State of Iowa v. David Edward Myers

CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
DecidedApril 10, 2024
Docket23-0297
StatusPublished

This text of State of Iowa v. David Edward Myers (State of Iowa v. David Edward Myers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Iowa v. David Edward Myers, (iowactapp 2024).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0297 Filed April 10, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DAVID EDWARD MYERS, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County,

Jennifer S. Bailey, Judge.

A defendant appeals his criminal conviction. AFFIRMED.

R.E. Breckenridge of Breckenridge Law P.C., Ottumwa, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua A. Duden, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ. 2

AHLERS, Judge.

While seeking medical treatment at a hospital for an unrelated injury, a

woman reported an incident of violence that occurred a few days earlier. The

woman had a bruised chest and hemorrhaged eye. She reported that her then-

paramour, David Myers, inflicted the injuries. Hospital staff contacted law

enforcement. Following an investigation, Myers was charged with domestic abuse

assault causing bodily injury in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1 and

708.2A(2)(b) (2022). A jury found Myers guilty. Myers appeals, challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence.

Before discussing the merits of the issue raised by Myers, we first address

the scope of this appeal. Myers frames his appeal as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence

challenge, yet he sprinkles his brief with references to evidentiary challenges. If

Myers intended to raise evidentiary issues—which is not clear—we decline to

address them for three reasons. First, any evidentiary challenges are not

developed, and we will not develop arguments for him. See, e.g., State v. Wilson,

No. 21-1287, 2022 WL 17481348, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2022) (declining to

address evidentiary issues sprinkled within a sufficiency-of-the-evidence

challenge). Second, the way Myers presents the evidentiary issues leads us to

conclude the issues are included only as part of his sufficiency challenge. See id.

Third, even if his evidentiary challenges were clearly presented and developed, we

could not address them because error was not preserved for our review. Myers

raised no objections to the evidence he now seemingly challenges when it was

offered at trial, so he cannot challenge the evidence on appeal. See State v. Trane,

984 N.W.2d 429, 434–35 (Iowa 2023) (“We will not consider an evidentiary 3

complaint unless the complaining party made their ‘specific objection’ to the

evidence ‘known’ in the district court, and the court had the ‘opportunity to pass

upon the objection and correct any error.’” (quoting State v. Brown, 656 N.W.2d

355, 361 (Iowa 2003))). So, if Myers is attempting to lodge evidentiary challenges,

we decline to address them, and we limit our discussion to his sufficiency-of-the-

evidence challenge.

We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges for correction of errors at

law. State v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Iowa 2022). This means we view

the record “in the light most favorable to the State” and “draw all legitimate

inferences in support of the verdict.” Id. (citation omitted). We will uphold a verdict

if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Evidence is substantial if it could

persuade a rational jury that Myers is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.

The district court instructed the jury that, in order to find Myers guilty of

domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury, the State had to prove four elements:

(1) Myers acted with the intent to cause pain or injury to the woman, result in

physical contact which was insulting or offensive to her, or place her in fear of

immediate physical contact that would have been painful, injurious, insulting, or

offensive to her; (2) Myers had the apparent ability to do the act; (3) the act caused

a bodily injury to the woman; and (4) the act occurred between family or household

members who resided together at the time of the incident or within the past year.

Myers made no objection to the instructions, so they became the law of the case

for purposes of appellate review of his sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. See

State v. Schiebout, 944 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 2020). 4

While Myers does not expressly state which element or elements of the

marshaling instruction he contends the State failed to prove, we discern from the

substance of his argument that he challenges only the intent component of the first

element. Myers argues the State presented insufficient evidence to prove his

specific intent. See State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Iowa 2010)

(confirming that assault under what is now Iowa Code section 708.1(2)(a) or (b) is

a specific-intent crime). Myers points to the conflicting testimony given by him and

the woman. Myers testified that he and the woman got in a “playful” struggle over

her cell phone because he desired to look at a photo on her phone, so he intended

no harm. The woman’s testimony painted a different picture—Myers came at her

aggressively, tried to get her phone from her, and “held [her] down against [her]

will and hurt [her].” She testified that she sustained injuries in the encounter and

that Myers’s pattern of violence made her “scared for [her] life.” See State v.

Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 125 (Iowa 2004) (noting that prior acts of violence are

relevant on the issue of intent in a domestic-abuse-assault case).

Because “[s]pecific intent is seldom capable of direct proof,” a factfinder can

infer a defendant’s intent to commit an assault based on the circumstances. State

v. Walker, 574 N.W.2d 280, 289 (Iowa 1998); see also Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 132.

Here, the jury’s guilty verdict in the face of the competing evidence shows it

believed the woman’s testimony and concluded Myers possessed the requisite

intent. The authority to make that credibility determination rests with the jury, not

the appellate court. State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Iowa 2006). As

substantial evidence supports the guilty verdict, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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Related

State v. Fountain
786 N.W.2d 260 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2010)
State v. Brown
656 N.W.2d 355 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2003)
State v. Musser
721 N.W.2d 758 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2006)
State v. Walker
574 N.W.2d 280 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1998)
State v. Taylor
689 N.W.2d 116 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2004)

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State of Iowa v. David Edward Myers, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-iowa-v-david-edward-myers-iowactapp-2024.