IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 23–0055
Submitted March 20, 2024—Filed April 19, 2024
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
CLAYTON CURTIS BROWN,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Derek Johnson
(trial) and John R. Flynn (sentencing), Judges.
The State seeks further review of a court of appeals decision reversing the
defendant’s convictions for possession of a firearm as a felon and aggravated
eluding. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN
PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices
joined. Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant Ap-
pellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee. 2
CHRISTENSEN, Justice. As the saying goes, “You can run, but you can’t hide.” That was certainly
the case for this defendant, as he eluded a police officer’s attempt to initiate a
routine traffic stop by running a stop sign, speeding, and swerving through park-
ing lots, only for the police officer to locate that same car abandoned on a side
street about forty minutes later. The police officer obtained a warrant to search
the car and subsequently discovered a loaded handgun under the driver’s seat
and ammunition in the center console and under the front passenger seat. A jury
ultimately convicted the defendant of possession of a firearm as a felon, aggra-
vated eluding, and driving while barred.
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the defendant’s convictions for
possession of a firearm as a felon and aggravated eluding, concluding there was
insufficient evidence to show the defendant knowingly possessed the handgun.
We disagree and hold that the State’s evidence—and all reasonable inferences
from that evidence—was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the de-
fendant had constructive possession of the firearm. Therefore, we vacate the por-
tion of the court of appeals decision reversing those convictions and affirm the
district court judgment in full. I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On September 29, 2021, Officer Joseph Slight observed a man driving a
car without wearing a seat belt while he was on routine patrol in Boone at around
12:20 p.m. Officer Slight turned on his emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop,
but the driver did not stop. Upon seeing the driver turn into an alleyway, Officer
Slight turned on his sirens and continued to pursue the car. During the pursuit,
he also maintained contact with dispatch, describing his belief that he was fol-
lowing C.H., a wanted person. The driver made a series of turns through parking lots and streets to escape, ran a stop sign, and accelerated his speed far beyond 3
the speed limit, prompting Officer Slight to stop his pursuit because he had a
passenger with him.
Officer Slight located the car forty minutes later, parked, unlocked, and
abandoned with valuable belongings inside. He ran the car’s information through
dispatch to discover that it had not been reported stolen. Officer Slight had the
car seized and retrieved a search warrant for the car. This search uncovered
personal items belonging to Clayton Brown, including a wallet in the cupholder
that held Brown’s debit card and a belt slung over the front passenger seat with
Brown’s name handwritten on it. Additionally, Officer Slight found a loaded
handgun under the driver’s seat with ammunition in the center console and un-
der the front passenger seat. He also retrieved a cell phone with cash inside the
phone case.
At some point, Officer Slight used Brown’s name to look up his driver’s
license photo and recognized Brown—not C.H.—as the car’s driver during the
pursuit. He also learned that Brown’s girlfriend was the car’s owner. Conse-
quently, the State charged Brown with possession of a firearm as a felon under
Iowa Code section 724.26(1) (2021), a class “D” felony; aggravated eluding under
Iowa Code section 321.279(3), a class “D” felony; and driving while barred under Iowa Code sections 321.560 and 321.561, an aggravated misdemeanor.
The case proceeded to a jury trial on September 20, 2022. Prior to trial,
the parties stipulated the following: “1. On September 29, 2021, the defendant’s
driver’s license was barred as a habitual offender. 2. On September 29, 2021,
the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony.” The district court read
this stipulation to the jury before the State called its only witness, Officer Slight.
During Officer Slight’s testimony, the prosecutor asked him why the gun
in the car was “important or relevant to you through the course of this.” Officer Slight responded, “Because there was convictions on his record that he should 4
not --,” to which defense counsel interrupted, “Objection, Judge. Move to strike.”
The district court sustained the objection, and the prosecutor rephrased the
question, asking Officer Slight, “From your check, did you learn that he had at
least a prior felony?” Officer Slight answered, “Yes.”
This prompted defense counsel to ask the district court to discuss the
matter outside the jury’s presence, where Brown moved for a mistrial. Brown
argued that Officer Slight’s mention of “convictions” resulted in “every juror
know[ing] [Brown] has a greater criminal record than what we agreed to or what
they should know about.” The district court denied Brown’s motion, explaining,
“[Brown] stipulated to basically two convictions. I don’t believe the evidence was
two felony convictions. I don’t believe the witness testified to multiple felony con-
victions. I think he just said ‘convictions’ plural.” The district court offered to
provide a curative instruction for the jury, but Brown indicated that was unnec-
essary.
After Officer Slight completed his testimony, Brown rested without pre-
senting any evidence on defense. The jury found Brown guilty as charged on all
three counts, and the district court sentenced Brown to indeterminate terms of
incarceration for five years on each of the class “D” felony counts and two years on the aggravated misdemeanor. The district court ordered Brown to serve these
sentences concurrently to each other but consecutively to his sentences in two
other cases.
Brown appealed, and we transferred his case to the court of appeals. The
court of appeals affirmed Brown’s conviction for driving while barred, but it re-
versed his other convictions upon concluding there was insufficient evidence
that Brown knowingly possessed a firearm. We granted the State’s application
for further review. 5
II. Analysis.
Brown raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends the district court
should have granted his motion for mistrial based on Officer Slight’s testimony
that Brown had “convictions on his record.” Second, Brown maintains there was
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he was driving the car that
eluded Officer Slight. Finally, even if the evidence was sufficient to show that
Brown was driving, he claims there was insufficient evidence that he knowingly
possessed the firearm that was located underneath the driver’s seat of the car.
A. Brown’s Motion for Mistrial. Brown asserts that the district court
should have granted his motion for mistrial based on Officer Slight’s testimony
that Brown had “convictions on his record” because this testimony exceeded the
information about Brown’s criminal history that was in the stipulation.1 “[W]e
review Brown’s challenge to the district court’s denial of a mistrial for an abuse
of discretion.” State v. Brown, 996 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Iowa 2023). In doing so, we
give district courts “considerable discretion in ruling upon motions for mistrial,
since they are present throughout the trial and are in a better position than the
reviewing court to gauge the effect of the matter in question on the jury.” State v.
Jirak, 491 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). Accordingly, we ordinarily only
1Brown’s mistrial argument also raises evidentiary issues, characterizing Officer Slight’s
testimony as “either irrelevant or substantially more prejudicial than probative.” Further, he contends Officer Slight’s testimony violated the prohibition on bad acts evidence under our rules of evidence. Brown never raised these evidentiary objections with the district court when he moved for a mistrial, nor did he reference any of these rules or arguments in objecting to Officer Slight’s testimony. He simply objected to the testimony without any explanation, and the district court sustained it. Therefore, we decline to address these arguments for the first time on appeal. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appel- late review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”); see also State v. Trane, 984 N.W.2d 429, 434–35 (Iowa 2023) (hold- ing that the defendant waived his evidentiary concerns on appeal by failing to raise a proper specific objection before the district court). 6
find an abuse of discretion upon the denial of a mistrial “where there is no sup-
port in the record for the trial court’s determination.” Id. That is not the case
here.
We agree with the district court that Brown “stipulated to basically two
convictions” when he stipulated that: (1) he was a felon, and (2) his driving priv-
ileges had been barred for being a habitual offender. Brown’s characterization of
his barred driver’s license as a habitual offender as merely a “refer[ence] to his
licensing status” instead of a criminal conviction is a distinction without a dif-
ference. That he was barred for being a habitual offender necessarily implies re-
peated convictions. Iowa Code section 321.555’s definition of “habitual offender”
further supports this conclusion by defining the term as “any person who has
accumulated convictions for separate and distinct offenses described in subsec-
tion 1, 2, or 3, committed after July 1, 1974, for which final convictions have
been rendered.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, Officer Slight’s isolated statement that Brown had “convictions” was
cumulative to evidence already before the jury. Moreover, the district court acted
quickly to sustain Brown’s objection to this testimony. And it offered to provide
the jury with a remedial instruction on the matter, but Brown informed the dis- trict court that such an instruction was unnecessary. See, e.g., State v. Brown,
397 N.W.2d 689, 699 (Iowa 1986) (en banc) (“Generally, trial court’s quick action
in striking the improper response and cautioning the jury to disregard it, cou-
pled, when necessary, with some type of general cautionary instruction, will pre-
vent any prejudice. A defendant who asserts these actions were insufficient bears
the heavy burden of demonstrating a clear abuse of discretion on the part of [the]
trial court.”). Accordingly, nothing leads us to believe that the district court
abused its discretion in denying Brown’s motion for a mistrial. 7
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Brown contests the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his convictions, arguing that the State failed to prove his
identity as the driver of the car that eluded Officer Slight. Alternatively, even if
the State presented sufficient evidence to show that he was the driver, Brown
maintains there was insufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed the fire-
arm that Officer Slight found tucked underneath the driver’s seat in the car. We
review these challenges “for the correction of errors at law, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the State.” Brown, 996 N.W.2d at 695–96. This
includes making “legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and
reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.” State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50,
54 (Iowa 2021) (quoting State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017)). There
is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict “when the evidence ‘would
convince a rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 2018)).
1. Evidence of Brown’s identity as the driver. Brown asserts that the State
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the driver who eluded
Officer Slight, noting Officer Slight was behind the vehicle during the entire pur-
suit “and never close enough to see the driver’s face well enough to make a pos- itive identification.” Brown also cites Officer Slight’s acknowledgment that he
originally believed a different person was driving. But Officer Slight explained
during cross-examination why he initially believed the driver was a different per-
son, in addition to how he identified Brown as the actual driver.
And contrary to Brown’s claim, Officer Slight was not always directly be-
hind the car, as the car was on a road perpendicular to the one Officer Slight
was on when the driver first turned in front of Officer Slight. Additionally, Officer
Slight still had the ability to see the driver’s face through the car’s rear and side 8
view mirrors when he was following it, which occurred in the daylight. This evi-
dence, combined with Officer Slight’s in-court identification of Brown as the
same person he saw driving, his testimony that he found Brown’s personal items
in the vehicle about forty minutes after the chase, and the fact that Brown’s
girlfriend owned the car all support Officer Slight’s identification of Brown as the
driver.
“[I]t is not within the province of our court ‘to resolve conflicts in the evi-
dence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of
explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters are for the jury.’ ” State v.
Slaughter, 3 N.W.3d 540, 550 (Iowa 2024) (quoting State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d
247, 256 (Iowa 2022)). The jury found Officer Slight’s testimony credible and his
explanations plausible. Especially viewing the evidence in the light most favora-
ble to the State, which we do in challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence,
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that Brown was
driving the car when it eluded Officer Slight. See Brown, 996 N.W.2d at 695–96.
2. Evidence that Brown knowingly possessed a firearm. Brown insists that
the State failed to prove that he knowingly possessed the handgun Officer Slight
located in the car to support Brown’s convictions for possession of a firearm as a felon and aggravated eluding. “Possession may be actual or constructive,” and
the State relied on the theory that Brown had constructive possession of the
firearm. State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Iowa 2021). “Constructive posses-
sion may be proved by inferences” and “turns on the peculiar facts of each case.”
State v. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 693, 705 (Iowa 2016) (quoting State v. Webb, 648
N.W.2d 72, 79 (Iowa 2002)). It “occurs when the defendant has knowledge of the
presence of the [firearm] and has the authority or right to maintain control of it,”
and the district court instructed the jury accordingly. State v. Carter, 696 N.W.2d 31, 38–39 (Iowa 2005) (quoting State v. Bash, 670 N.W.2d 135, 138 (Iowa 2003)); 9
see also Reed, 875 N.W.2d at 705 (“Although the doctrine of constructive pos-
session evolved in drug-possession cases, we apply the same principles in fire-
arm cases.”).
Specifically, the jury instruction explained,
A person who, although not in actual possession, has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or con- trol over a thing, either directly or through another person or per- sons, is in constructive possession of it. A person’s mere presence at a place where a thing is found or proximity to the thing is not enough to support a conclusion that the person possessed the thing.
Moreover, the instruction defined “[d]ominion and control” as “ownership or right
to the firearm and the power or authority to manage, regulate or oversee its use.”
Thus, the State had to prove that Brown had the power and intention to exercise
authority over the firearm’s use.
“Constructive possession is recognized by inferences,” and we have iden-
tified nonexclusive factors to consider in making this determination. State v.
Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 193–94 (Iowa 2008); see also Reed, 875 N.W.2d at
706. Those factors include:
(1) incriminating statements made by a person; (2) incriminating ac- tions of the person upon the police’s discovery of a [firearm] among or near the person’s personal belongings; (3) the person’s finger- prints on the packages containing the [firearm]; and (4) any other circumstances linking the person to the [firearm].
Reed, 875 N.W.2d at 706 (quoting State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 161 (Iowa
2013)). And when the “premises” where the contraband is located is a motor
vehicle, we have explained,
a court may consider these additional factors: (1) was the [firearm] in plain view, (2) was it with the accused’s personal effects, (3) was it found on the same side of the car seat as the accused or immedi- ately next to him, (4) was the accused the owner of the vehicle, and (5) was there suspicious activity by the accused.
Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 39. 10
True, some of these factors weigh in Brown’s favor. For instance, there was
no evidence of incriminating statements or fingerprints connecting Brown to the
firearm or the ammunition discovered in the car. See Reed, 875 N.W.2d at 706.
Likewise, Brown was not the car’s registered owner, nor was he in the car when
Officer Slight discovered the firearm. See id.; see also Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 39.
Yet, there was ample evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Brown
had constructive possession of the firearm beyond a reasonable doubt—espe-
cially viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State. See Brown,
996 N.W.2d at 695–96. Much of that evidence is comparable to the evidence
supporting the constructive possession of a controlled substance in State v. Max-
well. See 743 N.W.2d 185. That case also involved a police officer’s pursuit of a
defendant after the officer observed the defendant drive out of a parking lot with-
out a seat belt on and attempted to initiate a traffic stop. Id. at 188–89. Like
Brown, the defendant continued driving and eventually parked and walked away
from his vehicle. Id. at 189. When the officer searched the vehicle soon thereafter,
he discovered a plastic baggie protruding from a cigarette pack between the two
front seats that contained cocaine, leading to the defendant’s conviction for pos-
session of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Id. In affirming the verdict based on a theory of constructive possession, we
noted many similar factors to the evidence in Brown’s case. See id. at 194. For
example, we explained that the defendant was the only person in the vehicle from
the time the officer saw the vehicle pull out of a parking lot until the officer ap-
prehended him. Id. Here, the jury could equally infer that Brown was the most
recent driver of the car—and the sole person in the car—throughout the pursuit
and in the brief period between the pursuit and police seizure. We have previ-
ously held that “[t]his circumstance is relevant to the constructive possession analysis, even if it does not amount to exclusive possession entitling the State to 11
the inference discussed.” State v. Dewitt, 811 N.W.2d 460, 475–76 (Iowa 2012).
Brown’s “frequent and recent use of the car remains pertinent, though not dis-
positive,” even though he did not own the car. Id. at 476. Likewise, evidence
linked Brown to the car as the owner’s boyfriend.
Additional evidence supporting the verdict in Maxwell was that the officer
found the drugs immediately next to where the defendant had been sitting, as
they were lodged between his seat and the front passenger seat. 743 N.W.2d at
194. Here, too, the jury could reasonably infer Brown’s knowledge of the firearm’s
presence in the car and his dominion and control over it based on the location
of the firearm directly under the seat where Brown had recently been sitting to
drive. As Officer Slight testified, the firearm was “tucked back a little bit, but just
close enough [for the driver] to be able to grab.” See Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 39
(stating one factor supporting constructive possession is whether the item was
found where the accused was sitting).
Moreover, the presence of Brown’s personal effects strewn about in the car
next to the ammunition supports the State’s theory of constructive possession.
Officer Slight found ammunition under the front passenger seat, which had
Brown’s belt with his handwritten name slung over it. And Brown’s wallet con- taining his debit card was in the cupholder next to the center console compart-
ment in which Officer Slight similarly discovered ammunition for the firearm.
See id. (noting one factor supporting constructive possession is whether the item
was found with the accused’s personal effects); see also Reed, 875 N.W.2d at 706
(explaining one factor to consider in determining constructive possession is any
circumstances linking the person to the item).
And although it is not as compelling given Brown had additional reasons
to flee because he was driving while barred, both the defendant in Maxwell and Brown made the decision to flee when the police attempted to initiate a traffic 12
stop. See 743 N.W.2d at 194. Brown’s suspicious decision to flee is also similar
to the situation in State v. Thomas. See 847 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa 2014). There, po-
lice entered an apartment with six people inside, but only the defendant ran into
a bedroom upon their arrival, attempted to hold the door shut, and gave a false
name. Id. at 440–42. The police subsequently found drugs where the defendant
had been holding the door, and we affirmed the defendant’s conviction for pos-
session based on a theory of constructive possession. Id. at 439, 447. In doing
so, we reasoned, “The defendant was the person who had been most recently in
the spot where the drugs were found, his conduct prior to his arrest was highly
suspicious and makes sense only if his goal was to get the drugs off of his person,
and he offered resistance.” Id. at 444. Much of that logic applies here. The court of appeals disagreed and re- versed Brown’s convictions by hypothesizing that Brown’s decision to elude Of- ficer Slight “could have been related to driving while barred as [a] habitual of- fender—he had reason for a guilty conscience even without knowingly possessing the handgun.” We have said that “the probative value of evidence showing a de- fendant avoided apprehension turns on the circumstances under which the avoidance occurred.” State v. Wilson, 878 N.W.2d 203, 213 (Iowa 2016). Here, the evidence showed the defendant engaged in quite a serious effort to avoid being stopped by Officer Slight. “[T]he State need not discredit every other po- tential theory to be drawn from circumstantial evidence.” Ernst, 954 N.W.2d at 57; see also Jones, 967 N.W.2d at 342 (“Whether the State’s evidence is direct, circumstantial, or some combination of the two, the State is not required to ne- gate any and all rational hypotheses of the defendant’s innocence.”). That is also the case “when a jury makes inferences from the evidence presented at trial.” Ernst, 954 N.W.2d at 57. Further, while the jury was free to reach the same conclusion regarding Brown’s decision to flee as the court of appeals did, “[e]vi- dence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw different conclusions 13
from it; the ultimate question is whether it supports the finding actually made, not whether the evidence would support a different finding.” Jones, 967 N.W.2d at 339 (quoting Brokaw v. Winfield–Mt. Union Cmty. Sch. Dist., 788 N.W.2d 386, 393 (Iowa 2010)); see also Wilson, 878 N.W.2d at 215 (“Once a district court admits such evidence [of flight], it is for the jury to decide whether to credit the inferential chain leading from a particular act of the defendant to guilt for the crime charged.”). As the district court expressed, it was just as logical for the jury to
find that it does not make sense for an individual to commit multiple additional driving offenses such as eluding, stop sign violations, and speeding, in order to avoid being charged with or delay being charged with driving while barred. Based upon the dangerous oper- ation of the motor vehicle in an attempt to get away from law en- forcement, the jury was able to conclude that the Defendant’s flight was done in an effort to prevent detection of the firearm by law en- forcement. The jury was aware that the Defendant’s license was barred, but the jury weighed the evidence and determined that the Defendant committed the offense of eluding because he was know- ingly possessing a firearm as a felon. Furthermore, the jury could conclude that since Defendant was witnessed operating a motor ve- hicle in broad daylight by a police officer that the Defendant likely believed he would be charged with driving while barred, but since the officer was not able to see the gun that the Defendant needed to flee or buy more time to hide the gun.
In summary, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the jury’s verdict is supported by logical inferences drawn from the record rather than impermissible speculation. See Jones, 967 N.W.2d at 342. Consequently, we vacate the portion of the court of appeals decision reversing Brown’s convictions for possession of a firearm as a felon and aggravated eluding and affirm the judgment of the district court. III. Conclusion. We affirm all three of Brown’s convictions. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; DIS- TRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.