State of Iowa v. Dalton Wayne Cook

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: October 20, 2023
• Docket: 21-0522
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 21–0522

Submitted September 14, 2023—Filed October 20, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

DALTON WAYNE COOK,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Joel D. Yates,

Judge.

The defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision affirming

his conviction for willful injury causing serious injury and the district court’s

failure to merge his conviction for willful injury causing serious injury with his

conviction for robbery in the first degree. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee. 2

CHRISTENSEN, Chief Justice. The defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery, in violation of Iowa

Code sections 711.1 and 711.2 (2018), and willful injury causing serious injury,

in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4(1), for his participation in the robbery of

one individual and the assault of another. The defendant appeals his conviction

for willful injury causing serious injury, arguing the jury convicted him based on

insufficient evidence. The defendant also contends the district court imposed an

illegal and unconstitutional sentence by failing to merge his conviction for willful

injury causing serious injury with his conviction for robbery in the first degree.

The court of appeals affirmed both the conviction and sentence. On further

review, we affirm the conviction and conclude the jury had sufficient evidence to

convict the defendant of willful injury causing serious injury. We also affirm the

district court’s decision not to merge the willful injury causing serious injury

conviction with the first-degree robbery conviction as it is possible to commit

first-degree robbery under the dangerous-weapon alternative without also com-

mitting willful injury causing serious injury. That is because there are additional

elements of willful injury causing serious injury that are not encompassed within

the elements of first-degree robbery under the dangerous-weapon alternative.

Therefore, merger was not required. I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

About an hour before midnight on August 2, 2018, Tami Holderbaum

picked up her then-boyfriend Michael Bibby, and they headed to a cornfield “to

pick up something [Bibby] left there”: a rifle and a pistol. At about noon the next

day, Bibby, with the two guns still in Holderbaum’s car, drove Holderbaum to an

appointment in Ottumwa. Also in the car were two of Bibby’s friends, Dalton

Cook and Dylan White. They never returned to pick up Holderbaum as promised. 3

At about the same time Holderbaum was dropped off, Colt Stewart drove

Randi Hanrahan to Joseph and Amy Garrett’s house on Lillian Street in

Ottumwa to pick up her car that the Garretts had previously borrowed. Shortly

after arriving, Stewart was in the front of the house talking on his cell phone

when three men approached him. The tall man—later identified as Bibby—was

wearing a black paintball mask and carrying an AR-15-style rifle. The shorter

man—later identified as Cook—had red hair and was carrying a knife. The third

man with Bibby and Cook was later identified as White.

When the men approached Stewart, one of them stated, “We’re here to rob

you.” Thinking they were joking, Stewart laughed in response, prompting Cook

to knock Stewart’s phone out of his hand. Believing he was about to be jumped,

Stewart shoved Cook to the ground and punched Bibby. Bibby fell to the ground

and someone yelled, “Shoot him!” Bibby then shot Stewart in the thigh. The three

men then proceeded toward the entrance of the home.

Amy Garrett was inside her home when she heard a “pop” sound, like “a

paint can in a fire.” She then saw Bibby fire his weapon toward the driveway

before he entered the home and proceeded toward the bedroom. She heard Bibby

demand “Where’s the drugs?” and “Where’s the money?” As the other two men

entered the house, Amy quickly left through the back door and called 911 from a neighbor’s cell phone.

Joseph Garrett was asleep in his bedroom when he was awakened by

Bibby carrying his rifle and demanding money and drugs. Joseph also thought

it was a joke and laughed in response. Bibby retorted, “Do you think this is a

joke?” At this time, Hanrahan was also in the room. Bibby then grabbed

Hanrahan by the hair, put her to her knees, held the rifle to her head, and stated,

“This ain’t a joke.” Hanrahan pleaded with Bibby to take her purse, stating there

was money inside, and Joseph insisted they were at the wrong home. Bibby took 4

Amy Garrett’s purse hanging on the bed frame, backed out of the room, and

started running after exiting the house through the back door.

Several police officers began responding to the incident. The information

provided to the officers indicated that the three men were running to a nearby

wooded area. Chief of Police Tom McAndrew soon observed the men running out

of the wooded area into a field near Liberty Elementary School and pursued to-

ward them. As he got closer, he saw Bibby aiming a rifle toward his vehicle. Chief

McAndrew turned the vehicle sharply to the left and Bibby fired towards him,

causing his passenger side window to shatter. Chief McAndrew drove away, at-

tempting to take cover and put distance between him and the suspects. At this

time, several additional officers had begun to arrive at Liberty Elementary

School. While driving away, several times Chief McAndrew saw Bibby point the

rifle toward him and the officers gathered in the school parking lot.

After Bibby hit Chief McAndrews’s vehicle with gunfire, Cook broke off

from the group of three and began running across the field. While Bibby and

White continued to flee, Bibby would stop, aim, and occasionally shoot toward

the officers in the parking lot. Officers returned fire until both Bibby and White

were hit. White succumbed to his injuries and died at the scene and officers

transported Bibby to receive medical attention. Although Cook made it across the field and out of the area apparently unscathed, a police officer later located

Cook underwater in a nearby creek, at which time he surrendered.

Cook was subsequently charged with ten counts of attempted murder and

one count each of first-degree robbery, first-degree burglary, and willful injury

causing serious injury. After a seven-day jury trial, the district court granted

Cook judgment of acquittal on eight of the ten counts of attempted murder. The

jury returned its verdict on April 1, 2021. The jury acquitted Cook on one count

of attempted murder of Tom McAndrew, and found Cook guilty of (1) robbery in 5

the first degree as an aider and abettor; (2) burglary in the first degree as an

aider and abettor; (3) willful injury causing serious injury as to Stewart as an

aider and abettor; and (4) assault with intent to cause serious injury as to Colt

Stewart, a lesser included offense of attempted murder, under a theory of joint

criminal conduct.

Cook was sentenced as follows: (1) for robbery in the first degree, an inde-

terminate term of incarceration not to exceed twenty-five years with a require-

ment to serve 58% of the sentence before being eligible for parole; (2) for burglary

in the first degree, an indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed twenty-

five years; and (3) for willful injury causing serious injury, an indeterminate term

of incarceration not to exceed ten years and a fine. The conviction for assault

with intent to cause serious injury as to Stewart was merged with the willful

injury conviction. The district court ordered the robbery and burglary sentences

to run concurrently and the willful injury sentence to run consecutively.

Cook timely appealed. We transferred the case to the court of appeals,

which affirmed the conviction and sentence. We granted Cook’s application for

further review.

II. Standards of Review.

We review sufficiency of the evidence claims for the correction of errors at law. State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 2022) (citing State v. Jones, 967

N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021)). We will uphold a jury’s verdict if it is supported

by substantial evidence. Id. (citing State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa

2017)). Evidence is substantial if it is “sufficient to convince a rational trier of

fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 516–17. In review-

ing the sufficiency of the evidence, we will consider all evidence contained in the

record, not just the evidence supporting guilt. State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23,

27 (Iowa 2005). Further, we must view the “evidence in the light most favorable 6

to the State, including legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly

and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.” Id. (quoting State v. Quinn,

691 N.W.2d 403, 407 (Iowa 2005)).

We also review claims of an illegal sentence involving merger for correction

of errors at law. State v. Bloom, 983 N.W.2d 44, 49 (Iowa 2022) (citing State v.

Roby, 951 N.W.2d 459, 463 (Iowa 2020)). “Our review of double jeopardy claims

is de novo.” Id.

III. Analysis.

Cook raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends the evidence was not

sufficient to support his conviction for willful injury causing serious injury.1 Sec-

ond, Cook argues the district court imposed an illegal and unconstitutional sen-

tence by failing to merge his conviction for willful injury causing serious injury

with his conviction for robbery in the first degree.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Cook argues there was insufficient evi-

dence to convict him as an aider and abettor to the crime of willful injury causing

serious injury as to Stewart. Iowa Code section 703.1 provides that those who

aid and abet in the commission of a public offense “shall be charged, tried and

punished as principals.” As the district court correctly instructed the jury, aiding

and abetting means to

knowingly approve and agree to the commission of a crime, either by active participation in it or by knowingly advising or encouraging the act in some way before or when it is committed. Conduct follow- ing the crime may be considered only as it may tend to prove the

1In his sufficiency of the evidence argument, Cook also makes unexplained references to

the weight of the evidence standard and the standard for granting a new trial. However, such references were not connected to any argument, so we analyze the issue presented under the sufficiency of the evidence standard. See State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 166 n.14 (Iowa 2015) (indicating a “passing reference” in a brief is insufficient to raise the issue on appeal); State v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649, 650 n.1 (Iowa 2010) (citing Baker v. City of Iowa City, 750 N.W.2d 93, 102–03 (Iowa 2008)) (“Moreover, passing reference to an issue, unsupported by authority or argument, is insufficient to raise the issue on appeal.”). 7

defendant’s earlier participation. Mere nearness to, or presence at, the scene of the crime, without more evidence, is not “aiding and abetting.” Likewise, mere knowledge of the crime is not enough to prove “aiding and abetting.” State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 256–57 (Iowa 2022). To convict a defendant on the theory of aiding and abetting when intent is

an element of a crime charged, the evidence must show that the defendant par-

ticipated “with either the requisite intent, or with knowledge the principal pos-

sesses the required intent.” State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 574 (Iowa 2000)

(en banc). Because intent is not often susceptible to proof by direct evidence, “[a]iding and abetting may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence,” and

both are equally probative. State v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 517 (Iowa 2022)

(quoting State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 491 (Iowa 2017)); see also State v.

Lewis, 514 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Iowa 1994).

On our review of the record, we hold a reasonable jury could have found

beyond a reasonable doubt that Cook actively participated in or encouraged the

willful injury against Stewart with the requisite intent or with knowledge Bibby

possessed the requisite intent. The evidence shows that Cook was with Bibby in

a vehicle transporting two guns. The three men approached the Garretts’ home

together. Bibby had on a black paintball-style mask and was brandishing a rifle. Cook was holding a knife. Cook forcefully removed the cell phone out of Stewart’s

hand. It is irrelevant that the evidence is unclear about who yelled “Shoot him!”

See State v. Browne, 494 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Iowa 1992) (“Once Black had an-

nounced his intention to shoot Dewey Lamp, it may fairly be inferred that the

actions of those gang members accompanying him to the Lamp residence were

actions encouraging the intended criminal act.”). Further, Cook continued into

the home with Bibby while Bibby committed additional crimes, and then fled

with Bibby after the fact. 8

There were numerous times before Stewart was injured that Cook could

have stopped participating. Instead, he actively participated in the altercation by

approaching Stewart outside the home and forcefully knocking the cell phone

out of Stewart’s hands. See State v. Jefferson, 574 N.W.2d 268, 277–78 (Iowa

1997) (indicating the appellant’s failure to leave, intervene, or protest after seeing

another man pull out a gun, demand money, and force the victim toward a

backroom was evidence that the appellant could reasonably be found guilty of

robbery as an aider and abettor).

Furthermore, Cook asserts it was unforeseeable that Stewart would knock

him to the ground and then punch Bibby prior to the robbery and burglary. We

disagree. The men were wearing dark clothing and were masked. Bibby was

brandishing a rifle and Cook was carrying a knife. The fact that Bibby and Cook

brought weapons to the scene indicates there was some expectation the weapons

may need to be used in furtherance of the crime. Moreover, threatening words

were uttered by the same group of people holding weapons. Given these circum-

stances, Cook could have foreseen that the target of his conduct would respond

with physical force.

While the evidence may be circumstantial, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the State, it was sufficient to prove Cook aided and abetted Bibby with the specific intent to cause willful injury or with knowledge of Bibby’s intent

to cause willful injury. See State v. Ortiz, 789 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Iowa 2010) (stat-

ing that by wielding and waving a box cutter or utility knife in front of the victim,

the defendant used the instrument with an intent to inflict serious injury); State

v. Hickman, 623 N.W.2d 847, 849–50 (Iowa 2001) (en banc) (stating that the

defendant’s use of a gun was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for will-

ful injury causing serious injury); State v. Welborn, 443 N.W.2d 72, 73 (Iowa Ct. 9

App. 1989) (stating the defendant’s active participation in the crime was suffi-

cient to establish the aider and abettor’s awareness of the principal’s “intent to

seriously injure the victim”). Accordingly, we affirm his conviction for willful in-

jury causing serious injury.

B. Merger. Cook challenges the district court’s failure to merge his willful

injury causing serious injury conviction with his first-degree robbery conviction.

Under Iowa Code section 701.9, “[n]o person shall be convicted of a public offense

which is necessarily included in another public offense of which the person is

convicted.” This statute codifies the double jeopardy protection against multiple

punishments for the same offense. State v. Daniels, 588 N.W.2d 682, 683–84

(Iowa 1998). “[I]n deciding whether a punishment is constitutionally permissible

under the Double Jeopardy Clause, we look to what punishment the legislature

intended to impose.” State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339, 344 (Iowa 1995) (cit-

ing State v. Finnel, 515 N.W.2d 41, 43 (Iowa 1994)). In determining legislative

intent, “we first decide whether the crimes meet the legal-elements test for lesser

included offenses. If they do, we then study whether the legislature intended

multiple punishments for both offenses.” Id. (citations omitted) (citing Lewis, 514

N.W.2d at 69).

1. The legal-elements test. The legal-elements test compares “the elements of the two offenses to determine whether it is possible to commit the greater

offense without also committing the lesser offense.” Id. If “a statute provides al-

ternative ways of committing the offense, the alternative submitted to the jury

controls.” State v. Anderson, 565 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Iowa 1997) (citing State v.

Steens, 464 N.W.2d 874, 875 (Iowa 1991)).

The elements of Cook’s first-degree robbery charge were marshaled to the

jury as follows: 10

1. On or about the 3rd day of August, 2018, [Cook] had the specific intent to commit theft.

2. To carry out this intention or to assist in escaping from the scene, with or without the stolen property, [Cook]:

a. Committed an assault on another . . . and in committing the assault [Cook] intended to inflict serious injury upon another, caused bodily injury or mental illness to another, used or displayed a dangerous weapon in connection with the assault, caused serious injury to another or

b. Threatened another with, or purposely put another in fear of immediate serious injury.

3. [Cook]:

a. Purposely inflicted or attempted to inflict a serious injury on another or

b. Was armed with a dangerous weapon.

The elements of Cook’s willful injury causing serious injury charge were

marshaled to the jury as follows:

1. On or about the 3rd day of August, 2018, [Cook] committed an assault against Colt Stewart.

2. [Cook] specifically intended to cause serious injury to Colt Stewart.

3. [Cook’s] acts caused a bodily injury to Colt Stewart . . . .

When comparing the instructions provided to the jury, Cook’s convictions

do not satisfy the legal-elements test. The instruction provided for first-degree

robbery presented two alternatives: that the defendant (1) purposely inflicted or

attempted to inflict serious injury, or (2) was armed with a dangerous weapon.

The instruction for first-degree robbery also required a specific intent to commit

a theft. The instruction for willful injury causing serious injury requires bodily

injury, which is not an element of first-degree robbery. Thus, there are additional elements of willful injury causing serious injury that are not present in the ele-

ments for first-degree robbery under the dangerous-weapon alternative. 11

This means that one can commit first-degree robbery under the

dangerous-weapon alternative without also committing willful injury causing

serious injury. Therefore, it is possible to commit the greater offense without also

committing the lesser offense. Consequently, the two offenses for which Cook

was convicted are not the same under the legal-elements test. As addressed in

State v. Brown, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2023), also filed today, this conclusion

is not inconsistent with our prior merger cases. Therefore, merger is not required

here because the willful injury conviction requires proof of an additional element

(serious injury) that first-degree robbery conviction does not. See Bloom, 983

N.W.2d at 51 (citing State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52, 57 (Iowa 1992)).

Therefore, under the legal-elements test, the crimes do not merge.

2. Whether the legislature intended multiple punishments. The second step

in the analysis is to consider whether the legislature intended multiple

punishments for first-degree robbery and willful injury causing serious injury.

See Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d at 344. We did so in Brown, ___ N.W.2d at ___. Upon

consideration of the issue and for the reasons set forth in Brown, we find that

the legislature did intend multiple punishments, and hold that Cook’s conviction

for first-degree robbery and willful injury causing serious injury do not merge.

Accordingly, we uphold the sentences imposed by the district court for the conviction of first-degree robbery and willful injury causing serious injury.

IV. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court of appeals decision and the

judgment of the district court.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.