IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0570 Filed March 3, 2021
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER RYAN NICHOLS, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Patrick W.
Greenwood, Judge.
Christopher Nichols appeals his prison sentence. AFFIRMED.
Scott M. Wadding of Sease & Wadding, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by May, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ. 2
MAY, Presiding Judge.
Christopher Nichols appeals his prison sentence. Nichols claims his
sentence should be vacated because victim impact statements “introduced
unproven, unrelated, and prejudicial information for the sentencing court’s
consideration.” We affirm.
The State charged Nichols with (1) delivery or possession with intent to
deliver methamphetamine to a person under eighteen years old, a class “B” felony;
and (2) sexual abuse in the third degree, a class “C” felony. Nichols and the State
reached an agreement that (1) Nichols would plead guilty to sexual abuse in the
third degree; (2) the State would dismiss the methamphetamine charge; and
(3) the parties would jointly recommend a ten-year prison term.
At the plea hearing, Nichols admitted he committed the offense of sexual
abuse in the third degree by inappropriately touching a victim who was fifteen years
old when Nichols was four or more years older. The court accepted Nichols’s plea
and proceeded directly to sentencing.1 The State presented verbal victim impact
statements from the victim’s mother, the victim, and the victim’s grandfather.2 The
victim’s mother and grandfather described (1) Nichols’s abuse of the victim and
also (2) alleged abuse by Nichols of the victim’s mother. The victim’s mother also
alleged Nichols abused her son. Nichols raised no objection to these statements.
1 Nichols waived his right to delayed sentencing, his right to the use of a presentence investigation report for purposes of sentencing, and his right to file a motion in arrest of judgment. 2 Prior to the hearing, a written statement by the victim’s mother was also filed with
the court. A note from the victim’s therapist was attached to the mother’s statement. 3
The district court sentenced Nichols to prison. In this appeal, Nichols asks
us to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.3
“A sentencing court’s decision to impose a specific sentence that falls within
the statutory limits ‘is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only
be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate
matters.’” State v. Boldon, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2021 WL 297435, at *8 (Iowa
2021) (quoting State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002)). “We afford
sentencing judges a significant amount of latitude because of the ‘discretionary
nature of judging and the source of the respect afforded by the appellate process.’”
Id. (quoting Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725).
Even so, “[a] remand for resentencing is appropriate if the record contains
‘clear evidence’ that the sentencing court relied on unproven or unprosecuted
offenses.” State v. Olson, No. 19-1960, 2020 WL 5650580, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.
Sept. 23, 2020) (quoting State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 762–64 (Iowa 1998)).
“Even if a victim impact statement discloses unproven offenses, ‘there must be an
affirmative showing the court relied on . . . improper evidence.’” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 762). “We look at the court’s reasons for
imposing the sentence to determine whether any of them pertain to the
impermissible statements.” Id. (citing Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 763).
Nichols claims the mother and grandfather’s victim impact statements
introduced inappropriate matters, namely, alleged wrongs against the victim’s
3Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2020) prohibits direct appeals from guilty pleas unless the defendant appeals from a class “A” felony or has “good cause.” Because Nichols only appeals his sentence, he has good cause and we may consider his direct appeal. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020). 4
mother and brother. And Nichols contends that, because the court acknowledged
listening to those statements,4 the court considered inappropriate matters when
determining his sentence.
We begin by noting Iowa Code section 915.21(1) expressly authorizes
victims to “present a victim impact statement to the court.” And section 901.5
expressly requires sentencing courts to “receiv[e] and examin[e] . . . victim impact
statements.” So we do not fault the district court for acknowledging it listened to
the mother and grandfather’s statements. Cf. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 763 (noting
court was “unable to discern any reliance on improper factors which would
overcome the presumption that the district court properly exercised its discretion”
from district court’s statement that it had “considered the amount of the financial
loss to the victim of this offense” and further noting this “statement appears to
merely list sentencing factors which must be considered pursuant to”
section 901.5).
As noted, though, remand would be appropriate if the record “affirmative[ly]
show[ed]” through “clear evidence” that the sentencing court had relied on
unproven offenses described in the victim impact statements. See Olson, 2020
WL 5650580, at *4 (quoting Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 762–64). But it does not. When
explaining the reasons for its sentence, the court said it had considered (1) “the
impact of his offense on the victims,” (2) “the nature of the offense that Mr. Nichols
4 According to the transcript, the court said: “I’ve listened to the victim impact statement made those [sic], and I have reviewed those that are on file in this case. And specifically that filing was made February 29th of this year and includes [the victim’s mother’s] handwritten statement as well as the attached document from the [victim’s] therapist.” 5
committed,” (3) “the fact that the offense had considerable impact on the victim,”
(4) “the crime Mr. Nichols committed,” (5) “the impact that it had on the victims of
the offense,” (6) “the fact [Mr. Nichols] doesn’t appear [a] slight[] bit remorseful
about the offense,” and (7) the fact “probation would, of course, unduly depreciate
the seriousness of the offense.” (Emphasis added.) Seven times the court used
the singular to show that its focus was on the offense to which Nichols pled guilty.
And although the court also mentioned other proper considerations such as
Nichols’s age and employment, the court never mentioned the other wrongs
alleged in the mother and grandfather’s statements. This suggests the court
properly exercised its duty to “filter out” those improper considerations. See Sailer,
587 N.W.2d at 764 (noting that, although allowing victim impact statements “may
at times result in the airing of allegations which are unproven, we trust that our
district courts, when weighing such statements as part of the sentencing
determination, will filter out improper or irrelevant evidence” and further noting
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0570 Filed March 3, 2021
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER RYAN NICHOLS, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Patrick W.
Greenwood, Judge.
Christopher Nichols appeals his prison sentence. AFFIRMED.
Scott M. Wadding of Sease & Wadding, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by May, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ. 2
MAY, Presiding Judge.
Christopher Nichols appeals his prison sentence. Nichols claims his
sentence should be vacated because victim impact statements “introduced
unproven, unrelated, and prejudicial information for the sentencing court’s
consideration.” We affirm.
The State charged Nichols with (1) delivery or possession with intent to
deliver methamphetamine to a person under eighteen years old, a class “B” felony;
and (2) sexual abuse in the third degree, a class “C” felony. Nichols and the State
reached an agreement that (1) Nichols would plead guilty to sexual abuse in the
third degree; (2) the State would dismiss the methamphetamine charge; and
(3) the parties would jointly recommend a ten-year prison term.
At the plea hearing, Nichols admitted he committed the offense of sexual
abuse in the third degree by inappropriately touching a victim who was fifteen years
old when Nichols was four or more years older. The court accepted Nichols’s plea
and proceeded directly to sentencing.1 The State presented verbal victim impact
statements from the victim’s mother, the victim, and the victim’s grandfather.2 The
victim’s mother and grandfather described (1) Nichols’s abuse of the victim and
also (2) alleged abuse by Nichols of the victim’s mother. The victim’s mother also
alleged Nichols abused her son. Nichols raised no objection to these statements.
1 Nichols waived his right to delayed sentencing, his right to the use of a presentence investigation report for purposes of sentencing, and his right to file a motion in arrest of judgment. 2 Prior to the hearing, a written statement by the victim’s mother was also filed with
the court. A note from the victim’s therapist was attached to the mother’s statement. 3
The district court sentenced Nichols to prison. In this appeal, Nichols asks
us to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.3
“A sentencing court’s decision to impose a specific sentence that falls within
the statutory limits ‘is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only
be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate
matters.’” State v. Boldon, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2021 WL 297435, at *8 (Iowa
2021) (quoting State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002)). “We afford
sentencing judges a significant amount of latitude because of the ‘discretionary
nature of judging and the source of the respect afforded by the appellate process.’”
Id. (quoting Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725).
Even so, “[a] remand for resentencing is appropriate if the record contains
‘clear evidence’ that the sentencing court relied on unproven or unprosecuted
offenses.” State v. Olson, No. 19-1960, 2020 WL 5650580, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.
Sept. 23, 2020) (quoting State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 762–64 (Iowa 1998)).
“Even if a victim impact statement discloses unproven offenses, ‘there must be an
affirmative showing the court relied on . . . improper evidence.’” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 762). “We look at the court’s reasons for
imposing the sentence to determine whether any of them pertain to the
impermissible statements.” Id. (citing Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 763).
Nichols claims the mother and grandfather’s victim impact statements
introduced inappropriate matters, namely, alleged wrongs against the victim’s
3Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2020) prohibits direct appeals from guilty pleas unless the defendant appeals from a class “A” felony or has “good cause.” Because Nichols only appeals his sentence, he has good cause and we may consider his direct appeal. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020). 4
mother and brother. And Nichols contends that, because the court acknowledged
listening to those statements,4 the court considered inappropriate matters when
determining his sentence.
We begin by noting Iowa Code section 915.21(1) expressly authorizes
victims to “present a victim impact statement to the court.” And section 901.5
expressly requires sentencing courts to “receiv[e] and examin[e] . . . victim impact
statements.” So we do not fault the district court for acknowledging it listened to
the mother and grandfather’s statements. Cf. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 763 (noting
court was “unable to discern any reliance on improper factors which would
overcome the presumption that the district court properly exercised its discretion”
from district court’s statement that it had “considered the amount of the financial
loss to the victim of this offense” and further noting this “statement appears to
merely list sentencing factors which must be considered pursuant to”
section 901.5).
As noted, though, remand would be appropriate if the record “affirmative[ly]
show[ed]” through “clear evidence” that the sentencing court had relied on
unproven offenses described in the victim impact statements. See Olson, 2020
WL 5650580, at *4 (quoting Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 762–64). But it does not. When
explaining the reasons for its sentence, the court said it had considered (1) “the
impact of his offense on the victims,” (2) “the nature of the offense that Mr. Nichols
4 According to the transcript, the court said: “I’ve listened to the victim impact statement made those [sic], and I have reviewed those that are on file in this case. And specifically that filing was made February 29th of this year and includes [the victim’s mother’s] handwritten statement as well as the attached document from the [victim’s] therapist.” 5
committed,” (3) “the fact that the offense had considerable impact on the victim,”
(4) “the crime Mr. Nichols committed,” (5) “the impact that it had on the victims of
the offense,” (6) “the fact [Mr. Nichols] doesn’t appear [a] slight[] bit remorseful
about the offense,” and (7) the fact “probation would, of course, unduly depreciate
the seriousness of the offense.” (Emphasis added.) Seven times the court used
the singular to show that its focus was on the offense to which Nichols pled guilty.
And although the court also mentioned other proper considerations such as
Nichols’s age and employment, the court never mentioned the other wrongs
alleged in the mother and grandfather’s statements. This suggests the court
properly exercised its duty to “filter out” those improper considerations. See Sailer,
587 N.W.2d at 764 (noting that, although allowing victim impact statements “may
at times result in the airing of allegations which are unproven, we trust that our
district courts, when weighing such statements as part of the sentencing
determination, will filter out improper or irrelevant evidence” and further noting
“[w]ithout any clear evidence to the contrary, we assume the district court did so in
the case at bar”).
Even so, Nichols suggests resentencing is required by State v. Matheson,
684 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 2004), and State v. Hintze, No. 18-1418, 2019 WL
1056082 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2019). We disagree. In Matheson, the district
court overruled a defendant’s objections to victim impact statements that contained
impermissible information. 684 N.W.2d at 244–45. By overruling the objection,
the district court implied it could consider the impermissible information when
making the sentencing determination. But that did not happen here. For one thing,
because Nichols did not object to the victim statements, the court ruled on no 6
objections. Nor did the court otherwise suggest it relied on unproven offenses
described in the statements. So we think Matheson is distinguishable.
Hintze is also distinguishable. There, the district court made conflicting
statements as to whether it was considering unproven allegations. Hintze, 2019
WL 1056082, at *2 (“The mother’s statement introduced facts not otherwise in the
record and included serious allegations against Hintze that mirrored Hintze’s prior
offenses. The court stated it was not taking the mother’s statement into
consideration for sentencing purposes, then cited the minutes of testimony where
a police report noted M.G. making the same allegations.”). But here, there was no
conflict. The district court consistently focused on the single offense to which
Nichols pled. The court gave no reason to believe it was relying on other offenses.
The record does not show the district court relied on improper sentencing
considerations. So we affirm.
AFFIRMED.