State of Iowa v. Daniel C. Jones

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: July 2, 2025
• Docket: 24-1075
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1075 Filed July 2, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DANIEL CRAIG JONES, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, John D. Telleen (Trial)

and Henry W. Latham, II (Sentencing), Judges.

A criminal defendant appeals from fifteen convictions relating to

drug-dealing and the prostitution, solicitation, and sexual abuse of middle- and

high-school girls. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and

Sandy, JJ. Telleen, S.J., takes no part. 2

BULLER, Judge.

Daniel Jones appeals fifteen convictions relating to drug dealing and the

prostitution, solicitation, and sexual abuse of four middle- and high-school girls.

His complaints relate to denial of his motion for new trial, denial of his motion to

continue the sentencing hearing, and the court’s exercise of discretion when it

sentenced him to prison for two hundred fifty-five consecutive years. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Given the procedural issues raised on appeal and a lack of challenge to the

evidence supporting the convictions, we do not dwell on the facts of this case.

Suffice to say the details of how Jones groomed, exploited, solicited, and sexually

abused the girls filled multiple days of trial transcript. The jury not only heard from

the victims, but they also heard Jones’s confession to the elements of numerous

offenses and saw cell-phone forensics, including hundreds of text messages. On

October 6, 2023, the jury found Jones guilty of the vast majority of charges he

faced.1

On November 14 (two weeks before sentencing was scheduled), Jones’s

privately retained attorney moved to withdraw on the grounds that Jones was out

1 In total, Jones was convicted of two counts of prostitution, class “D” felonies in

violation of Iowa Code section 725.1(2)(b) (2022); four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor by solicitation, class “C” felonies in violation of section 728.12(1); three counts of distributing marijuana to a minor, special class “B” felonies in violation of section 124.406(1)(a); one count of distributing Xanax to a minor, an aggravated misdemeanor in violation of section 124.406(1)(c); one count of lascivious acts with a child by fondling, a class “C” felony in violation of section 709.8(1)(a); one count of lascivious acts with a child by solicitation, a class “D” felony in violation of section 709.8(1)(a); one count of indecent contact with a child, an aggravated misdemeanor in violation of section 709.12(b); and two counts of sexual abuse in the second degree, class “B” felonies in violation of section 709.3(1)(b). 3

of money; the court denied that motion pending further request from Jones. Jones

later sent the court a letter complaining that his privately retained counsel wasn’t

filing the motions Jones wanted and seeking new counsel. The court continued

sentencing and, on January 19, 2024, held a hearing on the motion to withdraw,

ultimately granting privately-retained counsel’s motion to withdraw and appointing

new counsel. In doing so, the court expressed that it was unlikely to grant a lengthy

continuance of sentencing “for instance, to prepare a transcript of the trial or

anything like that.” Jones also did not want a lengthy delay, explaining he “didn’t

want to have all this stuff being extended either.”

At sentencing on January 26, newly-appointed counsel moved orally to

continue sentencing so he could potentially file post-trial motions. He admitted

they were already “well past”2 the filing deadline for those motions but asked the

court to find good cause so he could order preparation of the trial transcript. The

State resisted, pointing to the untimeliness of any post-trial motions and explaining

that “a lot of people are here in court today to get this resolved”—presumably

referring to the victims and their families, in addition to the lawyers and the court.

The court commented on the potential for a postconviction action and granted a

continuance. Then newly-appointed counsel orally moved to withdraw, citing his

workload. The court granted the motion and appointed a second new lawyer. And

the court set sentencing for April 19.

Transcripts were ordered, prepared, and sent to the new lawyer. When

transcripts were not ready until several days before the April sentencing hearing,

2 Jones concedes the forty-five-day post-verdict deadline ran on or about November 20, 2023. 4

another motion to continue was made (but not docketed), and the court re-set

sentencing for June 14. At the June hearing, the second appointed lawyer again

moved to continue sentencing, asking for “additional opportunity to review [the trial

transcripts and evidence] in further detail and make a written motion in support of

the oral motion [for new trial],” such that she would have “the maximum opportunity

to make the appropriate record.” The State resisted, reiterating the timeline set

forth above and explaining that once again there were “a number of people

obviously here in the courtroom who are affected by this case and the defendant’s

conduct who are here to have a sentencing hearing.” The court denied the

continuance, explaining that it believed counsel could “adequately present to [the

court] an oral motion” on the new-trial issue.

Defense counsel made an oral motion for new trial alleging a discovery

violation, that there was “insufficient” evidence, and that the verdict was against

the weight of the evidence. The State resisted. And the court denied the motion

as both untimely and meritless.

The defense made a lengthy pitch for leniency in sentencing, claiming in

part that the sheer volume and severity of the counts at issue amounted to a life

sentence “[e]ven if they all run concurrently.” Jones said in allocution: “So I know

this is the point to where I’m supposed to show remorse for crimes, especially like

this, but I have maintained my innocence from day one and I still maintain my

innocence.” He claimed the prosecutor sought an “excessive sentenc[e]”

compared to other child molesters and rapists (whose names he listed off). The

county attorney filed a sentencing memorandum and orally stressed Jones’s lack

of remorse, the number of victims and nature of the offenses, and the danger to 5

the community if Jones was not incapacitated with incarceration. A victim, a

victim’s mother, and a victim’s father gave impact statements detailing the lasting

trauma Jones inflicted with his crimes.

The court explained that the majority of its discretion at sentencing

concerned whether it would run the forcible felonies concurrently or consecutively.

The court told Jones about its duty to “consider the serious nature of the offenses

that you have been convicted of in this case, also your willingness to accept

change and treatment, and what’s available to assist you in that process. I look at

the least restrictive alternatives first and then proceed to the more restrictive

alternatives.” Then the court went count-by-count and explained why it ran some

of the sentences concurrently and some consecutively. In concluding its remarks,

the court summarized:

[T]he reason for the consecutive sentencing is very clear, sir. There were five victims in this case. And your attorney very eloquently outlines for the Court that I should be considering the rehabilitation for you. But I also have to consider the protection of the community and how this has impacted these five victims. And your past criminal history, it’s horrendous, and it warrants the consecutive sentencing that I have imposed here. This community has to be protected from you. And I’m going to note for the purposes of the record, and I think it’s very important that I do so, it was very clear to me that during this entire proceeding you have been sitting there smirking, making very light of this entire situation. I do that because it’s very important for the appellate courts to know that and they understand the reasoning for my sentencing today. The impact that this has had upon these victims, I can’t even fathom to understand how they have been impacted. And I have a duty to protect this community, and I’m going to do so with the sentence that I have just imposed. 6

In total, the court sentenced Jones to two hundred fifty-five consecutive years in

prison with a mandatory minimum of fifty-three and one-half years before parole.

Jones appeals.

II. Discussion

Jones raises three claims on appeal relating to the new-trial motion, the

request to continue sentencing a fourth time, and the court’s exercise of its

discretion at sentencing. We consider each under the relevant standards of

review.

A. Motion for New Trial

Jones first challenges the denial of his motion for new trial. We review for

an abuse of discretion on both questions of timeliness and the merits. See State

v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 705–06 (Iowa 2016); State v. Alexander, No. 07-2048,

2008 WL 5412283, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2008).

First, we discern no abuse of discretion and agree with the district court that

the motion for new trial was untimely. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(a) (requiring

such a motion be filed “not later than” forty-five days after the verdict and not later

than five days before sentencing). Jones’s motion was at least six months untimely

by the time sentencing was finally held. See id. In our view, the court was quite

generous to grant Jones the multiple continuances and transcripts at state

expense (which is a luxury virtually unheard of for defense attorneys filing new-trial

motions). But, as the State notes in its appellate brief, the continuances were not

a “blank check to ignore all rules and requirements on timely filing, going forward.”

And even if we excused the failure to file the new-trial motion within forty-five days

of verdict, Jones still didn’t comply with the separate requirement he file the motion 7

five days before sentencing. See id. We end our analysis here not only because

we agree with the district court’s conclusion the motion was untimely, but also

because Jones does not offer any challenge to the merits of the new-trial ruling on

appeal.

The only additional argument we discern from Jones’s brief on this issue is

his implication that the court abused its discretion because the record does not

affirmatively disclose that the judge who heard the new-trial motion (different from

the trial judge) had reviewed the transcripts. This argument was not preserved,

and we have nothing to review as pertains to this claim. Cf. State v. Goodson, 958

N.W.2d 791, 806 (Iowa 2021) (finding error not preserved on recusal at a new-trial

hearing when the issue wasn’t raised until appeal). And even if this claim was

preserved, Jones has not overcome the presumption of regularity and cannot point

to any evidence the court ruled without reviewing the transcripts. See State v.

Pappas, 337 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Iowa 1983) (discussing the presumption of

regularity in the context of abuse-of-discretion review). This claim provides no

basis for relief, no matter how we approach it.

B. Motion for Fourth Continuance of Sentencing

Jones next contends the district court should have continued sentencing a

fourth time. “A trial court’s ruling on a motion for continuance will not be interfered

with on appeal unless it clearly appears that the trial court has abused its

discretion, and an injustice has resulted therefrom.” State v. Grimme, 338 N.W.2d

142, 144 (Iowa 1983) (cleaned up). This is the kind of courtroom-management

call we entrust to the district court: 8

We call upon our trial judges to do justice to those needing and deserving a continuance, while at the same time resolutely moving the trial assignment toward the speedy resolution of cases. The trial judge must sense whether a given continuance motion stems from a legitimate need, or from a wish to delay. From its closer vantage point, the trial court can better sort through these matters than an appellate court can.

State v. Teeters, 487 N.W.2d 346, 348 (Iowa 1992). Both the State’s and

defendant’s interests are relevant. See State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 530

(Iowa 2000).

We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling here. First,

we see no good cause for additional time in defense counsel’s request below. Her

word choice was that she wanted “further additional opportunity to review the trial

transcripts” and a “maximum opportunity to make the appropriate record.” Notably,

she didn’t say she was unprepared or unable to proceed. Lawyering is a

deadline-driven profession, and while we recognize many lawyers in many cases

would love more time to make better arguments, the hope that with more time you

could do better for your client is no basis for a continuance—and certainly not to

continue sentencing a fourth time. We also recognize the countervailing

consideration that this was not the first time victims and other interested parties

had come to court for sentencing, and the victims and their families have statutory

rights that must be honored. See Iowa Code § 915.21 (2023). And we note our

skepticism—apparently shared by the district court—of the sincerity of the request

for continuance given that it was only made orally at the time for hearing rather

than in writing ahead of time. The district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying a last-minute request to continue sentencing a fourth time for no good

reason. 9

C. Discretion at Sentencing

Jones’s last challenge relates to the court’s exercise of discretion at

sentencing. “[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence

within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will

only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate

matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “[O]ur task on

appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to

determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 725.

First, Jones claims the court failed to articulate reasons for sentencing him

to prison on the non-forcible felonies. We disagree. The court expressly

recognized that only some of the offenses required prison sentences and

explained its overall sentencing scheme in significant detail, as reproduced in this

opinion. The court was under no obligation to explain count-by-count why it

rejected certain sentencing options. See State v. Ayers, 590 N.W.2d 25, 28

(Iowa 1999). And we have no trouble conducting appellate review of the court’s

exercise of discretion given the reasons the court offered on the record below. See

State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015). This is no basis for relief.

Second, Jones claims the district court was required to separately articulate

why it tripled the sentence for the drug-related convictions. See Iowa Code

§ 124.411(1). But we have rejected an identical challenge to this very

enhancement. See State v. Caulker, No. 20-0820, 2021 WL 1661230, at *3 (Iowa

Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2021); see also State v. Vanover, 559 N.W.2d 618, 634–35

(Iowa 1997). Again, the court was not required to explain why it rejected certain

sentencing options, and its lengthy explanation of reasons is sufficient to enable 10

appellate review. See Ayers, 590 N.W.2d at 28; see also Thacker, 862 N.W.2d

at 408. And there is nothing in the record to suggest the court thought it did not

have discretion to not impose the enhancement. See Vanover, 559 N.W.2d

at 634–35. Contra State v. Moore, 936 N.W.2d 436, 439–40 (Iowa 2019)

(reversing where the court “incorrectly believed it had no discretion”). Under both

our case law and the supreme court’s precedent, Jones has identified no basis for

relief relating to the enhancement.

III. Disposition

Having rejected all of Jones’s claims, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.