IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1886 Filed February 5, 2020
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHARLES THOMAS STOPPELMOOR, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clay County, Charles K. Borth,
District Associate Judge.
Charles Stoppelmoor appeals the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence. AFFIRMED.
Matthew G. Sease of Sease & Wadding, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and May and Greer, JJ. 2
GREER, Judge.
After a trial on the minutes of evidence, Charles Stoppelmoor was convicted
of operating while intoxicated, second offense. On appeal, Stoppelmoor
challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, arguing
the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Early in the morning on February 3, 2018,1 while on patrol, Spencer Police
Lieutenant Patrick Westfall observed a 2004 Chevy Silverado pickup truck driving
below the posted speed limit. The lieutenant followed the truck and watched it
drive near, but never cross, the center line and angle toward, but never strike, a
curb. The driver corrected the truck motion with “a slight jerk” and continued on.
Westfall admitted none of these maneuvers warranted a stop.
Eventually, the truck pulled over in front of a house that did not match the
truck’s registered owner. The driver, later identified as Stoppelmoor, turned off the
engine and sat in the truck for a couple of minutes before exiting. He then walked
to the house and climbed the porch stairs to the front door. Stoppelmoor stood at
the front door for about forty-five seconds and did not knock or ring the doorbell.
Finding Stoppelmoor’s behavior odd, Lieutenant Westfall pulled over behind
the truck, without his squad car’s overhead lights on and without blocking in the
truck. He decided to approach Stoppelmoor to assess the situation. Lieutenant
Westfall engaged his body camera audio and video, recording his interaction with
Stoppelmoor from the moment he exited his patrol car. Because it was dark
1 It was around 2:30 a.m. 3
outside, the body camera only revealed what was illuminated by the lieutenant’s
flashlight.
Describing the encounter as a “mutual meeting,” Lieutenant Westfall
approached the house and stood near the base of the porch steps. He greeted
Stoppelmoor and asked if he was lost. He then asked why he was at this house
so late and why he had not knocked on the door or rang the doorbell. The entire
interaction lasts about eighty seconds. The lieutenant shined the flashlight on
Stoppelmoor’s entire body for most of the interaction, but at times he lowered the
flashlight and it only illuminated Stoppelmoor’s legs and the porch. During the
conversation, the occupant of the residence appeared at the door confirming to the
officer her knowledge of Stoppelmoor’s presence at the house.
According to the lieutenant, almost as soon as he began speaking with
Stoppelmoor he observed signs of intoxication including slurred speech, poor
balance, and bloodshot, watery eyes. After observing these signs, he asked
Stoppelmoor to step down and speak with him. Stoppelmoor complied. Once off
the porch, the lieutenant asked Stoppelmoor if he had been drinking. Stoppelmoor
admitted to having “a few beers,” and the lieutenant administered field sobriety
tests. After failing the tests, Stoppelmoor was arrested and charged with operating
while intoxicated, second offense. See Iowa Code § 321J.2 (2018).
Stoppelmoor moved to suppress the evidence obtained after he was
ordered off the porch. The district court denied the motion. Stoppelmoor elected
for a trial on the minutes of evidence, after which the court found him guilty as
charged. Stoppelmoor appeals. 4
II. Standard of Review.
We review alleged constitutional violations de novo. State v. Tague, 676
N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004). “We examine the entire record and ‘make an
independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.’” State v. Brown, 930
N.W.2d 840, 844 (Iowa 2019) (quoting State v. Meyer, 543 N.W.2d 876, 877 (Iowa
1996)). Because of its ability to weigh the credibility of witnesses, we defer to, but
are not bound by, the district court’s factual findings. State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d
371, 377 (Iowa 2007).
III. Analysis.
Stoppelmoor contends the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him,
thus violating his constitutional rights. The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures.2 “Subject to a few carefully drawn
exceptions, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable.” State
v. Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Iowa 2004). “The State has the burden to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement applies.” Id. “If the State does not meet this burden, all evidence
obtained at the stop must be suppressed.” Brown, 930 N.W.2d at 855.
2 U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”); Iowa Const. art. I, § 8 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated . . . .”). Stoppelmoor raises both state and federal constitutional claims, but he does not argue for a separate analysis under the state constitution. For that reason, we will consider his claims together. 5
There are, however, exceptions allowing for a warrantless search and
seizure. “One recognized exception allows an officer to stop an individual or
vehicle for investigatory purposes for a brief detention based only on a reasonable
suspicion that a criminal act has occurred or is occurring.” State v. Baker, 925
N.W.2d 602, 610 (Iowa 2019). “The purpose of an investigatory stop is to allow a
police officer to confirm or dispel suspicions of criminal activity through reasonable
questioning.” Id. (quoting State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002)). “[T]o
justify an investigatory stop, an officer must have reasonable suspicion, backed by
specific and articulable facts, to believe criminal activity is afoot.” Id. at 611.
“Circumstances raising mere suspicion or curiosity are not enough.” Id. (quoting
State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 2000)).
Here the parties agree that Stoppelmoor’s seizure occurred when
Lieutenant Westfall asked him to step off the porch. See, e.g., State v. White, 887
N.W.2d 172, 176 (Iowa 2016) (“[W]e conclude that [the defendant] was seized
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when [the police officer] directed
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1886 Filed February 5, 2020
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHARLES THOMAS STOPPELMOOR, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clay County, Charles K. Borth,
District Associate Judge.
Charles Stoppelmoor appeals the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence. AFFIRMED.
Matthew G. Sease of Sease & Wadding, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and May and Greer, JJ. 2
GREER, Judge.
After a trial on the minutes of evidence, Charles Stoppelmoor was convicted
of operating while intoxicated, second offense. On appeal, Stoppelmoor
challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, arguing
the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Early in the morning on February 3, 2018,1 while on patrol, Spencer Police
Lieutenant Patrick Westfall observed a 2004 Chevy Silverado pickup truck driving
below the posted speed limit. The lieutenant followed the truck and watched it
drive near, but never cross, the center line and angle toward, but never strike, a
curb. The driver corrected the truck motion with “a slight jerk” and continued on.
Westfall admitted none of these maneuvers warranted a stop.
Eventually, the truck pulled over in front of a house that did not match the
truck’s registered owner. The driver, later identified as Stoppelmoor, turned off the
engine and sat in the truck for a couple of minutes before exiting. He then walked
to the house and climbed the porch stairs to the front door. Stoppelmoor stood at
the front door for about forty-five seconds and did not knock or ring the doorbell.
Finding Stoppelmoor’s behavior odd, Lieutenant Westfall pulled over behind
the truck, without his squad car’s overhead lights on and without blocking in the
truck. He decided to approach Stoppelmoor to assess the situation. Lieutenant
Westfall engaged his body camera audio and video, recording his interaction with
Stoppelmoor from the moment he exited his patrol car. Because it was dark
1 It was around 2:30 a.m. 3
outside, the body camera only revealed what was illuminated by the lieutenant’s
flashlight.
Describing the encounter as a “mutual meeting,” Lieutenant Westfall
approached the house and stood near the base of the porch steps. He greeted
Stoppelmoor and asked if he was lost. He then asked why he was at this house
so late and why he had not knocked on the door or rang the doorbell. The entire
interaction lasts about eighty seconds. The lieutenant shined the flashlight on
Stoppelmoor’s entire body for most of the interaction, but at times he lowered the
flashlight and it only illuminated Stoppelmoor’s legs and the porch. During the
conversation, the occupant of the residence appeared at the door confirming to the
officer her knowledge of Stoppelmoor’s presence at the house.
According to the lieutenant, almost as soon as he began speaking with
Stoppelmoor he observed signs of intoxication including slurred speech, poor
balance, and bloodshot, watery eyes. After observing these signs, he asked
Stoppelmoor to step down and speak with him. Stoppelmoor complied. Once off
the porch, the lieutenant asked Stoppelmoor if he had been drinking. Stoppelmoor
admitted to having “a few beers,” and the lieutenant administered field sobriety
tests. After failing the tests, Stoppelmoor was arrested and charged with operating
while intoxicated, second offense. See Iowa Code § 321J.2 (2018).
Stoppelmoor moved to suppress the evidence obtained after he was
ordered off the porch. The district court denied the motion. Stoppelmoor elected
for a trial on the minutes of evidence, after which the court found him guilty as
charged. Stoppelmoor appeals. 4
II. Standard of Review.
We review alleged constitutional violations de novo. State v. Tague, 676
N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004). “We examine the entire record and ‘make an
independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.’” State v. Brown, 930
N.W.2d 840, 844 (Iowa 2019) (quoting State v. Meyer, 543 N.W.2d 876, 877 (Iowa
1996)). Because of its ability to weigh the credibility of witnesses, we defer to, but
are not bound by, the district court’s factual findings. State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d
371, 377 (Iowa 2007).
III. Analysis.
Stoppelmoor contends the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him,
thus violating his constitutional rights. The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures.2 “Subject to a few carefully drawn
exceptions, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable.” State
v. Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Iowa 2004). “The State has the burden to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement applies.” Id. “If the State does not meet this burden, all evidence
obtained at the stop must be suppressed.” Brown, 930 N.W.2d at 855.
2 U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”); Iowa Const. art. I, § 8 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated . . . .”). Stoppelmoor raises both state and federal constitutional claims, but he does not argue for a separate analysis under the state constitution. For that reason, we will consider his claims together. 5
There are, however, exceptions allowing for a warrantless search and
seizure. “One recognized exception allows an officer to stop an individual or
vehicle for investigatory purposes for a brief detention based only on a reasonable
suspicion that a criminal act has occurred or is occurring.” State v. Baker, 925
N.W.2d 602, 610 (Iowa 2019). “The purpose of an investigatory stop is to allow a
police officer to confirm or dispel suspicions of criminal activity through reasonable
questioning.” Id. (quoting State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002)). “[T]o
justify an investigatory stop, an officer must have reasonable suspicion, backed by
specific and articulable facts, to believe criminal activity is afoot.” Id. at 611.
“Circumstances raising mere suspicion or curiosity are not enough.” Id. (quoting
State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 2000)).
Here the parties agree that Stoppelmoor’s seizure occurred when
Lieutenant Westfall asked him to step off the porch. See, e.g., State v. White, 887
N.W.2d 172, 176 (Iowa 2016) (“[W]e conclude that [the defendant] was seized
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when [the police officer] directed
[him] to step off of the front porch and onto the driveway.”). The parties disagree
about whether the lieutenant had a reasonable suspicion that Stoppelmoor had
been operating while intoxicated when the lieutenant initiated the seizure.
Stoppelmoor argues that the body cam footage contradicts the lieutenant’s
testimony that Stoppelmoor was displaying signs of intoxication.
Even the district court observed, “The officer’s body camera does not
necessarily confirm all of [the lieutenant’s] observations. The court recognizes,
however, that an officer’s detailed personal observations are not always apparent
when later reviewing video footage of an encounter.” After noting the technological 6
limitations, the court found the lieutenant’s testimony credible and concluded the
lieutenant had reasonable suspicion of a crime when he ordered Stoppelmoor to
step off the porch.
After reviewing the footage and the testimony, we agree with the district
court. The body camera footage is inconclusive, but it does not contradict the
lieutenant’s testimony. To address credibility determinations, we examine extrinsic
evidence for contradictions in the officer’s testimony. State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d
288, 296–97 (Iowa 2013) (video footage from body camera refuted officer’s
rationale for the stop). Slurred speech is a reasonable observation from the audio
track of the video. However the footage is one piece of evidence to consider in the
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Also relevant are the lieutenant’s
observations while following the truck, while watching Stoppelmoor park the truck
and approach the house, and while interacting with Stoppelmoor. The district court
found the lieutenant’s testimony about these observations credible. After
considering all of the evidence, the totality of the circumstances establishes a
reasonable suspicion that Stoppelmoor was operating while intoxicated, which
justifies the seizure under both the United States and Iowa Constitutions.
IV. Disposition.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Stoppelmoor’s
motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.