State of Iowa v. Bridgett Denise Kuebler

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: February 7, 2024
• Docket: 23-0100
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0100 Filed February 7, 2024

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BRIDGETT DENISE KUEBLER, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Erica Crisp, District

Associate Judge.

A defendant appeals her convictions for operating while intoxicated, second

offense, and child endangerment. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ella M. Newell, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ. 2

BADDING, Judge.

A passenger in a car traveling west on Interstate 235 (I-235) in Des Moines

called 911 to report a driver “swerving all over” with a “little kid in the front seat.”

The driver was Bridgett Kuebler, and the little kid was her six-year-old nephew.

She was stopped by police and charged with operating while intoxicated, second

offense, and child endangerment. After a jury trial, Kuebler was convicted of those

charges. She appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting both

convictions. In doing so, Kuebler asks us to step into the jury’s shoes as the fact

finder. Because that is not our role, and we find substantial evidence supporting

the jury’s verdicts, we affirm Kuebler’s convictions.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

On July 31, 2022—the one-year anniversary of her sister’s death—

Kuebler’s friends surprised her with brunch at a restaurant in Des Moines that

served bottomless Bloody Marys and mimosas. They got to the restaurant around

11:00 a.m. During their meal, Kuebler thought she had around four or five drinks,

but she said they weren’t very strong. She and her friends left the restaurant

around noon.

When Kuebler got back home, she waited for her nephew to be dropped off

by his mother, Maria, so that they could go visit his father in Fort Dodge. Maria got

to Kuebler’s house around 3:00 p.m. with the child. She went inside, talked to

Kuebler for fifteen or twenty minutes, and then left the child with her. Maria did not

see any signs that Kuebler was intoxicated. Kuebler packed up a few things to

take with her, grabbed some spring rolls to eat on the way, and headed out the

door. The child jumped in the front seat of the car. At first, Kuebler said that she 3

told him to get in the back. But then she thought that because they were sharing

food and stopping to pick up her fiancé in West Des Moines, the child would be

safe in the front until they got there. Kuebler made sure the child was buckled up,

although she did not have a booster seat for him, and left her house.

Kuebler got onto I-235, traveling west from Altoona toward her fiancé’s

place. As Kuebler went by the 42nd Street exit, her driving was noticed by Jessica

Scuffham—a passenger in a car that had just merged onto the interstate.

Scuffham testified that Kuebler’s car was “just kind of all over,” veering from “the

far left lane driving on the shoulder, and then back in the left lane . . . and cars

were just trying to get out of” the way. As they passed by Kuebler’s car, Scuffham

saw “a little boy in the front seat. . . . His head was barely above kind of where the

window starts.” Once she saw the child, Scuffham decided to call 911 to report

Kuebler’s driving.

During the call, Scuffham described Kuebler’s driving as she watched her

on the interstate: “Oh now she’s speeding way up. . . . Oh shit! She’s going off the

road. . . . . She was in the grass and got back on.” And then about thirty seconds

later, “Oh shit! She just hit the bridge. . . .” When the dispatcher asked whether

the car crashed, Scuffham replied, “No. She bounced back into the road, but she

almost hit a car.” About a minute later, Scuffham told the dispatcher that the car

was driving on the shoulder but got back on the interstate, cutting off a semi-truck

in the process. She also said that it looked like the car hit concrete medians

several times. Past the Booneville exit, Scuffham reported that Kuebler made a

U-turn on a highway median to head eastbound back toward West Des Moines. 4

After making the illegal U-turn, Kuebler was pulled over by West Des

Moines Police Officer Molly Brooker at 5:04 p.m. As Officer Brooker approached

Kuebler’s car, she noticed that Kuebler had food spilled on her lap and the child’s

seatbelt was fastened across his neck. She also noticed that Kuebler’s eyes were

bloodshot, her speech was slurred, and her responses to questions were slow.

Not long after Officer Brooker stopped Kuebler, Iowa State Trooper Brady

Clary arrived. Trooper Clary made the same observations as Officer Brooker,

though neither smelled alcohol when they were talking to Kuebler in her car. They

also did not see any damage to Kuebler’s car that would show she collided with

concrete medians. After Kuebler handed Trooper Clary a receipt instead of her

registration, he decided to bring her back to his car. When Kuebler got out of her

car, she didn’t seem to notice the food spilled on her lap. Once Kuebler was in his

car, Trooper Clary noticed the smell of alcohol on her breath. She denied drinking

any alcohol that day, though the trooper observed her “speech was slurred and

kind of thick-tongued.” Kuebler did admit that she made a U-turn but explained it

was because she had missed her exit.

Trooper Clary then began field sobriety testing. Kuebler passed the vertical-

gaze-nystagmus test but not the horizontal one, showing “a lack of smooth pursuit

in both eyes and distinct and sustained nystagmus in both eyes, so four out of six

clues of impairment,” according to Trooper Clary. He also saw a lack of

convergence in her left eye. During the test, Kuebler stopped Trooper Clary to tell

him that he “had a really neat fingerprint,” which he thought was strange and

showed her lack of focus. After Kuebler passed the Modified Romberg test, which

asks a person to tilt their head back and estimate the passage of thirty seconds, 5

the trooper decided to move her off the interstate to conduct the rest of the tests.

Trooper Clary saw four out of eight possible clues of impairment during the walk-

and-turn test and three out of four on the one-leg-stand test. Kuebler also had

trouble completing the preliminary breath test, blowing into it four times before a

reading was registered. Officer Brooker, who was observing the tests, testified

“[s]ober people don’t take it multiple times.”

Trooper Clary arrested Kuebler and transported her to the police station.

Once there, he asked her to take a DataMaster breath test. After Kuebler waited

for an attorney for more than an hour, she took the test at 7:40 p.m.—more than

two hours after she was stopped—and blew a .059.1 She was charged with

operating while intoxicated, second offense, and child endangerment. A jury

convicted Kuebler of both charges. She appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of

errors at law, giving high deference to the verdict. State v. Burns, 988

N.W.2d 352, 370 (Iowa 2023). In doing so, we view “the evidence ‘in the light most

favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn

from the evidence.’” State v. Ortiz, 905 N.W.2d 174, 180 (Iowa 2017) (citation

omitted). “Substantial evidence exists when the evidence ‘would convince a

rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v.

Buman, 955 N.W.2d 215, 219 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted).

1 Cf. Iowa Code § 321J.2(12)(a) (2022) (“The alcohol concentration established by

the results of an analysis of a specimen of the defendant’s . . . breath . . . withdrawn within two hours after the defendant was driving . . . is presumed to be the alcohol concentration at the time of driving . . . .”). 6

III. Analysis

To find Kuebler guilty of operating while intoxicated, the jury was instructed

that the State was required to prove both of the following: “1. On or about July 31,

2022, Ms. Kuebler operated a motor vehicle. 2. At that time, Ms. Kuebler was

under the influence of alcohol.” The jury was further instructed that

[a] person is “under the influence” when, by drinking liquor and/or beer, one or more of the following is true: 1. Her reason or mental ability has been affected. 2. Her judgment is impaired. 3. Her emotions are visibly excited. 4. She has, to any extent, lost control of bodily actions or motions.

Kuebler’s conduct and demeanor were accordingly important considerations in

determining whether she was operating while intoxicated. See State v. White,

No. 19-0784, 2020 WL 3569581, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 1, 2020); see also State

v. Orr, No. 05-1864, 2006 WL 2419198, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2006) (“A

person may be found guilty under section 321J.2(1)(a) in the absence of

admissible evidence from chemical tests.”).

Within this framework, Kuebler claims the “State did not prove any of these

factors by substantial evidence.” She offers different explanations for the signs of

impairment observed by the 911 caller and the officers at the scene, including that

she missed her exit because of a song she heard on the radio that had played at

her sister’s funeral, “traffic conditions made it more difficult for [her] to make that

exit,” and the caller’s claim that she hit a median was “outlandish and easily

disproven.” But the “existence of evidence which might support a different verdict

does not negate the existence of substantial evidence sufficient to support the

verdict in this case.” State v. Brandt, No. 05-0368, 2006 WL 334245, at *3 (Iowa 7

Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2006) (citing State v. Frake, 450 N.W.2d 817, 818–19

(Iowa 1990)).

That substantial evidence includes the observations of both Officer Brooker

and Trooper Clary that Kuebler’s eyes were bloodshot, watery, and droopy, and

her speech was slurred or “thick-tongued.” They also noticed that her responses

were slow and delayed. And Trooper Clary smelled alcohol on her breath when

he brought her back to his car. So while Kuebler claims the videos from the stop

show that she was calm and cooperative, “asked reasonable and logical questions,

and could speak coherently,” the in-person observations by Officer Brooker and

Trooper Clary are better indicators of these signs of impairment. See State v.

Walter, No. 21-0446, 2022 WL 610571, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2022). Based

on those observations, both of the trained officers concluded that Kuebler was

under the influence of alcohol. See State v. Shannon, No. 17-0717, 2018 WL

1182561, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2018) (finding that an officer’s observation

of signs of impairment provides substantial evidence the subject was under the

influence); State v. Blake, No. 15-1771, 2016 WL 4384253, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

Aug. 17, 2016) (“The court may also consider an officer’s opinion regarding

another person’s sobriety.”).

Trooper Clary also concluded that Kuebler failed several of the field sobriety

tests. See State v. Bunce, No. 13-1024, 2014 WL 1494961, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

Apr. 16, 2014) (“Field sobriety tests allow officers to assess whether a driver is

under the influence of alcohol.”). Kuebler argues the videos do not show her losing

her balance, stopping while walking, or keeping her arms up, like the trooper 8

testified.2 The jury, however, was able to watch the videos and draw its own

conclusions. It is not our role on appeal “to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to

pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of explanations,

or to weigh the evidence,” as Kuebler would have us do here. State v. Musser, 721

N.W.2d 758, 761 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted). At any rate, the videos support

Trooper Clary’s testimony about Kuebler’s performance on the tests. See Walter,

2022 WL 610571, at *3 (discussing video evidence supporting a deputy’s

observations of the defendant’s speech and mannerisms).

We have also considered Kuebler’s admission that she performed a U-turn

on the interstate—an illegal and dangerous maneuver according to Trooper

Clary—with a six-year-old child in the front seat. See State v. Van Cleave,

No. 12-0041, 2013 WL 3458192, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 10, 2013) (stating a

person’s “manner of driving is relevant” in determining whether the person is under

the influence of alcohol). And although she initially denied having anything to drink

that day, Kuebler eventually admitted that she had four or five Bloody Marys and

mimosas at lunch with her friends. See id. (finding the defendant’s admission that

“she had been drinking, the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage about her, and

2 Kuebler also argues for the first time on appeal that the horizontal-gaze- nystagmus test was improperly administered because Trooper Clary did not hold his finger still for the required time. But the only video exhibit with a view of the test being given is the inward facing dashcam video from Trooper Clary’s car. This video is not clear, and it is not obvious whether Trooper Clary moved his finger too quickly. In any event, as the State points out, “any inconsistencies in administering the field sobriety tests affect the weight to be accorded to the results, rather than their admissibility.” State v. Quintero-Labrada, No. 19-0544, 2020 WL 6482726, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2020) (citation omitted). 9

her watery and bloodshot eyes indicated that her impairment was the result of

consumption of alcohol”).

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find

substantial evidence from which a rational fact finder could conclude Kuebler was

under the influence of alcohol while operating a motor vehicle.

The same evidence supports the jury’s guilty verdict on the child-

endangerment charge. For this offense, the jury was instructed that the State had

to prove all of the following:

1. On or about July 31, 2022, Ms. Kuebler was the person having custody or control over [the child]. 2. [The child] was under the age of fourteen. 3. Ms. Kuebler acted with knowledge that she was creating a substantial risk to [the child’s] physical, mental, or emotional health or safety.

Kuebler only challenges the final element, arguing that because she “honestly

believed that she was safe to operate a motor vehicle,” she did not “knowingly act

in a way that created a substantial risk of harm.”

But Kuebler admitted that she had four or five alcoholic drinks before driving

on the interstate with her nephew. See State v. Schrock, No. 09-0631, 2010

WL 624911, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2010) (finding the defendant knowingly

acted in a manner that created a substantial risk to his son after he admitted

drinking three or four beers before taking his son on an ATV ride). Whether

Kuebler thought she was drunk or not, two law enforcement officials immediately

noticed signs of impairment when she was stopped. And Kuebler must have been

concerned about her level of intoxication because she at first denied drinking that

day. See State v. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Iowa 2005) (“[T]he defendant’s 10

knowledge may be proved not only by direct evidence, but also by reasonable

inferences drawn from the circumstances surrounding the accident.”). She also,

in Trooper Clary’s opinion, tried to cheat the preliminary breath test by blowing into

it incorrectly. A reasonable inference from this evidence is that Kuebler knew she

might not have been safe to drive. See id. (“It is the appreciation of the risk to the

child or minor posed by one’s conduct that creates criminal culpability under this

statute.”).

While Kuebler agreed on cross-examination that her nephew would have

been safer in the back seat, on appeal she argues that letting him sit up front did

not create a substantial risk to his safety. The jury was instructed that in Iowa,

there “is no law requiring a child who is at least six years of age to sit in the back

seat of a vehicle.” But the instruction also stated that front seat occupants of a

vehicle, including “a child that is at least six years of age,” “shall each wear a

properly adjusted and fastened safety belt or safety harness any time the vehicle

is in forward motion on a street or highway in this state.” Both Officer Brooker and

Trooper Clary stated the child’s safety belt was not properly adjusted because it

was over his neck. Officer Brooker explained the danger: “if they were in an

accident, that seat belt . . . would have clamped down on his neck, or it wouldn’t

have stopped him at all from sliding out from underneath it or going over it.” See

State v. Anspach, 627 N.W.2d 227, 234 (Iowa 2001) (finding sufficient evidence of

child endangerment when the defendant drove recklessly with young children who

were not properly secured in safety seats).

Regardless of the child’s position in the car, a rational fact finder could

conclude under this record that erratically driving a motor vehicle on an interstate 11

at high speeds while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage created a

substantial risk to the child’s safety. See Schrock, 2010 WL 624911, at *2; see

also State v. Caskey, 539 N.W.2d 176, 177 (Iowa 1995) (stating that a defendant

who drove “her car with the children in it while she was intoxicated was neglectful

of her natural and legal duty to not expose them to the hazard of injury or death”

in a prosecution for neglect of a dependent person); State v. Friend, 630

N.W.2d 843, 845 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001) (quoting People v. Cruz, 576 N.Y.S.2d

978, 981 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) for the proposition that “‘it takes little imagination’

to recognize harm to children implicit in driving them while intoxicated”).

For these reasons, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support

Kuebler’s convictions for operating while intoxicated, second offense, and child

endangerment.

AFFIRMED.