IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 19–1228
Submitted January 19, 2022—Filed March 4, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
DANTREON LEVON NEWMAN,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeffrey Farrell, Judge.
The defendant challenges his guilty plea to lascivious acts with a child.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.
McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen,
C.J., and Appel, Waterman, Mansfield, and Oxley, JJ., joined. McDermott, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion.
Eric W. Manning of Manning Law Office, P.L.L.C., Urbandale, for
appellant. 2
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee. 3
McDONALD, Justice.
Dantreon Newman pleaded guilty to lascivious acts with a child, a class
“D” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.8(1)(d) (2017), and was
sentenced to an indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed five years. In
this appeal, Newman contends his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance
in allowing Newman to plead guilty without first requesting a competency
hearing. He also contends the district court should have, sua sponte, ordered a
competency hearing. The court of appeals affirmed Newman’s conviction,
concluding it was without authority to resolve Newman’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal and concluding there was nothing in the
record that should have alerted the district to the need for a competency hearing.
We granted Newman’s application for further review.
The primary questions presented in this appeal are jurisdictional. The first
jurisdictional question is whether Newman timely filed his notice of appeal. After
the entry of judgment, Newman filed a pro se notice of appeal. At the time, he
was still represented by plea counsel. Plea counsel did not timely file a notice of
appeal on Newman’s behalf. Iowa Code section 814.6A(1) (2019) prohibits a
defendant represented by counsel from filing “any pro se document, including a
brief, reply brief, or motion, in any Iowa court.” The Code further provides that
the “court shall not consider . . . such pro se filings.” Id. The application of this
Code provision to Newman’s notice of appeal raised a question of whether
Newman timely invoked this court’s appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v.
Stark, No. 20–1503, 2021 WL 4592246, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2021) (stating 4
pro se notice of appeal was a nullity but granting delayed appeal); Boring v. State,
No. 20–0129, 2021 WL 2453045, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 16, 2021) (“However,
the notice of appeal was again filed pro se while Boring was still represented by
counsel. Accordingly, it was a document that could not be considered. It was a
nullity, as the State claims. For that reason, the appeal is dismissed.”). While
this matter was pending on appeal, however, appellate counsel filed an additional
notice of appeal in the district court and filed a motion in this court requesting
Newman be granted a delayed appeal. Under the circumstances, we conclude
the grant of delayed appeal is appropriate here. See State v. Davis, ____, N.W.2d
___, ___, 2022 WL 258191, at *4 (Iowa Jan. 28, 2022) (granting delayed appeal
where represented defendant timely filed pro se notice of appeal and where
counsel subsequently filed a notice of appeal).
The second jurisdictional issue is whether Newman even has an appeal as
a matter of right following his guilty plea. A defendant has a statutory right of
appeal from “[a] final judgment of sentence, except in the following cases: (1) A
simple misdemeanor conviction. (2) An ordinance violation. (3) A conviction
where the defendant has pled guilty.” Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a). A defendant who
has pleaded guilty may still appeal as a matter of right, however, where the
defendant pleaded guilty to a class “A” felony or “where the defendant establishes
good cause” to appeal. Id. § 814.6(1)(a)(3). Newman pleaded guilty to a class “D”
felony and thus has a statutory right of appeal only upon establishing “good
cause.” 5
Section 814.6 does not define “good cause,” but we have defined it broadly.
In State v. Boldon and State v. Damme, we stated that “good cause” in section
814.6 means a “legally sufficient reason.” State v. Boldon, 954 N.W.2d 62, 69
(Iowa 2021) (quoting State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 2020)). “What
constitutes a legally sufficient reason is context specific.” State v. Treptow, 960
N.W.2d 98, 109 (Iowa 2021). Generally speaking, a defendant asserts a legally
sufficient reason and establishes good cause to appeal as a matter of right by
asserting a claim on appeal for which an appellate court potentially could provide
relief. See id. at 108–09.
In determining whether a defendant has asserted a claim on appeal for
which an appellate court potentially could provide relief, we do not assess the
merits of the claim. Instead, we assess whether the claim is of the type for which
an appellate court could provide relief. On direct appeal from a guilty plea, Iowa’s
appellate courts could potentially provide relief where the defendant preserved
error for appeal or where the defendant need not preserve error for appeal. For
example, we have recognized a defendant establishes good cause to appeal by
asserting a challenge to a sentencing hearing or sentence because a defendant
need not preserve error to assert such claims on appeal. See State v. Jordan, 959
N.W.2d 395, 399 (Iowa 2021); State v. Fetner, 959 N.W.2d 129, 134 n.1 (Iowa
2021); Boldon, 954 N.W.2d at 69; Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105. By way of
counterexample, a defendant who asserts only a claim or claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel cannot establish good cause to appeal as a matter of right
because Iowa’s appellate courts are without authority to provide relief on such 6
claim or claims. See Iowa Code § 814.7; Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109–10 (“The
defendant has no right to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal, and this court has no authority to decide a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Under the circumstances, the appellate
courts cannot provide the defendant with relief. The defendant has thus not
established good cause to pursue his appeal as a matter of right under section
814.6.”); State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 154 (Iowa 2021) (dismissing appeal
where defendant claimed his counsel was ineffective in allowing him to plead
guilty where the plea was not knowingly and intelligently made).
Newman’s claims in this appeal relate to his competency to plead guilty.
At the plea hearing, the district court engaged in a thorough colloquy with
Newman to establish his plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by a
factual basis. The presentence investigation report prepared for sentencing
showed that Newman reported he had been diagnosed with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia and that he was
taking medications while being held in pretrial detention. Because of the
information in the presentence investigation report, Newman’s plea counsel
requested to make a record at sentencing regarding Newman’s competency.
Newman’s counsel made clear that his conversations with Newman “raised
absolutely no concerns for me whatsoever about [Newman’s] competency.”
Counsel noted that Newman “was able to appropriately process the information”
related to this “really complex” case. The district court engaged in a brief colloquy
with Newman and stated there was “a lengthy discussion during the plea 7
hearing, and it appeared to me during that hearing that you were processing
everything well and understood everything well during the hearing.” Newman
agreed with that assessment.
On appeal, Newman contends the information contained in the
presentence investigation report was sufficient to trigger a competency hearing
under Iowa Code chapter 812. Iowa Code section 812.3(1) provides:
If at any stage of a criminal proceeding the defendant or the defendant’s attorney, upon application to the court, alleges specific facts showing that the defendant is suffering from a mental disorder which prevents the defendant from appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense, the court shall suspend further proceedings and determine if probable cause exists to sustain the allegations. The applicant has the burden of establishing probable cause. The court may on its own motion schedule a hearing to determine probable cause if the defendant or defendant’s attorney has failed or refused to make an application under this section and the court finds that there are specific facts showing that a hearing should be held on that question.
Newman presents two claims in this direct appeal related to his
competency to plead guilty. He first contends his counsel provided ineffective
assistance in failing to request a competency hearing pursuant to chapter 812.
This court is without authority to resolve claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel on direct appeal. Id. § 814.7; Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109–10; Tucker,
959 N.W.2d 151–52. Accordingly, Newman’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is not a legally sufficient reason that can serve as “good cause” to
establish a statutory right to appeal. See Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109–10; Tucker,
959 N.W.2d 154. And we do not consider this claim any further. 8
In his second claim, Newman contends the district court erred in failing
to, sua sponte, order a competency hearing. Our cases hold that a defendant
may, without preserving error, challenge on direct appeal the district court’s
failure to hold a competency hearing. See State v. Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d 773, 779–
80 (Iowa 2018); State v. Lucas, 323 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Iowa 1982) (en banc). The
rationale for the rule is that an incompetent defendant is in no position to
preserve error in the district court. See Lucas, 323 N.W.2d at 232. The State
concedes that Iowa’s courts “have excepted a claim that the district court failed
to conduct a sua sponte competency hearing from the traditional rule of error
preservation.” Because we could potentially provide relief on this type of claim,
Newman has asserted a legally sufficient reason to pursue this appeal and has
established good cause to appeal as a matter of right. See, e.g., State v.
Chindlund, No. 20–1368, 2021 WL 2708944, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30, 2021)
(“[G]ood cause exists to challenge competency at the time of the plea irrespective
of whether the issue was contested below.” (quoting State v. Cue, No. 19–2150,
2020 WL 6157813, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2020))).
On the merits of the appeal, Newman is not entitled to any relief. In
determining competency, “[t]he critical question is ‘whether [the defendant] has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” Lucas, 323 N.W.2d at 232–33
(second alteration in original) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960) (per curiam)). There is a presumption that a defendant is competent, and 9
the defendant has the burden to prove incompetence. State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d
528, 531 (Iowa 1994). “Of course, a past history of mental illness, without more,
is insufficient to trigger a competency hearing under Iowa Code section 812.3
. . . . The question is one of present competency, not past malady.” Einfeldt, 914
N.W.2d at 783 n.3; see State v. Rieflin, 558 N.W.2d 149, 153 (Iowa 1996),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Lyman, 776 N.W.2d 865 (Iowa 2010). We
have carefully reviewed the district court’s plea colloquy with the defendant and
the sentencing hearing, and there is nothing in the record that should have
alerted the district court that a competency hearing was required. To the
contrary, the defendant was lucid, oriented to time and place, demonstrated an
understanding of the proceedings and the role of the persons present,
demonstrated an ability to communicate with his lawyer, and demonstrated an
appreciation of the charge against him and the consequences of pleading guilty.
Christensen, C.J., and Appel, Waterman, Mansfield, and Oxley, JJ., join
this opinion. McDermott, J., files a dissenting opinion. 10
#19–1228, State v. Newman
McDERMOTT, Justice (dissenting).
I.
Our rules setting forth appeal deadlines were not tablet-carved and
handed to us by an ancient power. Their origins are far more mundane: drafted
by our own court with public input, submitted to the legislative council for review
as required under Iowa Code sections 602.4201 and 602.4202, and left
undisturbed. The rules’ deadlines are clear, their application simple. Despite the
humble origins and simplicity, our continued commitment to our appeal
deadlines allows us to administer a fair and orderly system of justice. But
adopting multi-factor tests when we have straightforward written deadlines
means that “a question that necessarily has a yes/no answer”—in this case,
whether the appeal was timely filed—“is not governed by some simple on/off
switch, but by a massive, costly, and uncertain inquiry.” Richard A. Epstein,
Simple Rules For a Complex World 25 (1995).
Equally troubling to me: I don’t know the source of our court’s power to
look past jurisdictional deadlines on an ad hoc basis as we’ve frequently been
doing of late. Iowa Code section 814.6A(1) (2019) commands that “[t]he court
shall not consider” filings made by defendants in criminal cases if the defendant
is represented by counsel. The pro se notice of appeal that Newman filed is thus
ineffectual—we, as a court, cannot consider it—because he was represented by
counsel when he made the filing. See State v. Thompson, 954 N.W.2d 402, 418– 11
19 (Iowa 2021). By the time his lawyer filed a notice of appeal on Newman’s
behalf, the appeal deadline had long since passed.
“The right to appeal is strictly governed by statute.” In re Melodie L., 591
N.W.2d 4, 6 (Iowa 1999). Appeal deadlines are jurisdictional. Root v. Toney, 841
N.W.2d 83, 87 (Iowa 2013). This means that our court doesn’t have jurisdiction—
the power to decide a case—when parties miss the prescribed appeal deadlines.
If a party “is late in filing, by as little as one day, we are without jurisdiction to
consider the appeal.” In re Marriage of Mantz, 266 N.W.2d 758, 759 (Iowa 1978).
Since both legal and pragmatic reasons dictate that we not take up the merits of
appeals filed beyond the mandatory deadlines, see In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280,
301–05 (Iowa 2021) (McDermott, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), I
would not consider the merits as the majority does under our ever-expanding
“delayed appeal” jurisprudence.
Last term, we found an appeal filed six months after the deadline “far too
long to permit a delayed appeal.” Anderson v. State, 962 N.W.2d 760, 763 (Iowa
2021). Yet a month ago, our court permitted an appeal to proceed
notwithstanding that the notice of appeal wasn’t filed until almost one year after
the deadline. State v. Davis, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2022 WL 258191, at *4 (Iowa
Jan. 28, 2022). Today the majority blows past even that new benchmark—by a
lot. The appeal permitted to proceed to the merits in this case involves a notice
filed over two years beyond the deadline. Earlier this term, the court discussed
the need for the delay in late-filed appeals to be “negligible” for us to consider a 12
direct appeal on its merits. In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Iowa 2021). After
today, I struggle to conceive of any length of delay that might be too long.
I thus respectfully dissent (once again) and would not further expand our
now-multiplying delayed appeal precedents by granting a delayed appeal in this
case.
II.
But that doesn’t end the analysis. Newman argues that the district court,
as part of the disclosures that the court must make to defendants about their
appeal rights under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(e), needed to advise
Newman that the notice of appeal could only be filed by his counsel. Indeed,
Newman contends that the district court’s statements at sentencing led him to
believe the opposite: that he personally was required to file the notice.
Newman’s supplemental brief on the issue of jurisdiction can be read to
allege a claim that the district court acted illegally by failing to advise him of (and
affirmatively misleading him about) his appeal rights. Rule 6.107 states that a
party asserting that a district court judge “exceeded the judge’s jurisdiction or
otherwise acted illegally” may file an original certiorari action in the supreme
court. Iowa R. App. P. 6.107(1)(a). That Newman’s appellate counsel filed a notice
of appeal and not a petition for writ of certiorari is no roadblock. If our court
“determines another form of review was the proper one, the case shall not be
dismissed, but shall proceed as though the proper form of review had been
requested.” Id. r. 6.108; see also Crowell v. State Pub. Def., 845 N.W.2d 676, 682 13
(Iowa 2014). “Our power to review lower court actions by issuing writs of
certiorari is discretionary.” Crowell, 845 N.W.2d at 682.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(e) requires that when imposing a
sentence the district court “shall advise the defendant of the defendant’s
statutory right to appeal.” The rule includes that the notification “advise
defendant that filing a notice of appeal within the time and in the manner
specified in Iowa R. App. P. 6.101 is jurisdictional and failure to comply with
these provisions shall preclude defendant’s right of appeal.” Iowa R. Crim. P.
2.23(3)(e). The cited rule of appellate procedure, rule 6.101, lists deadlines (thirty
days in most cases) for filing a notice of appeal.
The district court informed Newman of his right to file an appeal but never
specified that only Newman’s counsel—because Newman was still represented—
was permitted to file the notice of appeal. Instead, the court’s statements to
Newman suggested that Newman was authorized to file the notice of appeal
himself. Considering the critical importance of informing Newman about who
may file the notice of appeal, the district court’s discussion with Newman did not
adequately “advise the defendant” of his statutory right to appeal. Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.23(3)(e).
Not only did the district court’s statements at sentencing misinform
Newman about his appeal rights, the court’s actions after sentencing effectively
concealed its prior misinformation. The district court sentenced Newman on July
10, 2019. Newman filed his notice of appeal two days after he was sentenced, on
July 12. His pro se notice was a nullity from the outset by application of Iowa 14
Code section 814.6A. Yet ten days later and within the thirty-day deadline, on
July 22, the district court entered an order that gave Newman and his lawyers
every indication that the pro se notice of appeal was valid. The court’s order said:
A Notice of Appeal was filed by the Defendant. The Defendant is indigent. Counsel shall be appointed to represent Defendant on this appeal.
The Appellate Defender’s Office is appointed to represent the Defendant in this appeal.
The transcripts in all proceedings in this matter shall be prepared at State expense.
Counsel is advised that the combined certificate must be filed and served within four (4) days after the filing of the notice of appeal. See Iowa R. App.P.10(b). If it is not possible to meet that deadline at the time of appointment, counsel shall file an application for extension of time with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. . . . The appeal must then be docketed within the applicable deadline set forth under Iowa R. App. P.12(a) or (b).
Eight days after the order on July 30, once again still within the thirty-day
deadline, the State Appellate Defender filed a request for appointment of private
counsel due to staffing issues. (The district court granted that motion and
appointed private appellate counsel three days after the deadline.) The clerk of
court also erroneously certified Newman’s notice of appeal on August 20, stating:
“I assert in good faith that this appeal meets jurisdictional requirements.”
The district court’s order appointing appellate counsel and the clerk’s
certificate treated Newman’s pro se filing not as a nullity but as a valid notice of
appeal upon which orders relating to an appeal could be rendered. Newman thus
was misinformed by the court that he could file the notice of appeal and he (and
his lawyer) were also later led to believe that the invalid notice of appeal was in 15
fact proper. Newman filed his notice of appeal when there were still twenty-eight
days left to fix the error and meet the filing deadline.
When a defendant who is entitled to court-appointed counsel wishes to
appeal the conviction or sentence, the court may appoint appellate counsel only
if “trial counsel [has] file[d] with the district court the notice of appeal, an
application for appointment of counsel, and an application for production of
transcripts at public expense.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.29(6) (emphasis added). The
court appointed the state appellate defender’s office after Newman filed his pro
se notice of appeal and pro se request for appellate counsel, without any motion
by trial counsel. Had the court notified Newman of the notice-of-appeal error—
or had it at minimum not taken action that reasonably caused Newman and his
lawyers to believe that the pro se notice had legal effect—Newman could have
corrected the mistake within the deadline by directing his counsel to file the
notice. The district court should not have appointed appellate counsel except on
trial counsel’s motion. See id.
Iowa Code section 814.6A(1) commands that “[t]he court shall not consider,
and opposing counsel shall not respond to, such pro se filings.” (Emphasis
added.) But the district court plainly did consider Newman’s pro se filing when
it acknowledged his pro se notice of appeal and request for counsel as the basis
to appoint the appellate defender, order preparation of the transcripts, set the
deadline for the combined certificate, and so on. The court’s actions violated both
section 814.6A and rule 2.29(6). 16
A petition for writ of certiorari must be filed within thirty days of the court’s
alleged illegal action. Iowa R. App. P. 6.107(1)(b). But in this case, Newman
wasn’t put on notice of the need for counsel to file the notice of appeal until our
court issued an order (on our own motion) for the parties to file supplemental
briefs about our jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Until then, Newman wouldn’t
have known that the district court—contrary to its legal duties—failed to notify
him at sentencing of the counsel-required appeal notice and treated his invalid
pro se notice of appeal as valid. Newman, in other words, wouldn’t have known
that he was injured by the district court’s actions because the district court’s
own actions concealed the injury. Although Newman more properly should have
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari upon discovering the defect after our request
for briefing, we may consider the counsel-filed notice of appeal and argument in
his supplemental brief as if the proper form of review had been requested. Id. r.
6.108. Those filings were made within the required thirty-day deadline.
None of this is to suggest, of course, that the district court ever intended
to misdirect Newman to interfere with his appeal rights. But as the events played
out, the district court’s actions during and after sentencing prevented Newman
and his counsel from correcting the error before the deadline passed. The district
court thus prejudicially magnified its failure to adequately inform Newman of his
appeal rights at sentencing as required.
I would grant a writ of certiorari and hold that the district court was
required to inform Newman under rule 2.23(3)(e) at sentencing that only his
lawyer could file a valid notice of appeal, consistent with section 814.6A. This 17
failure, and the ensuing events that compounded and worked to hide its
disclosure from Newman until well beyond his appeal deadline, permit our review
of this claim. The appropriate remedy in this situation is to remand to the district
court for a prompt resentencing. See Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327,
332 (1969). At the resentencing hearing, the district court would be required to
include in its notice to Newman about his appeal rights information about who
must file any notice of appeal. If Newman thereafter wished to pursue his appeal,
he would have that opportunity.