IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1459 Filed November 12, 2015
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BYRON JOEL WILES, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Michael G.
Dieterich, District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals his conviction for failure to comply with sex offender
registration requirements. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ. 2
VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
Byron Wiles appeals his judgment and sentence for failure to comply with
sex offender registration procedures, in violation of Iowa Code sections 692A.104
and .111 (2013). He contends the evidence was insufficient to support the
district court’s finding of guilt.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The history leading up to Wiles’s present judgment is as follows. Wiles
pled guilty to third-degree sexual abuse and received a deferred judgment, which
was later revoked. In the revocation order, the district court imposed and
suspended a ten-year prison term, placed Wiles on probation, stated Wiles would
have to “register with the sheriff of the county of [his] residence . . . within five (5)
days of release from custody or placement on probation, parole, or work
release,” and required him to “complete all necessary sex offender registry forms
as directed.”
Wiles’s probation was later revoked. After serving time and receiving
parole, he registered as a sex offender. Wiles included a cell phone number on
the registration form. Wiles subsequently violated his parole and was placed on
work release at the Burlington Residential Correctional Facility, where he
completed two additional sex offender registration forms. Neither form listed a
cell phone number.
Residential facility employees found Wiles with a cell phone, in
contravention of facility rules. The phone had the same number as the number
listed on the original sex offender registration form. 3
The State charged Wiles with failure to “report relevant information on his
sex offender registration as defined in Iowa Code [section] 692A.101(23); to-wit,
a cell phone.” The case was tried to the court, which found him guilty. This
appeal followed.
II. Analysis
Wiles makes a two-pronged argument: (A) he “had no statutory duty to
update his registration since he was ‘incarcerated’ at the time and therefore
exempt” and (B) “[e]ven if he had such a duty, he was only required to report any
changes in his information.” Accordingly, in his view, the evidence was
insufficient to support the district court’s finding of guilt.
While styled a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, Wiles’s
argument is really a challenge to the district court’s interpretation of the relevant
statutory provisions in light of essentially undisputed facts. See State v. Romer,
832 N.W.2d 169, 179 (Iowa 2013) (focusing on whether language of statute
prohibited certain undisputed conduct); see also State v. West, No. 06-1316,
2007 WL 2963990, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2007) (noting West’s claim on
his motion for judgment of acquittal turned on a statutory interpretation issue);
State v. Wiley, No. 01-1458, 2002 WL 31309923, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 16,
2002) (“Although the issue before us is cast as whether there was sufficient
evidence to sustain a conviction . . . we believe the issue can at least as readily
be viewed as a challenge to the trial court’s interpretation and application of [the
pertinent statute].”). We review this statutory interpretation issue for errors of
law. Romer, 832 N.W.2d at 179. 4
A. Duty to Register
The first part of Wiles’s argument is premised on section 692A.103(2),
which states “[a] sex offender is not required to register while incarcerated.”
Wiles asserts he was “incarcerated” during his stay at the residential facility,
obviating the need to register and foreclosing prosecution and conviction for
failure to include the cell phone number on his second and third registration
forms. The State counters with a citation to section 692A.103(1)(b), which
requires registration “[f]rom the date of release on parole or work release.”
Wiles has the statutory definition of “incarcerated” on his side. Chapter
692A defines “incarcerated” as “to be imprisoned by placing a person in a jail,
prison, penitentiary, juvenile facility, or other correctional institution or facility or a
place or condition of confinement or forcible restraint regardless of the nature of
the institution in which the person serves a sentence for a conviction.”1 Iowa
Code § 692A.101(14) (emphasis added). It is true that the Burlington Residential
Correctional Facility is “not under the management of the department of
corrections.” See State v. Halverson, 857 N.W.2d 632, 638 (Iowa 2015).2
However, the residential correctional facility easily fits within the last broad
category of confinement listed in the definition of “incarcerated.” Accordingly, we
conclude Wiles was “incarcerated” within the meaning of Iowa Code section
692A.101(14).
1 Former versions of Iowa Code chapter 692A that imposed the duty to register distinguished “work release” from “residential treatment” and “any other release from custody.” See Iowa Code § 692A.2(1) (2007). 2 According to Wiles’s probation-parole officer, Wiles remained in the custody of the Iowa Department of Corrections while housed at the facility. 5
Wiles asks us to end our analysis here. But to hold that a work released
sex offender housed at a residential correctional facility is not required to register
simply because he meets the definition of “incarcerated” would render section
692A.103(1)(b) superfluous. See State v. Nicoletto, 845 N.W.2d. 421, 427 (Iowa
2014) (“[W]e interpret statutes in a manner to avoid absurd results and to avoid
rendering any part of an enactment superfluous.”) superseded by statute, 2014
Iowa Acts ch. 1114, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 709.15(f) (2015)). As the
district court stated,
The legislature clearly enacted Section 692A.103(1)(b) to ensure that those individuals who are given the benefit of early release to a residential facility must register with the sex offender registry as would any other individual with a similar conviction who has not been incarcerated would. To interpret the statute as [Wiles] suggests would clearly negate Section 692A.103(1)(b).
If section 692A.103(1)(b) were not sufficiently clear, the legislature also
stated, “Probation, Parole, work release, or any other form of release after
conviction shall not be granted unless the offender has registered as required
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1459 Filed November 12, 2015
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BYRON JOEL WILES, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Michael G.
Dieterich, District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals his conviction for failure to comply with sex offender
registration requirements. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ. 2
VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
Byron Wiles appeals his judgment and sentence for failure to comply with
sex offender registration procedures, in violation of Iowa Code sections 692A.104
and .111 (2013). He contends the evidence was insufficient to support the
district court’s finding of guilt.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The history leading up to Wiles’s present judgment is as follows. Wiles
pled guilty to third-degree sexual abuse and received a deferred judgment, which
was later revoked. In the revocation order, the district court imposed and
suspended a ten-year prison term, placed Wiles on probation, stated Wiles would
have to “register with the sheriff of the county of [his] residence . . . within five (5)
days of release from custody or placement on probation, parole, or work
release,” and required him to “complete all necessary sex offender registry forms
as directed.”
Wiles’s probation was later revoked. After serving time and receiving
parole, he registered as a sex offender. Wiles included a cell phone number on
the registration form. Wiles subsequently violated his parole and was placed on
work release at the Burlington Residential Correctional Facility, where he
completed two additional sex offender registration forms. Neither form listed a
cell phone number.
Residential facility employees found Wiles with a cell phone, in
contravention of facility rules. The phone had the same number as the number
listed on the original sex offender registration form. 3
The State charged Wiles with failure to “report relevant information on his
sex offender registration as defined in Iowa Code [section] 692A.101(23); to-wit,
a cell phone.” The case was tried to the court, which found him guilty. This
appeal followed.
II. Analysis
Wiles makes a two-pronged argument: (A) he “had no statutory duty to
update his registration since he was ‘incarcerated’ at the time and therefore
exempt” and (B) “[e]ven if he had such a duty, he was only required to report any
changes in his information.” Accordingly, in his view, the evidence was
insufficient to support the district court’s finding of guilt.
While styled a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, Wiles’s
argument is really a challenge to the district court’s interpretation of the relevant
statutory provisions in light of essentially undisputed facts. See State v. Romer,
832 N.W.2d 169, 179 (Iowa 2013) (focusing on whether language of statute
prohibited certain undisputed conduct); see also State v. West, No. 06-1316,
2007 WL 2963990, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2007) (noting West’s claim on
his motion for judgment of acquittal turned on a statutory interpretation issue);
State v. Wiley, No. 01-1458, 2002 WL 31309923, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 16,
2002) (“Although the issue before us is cast as whether there was sufficient
evidence to sustain a conviction . . . we believe the issue can at least as readily
be viewed as a challenge to the trial court’s interpretation and application of [the
pertinent statute].”). We review this statutory interpretation issue for errors of
law. Romer, 832 N.W.2d at 179. 4
A. Duty to Register
The first part of Wiles’s argument is premised on section 692A.103(2),
which states “[a] sex offender is not required to register while incarcerated.”
Wiles asserts he was “incarcerated” during his stay at the residential facility,
obviating the need to register and foreclosing prosecution and conviction for
failure to include the cell phone number on his second and third registration
forms. The State counters with a citation to section 692A.103(1)(b), which
requires registration “[f]rom the date of release on parole or work release.”
Wiles has the statutory definition of “incarcerated” on his side. Chapter
692A defines “incarcerated” as “to be imprisoned by placing a person in a jail,
prison, penitentiary, juvenile facility, or other correctional institution or facility or a
place or condition of confinement or forcible restraint regardless of the nature of
the institution in which the person serves a sentence for a conviction.”1 Iowa
Code § 692A.101(14) (emphasis added). It is true that the Burlington Residential
Correctional Facility is “not under the management of the department of
corrections.” See State v. Halverson, 857 N.W.2d 632, 638 (Iowa 2015).2
However, the residential correctional facility easily fits within the last broad
category of confinement listed in the definition of “incarcerated.” Accordingly, we
conclude Wiles was “incarcerated” within the meaning of Iowa Code section
692A.101(14).
1 Former versions of Iowa Code chapter 692A that imposed the duty to register distinguished “work release” from “residential treatment” and “any other release from custody.” See Iowa Code § 692A.2(1) (2007). 2 According to Wiles’s probation-parole officer, Wiles remained in the custody of the Iowa Department of Corrections while housed at the facility. 5
Wiles asks us to end our analysis here. But to hold that a work released
sex offender housed at a residential correctional facility is not required to register
simply because he meets the definition of “incarcerated” would render section
692A.103(1)(b) superfluous. See State v. Nicoletto, 845 N.W.2d. 421, 427 (Iowa
2014) (“[W]e interpret statutes in a manner to avoid absurd results and to avoid
rendering any part of an enactment superfluous.”) superseded by statute, 2014
Iowa Acts ch. 1114, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 709.15(f) (2015)). As the
district court stated,
The legislature clearly enacted Section 692A.103(1)(b) to ensure that those individuals who are given the benefit of early release to a residential facility must register with the sex offender registry as would any other individual with a similar conviction who has not been incarcerated would. To interpret the statute as [Wiles] suggests would clearly negate Section 692A.103(1)(b).
If section 692A.103(1)(b) were not sufficiently clear, the legislature also
stated, “Probation, Parole, work release, or any other form of release after
conviction shall not be granted unless the offender has registered as required
under this chapter.” See Iowa Code § 692A.109(2)(a) (emphasis added).
Together, these provisions unambiguously required Wiles to register as a sex
offender.
Wiles falls back on the rule of lenity, which requires strict construction of
criminal statutes in favor of the defendant. See State v. Hearn, 797 N.W.2d 577,
585 (Iowa 2011). Like the district court, we decline to read the definition of
“incarcerated” as injecting ambiguity into this analysis and as requiring strict
construction under the rule of lenity. Id. at 587 (“At a minimum, . . . our cases
stand for the proposition that the rule of lenity does not apply if there is no 6
ambiguity regarding the application of a statute to a given set of facts after
examination of the text, the context of the statute, and the evident statutory
purpose as reflected in the express statutory language.”). Sections
692A.103(1)(b) and 692A.109(2)(a) clearly require registration.
B. Duty to Update Information
In the alternative, Wiles argues section 692A.104, which Wiles was
charged with violating, only imposes an obligation to update changed
information, and his cell phone number did not change.3 At first glance, the
statutory language would appear to support this argument. Section 692A.104(3)
requires an offender to “notify the sheriff of the county where the principal
residence of the offender is maintained about the change to the relevant
information.” “Change” is defined as “to add, begin, or terminate.” Iowa Code
§ 692A.101(5). But Wiles’s argument ignores section 692A.104(8), which states
“the sex offender shall register by appearing in person . . . to verify the offender’s
arrival and relevant information.” Wiles concedes his cell phone number was
“relevant information.” Accordingly, section 692A.104(8) required verification of
the number. It is undisputed Wiles failed to do so.
Wiles may have believed his initial registration of the number was
sufficient. However, this court has refused to excuse non-compliance based on
an offender’s subjective misunderstanding of the requirements. See State v.
Dawson, No. 13-0792, 2015 WL 1546353, at *7-8 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2015).
3 The State did not charge Wiles with a violation of section 692A.108, which requires an offender “to verify the accuracy” of certain “relevant information.” See Iowa Code §§ 692A.108, .101(23)(a)(17). 7
Additionally, if this was his belief, it is undercut by the fact he re-registered other
unchanged information.
We conclude the district court did not err in interpreting the cited statutory
provisions on sex offender registration. To the extent Wiles challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s fact findings, we find substantial
evidence to support those fact findings. Accordingly, we affirm Wiles’s judgment
and sentence for failure to comply with the sex offender registration
requirements.
AFFIRMED.