State of Iowa v. Brandon Lee Nelson

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: May 7, 2025
• Docket: 23-2064
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-2064 Filed May 7, 2025

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BRANDON LEE NELSON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Justin Lightfoot, Judge.

A defendant appeals his convictions and sentence. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ella M. Newell, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Benjamin Parrott, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and

Buller, JJ. 2

AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

After driving at excessive speeds back and forth on the same stretch of city

street while multiple police officers tried to stop him, Brandon Nelson eventually

stopped the car. He got out of the car brandishing a shotgun and chambered a

round as two officers yelled at him to drop the gun. Instead, Nelson pointed the

shotgun at the officers, both of whom fired their handguns at Nelson. At the same

time he was struck by the officers’ bullets and began to fall, Nelson fired the

shotgun. Because he was starting to fall when he pulled the trigger of the shotgun,

the shotgun blast did not strike the officers. Officers immediately rendered aid to

Nelson, who survived the shooting.

The State charged Nelson with thirteen crimes related to the incidents. 1 At

his jury trial, Nelson defended the charges that required proof of intent by arguing

he did not intend to harm or shoot any police officers. He claimed he was trying to

kill himself, was unwilling or unable to do so himself, and tried to bait police officers

into an encounter that would cause them to shoot and kill him—a situation

sometimes colloquially referred to as “suicide by cop.” The jury rejected Nelson’s

argument and found him guilty of all thirteen charges. The district court sentenced

him to sixty-two years in prison by running the sentences for eight of the charges

consecutively to each other and the sentences for the remaining five concurrently

1 The trial information charged Nelson with one count of attempted murder of a

peace officer (count 1); two counts of intimidation with a dangerous weapon (counts 2–3); three counts of assault on a peace officer while using or displaying a dangerous weapon (counts 4–6); two counts of interference with official acts while armed with a firearm (counts 7–8); going armed with intent (count 9); eluding while exceeding the speed limit by twenty-five miles per hour or more, second offense (count 10); driving while barred (count 11); persons ineligible to carry dangerous weapons (count 12); and reckless driving (count 13). 3

to each other and to the other eight.

Nelson appeals. He contends the evidence is insufficient to support his

convictions for (1) assault on a peace officer while using or displaying a dangerous

weapon (count 6); (2) interference with official acts while armed with a firearm

(count 7); (3) going armed with intent (count 9); and (4) attempted murder of a

peace officer (count 1). He also contends the district court abused its discretion in

sentencing him because it did not adequately weigh Nelson’s claimed expressions

of remorse. We address these contentions in turn.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence for correction of errors

at law. State v. Cook, 996 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Iowa 2023). The jury’s verdict will be

upheld if supported by substantial evidence. Id. Evidence is considered

substantial if it could convince a rational fact finder of the defendant’s guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt. Id. “In determining whether the jury’s verdict is supported by

substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,

including all ‘legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and

reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.’” State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d

189, 202 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted).

A. Assault on a Peace Officer While Using or Displaying a

Dangerous Weapon (Count 6)

Count 6 charging assault on a peace officer while using or displaying a

dangerous weapon relates to events occurring before Nelson stopped his vehicle

and the armed encounter ensued. It is based on the claim that Nelson swerved

his vehicle at the vehicle of one of the officers trying to stop him. The district court 4

gave the jury a marshaling instruction on this charge, which required the state to

prove:

1. On or about July 30, 2022, in Linn County, Iowa, the defendant: a. Intentionally displayed a dangerous weapon in a threatening manner towards [the officer], as explained in [a later instruction], or b. Did an act which was specifically intended to: i. Cause pain or injury to [the officer], coupled with the apparent ability to do the act, or ii. Result in physical contact which was insulting or offensive to [the officer], coupled with the apparent ability to do the act, or iii. Place [the officer] in fear of immediate physical contact which would have been painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive to [the officer], coupled with the apparent ability to do the act; 2. The act was done using or displaying a dangerous weapon, as defined in [a later instruction]; and 3. When the defendant acted, he knew [the officer] was a peace officer acting in his official capacity.

Nelson did not object to this marshaling instruction, so it is the law of the case for

the purpose of assessing his sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge.2 See State v.

Schwartz, 7 N.W.3d 756, 764 (Iowa 2024).

Nelson challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

specific intent aspect of element (1)(b). He argues his sole purpose was not to

harm anyone, but simply to attract police attention through reckless driving.

Evidence at trial showed Nelson was speeding through city streets at over

ninety miles per hour. Officers were notified by an ambulance crew that they had

nearly been hit head-on by a vehicle matching the description of the one Nelson

was driving. Nelson’s driving was so reckless that officers were instructed to end

2 The same is true about the marshaling instruction for each of the other counts to

which Nelson has raised a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. As such, this principle applies to those counts as well, but for brevity’s sake, we will not repeat it for each challenge. 5

the pursuit at one point in the interest of public and officer safety.

One of the officers trying to apprehend Nelson was driving in the left-most

lane in his direction of travel when Nelson’s vehicle approached from the opposite

direction at over ninety miles per hour. As Nelson’s vehicle approached, Nelson

swerved his vehicle into the officer’s lane, causing the officer to take evasive action

by swerving to the right to avoid the collision. The officer testified that Nelson’s

action caused him fear, and the officer believed he would have been killed had he

not taken evasive action.

Nelson contends this evidence is insufficient to demonstrate a specific intent

to assault the officer by claiming the dash camera video from the officer’s vehicle

shows Nelson in his own lane and does not support the officer’s account.

However, the jury viewed the video and evidently found the officer’s testimony

credible. Based on our review of the video, the jury could reasonably conclude

that Nelson veered toward the officer’s vehicle. At the very least, the video does

not conclusively contradict the officer’s testimony, as Nelson claims. It is the jury’s

responsibility to resolve the conflicts in and weigh the evidence, not ours. See

State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 256 (Iowa 2022).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, see Crawford, 972 N.W.2d

at 202, the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude Nelson acted

with the specific intent to place the officer in fear of immediate physical contact that

would have been painful or injurious. As this was the only element Nelson

contests, we reject his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction for assault on a peace officer while using or displaying a dangerous

weapon as charged in count 6. 6

B. Interference with Official Acts While Armed with a Firearm

(Count 7)

This count stems from Nelson’s actions immediately following the stop of

his vehicle. The district court gave a marshaling instruction to the jury requiring

the State to prove:

1. On or about July 30, 2022, in Linn Couty, Iowa, the defendant knew that [the person who stopped him] was a peace officer who was acting in the official capacity of a peace officer; 2. The defendant knowingly resisted or obstructed [the person] in her official acts; and 3. The defendant was armed with a firearm, as explained in [a later instruction].

On appeal, Nelson limits his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

the second element. He focuses his argument on parsing the timing of when the

two officers at the scene yelled at him to drop the shotgun he was pointing at them,

contending he didn’t have enough time to comply with the command of the specific

officer identified in the marshaling instruction before he was shot.

We reject Nelson’s argument for two reasons. First, the timing of the

commands to drop his shotgun are largely irrelevant on these facts. A reasonable

juror could conclude Nelson resisted and obstructed the officer’s official act of

conducting a traffic stop by pointing his shotgun at her irrespective of whether any

command to drop it was given. Second, Nelson’s argument ignores his actions

before he raised the shotgun. By brandishing a shotgun in a threatening manner

while exiting his vehicle following a traffic stop, plus chambering a round as he did

so, a reasonable juror could conclude Nelson resisted or obstructed the officer’s

official act of conducting the traffic stop even before he raised it to point at the

officers. See State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 293–95 (Iowa 1996) (finding 7

interference with official acts to be a general-intent crime and affirming a conviction

when the defendant exited his home with a loaded gun while officers were

investigating a disturbance). We find substantial evidence supporting Nelson’s

conviction of interference with official acts while armed with a firearm as charged

in count 7, so we reject Nelson’s challenge to his conviction for this crime.

C. Going Armed with Intent (Count 9) & Attempted Murder of a

Peace Officer (Count 1)

We review Nelson’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges for going armed

with intent (count 9) and attempted murder of a peace officer (count 1) together,

as both raise essentially the same challenge based on the same argument. For

the going-armed-with-intent charge, the marshaling instruction required the State

to prove:

1. On or about July 30, 2022, in Linn County, Iowa, the defendant was armed with a firearm as defined in [a later instruction]; 2. The firearm was a dangerous weapon as defined in [a later instruction]; 3. The defendant was armed with the specific intent to shoot another person; and 4. While armed with the firearm, the defendant moved from one place to another.

For the attempted-murder-of-a-peace-officer charge, the marshaling instruction

required the State to prove:

1. On or about July 30, 2022, in Linn County, Iowa, the [d]efendant aimed a firearm at [the specified officer]; 2. By his acts, the defendant expected to set in motion a force or chain of events which would cause or result in the death of [the specified officer]; 3. When defendant acted, he specifically intended to cause the death of [the specified officer]; 4. When the defendant acted, he knew [the specified person] was a peace officer acting in his official capacity. 8

Nelson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the third element of

the going-armed-with-intent charge and the second and third elements of the

attempted-murder-of-a-peace-officer charge. In essence, Nelson’s argument is

that he lacked any intent to shoot another person and he did not intend to cause

the specified officer’s death. Nelson supports this argument by pointing to his

testimony and the testimony of his forensic-psychologist expert. In their testimony,

Nelson and his expert painted a picture of Nelson suffering from long-term

depression with a history of suicide attempts. Nelson testified as to his plan to kill

himself that night with the shotgun, but he could not bring himself to do it. So, he

decided on suicide by cop. He testified that he drove as he did to lure the police

into stopping him, with the plan that he would then confront them, forcing them to

respond with deadly force. He testified he had no intent to shoot or harm anyone

but himself. Based on this narrative, Nelson contends the evidence was

insufficient to prove he intended to shoot anyone or to kill the specified officer.

There are three dispositive flaws in Nelson’s argument. First, accepting his

arguments would require us to ignore the jury’s verdict and replace it with our own

determination of the facts. This is not something we are permitted to do in

assessing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. See Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d at

256 (“It is not our place ‘to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the

credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh

the evidence; such matters are for the jury.’” (quoting State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d

758, 761 (Iowa 2006))).

Second, Nelson’s argument assumes that the jury had to believe his

testimony and the testimony of his expert. Of course, the jury had no such 9

obligation. The jurors were free to believe or disbelieve any of the testimony and

assign weight to it as they saw fit. State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa

1993). After doing so, they found Nelson guilty of both crimes. The jury had no

obligation to believe Nelson’s narrative that he was trying to commit suicide by cop.

Reasonable jurors could have chosen not to believe Nelson’s narrative and simply

rely on the video and testimonial evidence to conclude that Nelson got out of his

car with a shotgun, chambered a round, pointed it at the police because he

intended to shoot and kill them, and the only reason he failed is because the police

shot him first. These are all fair inferences from the evidence, and we are required

to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all legitimate

inferences that can be fairly and reasonably deduced from the evidence. Brimmer,

983 N.W.2d at 256.

Third, Nelson’s argument ignores the fact that, even if the jury believed his

narrative, intending to provoke officers into shooting him and intending to shoot

and kill police officers are not mutually exclusive. The whole premise of Nelson’s

narrative is that he wanted to provoke a lethal response from the police officers.

One way to do that would be to shoot and kill one or more of them. Just as

importantly, a reasonable juror could have disbelieved Nelson’s narrative. As the

State accurately argues:

If Nelson did not intend to shoot, he did not need to load his gun. Further, even if he loaded the gun, he did not need to work the action. Even if he worked the action, he did not need to deactivate the safety. Even if he deactivated safety, he did not need to place his finger on the trigger. 10

A reasonable juror could conclude that Nelson did all these things because he

intended to shoot and kill at least one police officer, irrespective of whether he

hoped police officers would respond with lethal fire.

The State presented substantial evidence satisfying the challenged

elements of the going-armed-with-intent and attempted-murder-of-a-peace-officer

charges. As such, Nelson’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges to those

charges fail.

II. Sentencing Discretion

Nelson contends that the district court abused its discretion by citing his

failure to accept responsibility as a factor in the sentencing determination. As the

sentence falls within the statutory parameters, it is presumed valid and will only be

overturned if there was an abuse of discretion or reliance on inappropriate factors.

State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 554 (Iowa 2015).

Before imposing a sentence, the district court must consider the defendant’s

age, criminal record, employment history, family circumstances, mental-health and

substance-use history, the nature of the offense, and other appropriate facts. State

v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020). Among the permissible

considerations is a defendant’s lack of remorse. State v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83,

88 (Iowa 2005).

Although Nelson stated that he had accepted a “lot of responsibility” for his

actions during his allocution, he subsequently refused to accept responsibility for

the attempted murder of the officer. The district court acknowledged Nelson’s

expressions of remorse but could not ignore his explicit denial of responsibility for

endangering the officer’s life. See id. (“We conclude that a defendant’s lack of 11

remorse is highly pertinent to evaluating his need for rehabilitation and his

likelihood of reoffending.”). The district court conducted a comprehensive analysis

of several appropriate factors, both aggravating and mitigating, before arriving at

its sentencing decision. Nelson’s argument is essentially a request that we

independently consider his level of remorse and give it greater weight than the

district court to reach a different sentencing determination. But that is not our role.

We do not second-guess sentencing decisions, and we afford sentencing judges

significant latitude due to the discretionary nature of sentencing. Damme, 944

N.W.2d at 106. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing

decision, so we reject Nelson’s sentencing challenge.

III. Conclusion

Substantial evidence supports Nelson’s convictions for assault on a peace

officer while using or displaying a dangerous weapon, interference with official acts

while armed with a firearm, going armed with intent, and attempted murder of a

peace officer. The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Nelson.

Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.