State of Iowa v. Carlton Douglas Jr.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 30, 2024
• Docket: 23-1170
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1170 Filed October 30, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CARLTON DOUGLAS JR., Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County,

John Telleen (pre-trial rulings) and Patrick A. McElyea (trial), Judges.

A defendant appeals his convictions for first-degree murder and possession

of a firearm as a felon. AFFIRMED.

Alfredo Parrish of Parrish Kruidenier, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ. Telleen, S.J.,

takes no part. 2

TABOR, Chief Judge.

A jury convicted Carlton Douglas of first-degree murder and possession of

a firearm as a felon. On appeal from that verdict, he alleges that two jury

instructions misstated the law on self-defense. He also contends the two charges

should have been severed for trial. Trouble is, his trial counsel did not preserve

error on either issue. And we can no longer consider claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel on direct appeal. No doubt expecting that roadblock,

Douglas promotes his appeal as a good candidate for plain error review. But that

route is also closed to us under State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 2021).

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

In December 2020, Douglas shot and killed Cedric Hood in the parking lot

of the Hop-N-Shop in Clinton. Surveillance video captured the shooting. Hood’s

girlfriend and her son were inside the convenience store when Douglas pulled into

the lot. Douglas left his car, approached the driver’s side window of Hood’s SUV,

and fired six shots at Hood. Douglas then returned to his car, where his girlfriend

was waiting, and they drove away. His girlfriend testified that Douglas said: “That’s

first-degree murder, girl. Pull off.”

The State indeed charged Douglas with first-degree murder, a class “A”

felony in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1 and 707.2 (2020), as well as

possession or control of a firearm as a felon, a class “D” felony in violation of

section 724.26(1). After several continuances, the district court set Douglas’s trial

for June 2023.

At trial, the prosecution offered evidence that Hood and Douglas had been

involved with the same woman, which angered Hood. In November 2020, Hood 3

sent Douglas threatening text messages. And Douglas believed that Hood shot

out the back window of his car when it was parked on the street. The prosecution

theorized that Douglas shot Hood a few days later in retaliation. After hearing

three days of evidence, the jury returned verdicts finding Douglas guilty as

charged. The court entered judgment and sentenced Douglas to life in prison on

the murder count and five years on the felon-in-possession count, to run

concurrently. Douglas now appeals that judgment.

II. Analysis

A. Jury Instructions

Douglas challenges two jury instructions on appeal. Those challenged

instructions addressed his duty to retreat: 4

Douglas asserts that the “obvious harm” in the first instruction emerges

when it cross-references the marshalling instruction for felon-in-possession as the

definition of “illegal activity.” He contends that these two instructions misstate the

law and highlight his felony record.

In its appellee’s brief, the State argues that Douglas did not preserve error

on his current claim. The State recognizes that Douglas submitted proposed jury

instructions before trial. But the State notes that in the final discussion of the

justification instructions, defense counsel told the court that the duty-to-retreat

instruction “adequately addresses the [stand-your-ground] issues as raised in

[State v. Ellison, 985 N.W.2d 473 (Iowa 2023)]. So we do not raise an objection

to proposed Instruction No. 34.” The State contends that Douglas is bound by his

failure to challenge these jury instructions in their final form. See State v. Maghee,

573 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 1997) (noting parties “may not amplify or change the

objection on appeal”). We agree that because Douglas did not object to the final

jury instructions, he did not preserve error. See State v. Davis, 951 N.W.2d 8, 16

(Iowa 2020) (citing State v. Sallis, 262 N.W.2d 240, 248 (Iowa 1978)).

In his reply brief, Douglas relies on Davis for the notion that counsel’s failure

to object to an erroneous instruction constituted ineffective assistance and the

resulting prejudice required a new trial. Id. at 17−20. But we lack authority to

decide his claim of ineffective assistance in this direct appeal. See State v. Hanes,

981 N.W.2d 454, 460 (Iowa 2022) (noting that path is foreclosed by Iowa Code

section 814.7, which diverts ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims to

postconviction proceedings). Under these circumstances, we have no means to

grant relief on the alleged instructional error. 5

B. Severance of Counts

We face that same situation when addressing Douglas’s severance claim.

He argues on appeal that “gross error” occurred when the felon-in-possession

count was tried with the murder charge. In his issue heading, Douglas argues that

counsel provided ineffective assistance “by failing to sever or enter a plea on the

felon in possession charge, or take any other step to protect Douglas from

prejudice.” But by the end of his argument, he contends that the district court

“should have exercised its discretion and severed [his] felon in possession charge

from his murder charge.”

Neither focus offers an avenue for relief. Under section 814.7, we are

without authority to decide ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct

appeal. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109. And Douglas cites no authority for his claim

that the district court had a duty to sever the two counts independent of counsel’s

conduct. In fact, case law goes the other way. See State v. Owens, 635 N.W.2d

478, 482 (Iowa 2001) (placing burden on defense counsel to move for severance

and prove that any prejudice resulting from a joint trial outweighed State’s interest

in judicial economy). Thus, we decline to address his severance claim.

C. Plain Error

Finally, Douglas urges that the “errors inherent in [his] case call for a plain

error standard for preservation.” Yet he recognizes that our supreme court has

“repeatedly rejected plain error review.” Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109 (collecting

cases). We cannot overrule supreme court precedent. Bomgaars v. State, 967

N.W.2d 41, 48 n.4 (Iowa 2021).

AFFIRMED.