State of Iowa v. Brittany Jo Ann Bailey

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: April 23, 2025
• Docket: 24-0620
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0620 Filed April 23, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BRITTANY JO ANN BAILEY, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clarke County,

Patrick W. Greenwood, Judge.

Brittany Jo Ann Bailey appeals the sentences imposed by the district court

after her convictions. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and

Chicchelly, JJ. 2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Brittany Jo Ann Bailey appeals the sentences imposed by the district court

after her convictions. Because the court did not abuse its discretion when

sentencing her, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

While executing a search warrant for stolen property at a home in Osceola,

the Clarke County Sheriff’s Department discovered a locked bedroom door with

“the odor of [m]arijuana emitting from it.” After obtaining a second search warrant,

the law enforcement officers searched the bedroom, in which they found drug

paraphernalia and quantities of marijuana and psilocybin mushrooms that were too

large for personal use and were individually packaged in varying smaller amounts

consistent with drug dealing. The owner of the house later testified that the

bedroom belonged to Bailey. The State charged Bailey with two counts of

possession with intent to deliver a schedule I controlled substance, two counts of

failure to affix drug tax stamps, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.

After a two-day trial, a jury convicted her as charged. The court ordered a

presentence investigation (PSI) and scheduled sentencing, but Bailey refused to

cooperate with the investigator and sign releases of information. Despite this, the

PSI investigator still recommended probation.

At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended incarceration, but Bailey

requested a deferred judgment and probation. The court denied Bailey’s request

for a deferred judgment and sentenced Bailey to indeterminate terms of

incarceration not to exceed five years on counts I, III, and IV; one year for count II;

and three days for count V. The court ordered the sentences for counts I and II to 3

run consecutively to each other and all other counts to run concurrently to counts I

and II. But the court suspended all incarceration and imposed probation. Bailey

appeals.

II. Review.

We give sentencing courts “broad discretion to impose the sentence it

determines is best suited to rehabilitate a defendant and protect society.” State v.

West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022). The discretion “to impose a

particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption

in its favor,” and we will only reverse for an abuse of discretion. State v. Formaro,

638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs when “the

decision was exercised on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or

unreasonable.” Id.

III. Sentencing Discretion.

Bailey contends the district court abused its sentencing discretion by

denying her a deferred judgment. She specifically cites the court’s “fail[ure] to

consider what three felony convictions would do to hinder her rehabilitation,” its

weighing of the mitigating factors, and its reliance on her failure to comply with the

PSI. “A district court must consider all relevant factors, including the ‘nature of the

offense, the attending circumstances, the defendant’s age, character and

propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform.’” West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d

at 355 (citation omitted). But sentencing is highly discretionary, and the

consideration of proper factors “will not always lead to the same sentence.”

Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. Upon our own review of the record, we do not find

any abuse of discretion. 4

The court expressly considered the mitigating factors Bailey cites and

“fashion[ed] a sentence that will give [her] the best chance” for rehabilitation.1 But

it also considered aggravating factors, such as her unwillingness to cooperate with

the PSI investigator and her previous criminal history, which did not convince the

court of her ability to be successful on probation:

Ms. Bailey, bluntly, I can’t think of any defendant that I have ever been involved with in the past that seemingly did as much as they could to sabotage the recommendation from the presentence investigator. You refused to cooperate fully with the investigator by not releasing information. . . . .... . . . What I read [in the PSI report] is someone who doesn’t want anything to do with probation.

Despite the court’s reservations, it still granted Bailey probation, but it denied her

a deferred judgment. To explain this decision, the court stated:

[D]ue to the nature and circumstances of the offenses that you have committed, I’m not going to grant a deferred judgment because I think that would unduly depreciate [sic] the seriousness of the offenses that you have committed . . . .

The consideration of these factors is not only proper, but it is required by statute.

See Iowa Code §§ 901.5, 907.5(1)(a)–(g) (2023); West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d

at 355 (“A defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for the offense, and a sincere

demonstration of remorse, are proper considerations in sentencing.” (citation

omitted)). And the mere fact that Bailey requested a different sentence is not an

abuse of discretion. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. Instead, it reflects “the

1 While the court expressly considered these factors in this case, we do note that

it was not required to. See State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (“We do not believe, however, it is required to specifically acknowledge each claim of mitigation urged by a defendant. Furthermore, the failure to acknowledge a particular sentencing circumstance does not necessarily mean it was not considered.”). 5

discretionary nature” of sentencing. Id. “Our task on appeal is not to second-guess

the sentencing court’s decision,” but to determine whether the court considered

some improper factor. State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020).

Because Bailey provides no indication that the court relied on an improper factor

or abused its discretion, we affirm her sentences.

IV. Disposition.

Because we find the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm

the sentences imposed.

AFFIRMED.