State of Iowa v. Chad Alan Stechcon

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: April 10, 2024
• Docket: 22-1448
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1448 Filed April 10, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CHAD ALAN STECHCON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Ian K. Thornhill, Judge.

The defendant appeals from his convictions, challenging the district court’s

denial of his motion for mistrial and a jury instruction. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Michelle E. Rabe, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., Buller, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024). 2

POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.

Stechcon appeals his convictions of willful injury causing bodily injury and

false imprisonment,1 arguing (1) the district court should have granted his motion

for mistrial after one of the State’s witnesses violated the court’s ruling on the

motion in limine prohibiting witnesses from referencing that Stechcon had been in

legal trouble before and “would spend seventeen more years locked up” and

(2) the court erred in giving a jury instruction on general intent because it was not

applicable to any of the charged offenses.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The State charged Stechcon with kidnapping in the third degree (count I),

willful injury causing bodily injury (count II), domestic abuse assault causing bodily

injury (count III), and false imprisonment (count IV). All four crimes were alleged

to have occurred on January 23, 2022, with F.T.—Stechcon’s sometimes

paramour—as the named victim.

In a motion in limine, Stechcon asked the court to prohibit “[a]ny testimony

and/or statement referencing any previous criminal record, arrest or conviction” of

Stechcon and any reference to F.T.’s statement about him being “in trouble before”

or that he “would spend seventeen more years locked up.” The court ruled there

would be no mention of Stechcon’s prior criminal history. And the State agreed it

was not going to be asking about Stechcon being “in trouble before” or the

identified statements.

1 The jury also found Stechcon guilty of assault causing bodily injury. The district court concluded it merged with the charge of willful injury causing bodily injury and entered convictions on just willful injury causing bodily injury (count II) and false imprisonment (count IV). 3

At trial, F.T. testified that Stechcon picked her up from her home on the night

of January 23, 2022. Almost immediately, F.T. realized she did not want to spend

time with Stechcon; she tried to get out of his truck multiple times, but he physically

pulled her back in and verbally threatened her. After driving for some time,

Stechcon stopped on an unlit gravel road. He got out, came around to the

passenger side, and began hitting F.T. with a closed fist as he tried to pull her out

of the truck. Another vehicle happened to come down the road, and the driver

stopped after hearing F.T.’s shouts for help. F.T. testified that as a parting shot,

she told Stechcon, “[E]njoy the next fucking seventeen years of your life.” The

driver of the other vehicle took F.T. to her cousin’s home. F.T. did not report the

incident to law enforcement until a few days later—when she was at the hospital

for her injuries—and photographs taken of her that day were admitted into

evidence.

The jury acquitted Stechcon of third-degree kidnapping (count I) but found

him guilty of willful injury causing bodily injury (count II), a lesser-included offense

assault causing bodily injury (count III), and false imprisonment (count IV). After

merging count III into count II, the court sentenced him to a term of incarceration

not to exceed five years.

Stechcon appeals.

II. Analysis.

A. Motion for Mistrial.

Stechcon challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for mistrial.

When reviewing the district court’s decision, we keep in mind that “[t]rial courts

have considerable discretion in ruling upon motions for mistrial, since they are 4

present through the trial and are in a better position than the reviewing court to

gauge the effect of the matter in question on the jury.” State v. Jirak, 491

N.W.2d 794, 796 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). “The trial court’s ruling . . . will not be set

aside except upon a showing of abuse of discretion.” Id. And “[t]he defendant is

only entitled to a new trial if the prejudice resulting from the denial prevented the

defendant from having a fair trial.” State v. Brown, 996 N.W.2d 691, 696

(Iowa 2023).

Here, Stechcon received a ruling in limine that witnesses were prohibited

from testifying about his previous troubles with the law and that he “would spend

seventeen more years locked up.” During F.T.’s testimony, she stated that as she

fled from Stechcon into the stranger’s vehicle, she told Stechcon to “enjoy the next

fucking seventeen years of your life.” Stechcon objected and moved for mistrial,

arguing the jury was tainted because F.T.’s comment provided “a strong inference

that one of two things. Either he is on probation or parole and he has time hanging

over head or that the allegations that were made today would lead to results of a

sentence of seventeen years.” The State resisted, noting F.T.’s comment was

“quite vague” and “[t]here wasn’t any statement or any even intimation by her that

this involved any kind of previous conviction or any type of potential prison time

that was hanging over the defendant’s head.” Additionally, the prosecutor noted

that while the jury was not to have any part in the punishment part, “it’s not out of

the realm of possibility that they know there will be some type of punishment.”

The court concluded that F.T.’s testimony violated its ruling on the motion

in limine but correctly recognized that violation did not necessarily require a

mistrial. See, e.g., State v. Lawrence, 559 N.W.2d 292, 294–95 (Iowa Ct. 5

App. 1996) (affirming district court’s decision to not grant mistrial after witnesses’

testimony violated court’s limine ruling). The court then denied Stechcon’s motion

for mistrial, stating:

The statement itself in the context was—to me, does not communicate anything about any prior record of the defendant or any prior convictions or enhancements, which are part of the State’s overall charge, and it[] seem[s] common sense to the public, if you actually commit a crime, you could go to jail for that. I’m not sure what’s magical about the seventeen year comment. We don’t have any singular offenses under the Iowa Code that give you seventeen years in prison. You can certainly—I get they’re adding up a few, but in the context that it was given, I don’t think that the jury would take this any way other than the witness indicating from the context of the circumstances she was describing, at worst that you’re going to get caught and get in trouble. . . . [T]hat’s an obvious conclusion or feeling people might have in that circumstance. But because it didn’t reference the fact that the defendant has actually been convicted of a crime prior to this or was on probation— I don’t even know if that’s the case—or on parole—I don’t know any of that, but none of those magic words were hit, so I don’t see the basis to grant the mistrial here.

On appeal, Stechcon maintains the court should have granted his motion

for mistrial, claiming that F.T.’s testimony about “seventeen years” was improper

evidence of his prior bad acts and suggested he was some sort of serial offender.

Taking the next inferential step, Stechcon maintains that the jury’s instinct to

punish was triggered by the inadmissible evidence. And he claims that because

the court did not instruct the jury to disregard the statement and failed to offer a

curative instruction, the prejudice he suffered was not mitigated. Cf. State v.

Lawrence, 559 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (“Generally, the striking of

an improper response, and an instruction to the jury to disregard the response, will

prevent prejudice.”). 6

Like the district court, we think Stechcon overstates what F.T. conveyed to

the jury about him and any previous legal trouble he may have had when she

testified she told him to “enjoy the next fucking seventeen years of your life.” While

she used a specific number with her parting statement and the implication seemed

to be that she expected Stechcon to become incarcerated as a result of his actions,

there was no indication that was due to any prior convictions. And the district court,

who was present and could witness the demeanor of the jury, did not believe the

statement had any inappropriate impact on the jury. This is not a case where there

is no support in the record for the trial court’s determination. See Jirak, 491 N.W.2d

at 796 (“Ordinarily, abuse of discretion is found upon the denial of a mistrial only

where there is no support in the record for the trial court’s determination.”). And

the district court was not “clearly unreasonable in concluding an impartial verdict

could be reached notwithstanding [F.T.’s] testimony.” See State v. Newell, 710

N.W.2d 6, 33 (Iowa 2006).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stechcon’s motion

for mistrial.

B. Jury Instruction.

Stechcon maintains the district court erred in giving the jury an instruction

on general intent, asserting that none of the four crimes for which he was charged

were a general-intent crime so the instruction was inapplicable and likely led the

jury to convict without forcing the State to meet the standard of proving specific

intent. Stechcon raised this same objection to the district court; he asked the court

to not give the general-intent instruction because “[t]he crimes that he [was]

charged with all are specific intent crimes” and argued leaving the instruction in 7

could cause the jury confusion. The State argues false imprisonment is a general-

intent crime2 and, insofar as Stechcon claims error because the instructions on

general intent and specific intent did not specify which count or counts they

applied, he failed to preserve error on that claim because he did not raise the issue

to the district court.

“We review challenges to jury instructions for correction of errors at law.”

Krogmann, 998 N.W.2d at 150 (citation omitted). “Where an instruction is incorrect

as a matter of law and not cured by other instructions, we presume prejudice

‘unless the record affirmatively establishes there was no[ne].’” State v. Ross, 986

N.W.2d 581, 585 (Iowa 2023) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). But

“[h]armless error may be found, for example, if the record affirmatively establishes

that a party has not been injuriously affected by the alleged error or that there has

not been a miscarriage of justice.” Rivera v. Woodward Res. Ctr., 865

N.W.2d 887, 903 (Iowa 2015).

False imprisonment is a serious misdemeanor, criminalized at Iowa Code

section 710.7 and established during the comprehensive criminal-code revision

enacted in the late 1970s. See 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245, § 1007. The uniform

jury instruction, which was used in this case, lists the following requirements to

establish the crime:

1. On or about the ____ day of __________, 20___, the defendant intentionally confined (victim). 2. (Victim) was confined against [his] [her] will.

2 On appeal, the parties are in agreement that the three other charges Stechcon

faced—all assaults—are specific-intent crimes. See State v. Krogmann, 998 N.W.2d 141, 158 (Iowa 2023) (“It is established law in Iowa that assault is a specific-intent crime.”). 8

3. The defendant did not have a reasonable belief that [he] [she] had a right or authority to confine (victim).

Iowa Crim. Jury Instruction 1000.8. And neither Stechcon nor the State dispute

that these instructions correctly state the law.

While Iowa does not have traditional legislative history, and we often lack

meaningful insight into the legislative process, crimes enacted as part of the

comprehensive criminal-code revision are an outlier because there were

contemporary commentaries discussing the proposal in the Drake and University

of Iowa law reviews. In part two of his series discussing the new criminal code,

Kermit Dunahoo expressly concluded false imprisonment “is not a specific intent

crime,” and observed the addition of specific intent to false imprisonment is what

aggravates the offense to kidnapping. Kermit L. Dunahoo, The New Iowa Criminal

Code: Part II, 29 Drake L. Rev. 491, 565 (1980); see also id. at 560. Dunahoo

made a related observation in part one of the series, where he explained that false

imprisonment criminalized conduct that had been previously left to civil remedies

and was defined in the new uniform jury instructions to “require only that the

respective act be done intentionally without also requiring that [it] be done with

specific purposes.” Kermit L. Dunahoo, The New Iowa Criminal Code, 29 Drake

L. Rev. 237, 245, 303 & n.541 (1979–80). Professor John Yeager similarly

described the new criminal code’s kidnapping offense as false imprisonment

accompanied by intent, which again suggests false imprisonment is a general-

intent offense. See John J. Yeager, Proposed Criminal Law Reform in Iowa: A

Symposium, Crimes against the Person: Homicide, Assault, Sexual Abuse and

Kidnapping in the Proposed Iowa Criminal Code, 60 Iowa L. Rev. 503, 526 (1975). 9

At minimum, these authorities suggest that false imprisonment requires proof of

only general intent.

But, recognizing that no precedent from this court or the Iowa Supreme

Court squarely answers whether false imprisonment in a specific- or general-intent

crime and “‘[s]pecific intent’ and ‘general intent’ have been notoriously difficult to

define and apply and have proved to be mischievous,” State v. Keeton, 710

N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 2006) (cleaned up) (citation omitted), we decline to decide

the issue and instead resolve Stechcon’s claim on the basis of harmless error.

Our court has repeatedly held error was harmless in analyzing confusing or

missing intent instructions when the marshaling instruction closely tracked the

elements of a criminal offense. See State v. Wessels, No. 15-1023, 2016

WL 4543719, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2016) (holding lack of specific-intent

instruction harmless when marshaling instruction correctly described the specific

intent required for the offense of assault on a peace officer); State v. Hall,

No. 11-1524, 2012 WL 4900426, at *5–6 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2012) (coming to

a similar conclusion in light of a jury question about lesser-included assault

offense). Still, we acknowledge this court has twice come out the other way when

the unique circumstances of a case suggested jury confusion.

In State v. Drake, a panel of our court found trial counsel was ineffective for

allowing the jury to receive both general- and specific-intent instructions in a

domestic-abuse-assault prosecution, when the jury asked a question relating

directly to the intent element and the court left the question unanswered. See

No. 12-0554, 2013 WL 3457176, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. July 10, 2013). But we have

declined to follow Drake more recently. See State v. Basquin, No. 17-0057, 2018 10

WL 1858378, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2018) (distinguishing Drake based on

the specific language of the instructions and the absence of jury questions

indicating confusion).

And in an older case, State v. Hague, our court emphasized “the unique

circumstances” of the record and concluded a general-intent instruction was

prejudicial when the only crime at issue (fraudulent practice) required proof of

specific intent and the instructions were overall “rather confusing.” No. 04-1024,

2005 WL 2989705, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2005). But the supreme court

declined to follow Hague in a subsequent case that involved specific- and general-

intent instructions in an assault prosecution. See State v. Murray, 796

N.W.2d 907, 910 (Iowa 2011). And in its most recent case addressing a

permutation of this question, the supreme court’s prejudicial-error analysis focused

on a prosecutor’s references to both specific- and general-intent concepts during

closing argument—which is not inconsistent with Hague’s focus on the peculiarities

of the record before it in assessing prejudice. See State v. Benson, 919

N.W.2d 237, 245–46 (Iowa 2018).

We conclude Wessels and Hall take the better approach—concluding jury

instructions that track the statutory elements adequately inform jurors of the law,

regardless of any errant general- or specific-intent instructions that also appear in

a lengthy stack of instructions. Wessels, 2016 WL 4543719, at *2; Hall, 2012

WL 4900426, at *5–6. And Drake and Hague are self-limiting with their reference

to the peculiar records at issue in those appeals, namely the question from the jury

in Drake and the confusing-on-their-face instructions in Hague. Drake, 2013

WL 3457176, at *6; Hague, 2005 WL 2989705, at *7. The same seems true of 11

Benson, which can fairly be read as fact-bound to the confusion that flowed from

the prosecutor urging incorrect general-intent concepts during closing. Benson,

919 N.W.2d at 246.

Here, like in Wessels, Hall, and Basquin, the marshaling instruction

correctly captured the elements, there were no questions from the jury indicating

confusion, and there was nothing improper in the prosecutor’s closing argument.

For these reasons, the alleged error of providing the general-intent instruction was

harmless.

AFFIRMED.