IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0168 Filed August 3, 2022
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHAD A. BRADFORD, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Tabitha Turner, District
Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals his guilty plea. AFFIRMED.
Austin Jungblut of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Gentry, Brown, Bergmann &
Messamer, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Chad Bradford challenges his guilty plea for domestic abuse assault
causing bodily injury. Bradford alleges the district court’s failure to advise him of
the right to move in arrest of judgment provides good cause to file a direct appeal.
He also alleges the district court’s (1) incorrect recitation of the minimum fine and
(2) failure to advise him of two surcharges require that his judgment be vacated.
We find good cause for Bradford’s direct appeal but determine Bradford has not
demonstrated that he more likely than not would have declined to enter a plea of
guilty if the procedural defect had not occurred. We affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
A complaint filed by the State alleged Bradford and his fiancé were in an
argument on December 5, 2021, which resulted in him head-butting his fiancé.
The State charged him with one count of domestic abuse assault with intent to
inflict serious injury, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1(2)(a) and
708.2A(2)(c) (2021), and one count of domestic abuse assault causing injury or
mental illness, in violation of sections 708.1(2)(a) and 708.2A(2)(b). Bradford was
also alleged to have violated a no-contact order.
A combined plea and sentencing hearing was scheduled for December 29,
2021, after the parties reached a plea agreement. The plea agreement called for
Bradford to plead guilty to one count of domestic abuse assault causing bodily
injury or mental illness, in violation of sections 708.1(2)(a) and 708.2A(2)(b), a
serious misdemeanor, in exchange for the remaining charges being dismissed. 3
Bradford waived his right to be personally present at the sentencing
hearing.1 At this combined plea and sentencing hearing, the court sought to
confirm that Bradford was knowingly and voluntarily waiving his constitutional right
to a jury trial. Bradford responded, “That’s not what I want to do, but that’s what
I’m willing to do, Your Honor.” He clarified that he would go forward with the plea
agreement. After confirming the factual basis for the plea, the court informed
Bradford of the minimum and maximum fines possible pursuant to the plea deal.
The court mistakenly informed Bradford that the minimum fine was higher than that
established by statute. The court also omitted two surcharges Bradford would
need to pay. Finally, the court failed to inform Bradford of the necessity to move
in arrest of judgment if he wished to challenge his guilty plea.
The court sentenced Bradford to one year in jail, suspended the sentence,
and placed him on probation for one year. The court fined him $430.00, with the
fifteen-percent surcharge under section 911.1(1).2 The court suspended the fine.
Finally, the court ordered Bradford to pay the domestic abuse crime surcharge
under section 911.2B. Bradford appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“We review challenges to plea proceedings for correction of errors at law.”
State v. Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Iowa 2017).
1 Bradford was incarcerated in Polk County Jail and appeared telephonically. 2 The court’s oral sentencing pronouncement and written sentencing order reference the fine of $430.00. Both the fine and fifteen-percent surcharge were suspended. The domestic abuse surcharge was not suspended. 4
III. Discussion
First, we are asked to address whether Bradford has good cause to file a
direct appeal of his guilty plea following the failure of the district court to advise a
defendant of the right to move in arrest of judgment. If so, we must then address
whether the district court’s pronouncement of an incorrect minimum fine and the
absence of the advisory of two surcharges under a newly enacted statute requires
that we vacate Bradford’s conviction. On this record, we determine reversal of the
conviction pursuant to Iowa Code section 814.29 is not required.
A. Good Cause
We must determine whether Bradford has good cause to appeal. Iowa
Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) requires a defendant appealing their guilty plea to
establish good cause. Our supreme court has held that “good cause” is context
specific, but must be “[a] legally sufficient reason.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d
98, 104 (Iowa 2020). “By definition, a legally sufficient reason is a reason that
would allow a court to provide some relief.” State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 109
(Iowa 2021).
A defendant appealing their guilty plea who did not move in arrest of
judgment is generally prohibited from appealing because the appellate court would
be unable to provide relief. See id.; see also Iowa R. Crim P. 2.24(3)(a) (“A
defendant’s failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding by motion
in arrest of judgment shall preclude the defendant’s rights to assert such challenge
on appeal”).3 But “we have recognized a defendant may challenge his guilty plea
3A failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment has been held to preclude appellate relief both as a failure to preserve error and a failure to present good cause. See 5
on appeal despite not filing a motion in arrest of judgment where the district court
failed to adequately advise the defendant of the consequences of not filing a
motion in arrest of judgment.” Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109. The State does not
dispute that the district court failed to comply with rule 2.8(2)(d) by neglecting to
advise of the right to file a motion in arrest of judgment and the consequences of
not filing the same.4 With this omission by the district court, we conclude Bradford
has good cause to appeal.
B. Validity of Plea
Bradford claims he did not enter into his plea knowingly and voluntarily
because the court incorrectly cited the mandatory minimum fine and failed to
advise concerning two surcharges Bradford faced, in particular a ninety-dollar
domestic abuse surcharge and a fifteen-percent surcharge assessed on the fine.
A court must explain “the mandatory minimum punishment” a defendant faces
during a plea proceeding. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b)(2). And our courts have
recognized that surcharges can constitute a punishment. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d at
State v. Schulte, No. 20-1092, 2021 WL 4889069, at *1 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2021). The State concedes Bradford was not required to preserve error based on the district court’s failure to inform him of the need to file a motion in arrest of judgment pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(d). See State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 2016) (quoting State v. Worley, 297 N.W.2d 368
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0168 Filed August 3, 2022
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHAD A. BRADFORD, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Tabitha Turner, District
Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals his guilty plea. AFFIRMED.
Austin Jungblut of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Gentry, Brown, Bergmann &
Messamer, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Chad Bradford challenges his guilty plea for domestic abuse assault
causing bodily injury. Bradford alleges the district court’s failure to advise him of
the right to move in arrest of judgment provides good cause to file a direct appeal.
He also alleges the district court’s (1) incorrect recitation of the minimum fine and
(2) failure to advise him of two surcharges require that his judgment be vacated.
We find good cause for Bradford’s direct appeal but determine Bradford has not
demonstrated that he more likely than not would have declined to enter a plea of
guilty if the procedural defect had not occurred. We affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
A complaint filed by the State alleged Bradford and his fiancé were in an
argument on December 5, 2021, which resulted in him head-butting his fiancé.
The State charged him with one count of domestic abuse assault with intent to
inflict serious injury, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1(2)(a) and
708.2A(2)(c) (2021), and one count of domestic abuse assault causing injury or
mental illness, in violation of sections 708.1(2)(a) and 708.2A(2)(b). Bradford was
also alleged to have violated a no-contact order.
A combined plea and sentencing hearing was scheduled for December 29,
2021, after the parties reached a plea agreement. The plea agreement called for
Bradford to plead guilty to one count of domestic abuse assault causing bodily
injury or mental illness, in violation of sections 708.1(2)(a) and 708.2A(2)(b), a
serious misdemeanor, in exchange for the remaining charges being dismissed. 3
Bradford waived his right to be personally present at the sentencing
hearing.1 At this combined plea and sentencing hearing, the court sought to
confirm that Bradford was knowingly and voluntarily waiving his constitutional right
to a jury trial. Bradford responded, “That’s not what I want to do, but that’s what
I’m willing to do, Your Honor.” He clarified that he would go forward with the plea
agreement. After confirming the factual basis for the plea, the court informed
Bradford of the minimum and maximum fines possible pursuant to the plea deal.
The court mistakenly informed Bradford that the minimum fine was higher than that
established by statute. The court also omitted two surcharges Bradford would
need to pay. Finally, the court failed to inform Bradford of the necessity to move
in arrest of judgment if he wished to challenge his guilty plea.
The court sentenced Bradford to one year in jail, suspended the sentence,
and placed him on probation for one year. The court fined him $430.00, with the
fifteen-percent surcharge under section 911.1(1).2 The court suspended the fine.
Finally, the court ordered Bradford to pay the domestic abuse crime surcharge
under section 911.2B. Bradford appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“We review challenges to plea proceedings for correction of errors at law.”
State v. Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Iowa 2017).
1 Bradford was incarcerated in Polk County Jail and appeared telephonically. 2 The court’s oral sentencing pronouncement and written sentencing order reference the fine of $430.00. Both the fine and fifteen-percent surcharge were suspended. The domestic abuse surcharge was not suspended. 4
III. Discussion
First, we are asked to address whether Bradford has good cause to file a
direct appeal of his guilty plea following the failure of the district court to advise a
defendant of the right to move in arrest of judgment. If so, we must then address
whether the district court’s pronouncement of an incorrect minimum fine and the
absence of the advisory of two surcharges under a newly enacted statute requires
that we vacate Bradford’s conviction. On this record, we determine reversal of the
conviction pursuant to Iowa Code section 814.29 is not required.
A. Good Cause
We must determine whether Bradford has good cause to appeal. Iowa
Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) requires a defendant appealing their guilty plea to
establish good cause. Our supreme court has held that “good cause” is context
specific, but must be “[a] legally sufficient reason.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d
98, 104 (Iowa 2020). “By definition, a legally sufficient reason is a reason that
would allow a court to provide some relief.” State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 109
(Iowa 2021).
A defendant appealing their guilty plea who did not move in arrest of
judgment is generally prohibited from appealing because the appellate court would
be unable to provide relief. See id.; see also Iowa R. Crim P. 2.24(3)(a) (“A
defendant’s failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding by motion
in arrest of judgment shall preclude the defendant’s rights to assert such challenge
on appeal”).3 But “we have recognized a defendant may challenge his guilty plea
3A failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment has been held to preclude appellate relief both as a failure to preserve error and a failure to present good cause. See 5
on appeal despite not filing a motion in arrest of judgment where the district court
failed to adequately advise the defendant of the consequences of not filing a
motion in arrest of judgment.” Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109. The State does not
dispute that the district court failed to comply with rule 2.8(2)(d) by neglecting to
advise of the right to file a motion in arrest of judgment and the consequences of
not filing the same.4 With this omission by the district court, we conclude Bradford
has good cause to appeal.
B. Validity of Plea
Bradford claims he did not enter into his plea knowingly and voluntarily
because the court incorrectly cited the mandatory minimum fine and failed to
advise concerning two surcharges Bradford faced, in particular a ninety-dollar
domestic abuse surcharge and a fifteen-percent surcharge assessed on the fine.
A court must explain “the mandatory minimum punishment” a defendant faces
during a plea proceeding. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b)(2). And our courts have
recognized that surcharges can constitute a punishment. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d at
State v. Schulte, No. 20-1092, 2021 WL 4889069, at *1 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2021). The State concedes Bradford was not required to preserve error based on the district court’s failure to inform him of the need to file a motion in arrest of judgment pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(d). See State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 2016) (quoting State v. Worley, 297 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1980)) (“No defendant . . . should suffer the sanction of rule [2.24(3)(a)] unless the court has complied with rule [2.8(2)(d)] during the plea proceedings” (alteration in original)). 4 The State argues that the amendment to Iowa Code section 814.6(2)(f) requires
that the defendant apply for discretionary review and meet the applicable standard, in that the cases that allow a direct appeal from a guilty plea due to the failure to advise of the right to file a motion in arrest of judgment predate the amendment. But the amended code section addresses the grant of discretionary review from an order denying a motion in arrest of judgment. That is not the procedural posture in the instant case. 6
685-86. A failure by the court to substantially comply with that requirement
constitutes a procedural defect in the proceedings. See Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d at
408. The State concedes the district court failed to accurately identify the minimum
fine and failed to mention two surcharges during the plea proceedings. By failing
to address the issue, the court violated rule 2.8(2)(b)(2). See id. at 409 (“The
district court’s outright and wholesale omission regarding the criminal penalty
surcharges cannot pass the substantial compliance threshold. . . .”).
But what remedy, if any, is warranted under the newly enacted statute?
Bradford contends the error requires we vacate his judgment and sentence. See
id. (finding that the proper remedy for a violation of rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) is “mandatory
automatic reversal”). In contrast, the State claims the matter is controlled by
section 814.29, which requires “a defendant challeng[ing] a guilty plea based on
an alleged defect in the plea proceeding” to demonstrate that they “more likely than
not would not have pled guilty if the defect had not occurred.”
We agree with the State that section 814.29 applies to Bradford’s claim.
The cases that identify mandatory reversal as the proper remedy originate before
the legislature’s omnibus crime bill, S.F. 589, which went into effect July 1, 2019.
See State v. Macke, 933 N.W.2d 226, 227 (Iowa 2019) (identifying the date that
the bill went into effect). Section 814.29 altered the remedy for violations of
procedural defects in plea proceedings. Given the date of Bradford’s plea and
sentencing hearing, we conclude that section 814.29 controls Bradford’s claim.
And Bradford makes no attempt to demonstrate that he more likely than not
would not have pled guilty if the defect had not occurred. Even in the absence of
the argument, the record reflects that he desired to plead guilty regardless of the 7
fines imposed. First, upon the court explaining that it could continue the case to
allow Bradford to confer with his attorney before sentencing, Bradford responded,
“No. I need to get back home to [his fiancé]. She’s homeless. I need to get back
to her so I can take care of her. So I can’t continue this anymore.” When asked if
he wanted to waive his constitutional rights to a jury trial by pleading guilty, he
informed the court, “That’s not what I want to do, but that’s what I’m willing to do,
Your Honor.” Thus, Bradford desired to plead guilty in order to resolve his pending
charges. He has not demonstrated that being informed of a lesser fine and two
additional surcharges would have altered that decision-making.
Particularly persuasive is that the district court erroneously informed
Bradford that the minimum fine would be higher than the fine that was imposed.5
The district court informed Bradford that the minimum fine was $850.00. But the
minimum fine for a serious misdemeanor is $430.00. See Iowa Code
§ 903.1(1)(b). The court imposed a fine of $430.00 and suspended that fine. After
including the fifteen percent surcharge under section 911.1(1) and the ninety-dollar
domestic abuse surcharge pursuant to section 911.2B, Bradford’s fine and
surcharges amounted to $584.50, the majority of which was suspended by the
court. It is illogical to believe Bradford would not have pled guilty when he is
required to pay less than what he believed would be imposed. We determine that
Bradford has not demonstrated that he more likely than not would have declined
to enter a plea of guilty if the procedural defect had not occurred.
AFFIRMED.
5We do not determine the outcome under Iowa Code section 814.29 if the district court had advised the defendant of a lower fine but imposed a higher fine.