from his inmate account was not utilized to satisfy his restitution plan." He also challenged IDOC's procedures for withholding money from his inmate account and claimed violations of his due process rights. As a remedy, Hering requested the court "issue an order requiring [IDOC] to refund his inmate account with 'all' of the money they have withheld from his inmate account for restitution or set this matter for hearing and allow Hering to participate."

On April 6, the district court denied the motion, stating: "Restitution is already ordered in this case and time limits are over to challenge restitution."

On April 17, Hering filed a "Motion to Enlarge or Amend Findings and Conclusions or to Modify or Substitute Judgment." On that same date, the court found the motion "not timely filed."

On April 28, Hering filed another "Motion to Enlarge or Amend Findings and Conclusions or to Modify or Substitute Judgment," asserting his April 17 motion was timely.

On May 16, Hering filed a notice of appeal. The supreme court transferred the appeal to this court.

Restitution in Iowa is a creature of statute. State v. Johnson , 887 N.W.2d 178 , 181 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016). Iowa Code section 910.2(1) (2017) provides:

In all criminal cases in which there is a plea of guilty, verdict of guilty, or special verdict upon which a judgment of conviction is rendered, the sentencing court shall order that restitution be made by each offender to the victims of the offender's criminal activities, to the clerk of court for fines, penalties, surcharges, and, to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to pay, for crime victim assistance reimbursement, restitution to public agencies ..., court costs including correctional fees approved pursuant to section 356.7, court-appointed attorney fees ordered pursuant to section 815.9, including the expense of a public defender, when applicable, contribution to a local anticrime organization, or restitution to the medical assistance program pursuant to chapter 249A.

This court has observed that pursuant to this provision, the court must order restitution to the victims of the crime and to the clerk of court for fines, penalties, and surcharges. State v. Kurtz , 878 N.W.2d 469 , 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016). And, to the extent that the defendant has the reasonable ability to pay, "restitution is ordered for crime victim assistance reimbursement, for public agencies, for court costs including correctional fees, for court-appointed attorney fees, for contribution to a local anticrime organization, and for the medical assistance program." Id.

Hering argues he is entitled to a hearing to determine whether IDOC must return $2350.31 previously withheld from Hering's inmate account. Hering expresses concern because "[i]t is unclear why the clerk did not refund his prison account" any moneys previously withheld. He notes, "The record is devoid of any unpaid court costs, attorney fees, or other ass[ess]ed sums due and unpaid, no supplemental restitution orders were ever issued."

The State asserts:

The fact that one of the obligations for which Hering owed was eliminated, does not extinguish the requirement that he has to make amends. Rather, the only issue of significance for Hering is that money originally collected for one obligation-could be applied to another obligation. As a result, merely because one obligation for which collections were completed, which was subsequently eliminated, does not mean that the funds collected could not be applied to other obligations-which he owed.

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Related

State v. Ashburn
534 N.W.2d 106 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1995)
State v. Klawonn
688 N.W.2d 271 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2004)
State of Iowa v. Zedekiah Douglas Kurtz
878 N.W.2d 469 (Court of Appeals of Iowa, 2016)
State of Iowa v. Kendall Chavez Johnson
887 N.W.2d 178 (Court of Appeals of Iowa, 2016)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
918 N.W.2d 503, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-iowa-v-david-hering-iowactapp-2018.