IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0247 Filed November 2, 2022
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHAD MICHAEL VICE, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (North) County, Michael J.
Schilling, Judge.
A defendant appeals his convictions for first-degree burglary and assault
while participating in a felony. AFFIRMED.
Erin M. Carr of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Heard by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
TABOR, Presiding Judge.
A case of mistaken identity: that’s what Chad Vice calls his convictions for
first-degree burglary and assault while participating in a felony. Vice contends the
district court should not have given any weight to the victim’s identification of him
in a faulty photo array. He also challenges the admission of an out-of-court
statement by his cousin placing him near the crime scene.1
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s ruling
and giving due deference to its credibility findings, we find substantial evidence
that Vice committed these crimes. We agree with Vice that the court should have
sustained his hearsay objection. But we find the State overcame the presumption
of prejudice from that hearsay. Thus, we affirm his convictions.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
On a May morning in 2019, Julie drove to her ex-husband’s house to pick
up their teenage daughter. She texted her daughter that she was parked outside.
A few minutes later, still looking down at her phone, in her peripheral vision Julie
saw a figure approaching. Assuming it was her daughter, Julie unlocked the car
doors so she could get into the passenger side. But the person came to the driver’s
door instead.
Looking up, Julie saw “a very angry person.” The man opened her car door
with one hand and brandished a switchblade in the other. From two feet away, the
intruder yelled “fucking piece of shit” as he lunged at her with the blade, aiming for
1 Vice also mentions a potential ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. But such claims cannot be decided on direct appeal from a criminal proceeding and need not be preserved for postconviction relief. Iowa Code § 814.7 (2021). 3
her neck. Julie screamed and dropped her phone, prompting the man to look at
her and pull away. His demeanor changed, he apologized, and said she was the
“wrong person.” In that moment, Julie thought the man looked familiar. The man
then fled behind a neighboring house as Julie yelled: “Are you fucking kidding me?”
Julie ran into her ex-husband’s house and locked the door. Her daughter
was still inside and Julie told her to call 911. While waiting for police to arrive, Julie
and her daughter saw a man dressed in jeans and a black sweatshirt leave the
house next door. Her daughter filmed the man on her phone as he walked to a
maroon truck and drove away. Neither Julie nor her daughter saw his face.
Once Officer Dustin Fullhart arrived, Julie recounted what happened and
described her attacker as wearing a black hoodie, jeans, and a gray hat.2 She also
recalled that his eyes looked “a silver bluish” but “darker like he was mad.” From
the ten to fifteen seconds that she had to look at his face, Julie recalled the
“chiseledness of his jaw line” and that his “jaws were clenched.” Julie said he
“wasn’t clean shaven,” and instead had “scraggily” salt-and-pepper facial hair,
adding to an overall “disheveled” look. She originally thought the man might be
her ex-husband’s brother, but soon realized it was not. She then assumed the
man who just left the neighbors’ house was the attacker.
After talking to Julie, Officer Fullhart looked behind the house next door but
did not find the suspect or evidence of the attack. He spoke to that house’s
occupants: Lynsey Gilpin, his wife, their daughter, and a family friend. None of
2 At trial, Julie testified the man was wearing a grey hoodie instead. 4
them matched Julie’s description of the assailant and none recalled that anyone
left their house.
When the officer returned to Julie, he viewed her daughter’s phone video of
the man leaving the neighbors’ house. Julie also provided the plate number of the
maroon truck. Equipped with that video, Fullhart returned to the Gilpin residence
to ask again if anyone had left the house. Lynsey Gilpin then remembered that
Kane Simmons left just before law enforcement arrived. Gilpin described Simmons
as “unstable” and “a little bit crazy.” The family provided Simmons’s phone number
and told the officer where he was headed. Before leaving, Fullhart told them to
call police if Simmons returned.
After Fullhart left, Gilpin went to the detached garage behind his house.
Inside, he saw a man hiding in the garage attic. While no lights were on, Gilpin
testified he was “seventy-five percent” sure it was his cousin, Vice.3 Startled, Gilpin
told the person in the attic he planned to call the police. When Gilpin left to call
911, the man ran off. When he connected with Officer Fullhart by phone, Gilpin
reported seeing Vice in his attic. It was then that the course of the investigation
changed with Vice becoming the prime suspect. Police returned to the crime
scene to search for Vice but did not find him. Fullhart also talked with Simmons
on the phone that day but ruled him out as a suspect based on their conversation,
as well as Gilpin placing Vice at the scene and Julie’s photo identification.
That same day, Officer Fullhart compiled a photo lineup to see if Julie could
identify her assailant. The lineup included six men, ages nineteen to forty-three
3 Gilpin and Vice hung out weekly, and Vice had been in his garage before. 5
years old, with Vice being the oldest. Each man appeared in two mugshots, one
facing forward and one profile, except for Vice who only had a forward-facing
photo. The lineup did not include a photo of Simmons. Fullhart met with Julie at
her home and gave her the photos all at once to see if she recognized anyone. He
told her the assailant may or may not be in the array. After studying the photos,
Julie pointed to the single image of Vice as the man who assaulted her. This
exchange was not recorded. Officer Fullhart recalled that after Julie picked that
photo, he mentioned the name Chad Vice. Julie couldn’t remember which of them
said Vice’s name first. But she then recognized Vice because they went to high
school together, though she had not seen him in ten to fifteen years.
After the photo identification, Fullhart interviewed Vice. Vice acknowledged
knowing Julie but denied assaulting her. Vice said that he did not know where he
was during the assault, blaming blackouts caused by diabetes and “not eating
right.” He conceded his health condition sometimes made him “wacky” and angry.
Officers arrested Vice two days later.
The State charged Vice with first-degree burglary and assault while
participating in a felony. While in jail, Vice placed eight phone calls during the
month of June, trying to craft an alibi through an acquaintance named Tara: “I don’t
know what I got to say to convince her to help me but I’m thinking I could promise
her some money. . . . She’s a liar so what the fuck. You might as well get paid for
your lies.” In one of the calls, Vice admitted hiding in Gilpin’s garage attic, and
Gilpin telling him, “you can’t be here,” but claimed it was two days before the
assault, and the authorities had their timeline mixed up. 6
Pretrial, Vice’s attorney engaged in discovery. Only after being deposed
did Officer Fullhart show Julie two photographs that he believed to be of Simmons.
She did not recognize Simmons and thought the photos were of two different
people. Fullhart acknowledged that the two images looked “very different” and he
was not “quite sure” whether both photos depicted Simmons.4
Vice waived his right to a jury and was tried by a judge. At the bench trial,
three people testified. First, Julie identified Vice as the man who assaulted her.
Second, Gilpin testified he was “seventy-five percent” sure he saw Vice in his attic,
but gave somewhat conflicting statements on whether he or police brought Vice’s
name up first in the investigation. Third, Officer Fullhart explained his investigation.
After a back-and-forth of sustained hearsay objections, Fullhart said he
developed a new suspect when Gilpin provided Vice’s name. Vice objected to this
statement as hearsay. But the court overruled the objection. Based on the
evidence, the district court found Vice guilty of burglary in the first degree and
assault while participating in a felony beyond a reasonable doubt. He now
appeals.
II. Analysis
A. Substantial Evidence Identifying Vice
Vice contends the State failed to present substantial evidence that he was
the man who attacked Julie. We review his challenge for legal error. State v.
Banes, 910 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018). Our sufficiency review is the
same for a bench trial as a jury trial. State v. Myers, 924 N.W.2d 823, 827
4One of the photos was from a driver’s license and the other appeared to be a mug shot. 7
(Iowa 2019). The court’s findings of fact have the effect of a special verdict—
binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Fordyce, 940
N.W.2d 419, 425 (Iowa 2020). We view the record in the light most favorable to
the court’s decision. Myers, 924 N.W.2d at 827. But evidence is not substantial if
it creates no more than “speculation, suspicion, or conjecture.” State v.
Chapman, 944 N.W.2d 864, 871 (Iowa 2020). And “[i]dentity is an element of a
criminal offense which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Jensen, 216 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Iowa 1974).
The State relied on Julie’s identification of Vice as the linchpin of the
prosecution. She picked Vice from a photo array after Gilpin reported seeing Vice
in his garage. So those two eyewitness identifications formed the core of the case.
On top of those identifications, the State offered Vice’s jail calls seeking help in
creating an alibi.
Vice now highlights weaknesses in the State’s case. He points to the lack
of physical evidence tying him to the crime and the State’s failure to thoroughly
investigate Simmons as an alternative suspect. And to explain the jail calls, Vice
contends he was searching for Tara to help determine where he was during the
assault because he blacked out from his medical condition.
But Vice devotes most of his argument to questioning the reliability of Julie’s
identification.5 He notes that she had only seconds to see her attacker. She was
inconsistent in her impressions, thinking at first the man was her ex-husband’s
5Vice also critiques Gilpin’s identification, noting that at trial Gilpin was evasive about whether the officers suggested he look for Vice or if he brought up his cousin’s name after seeing him in the attic. 8
brother and then believing it was the man who drove away from the scene. She
also changed her mind about the color of the attacker’s clothing.
As his main challenge, Vice takes aim at the photo array compiled by
Fullhart, arguing that it was impermissibly suggestive and failed to use the best
practices outlined by our supreme court in State v. Booth-Harris, 942
N.W.2d 562, 573 (Iowa 2020). For instance, Officer Fullhart both prepared and
administered the photo lineup, the lineup made Vice stand out since he was
depicted in only a single photo, and the men in the other photos were much
younger than him. He contends Fullhart’s confirmation that Vice was their suspect
after Julie identified him “inflated her confidence” to a degree that prevented her
from recognizing an alternative suspect months later when Fullhart showed her
two photos, ostensibly, of Simmons. Vice claims the suggestive photo array
rendered Julie’s identification unreliable and that we should exclude it from our
substantial-evidence analysis.
The State counters that Vice is conflating a ground to suppress the photo
array as impermissibly suggestive, which he did not pursue at trial, with his
appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Vice did not move to
suppress the photo array, did not object to the photos as trial exhibits, and did not
object to the officer’s testimony about his preparation of the array nor to Julie’s
positive in-court identification. Contrast Booth-Harris, 942 N.W. at 570 (analyzing
motion to suppress which alleged that identification procedure was impermissibly
suggestive and suggestive procedure led to “very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification”). And because Vice made no pretrial effort to show 9
a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, the evidence was for
the factfinder to weigh. See id.
Those points are true. Still, Vice was free to attack the credibility of Julie’s
identification at trial. And he did so. For example, on cross-examination, Julie
acknowledged that she did not recognize the assailant as Vice, her high school
acquaintance, until presented with the photo array. It’s just that the district court
found her identification reliable despite the suggestive aspects of the photo array.
And we abide by the tenet that deciding credibility and giving appropriate weight
to witness identifications are tasks better suited to the factfinder than an appellate
court. See State v. Doolin, 942 N.W.2d 500, 510–11 (Iowa 2020).
The district court was under no illusion about the strength of the State’s
case. Rather, it observed: “Without question, law enforcement left some holes in
the investigation.” The court also acknowledged that “the photo array may have
been suggestive” but not unduly so. The court then employed the uniform jury
instruction to reach its conclusion that Julie’s identification was reliable.6 The court
6 In Booth-Harris, our supreme court found that counsel had no duty to object to the uniform instruction on eyewitness identification that considers four factors: 1. If the witness had an adequate opportunity to see the person at the time of the crime. You may consider such matters as the length of time the witness had to observe the person, the conditions at that time in terms of visibility and distance, and whether the witness had known or seen the person in the past. 2. If an identification was made after the crime, you shall consider whether it was the result of the witness’s own recollection. You may consider the way in which the defendant was presented to the witness for identification, and the length of time that passed between the crime and the witness’s next opportunity to see the defendant. 3. Any identification made by picking the defendant out of a group of similar individuals is generally more reliable than one which results from the presentation of the defendant alone to the witness. 10
highlighted Julie’s career as a registered nurse, a profession that requires “above
average skills of observation and attention to detail.” The court also discussed her
opportunity to see the attacker: she was within two feet of him, it was daylight, and
she had an unobstructed view. She picked Vice out of the array the same day,
while the incident was fresh in her mind and after the officer explained the
attacker’s photo may not be there. She ultimately recognized Vice from high
school. And she identified him with confidence again in open court. The court also
weighed her prior identification of Simmons as the assailant, but noted that she
could not see Simmons’s face in her daughter’s phone video.
Beyond Julie’s identification of Vice, the court found Gilpin’s testimony that
he saw his cousin in the garage attic as “credible and persuasive.” Again, the court
was not naïve about Gilpin’s hesitancy to accuse Vice. Yet the court found “Gilpin’s
demeanor and word choices during his testimony at trial suggested strongly that
he was trying to ‘thread the needle’ between giving honest testimony consistent
with what he told law enforcement before trial and his obvious concern at trial of
implicating his cousin in a serious crime that would send Vice to prison.” We defer
to that careful reasoning.
As a final gloss, we find support for Vice’s convictions in his recorded jail
calls. Despite his innocent explanation, the fact finder could infer that Vice’s
attempt to pay an acquaintance to fabricate an alibi went to his consciousness of
guilt. See People v. Morrison, 368 N.E.2d 1325, 1328 (Ill. App. 1977).
4. Any occasion in which the witness failed to identify the defendant or made an inconsistent identification. 942 N.W.2d at 578. 11
All in all, the district court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence
and are binding on us. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to its decision,
we find proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Vice committed first-degree burglary
and assault while participating in a felony.
B. Hearsay Challenge
Vice next contends the district court erred in overruling his hearsay
objection and allowing Officer Fullhart to testify about his conversation with Gilpin.
The State asked Fullhart: “Why were you now looking for Chad Vice?” Fullhart
responded: “That name was given to me by Lynsey Gilpin.” The State contends
the response was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement. Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(c). Unlike most evidentiary issues,
we review hearsay claims for legal error. State v. Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 560
(Iowa 2009). That standard applies because trial courts have “no discretion to
admit hearsay.’” State v. Veverka, 938 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Iowa 2020) (quoting
State v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Iowa 2003)).
Vice claims the State offered Fullhart’s statement for its truth because the
prosecutor wanted to bolster Gilpin’s direct-examination testimony that he was the
first to mention Vice after seeing his cousin in the garage attic. That testimony was
impeached on cross-examination when defense counsel pointed out that Gilpin
swore in his deposition: “I’d gone to my garage and opened up the attic and found
someone standing or in there. I thought it was Chad Vice because the police had
told me that’s who they thought was there.” Gilpin added that he did not remember 12
giving that answer and wasn’t “exactly sure” if police told him to be on the lookout
for Vice.
The State responds that Fullhart’s statement was offered, not for its truth,
but to explain the officer’s subsequent conduct in returning to the crime scene and
shifting his focus to Vice as the prime suspect.
To settle the parties’ dispute, we consider what it means to offer a statement
for its truth. “A statement that would ordinarily be deemed hearsay is admissible
if it is offered for a non-hearsay purpose that does not depend upon the truth of the
facts presented.” McElroy v. State, 637 N.W.2d 488, 501 (Iowa 2001). In
determining whether the statement is admissible, “we look ‘at the real purpose for
the offered testimony, not just the purposes urged by the prosecutor.’” State v.
Elliott, 806 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Iowa 2011) (quoting State v. Sowder, 394 N.W.2d
368, 371 (Iowa 1986)). In making this determination, “we review the relevant
record to determine if the purpose voiced by the State can reasonably be found to
be the real purpose for which the challenged testimony was offered.” State v. Lee,
No. 00-1019, 2002 WL 100195, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2002). Posed
differently, does the statement have value independent of the fact asserted
therein? State v. Huser, No. 10–2067, 2011 WL 6079120, at *10 (Iowa Ct. App.
Dec. 7, 2011).
If offered to prove responsive conduct, an out-of-court statement is relevant
independent of its truth. See State v. Mitchell, 450 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Iowa 1990)
(explaining statement by defendant’s friend to victim was offered to show victim’s
response). But out-of-court statements offered to explain responsive conduct of
police are not automatically admissible. See State v. Dessinger, 958 13
N.W.2d 590, 603 (Iowa 2021) (chronicling recent cases excluding statements that
went “beyond mere fact that conversation occurred”). Our supreme court limits the
scope of such evidence to “explaining why certain responsive actions were taken
by officers.” State v. Bos, No. 01-0132, 2002 WL 663644, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr.
24, 2002) (quoting State v. Doughty, 359 N.W.2d 439, 442 (Iowa 1984)).7
In arguing the State’s real purpose for offering Fullhart’s statement was for
its truth, Vice notes that the State already offered Gilpin’s testimony to explain law
enforcement’s return to the scene and subsequent investigation. Gilpin testified
that he called Fullhart about finding a man in his attic he believed to be Vice. But
despite securing that explanation of why the investigation turned to Vice, the
prosecution was dogged in asking Fullhart to repeat Gilpin’s out-of-court
statements. The trial transcript is illuminating on this point. Before the court
allowed the disputed statement, the defense repeatedly objected to the State’s line
of questioning on hearsay grounds and the court repeatedly sustained those
objections:
Q. As a result of that phone call to LEECOM, did you then return a phone call from Lynsey Gilpin? A. I did. Q. And what was the reason for that call? A. Well, he informed me— [The Defense]: Objection. The answer didn’t call for hearsay, but he’s answering it in a hearsay fashion. THE COURT: Well, it sounds like he’s going to discuss what Mr. Gilpin told him. I don’t think that was even the question that you asked. So why don’t you ask a different question that can be answered either “yes” or “no” or some fashion that allows [the defense] to lodge an objection if he has one.
7 Doughty explained that often officers will explain their conduct by saying they took action “upon information received,” which is not objectionable. 359 N.W.2d at 442. But the danger in relaying more substantive information is that it may be misused by the fact finder. Id. 14
Q. Did Lynsey Gilpin inform you that he had found somebody hiding in his garage at that time? [The Defense]: Objection. It calls for hearsay. The COURT: Sustained. .... THE COURT: Isn’t it already in the record that Mr. Gilpin called the police department to advise that he saw an individual in the attic of his garage? Didn’t Mr. Gilpin testify to that? [The State]: He did testify to that. THE COURT: So doesn’t that explain why the officer changed the course of the investigation? [The State]: I suppose it does.
After that concession, the judge had the court reporter read back the last
question in the record.
THE COURT REPORTER: “Question: Did Lynsey Gilpin inform you that he had found somebody hiding in his garage at that time?” THE COURT: All right. You can answer that question either “yes” or “no.” THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. Yes, he did. THE COURT: Go ahead and ask your next question. [The State]: Were you given a description of the individual that was found in Mr. Gilpin’s garage? A: Yes. Q. Did the description match the description that Julie had given you of that individual? [The Defense]: Objection. Once again this is hearsay. . . . THE COURT: The objection is sustained. . . . Q. (By [the State]) Was this the first point in your investigation that name Chad Vice was brought up? [The Defense]: Objection. That naturally implies that Mr. Gilpin brought it up. THE COURT: Sustained. Ask another question.
Fullhart then testified that after Gilpin informed him of the individual in the
attic he went back to the crime scene. This series of questions followed:
Q. Had you a new suspect at that point in time? A. Yes, sir. Q. Who was your suspect? A. Chad Vice. Q. Okay. Why were you now looking for Chad Vice? A. That name was given to me by Lynsey Gilpin. [The Defense]: Objection. I move to strike that. It’s almost like they’re trying to impeach Mr. Gilpin because he was unclear—I shouldn’t say “unclear.” He was adamant, I believe, that he had got the name from the police. And so this is, I think, the State’s attempt 15
to fix a major fall with their case, this is just calling for hearsay to try to fix that.
After the court overruled that last hearsay objection, Fullhart testified that before
receiving the phone call from Gilpin he had no reason to suspect Vice’s
involvement.
The district court was correct in observing that Gilpin’s testimony already
explained Fullhart’s responsive conduct. The State conceded as much at trial.
That concession discredits the State’s alleged non-hearsay purpose for Fullhart’s
repetition of this point. State v. Vuong, No. 02-2097, 2003 WL 22701354, at *2
(Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2003). In other words, the non-truth value of Fullhart’s
testimony is diminished because his conduct could be explained without resorting
to the use of the out-of-court statement. See State v. Maniccia, 355
N.W.2d 256, 261 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).
And even if Gilpin’s out-of-court statement retained its non-truth value, a
review of the record shows that explaining the officer’s responsive conduct was
not the State’s true purpose in offering this testimony. The prosecutor was intent
on eliciting the contents of Fullhart’s conversation with Gilpin to reinforce Gilpin’s
assertion on direct examination that he was the first to bring up Vice. Thus,
Fullhart’s repetition of Gilpin’s statement was not offered to explain his subsequent
investigation. Rather, the out-of-court statement was offered for its truth—the
officer received the suspect’s name from Gilpin, which avoided the inference that
Gilpin’s identification of Vice may have been confirming the identity of a suspect
already on the police radar. 16
Having found the court improperly admitted the hearsay statement, we turn
to the question of prejudice. We presume improper admission of hearsay is
prejudicial unless the record shows otherwise. State v. Plain, 898
N.W.2d 801, 810 (Iowa 2017).
The State argues the admission was harmless because the information
offered by Fullhart was cumulative of evidence already in the record from Gilpin.
See State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 19 (Iowa 2006) (“[E]rroneously admitted
hearsay will not be considered prejudicial if substantially the same evidence is
properly in the record.”). The State also underscores that the error occurred in a
bench trial, reducing any risk of prejudice because a judge, equipped with legal
training, determined Vice’s guilt.
Neither argument is satisfying. That the evidence is cumulative is a two-
edge sword. On one edge, because the out-of-court statement repeated Gilpin’s
in-court statement, the State did not need it to explain Fullhart’s responsive
conduct. On the other edge, the factfinder already heard that Gilpin was the first
to introduce Vice’s name into the conversation. Further, even cumulative hearsay
may be prejudicial if witness credibility is central to the case and the evidence is
used to bolster that credibility. State v. Elliott, 806 N.W.2d 660, 670 (Iowa 2011).
And as for it being a bench trial, the court found: “Gilpin called captain Fullhart and
informed him that he found a man he knew to be Chad Vice in the attic of his
detached garage.” Thus, we cannot assume the district court gave no weight to
the hearsay. See State v. Matheson, 684 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Iowa 2004).
Still, Fullhart’s disputed testimony did not change the trajectory of the case.
Both Gilpin and Fullhart testified that Gilpin reported seeing Vice in his attic. 17
Granted, Gilpin was not one-hundred percent sure on the stand that it was Vice.
And he was impeached on cross-examination with his deposition testimony. But
the hearsay did not contradict the core of Gilpin’s testimony. Plus, Fullhart testified
without objection that he never brought up the name, Chad Vice, and had no
reason to suspect his involvement until Gilpin’s phone call. And Vice fails to
connect the debate over who mentioned his name first with the overall reliability of
Gilpin’s identification. So even if the officer told Gilpin to watch for Vice, it does
not erase the fact that Gilpin indeed called Fullhart to tell him that he spotted his
cousin hiding in the attic.8
In the end, the erroneously admitted hearsay was not prejudicial because it
was not central to the identification issue and was cumulative to other testimony
from Fullhart admitted without objection. See State v. Johnson, 272
N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 1978) (finding hearsay harmless when “independent
sources of the same line of testimony” came into the record without objection).
Thus, we affirm Vice’s convictions.
AFFIRMED.
8Vice contributes to the credibility of that report by acknowledging in a jail call that he indeed did hide in the Gilpin’s garage attic, just on a different occasion.