State of Iowa v. Christopher Joseph Hidlebaugh

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: January 23, 2025
• Docket: 23-2016
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-2016 Filed January 23, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH HIDLEBAUGH, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Michael Jacobsen,

Judge.

A defendant attempts to appeal a sentence imposed following the

defendant’s guilty plea. APPEAL DISMISSED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ashley Stewart (until

withdrawal) and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ. 2

AHLERS, Judge.

Christopher Hidlebaugh entered a guilty plea to the offense of sex offender

registry violation, second offense, as a habitual offender. The plea agreement

required the State to recommend a suspended sentence with probation if

Hidlebaugh provided proof that he had purchased a home by taking out a home

loan with a mortgage or by entering a real estate contract for purchase of a home

by the time of sentencing. If not, the State would recommend prison. Hidlebaugh

agreed to be bound by the applicable sentencing recommendation. The court was

not bound by the joint sentencing recommendation. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(3).

When the sentencing hearing was held approximately six months later,

Hidlebaugh had not purchased a home. Consistent with the plea agreement, the

State recommended imposition of a fifteen-year prison sentence, with a minimum

of three years. Hidlebaugh’s counsel confirmed that the plea agreement called for

the defense to join in the State’s recommendation. After Hidlebaugh gave his

statement in mitigation of punishment, the district court imposed the agreed-upon

sentence.

Hidlebaugh appeals this sentence. He contends the district court

considered an improper factor and violated his constitutional right to equal

protection under the United States and Iowa Constitutions by imposing a prison

term based on his inability to buy a house.

Before we can address the merits of Hidlebaugh’s claim, we must first

determine whether we have jurisdiction. Because Hidlebaugh pleaded guilty to a

crime that is not a class “A” felony, he is required to show good cause before we

have jurisdiction over his appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2023); see also 3

State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103–05 (Iowa 2020) (holding the appellate courts

lack jurisdiction over an appeal following a guilty plea absent a showing of good

cause). Although the State concedes that we have jurisdiction, we are not bound

by the concession. See State v. Hennings, 791 N.W.2d 828, 838 (Iowa 2010)

(concluding the appellate court is not bound by a party’s concession), overruled on

other grounds by State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 275 (Iowa 2016). And we have

the obligation to police our own jurisdiction sua sponte. See Vasquez v. Iowa Dep’t

of Human Serv., 990 N.W.2d 661, 667 (Iowa 2023).

We conclude we do not have jurisdiction over Hidlebaugh’s attempted

appeal. It is true that Hidlebaugh appeals only his sentence, which generally

establishes good cause to appeal following a guilty plea. See Damme, 944 N.W.2d

at 105. However, that general rule only applies when the defendant receives “a

discretionary sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to as part of [the]

plea bargain . . . .” Id. When the defendant receives an agreed-upon sentence,

the defendant fails to establish good cause to appeal even when the appeal is

limited to challenging the sentence. Id.; see also State v. Spencer, No. 23-0844,

2024 WL 3518267, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jul. 24, 2024); State v. Brumley, No. 23-

1693, 2024 WL 2842224, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 5, 2024). Here, Hidlebaugh

received the agreed-upon sentence. We therefore lack jurisdiction over his

attempted appeal and must dismiss it.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Badding, J., concurs; Greer, P.J., concurs specially. 4

GREER, Presiding Judge (specially concurring).

Given the procedural history and our caselaw, I agree that we lack

jurisdiction to decide Christopher Hidlebaugh’s appeal. See State v. Damme, 944

N.W.2d 98, 103–05 (Iowa 2020); but see State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 66

(Iowa 2022) (“If good cause exists to challenge any sentencing error, then we also

have jurisdiction to review other alleged sentencing errors as well. We save for

another day the question of whether good cause exists to solely appeal an agreed

sentence without an accompanying sentencing error outside the scope of the plea

agreement.” (internal citation omitted)).

I write separately to highlight that while a defendant’s indigency (or inability

to find stable housing) in no way immunizes him from punishment, incarcerating a

defendant based solely on his inability to follow through with a financial undertaking

is unconstitutional. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665–70 (1983); State

v. Snyder, 203 N.W.2d 280, 287 (Iowa 1972) (“Distinctions in the administration of

criminal justice between rich and poor are generally not likely to bear up under

constitutional scrutiny. Such economic discrimination falls squarely within the

protection of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”). As to this specific charge, the failure

of an indigent defendant to afford housing should not be the sole reason to

incarcerate, given the authority referenced above. Thus, I encourage district court

judges to carefully scrutinize a plea agreement like the one entered into by

Hidlebaugh and the State.