IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0590 Filed November 13, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CARLOS ALLEN HIVENTO, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Elizabeth Dupuich,
Judge.
A defendant appeals the sentence imposed following his conviction for third-
degree sexual abuse. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Kent A. Simmons, Bettendorf, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Badding, P.J., Langholz, J., and
Mullins, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2025). 2
MULLINS, Senior Judge.
A jury found Carlos Hivento guilty of third-degree sexual abuse after he
lured a woman to the rooftop of an Iowa City bar, forced her to the ground, and
sexually assaulted her. The district court imposed a ten-year term of
imprisonment, which it ordered to run consecutively to Hivento’s preexisting
sentence for a separate offense. In this appeal, Hivento contends the court abused
its discretion by “failing to state valid reasons” for imposing a consecutive prison
term. He also asserts that the district court exceeded its sentencing authority by
ordering him to complete sex offender treatment while incarcerated. Our review is
for correction of errors at law. State v. Duffield, 16 N.W.3d 298, 302 (Iowa 2025).
I. Consecutive Sentence
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23 requires the sentencing court to
“particularly state the reason for imposition of any consecutive sentence.” Iowa R.
Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g). This requirement is designed to ensure defendants are “aware
of the consequences of their criminal actions” as well as to facilitate appellate
review. State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). The
sentencing court’s explanation need not be detailed so long as it satisfies these
goals. See State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015). That said, the
grounds for a consecutive sentence must be “explicitly state[d].” Hill, 878 N.W.2d
at 275 (holding appellate courts may not infer that “the same reasons for imposing
a sentence of incarceration” motivated a consecutive sentence).
Because Hivento’s offense was a forcible felony, the district court was
required to impose an indeterminate prison term. See Iowa Code § 907.3 (2017).
The applicable term of confinement for third-degree sexual abuse is no more than 3
ten years. See id. §§ 709.4, 902.9(d). What remained for the court to decide was
whether Hivento’s new sentence would run concurrently or consecutively to the
thirty-four-year prison term he was already serving for a different sexual assault.
See id. § 901.8 (granting the sentencing court discretion to order a “second or
further sentence to begin at the expiration of the first”). The State urged the court
to impose a consecutive sentence, arguing this case involves a violent offense that
is wholly separate from Hivento’s other crime. Defense counsel argued that
Hivento’s existing term is more than sufficient to protect the public.1
Weighing its sentencing options, the district court noted Hivento’s “robust”
criminal history and his failure to accept responsibility for his offense. It then
recounted the troubling details of the instant assault, which Hivento continued to
dispute at the time of sentencing. The court also observed that Hivento had been
exposed as a “sexual offender who cannot be released without an alarming risk to
the community.” Ultimately, the court imposed a consecutive term of
imprisonment. It explained that Hivento’s present and former offenses “were two
totally separate events.” It further cited “the factors the court has already stated”
and “the reasons stated by the State”—which both parties take to mean the violent
and predatory circumstances of the assault. Hivento contends these reasons are
not enough to support his additional punishment. We disagree.
Iowa courts have routinely observed that the independent nature of a
second offense is an appropriate ground for consecutive sentencing. See, e.g.,
1 Hivento took a different tack than his attorney. When it was his turn to address the court, he challenged the validity of his conviction, objected to his pre-existing sentence, and argued “nobody’s been treated worse by the State of Iowa than me.” 4
State v. Pirie, 18 N.W.3d 238, 250 (Iowa 2025); State v. Johnson, 476 N.W.2d 330,
335 (Iowa 1991); State v. Scotton, No. 24-1582, 2025 WL 1704360, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
App. June 18, 2025); State v. McDole, No. 22-1397, 2023 WL 3092108, at *1 (Iowa
Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2023). Hivento correctly points out that a separate conviction is
the legal prerequisite for a consecutive sentence, not an automatic reason to
impose one. But here, the court’s focus was on the “total” factual distinction
between Hivento’s two offenses, which he perpetrated at different times and
against different victims. It was within the court’s discretion to find these “separate
and independent crimes” warranted consecutive sentences. Johnson,
476 N.W.2d at 335.
Hivento also contends that the violent character of his offense cannot justify
a consecutive sentence because this consideration is “embedded in the mandatory
imprisonment” the legislature has prescribed for forcible felonies. But there is
nothing wrong with that. The district court may impose a consecutive sentence for
“the same reasons” that support a sentence of incarceration, so long as those
reasons are made explicit. Hill, 878 N.W.2d at 275. At bottom, Hivento’s
arguments amount to little more than disagreement with the district court’s
decision, which is not a basis for us to disturb his sentence. See State v. Formaro,
638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002) (explaining a sentence within statutory limits
“will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of
inappropriate matters”). The court’s reasons were permissible, and its statements
on the record were sufficient to apprise Hivento and facilitate our review. We find
no abuse of discretion. 5
II. Sex-Offender Treatment
As a part of Hivento’s sentence, the district court separately ordered him to
“attend and successfully complete the Sex Offender Treatment Program” (SOTP)
while in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Hivento contends the court
lacked statutory authority to order this treatment. The State agrees. Both parties
ask that we vacate Hivento’s SOTP requirement without disturbing the rest of the
district court’s sentence.
Sentencing courts “may only impose punishment authorized by the
legislature within constitutional constraints.” State v. Louisell, 865 N.W.2d 590,
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0590 Filed November 13, 2025
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CARLOS ALLEN HIVENTO, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Elizabeth Dupuich,
Judge.
A defendant appeals the sentence imposed following his conviction for third-
degree sexual abuse. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Kent A. Simmons, Bettendorf, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Badding, P.J., Langholz, J., and
Mullins, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2025). 2
MULLINS, Senior Judge.
A jury found Carlos Hivento guilty of third-degree sexual abuse after he
lured a woman to the rooftop of an Iowa City bar, forced her to the ground, and
sexually assaulted her. The district court imposed a ten-year term of
imprisonment, which it ordered to run consecutively to Hivento’s preexisting
sentence for a separate offense. In this appeal, Hivento contends the court abused
its discretion by “failing to state valid reasons” for imposing a consecutive prison
term. He also asserts that the district court exceeded its sentencing authority by
ordering him to complete sex offender treatment while incarcerated. Our review is
for correction of errors at law. State v. Duffield, 16 N.W.3d 298, 302 (Iowa 2025).
I. Consecutive Sentence
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23 requires the sentencing court to
“particularly state the reason for imposition of any consecutive sentence.” Iowa R.
Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g). This requirement is designed to ensure defendants are “aware
of the consequences of their criminal actions” as well as to facilitate appellate
review. State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). The
sentencing court’s explanation need not be detailed so long as it satisfies these
goals. See State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015). That said, the
grounds for a consecutive sentence must be “explicitly state[d].” Hill, 878 N.W.2d
at 275 (holding appellate courts may not infer that “the same reasons for imposing
a sentence of incarceration” motivated a consecutive sentence).
Because Hivento’s offense was a forcible felony, the district court was
required to impose an indeterminate prison term. See Iowa Code § 907.3 (2017).
The applicable term of confinement for third-degree sexual abuse is no more than 3
ten years. See id. §§ 709.4, 902.9(d). What remained for the court to decide was
whether Hivento’s new sentence would run concurrently or consecutively to the
thirty-four-year prison term he was already serving for a different sexual assault.
See id. § 901.8 (granting the sentencing court discretion to order a “second or
further sentence to begin at the expiration of the first”). The State urged the court
to impose a consecutive sentence, arguing this case involves a violent offense that
is wholly separate from Hivento’s other crime. Defense counsel argued that
Hivento’s existing term is more than sufficient to protect the public.1
Weighing its sentencing options, the district court noted Hivento’s “robust”
criminal history and his failure to accept responsibility for his offense. It then
recounted the troubling details of the instant assault, which Hivento continued to
dispute at the time of sentencing. The court also observed that Hivento had been
exposed as a “sexual offender who cannot be released without an alarming risk to
the community.” Ultimately, the court imposed a consecutive term of
imprisonment. It explained that Hivento’s present and former offenses “were two
totally separate events.” It further cited “the factors the court has already stated”
and “the reasons stated by the State”—which both parties take to mean the violent
and predatory circumstances of the assault. Hivento contends these reasons are
not enough to support his additional punishment. We disagree.
Iowa courts have routinely observed that the independent nature of a
second offense is an appropriate ground for consecutive sentencing. See, e.g.,
1 Hivento took a different tack than his attorney. When it was his turn to address the court, he challenged the validity of his conviction, objected to his pre-existing sentence, and argued “nobody’s been treated worse by the State of Iowa than me.” 4
State v. Pirie, 18 N.W.3d 238, 250 (Iowa 2025); State v. Johnson, 476 N.W.2d 330,
335 (Iowa 1991); State v. Scotton, No. 24-1582, 2025 WL 1704360, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
App. June 18, 2025); State v. McDole, No. 22-1397, 2023 WL 3092108, at *1 (Iowa
Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2023). Hivento correctly points out that a separate conviction is
the legal prerequisite for a consecutive sentence, not an automatic reason to
impose one. But here, the court’s focus was on the “total” factual distinction
between Hivento’s two offenses, which he perpetrated at different times and
against different victims. It was within the court’s discretion to find these “separate
and independent crimes” warranted consecutive sentences. Johnson,
476 N.W.2d at 335.
Hivento also contends that the violent character of his offense cannot justify
a consecutive sentence because this consideration is “embedded in the mandatory
imprisonment” the legislature has prescribed for forcible felonies. But there is
nothing wrong with that. The district court may impose a consecutive sentence for
“the same reasons” that support a sentence of incarceration, so long as those
reasons are made explicit. Hill, 878 N.W.2d at 275. At bottom, Hivento’s
arguments amount to little more than disagreement with the district court’s
decision, which is not a basis for us to disturb his sentence. See State v. Formaro,
638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002) (explaining a sentence within statutory limits
“will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of
inappropriate matters”). The court’s reasons were permissible, and its statements
on the record were sufficient to apprise Hivento and facilitate our review. We find
no abuse of discretion. 5
II. Sex-Offender Treatment
As a part of Hivento’s sentence, the district court separately ordered him to
“attend and successfully complete the Sex Offender Treatment Program” (SOTP)
while in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Hivento contends the court
lacked statutory authority to order this treatment. The State agrees. Both parties
ask that we vacate Hivento’s SOTP requirement without disturbing the rest of the
district court’s sentence.
Sentencing courts “may only impose punishment authorized by the
legislature within constitutional constraints.” State v. Louisell, 865 N.W.2d 590,
598 (Iowa 2015). A sentence imposed without statutory authority is illegal and
void. Id. at 597. As we have previously observed, no statute authorizes a district
court to order SOTP in connection with a defendant’s prison sentence. See State
v. Smith, No. 18-2248, 2021 WL 1400772, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2021).
While the Department of Corrections may require an inmate to participate in sex
offender treatment, that decision is within the authority of the department and not
the sentencing judge. See Dykstra v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 783 N.W.2d 473, 478–79
(Iowa 2010).
When an illegality is severable from the balance of a defendant’s sentence,
we may vacate the challenged portion alone. See Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d
697, 702 (Iowa 2010); State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 1997). Because
the district court lacked authority to order Hivento’s participation SOTP, we vacate 6
that portion of his sentence and remand for entry of a corrected sentencing order.
As Hivento acknowledges, no rehearing is necessary.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.