IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0279 Filed March 3, 2021
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BRADLEY STEVEN GRAHAM, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David Porter, Judge.
Bradley Graham appeals the judgment finding him guilty of two counts of
forgery and one count of third-degree theft. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Ahlers, JJ. 2
AHLERS, Judge.
On June 10, 2019, Bradley Graham entered a branch of a credit union to
cash a check. Graham had an account at the credit union and was known to the
tellers. The check Graham presented was made payable to Graham in the amount
of $995.56 and purported to be drawn on the account of “Fawn Manufactering.”
Despite the spelling error and other facial issues with the check,1 a teller cashed it
for Graham.
About four hours later, Graham returned to the credit union and presented
a second check to cash to the same teller. The second check was in the same
amount as the first and appeared to be identical in all respects except the second
check bore a check number one number higher than the first. The teller became
suspicious of the similarities between the checks, finding it particularly odd that the
same customer would have a second check for an identical amount dated on the
same date. The teller took the second check to the credit union manager.
The manager determined both checks were counterfeit and confronted
Graham. During their conversation, Graham stated the checks were payment for
landscaping work he had done and the sequential check numbers had to do with
back pay he was owed. The manager learned Graham had already spent the cash
received from cashing the first check. When Graham was informed the credit
union would not cash the second check and he would need to reimburse the credit
union for the proceeds of the first check, Graham agreed to a repayment plan.
1The teller noted the check was “a little off,” but it “didn’t really raise a flag.” Closer scrutiny of the check later revealed it had mismatched routing numbers, fonts of different sizes, and lighter printing on some areas. 3
However, after being allowed to leave, Graham did not return to the credit union.
He did not reimburse the credit union and did not contact the manager. The
manager contacted the police.
Police investigation revealed Graham had been employed by Fawn
Manufacturing for about one month approximately two years prior to the dates on
the checks. Graham did not do any landscaping or other work for Fawn in 2019,
and Fawn did not owe him any back pay.
Graham was charged with two counts of forgery and one count of theft in
the third degree. The jury found Graham guilty as charged. Graham appeals,
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on all three counts.
I. Issues Presented
Regarding the forgery counts, Graham asserts there is insufficient evidence
to establish he knew the checks were altered or created without permission of the
account holder. Regarding the theft count, he asserts there is insufficient evidence
to establish he knowingly deceived the credit union when presenting the first
check.
II. Standard of Review
Claims of insufficiency of the evidence are reviewed for correction of errors
at law. State v. Benson, 919 N.W.2d 237, 241 (Iowa 2018). “We will uphold the
verdict on a sufficiency-of-evidence claim if substantial evidence supports it.” State
v. Schiebout, 944 N.W.2d 666, 670 (Iowa 2020). “Evidence is substantial ‘if, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it can convince a rational jury that
the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting State v. Trane,
934 N.W.2d 447, 455 (Iowa 2019)). “In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of 4
evidence supporting a guilty verdict, courts consider all of the record evidence
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences
that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.” State v. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 693, 704
(Iowa 2016) (quoting State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012)).
III. Discussion
Graham challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
knowledge element of each charge: with respect to the forgery charges, the
requirement that he “knew the check was altered or created without the permission
of the account holder”; and with respect to the theft charge the requirement that he
“knowingly deceived the credit union by uttering the check.”2
Graham bases his challenge on the fact there was no direct evidence he
knew of the counterfeit nature of the checks. He claims the State’s evidence of his
knowledge amounts to no more than “speculation, suspicion and conjecture.” See
State v. Schlitter, 881 N.W.2d 380, 389 (Iowa 2016) (noting substantial evidence
requires a fair inference of guilt and “not merely suspicion, speculation, or
conjecture”).
While Graham might be right that there was no direct evidence of his
knowledge, there is ample circumstantial evidence. See State v. Ernst, ___
N.W.2d. ___, ___, 2021 WL 297250, at *5 (Iowa 2021) (recognizing direct and
circumstantial evidence as equally probative). “Knowledge is seldom capable of
2 Because these are the definitions the court provided in the jury marshaling instructions, and Graham did not object, they are law of the case. See State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Iowa 2009) (holding when no objection to instructions is made at trial, “the jury instructions become the law of the case for purposes of our review of the record for sufficiency of the evidence”). 5
direct proof but is usually inferred from surrounding circumstances.” State v.
Boose, 202 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1972). The surrounding circumstances in this
case provide proof of Graham’s knowledge that goes beyond mere suspicion,
speculation, or conjecture.
Graham presented two sequentially-numbered checks dated the same day
in the same amount. A rational jury could conclude this should have raised the
same suspicions of authenticity of the checks to Graham as they did to the teller,
negating Graham’s suggestion that he was unaware of the counterfeit nature of
the checks. Additionally, Graham presented one check, was successful in cashing
it, and returned to cash the identically-dated second check. A rational jury could
view this sequence of events as a calculated plan by Graham to do a test run with
the first check, and, having success with the test run, return to cash the second
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0279 Filed March 3, 2021
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BRADLEY STEVEN GRAHAM, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David Porter, Judge.
Bradley Graham appeals the judgment finding him guilty of two counts of
forgery and one count of third-degree theft. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Ahlers, JJ. 2
AHLERS, Judge.
On June 10, 2019, Bradley Graham entered a branch of a credit union to
cash a check. Graham had an account at the credit union and was known to the
tellers. The check Graham presented was made payable to Graham in the amount
of $995.56 and purported to be drawn on the account of “Fawn Manufactering.”
Despite the spelling error and other facial issues with the check,1 a teller cashed it
for Graham.
About four hours later, Graham returned to the credit union and presented
a second check to cash to the same teller. The second check was in the same
amount as the first and appeared to be identical in all respects except the second
check bore a check number one number higher than the first. The teller became
suspicious of the similarities between the checks, finding it particularly odd that the
same customer would have a second check for an identical amount dated on the
same date. The teller took the second check to the credit union manager.
The manager determined both checks were counterfeit and confronted
Graham. During their conversation, Graham stated the checks were payment for
landscaping work he had done and the sequential check numbers had to do with
back pay he was owed. The manager learned Graham had already spent the cash
received from cashing the first check. When Graham was informed the credit
union would not cash the second check and he would need to reimburse the credit
union for the proceeds of the first check, Graham agreed to a repayment plan.
1The teller noted the check was “a little off,” but it “didn’t really raise a flag.” Closer scrutiny of the check later revealed it had mismatched routing numbers, fonts of different sizes, and lighter printing on some areas. 3
However, after being allowed to leave, Graham did not return to the credit union.
He did not reimburse the credit union and did not contact the manager. The
manager contacted the police.
Police investigation revealed Graham had been employed by Fawn
Manufacturing for about one month approximately two years prior to the dates on
the checks. Graham did not do any landscaping or other work for Fawn in 2019,
and Fawn did not owe him any back pay.
Graham was charged with two counts of forgery and one count of theft in
the third degree. The jury found Graham guilty as charged. Graham appeals,
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on all three counts.
I. Issues Presented
Regarding the forgery counts, Graham asserts there is insufficient evidence
to establish he knew the checks were altered or created without permission of the
account holder. Regarding the theft count, he asserts there is insufficient evidence
to establish he knowingly deceived the credit union when presenting the first
check.
II. Standard of Review
Claims of insufficiency of the evidence are reviewed for correction of errors
at law. State v. Benson, 919 N.W.2d 237, 241 (Iowa 2018). “We will uphold the
verdict on a sufficiency-of-evidence claim if substantial evidence supports it.” State
v. Schiebout, 944 N.W.2d 666, 670 (Iowa 2020). “Evidence is substantial ‘if, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it can convince a rational jury that
the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting State v. Trane,
934 N.W.2d 447, 455 (Iowa 2019)). “In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of 4
evidence supporting a guilty verdict, courts consider all of the record evidence
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences
that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.” State v. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 693, 704
(Iowa 2016) (quoting State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012)).
III. Discussion
Graham challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
knowledge element of each charge: with respect to the forgery charges, the
requirement that he “knew the check was altered or created without the permission
of the account holder”; and with respect to the theft charge the requirement that he
“knowingly deceived the credit union by uttering the check.”2
Graham bases his challenge on the fact there was no direct evidence he
knew of the counterfeit nature of the checks. He claims the State’s evidence of his
knowledge amounts to no more than “speculation, suspicion and conjecture.” See
State v. Schlitter, 881 N.W.2d 380, 389 (Iowa 2016) (noting substantial evidence
requires a fair inference of guilt and “not merely suspicion, speculation, or
conjecture”).
While Graham might be right that there was no direct evidence of his
knowledge, there is ample circumstantial evidence. See State v. Ernst, ___
N.W.2d. ___, ___, 2021 WL 297250, at *5 (Iowa 2021) (recognizing direct and
circumstantial evidence as equally probative). “Knowledge is seldom capable of
2 Because these are the definitions the court provided in the jury marshaling instructions, and Graham did not object, they are law of the case. See State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Iowa 2009) (holding when no objection to instructions is made at trial, “the jury instructions become the law of the case for purposes of our review of the record for sufficiency of the evidence”). 5
direct proof but is usually inferred from surrounding circumstances.” State v.
Boose, 202 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1972). The surrounding circumstances in this
case provide proof of Graham’s knowledge that goes beyond mere suspicion,
speculation, or conjecture.
Graham presented two sequentially-numbered checks dated the same day
in the same amount. A rational jury could conclude this should have raised the
same suspicions of authenticity of the checks to Graham as they did to the teller,
negating Graham’s suggestion that he was unaware of the counterfeit nature of
the checks. Additionally, Graham presented one check, was successful in cashing
it, and returned to cash the identically-dated second check. A rational jury could
view this sequence of events as a calculated plan by Graham to do a test run with
the first check, and, having success with the test run, return to cash the second
Additionally, Graham’s conduct during his interview with the credit union
manager supports a finding Graham knew of the counterfeit nature of the checks.
First, there is the issue of Graham’s story about the checks. Graham told the
manager the checks were for landscaping work he had done. His explanation for
having the second check was that it was for back pay he was owed. However, the
evidence at trial established Graham had not worked at Fawn Manufacturing for
over two years, was owed no back pay, and had done no landscaping work for
Fawn Manufacturing. Based on this evidence, a rational jury could conclude
Graham was weaving a false story about the checks and he was doing so because
he knew the checks were fraudulent. See Ernst, 2021 WL 297250, at *4 (“[A] false
story told by a defendant to explain or deny a material fact against him is by itself 6
an indication of guilt and . . . is relevant to show that the defendant fabricated
evidence to aid his defense.” (citation omitted)).
Second, there is Graham’s reaction when confronted with the information
the checks were counterfeit. If, as Graham suggests, he thought the checks were
legitimate, a rational jury might expect Graham to express surprise that the checks
were counterfeit and insist on calling the issuer of the checks to try to determine
why there was a problem with the checks and how the issuer was going to
reimburse him. Graham did not do that or anything like it. Instead, Graham readily
agreed to reimburse the credit union for the cash received in return for the first
check. A rational jury could conclude Graham’s reaction to being informed of the
counterfeit nature of the checks implied he already knew the checks were not
authentic. See State v. Thomas, 847 N.W.2d 438, 446 (Iowa 2014) (noting a
defendant’s reaction to events may imply guilty knowledge in assessing the
sufficiency of the evidence when knowledge is at issue).
IV. Conclusion
When viewing the record as a whole in the light most favorable to the State,
we find substantial evidence for a jury to conclude Graham knew the checks were
“altered or created without permission of the account holder,” and Graham
“knowingly deceived the credit union” by cashing the first check. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.